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A B S T R A C T

The thesis is concerned with the relationship between the household economy and capitalism in Southeastern Turkey. It is argued in the thesis that capitalism develops unevenly and that regional underdevelopment is a spatial reflection of uneven development in capitalism. In Turkey the State tries to ensure a continuous process of capital accumulation, and in Diyarbakir province the main contributor to this process is the peasant household through the loss of its surplus product and surplus labour. The exploitation of peasants does not take place in the form of capital-wage labour relations. Instead, peasant production in Southeastern Turkey has gradually become commoditised, with unfavourable market conditions ensuring the appropriation of the surplus of the peasant household by merchants and the State. The impoverishment of the peasant household is intensified through their exploitation by landlords and usurers. Migration from the village becomes inevitable for the poor, either permanently or temporarily. Capitalism benefits from this cheap labour, part of whose subsistence is met by the peasant households. It is the self-exploitation of the household members, mainly in the form of women's labour, which makes this cheap labour force available for the use of urban-based capitalism.

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ASPECTS OF RURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY
The Household Economy in
Gisgis and Kalhana

ZÜLKÜF AYDIN

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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University of Durham
Department of Sociology and Social Policy

Durham 1980

16 JAN 1984

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P R E F A C E

The thesis is based on fieldwork carried out in 1977 in the Southeast region of Turkey. Most of the fieldwork data was collected in Gısgıs and Kalhana villages of Ergani District in the province of Diyarbakır. I selected the Southeastern region because it was one of the most underdeveloped regions in Turkey. By studying the household economy I hoped to be able to indicate some interrelationships between the household as a unit of production and reproduction and capitalist development, and therefore also regional underdevelopment in Turkey.

I began my fieldwork by administering a questionnaire for each household in the two villages. Later, a number of households were selected according to the results of the initial questionnaire for detailed surveys and interviews. Although the questionnaire was designed in a statistical manner (see the Appendix), the thesis does not entirely rely on a quantitative approach. Instead, I have tried to indicate some general tendencies - in the light of my fieldwork and experience gained from living in the area - as exemplified by sharecropping arrangements in animal husbandry.

I was extremely fortunate to have the assistance of university students Şeyhmus İpek and Mehmet Çokel, and schoolteacher Recep Okan in the administration of the questionnaires in the early stages of the fieldwork. I would like to thank them all. I would also like to thank

Lionel Cliffe for his suggestions about the design of the questionnaire, and John Norton, Head of the Turkish Department in the University of Durham, who gave me invaluable assistance in the final production of the questionnaire. I also wish to thank Prof. Philip Abrams and the University of Durham as a whole for their assistance in financing the production of the questionnaire.

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edited and finally typed the thesis in an incredibly short period of time.

Finally, I should like to thank the people of Gisgis and Kalhana, not only for putting up with me through all of my fieldwork, but also for offering me their hospitality and friendship, and willingly co-operating with me in my work. They must, of course, remain nameless, and where names have been used they are purely fictitious.

NOTE ON TURKISH SPELLING AND PRONUNCIATION

The Turkish language is a phonetic language. The following is a guide to pronunciation taken from A. D. Alderson and F. Iz (eds).

The Concise Oxford Turkish Dictionary, London Oxford University Press, 1959.

The vowels are approximately:

a	as <u>a</u> in sun
e	as <u>e</u> in bed
i	between the <u>i</u> in big and the <u>u</u> in bug
ı	as <u>i</u> in hit
o	as <u>o</u> in doll
ö	as French <u>eu</u> in <u>peu</u>
u	as <u>u</u> in bull
ü	as French <u>u</u> in <u>tu</u>

The consonants are as in English, except:

c	as <u>j</u> in jam
ç	as <u>ch</u> in church
ğ	with hard vowels is a very guttural but faint <u>g</u> (dağ = dagh), with soft vowels it is a consonantal <u>y</u> (eğer = eyer).
j	as <u>s</u> in treasure
ş	as <u>s</u> in sugar
v	is between English <u>v</u> and <u>w</u> ; in some words it is interchangeable with <u>ğ</u> (dövmek = doğmek)

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of two villages in Southeast Anatolia in Turkey, which is concerned with the development of capitalism and capital accumulation. Turkey has long been an integrated part of the world capitalist system, but although the dominant mode of production is capitalist, peasant production plays an important role in the production of surplus. It is hoped that the present study of two villages in Southeast Anatolia will show the interaction between the peasant household economy and rural and urban capitalism in Turkey. As to the reason for choosing Gırgıs and Kalhana villages, it is due to the fact that despite their differences in terms of the size of landownership and of the nature of the organisation of production, the household economy plays an important role in both. Furthermore, the two villages adequately reflect the rural structure of Southeast Anatolia. That is, they highlight the two types of landholdings and the two sets of production relations which coexist in this region.

The two types of landholdings, which are the outcome of historical conditions specific to the region, are those of large estates and small peasant holdings. Large landowners can and do own all the land in some villages, while small peasant holdings characterise other villages. It is for this reason, for example, that some sociologists have categorised villages in terms of whether or not the whole village is owned by a landlord or by the village residents.¹



As to the two types of production relations, they are due to the fact that although large estates became more and more mechanised and capitalist oriented, since the 1950s the peasant household units have also survived and continued to play an important role in the production of surplus. Nevertheless, prior to proceeding with a discussion of our fieldwork data from Gisgis and Kalhana it is necessary to examine briefly some of the central concerns of the literature concerning the peasantry in general.

Anthropology is one of the disciplines which concerns itself with peasants and peasant studies. A common concern amongst the anthropologists is the problematic nature of peasant structures, the peasantry and peasant economies. However, this has not prevented the emergence, and adoption by many scholars, of different approaches to the study of the peasantry. In the following section we shall examine briefly and critically how some anthropologists have approached the peasantry as a means of a general framework within which we shall discuss landholdings, production relations and surplus generation in Gisgis and Kalhana.

A major feature of the different definitions of the peasantry in the anthropological literature is that they are of a descriptive nature. The peasantry is treated as a specific world-wide type of social structure,² existing between two dichotomous social types in an historical continuum. For instance, Redfield puts the peasantry between the tribe and the modern city.³ In this evolutionary approach the question for Redfield is the whereabouts of the peasants in the given

scheme of things. Although Redfield does not effectively try to conceptualise the peasantry, he describes them as a sort of universal human type "Peasant society and culture has something generic about it. It is a kind of arrangement of humanity with some similarities all over the world".⁴ The peasants have a particular way of life and specific set of values which are described in an ideal typological fashion. Using Kroeber's notion of part societies⁵ Redfield stresses that peasant communities are part societies. The peasant community is "an aspect or dimension of the civilisation of which it is a part".⁶ Peasant culture is a semi-autonomous part of the wider society. The peasant village shares many of the features of both part-society and the wider society. The integration of peasant part-society in the national society is explained through the traditions of civilisation which they share. No importance is attributed to rural-urban economic relations, the forms of surplus transfer, or the economic integration of the rural areas into the national economy.

Unlike Redfield, who deals with the peasantry in cultural terms, Wolf is concerned with the effects of industrial development on peasant segments, and bases his typology on the economic aspect of the peasantry. He argues that various types of industrial expansion and market growth have affected different peasant segments in different ways. In order to "define the term 'peasant' as strictly as possible"⁷ he makes three distinctions 1) that the term "peasant" includes only agricultural producers, not other categories like fishermen, strip-miners, rubber gatherers, and livestock keepers, 11) the term covers those peasants who control their own land, and not tenant

farmers whose control of their land is subject to outside authority, and 111) that "the peasant aims at subsistence, not at reinvestment"⁸ Having established these three distinctions he emphasises that "the term 'peasant' indicates a structural relationship, not a particular content".⁹ Then he develops a typology of peasants in terms of their position vis-a-vis a larger whole, of which they are a part. Since peasants are not primitives "the culture of a peasant segment cannot be understood in terms of itself" but in relation to some larger integral whole. The first type he develops is called a corporate peasant community, which comprises the peasants practising intensive cultivation. These peasants produce mainly for their immediate subsistence needs and very little is produced for cash sale in the village market in order to obtain goods produced elsewhere. The corporate peasant community "represents a bounded social system with clear-cut limits, in relation to both outsiders and insiders".¹⁰ There exists an institutionalised poverty in this type, and the family is the unit both of production and consumption.

The second type is also characterised by the amount of cash crops they sell. The peasants included in this type are those who regularly put 50 to 75 per cent of their production on the market as cash crops, the production of which "requires outside capitalisation...peasants of this type receive such capitalisation from the outside, but mainly on a traditional small scale, intermittent and speculative basis. Investments are not made either to stabilise the market or to organise the apparatus of production and distribution of the peasantry".¹¹

The community which ensures the integration of this type of peasant segment with others and with the larger socio-cultural whole is called the "open" community. This differs from the corporate community in that it allows almost continuous interaction with the outside world, whereas the corporate community resists outside influences which might threaten its integrity. Furthermore, the open-ended community allows and expects its members to accumulate and display wealth.¹²

Apart from these two basic types, Wolf suggests five more types which are also defined in terms of their marketable products. The third type resembles the second type, and sells 90 to 100 per cent of its products and requires more extensive outside capital than the second type. The fourth type is that of peasants who sell the larger part of their production "in restricted but stable local markets".¹³ The last three types are transitional types and are only indirectly related to the first two types of peasantry

It is clear that Wolf bases his typology of the peasantry on the amount of marketable surplus produced by the peasants. However, in a later work¹⁴ Wolf revises his usage of the term surplus. In its new usage surplus is treated as a part of the peasants' product expropriated by a ruling class. In this work the relationship between the peasant producers and a non-productive executive and administrative group is of an exploitative or asymmetrical nature. This administrative class exploits the peasants by way of having control of the distribution of the product as well as by using force.

furthermore, in Peasants Wolf adopts an evolutionary approach which is very clear in the following extract

This book is concerned with those large segments of mankind which stand midway between the primitive tribe and industrial society. These populations, many million strong, neither primitive nor modern, form the majority of mankind. They are important contemporaneously, because they inhabit that "underdeveloped" part of the world. ¹⁵

So, according to Wolf, peasants are universal human types, representing a phase in the evolution of the civilisation. The peasants of the underdeveloped world are all considered to be of the same nature

Another attempt to formulate a "general type" of peasant society is that of Shanin. In a paper entitled "Peasantry, delineation..." which discusses the possibility of developing concepts in sociology along the lines of the Weberian tradition, by way of abstraction and generalisation Shanin briefly summarises some of the modes of conceptualisation of the peasantry in the social sciences, and then goes on to put forward a general definition of the peasantry based on four essential features

- 1 The peasant family as the basic unit of a multi-dimensional social organisation...
- 2 Land husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly providing the major part of the consumption needs...
- 3 Specific traditional culture related to the way of life of small communities...
- 4 The underdog position. The domination of peasantry by outsiders.¹⁶

To this general type Shanin adds seven "analytically marginal groups" such as agricultural labourers, rural craftsmen and tradesmen, frontier squatters, tribesmen, etc. These analytically marginal groups share some of the characteristics of peasantry, but not all.¹⁷

An important limitation of Shanin's work, and all others who have tried to produce a general definition of peasantry, is that they fail to differentiate between various types of rural cultivators who have existed in different historical periods and in different types of societies. Peasants of the Third World today, in the epoch of imperialism, are different to the peasants of feudal Europe or the pre-capitalist Ottoman, Indian or Chinese Empires. A general descriptive definition of the peasantry is ahistorical. Another limitation of these general descriptions of the peasantry is that they equate peasants to rural producers using family labour as the basic form of labour. As Bernstein points out, however,¹⁸ this type of approach does not give the category "peasant" any theoretical content namely an historically and socially specific content.

Such a general definition can not help us distinguish the social differences between, say, peasants in medieval Europe whose surplus-labour was appropriated in the form of rent by the feudal landowning class, and peasants in Africa today who are exploited through relations of commodity production and exchange which lock them into the international capitalist economy.¹⁹

Furthermore, the agglomeration of the rural producers under the term peasant tends to ignore the differentiation of the peasants in class terms, and treats them as a homogeneous group. On the other hand,

Lenin, for instance, has shown in his Development of Capitalism in Russia²⁰ that the peasantry is not a homogeneous group and may be divided into three groups in terms of their class position. A further limitation is due to the evolutionist bias inherent in these approaches, which places the peasants somewhere on the unilinear development scheme of civilisation. This can be criticised from several points. First, it is wrong to assume that all societies will pass through the stages put forward by this theory, second, to place the peasants between the primitive tribe and industrial society implies that all the peasantries of the underdeveloped world bear the same features. Instead, peasants should be treated according to the specific historical conditions under which they exist, and the specific relations of production in which they are involved. Moreover, the attempt to develop a specific "peasant mode of production" has also been criticised. For instance, in a recent article, Ennew, Hirst and Tribe, moving from their specific definition of a mode of production, argue that the peasant mode of production is not possible.²¹ Also, Bernstein produces a very concise criticism of the "peasant mode of production" approach.²² According to Bernstein the object of this kind of theory is the peasant family or household as a unit of production and reproduction, not a mode of production in the materialist sense.²³

In these "models" of peasant economy, the social relations suggested are those internal to the producing unit, the peasant household. They cannot formulate the social relations of production which provide the most important element in the materialist theory of a mode of production. The social relations of production encompass and relate to the relations of production, appropriation, distribution and utilisation of the social product as a whole. Analysis of the social

relations of production therefore includes the relations between various units of production, between various classes, and the relations of the process of social reproduction (no household can satisfy the conditions of its own reproduction outside the process of social reproduction). For those who try to constitute a theory of a peasant or domestic mode of production these kinds of relations are external to the dynamic of the elementary unit of production (the household); something which is clear enough in the work of both Chayanov and Sahlins.

For materialist analysis this is an incorrect procedure. According to materialist method it is necessary to examine different units and forms of production, and classes, as they are constituted through the social relations of production in specific concrete conditions. (Emphasis original).²⁴

This criticism of the "peasant mode of production" by Bernstein can also be extended to cover the work of Meillassoux, who formulated the concept of the domestic mode of production in his Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux (1975).²⁵ Through a theory of the articulation of modes of production he argues that capitalism benefits from the domestic community as a source of cheap labour. His main concern in the book is the importance of the family-based social relations within a capitalist system and he maintains that since capitalism has become a world system the dynamic of the capitalist world system cannot be understood without reference to the dynamics of the pre-capitalist modes of production. Furthermore, he notes that in certain historical conditions capitalism plays either a dissolving or a preserving role upon non-capitalist modes of production and that capitalism exploits more by preserving the domestic mode of production. The domestic community, therefore, for Meillassoux, provides capitalism with cheap labour power and cheap commodities.

The agricultural self-sustaining communities, because of their comprehensiveness and their raison d'être are able to fulfil functions that capitalism prefers not to assume in the underdeveloped countries: the functions of social security. The cheap cost of labour in these countries comes from the super-exploitation, not only of the labour from the wage-earner himself but also of the labour of his kin-group.²⁶

Meillassoux's argument that capitalism uses the peasantry as a source of cheap labour and cheap commodities can be retained without reference to the "domestic mode of production" or to the articulation of this mode with the capitalist mode of production. In a capitalist social formation the peasant household as a unit of simple reproduction can continue to provide cheap labour and commodities. The question arises, however, as to how we are to conceptualise the household as a unit of production and reproduction.

We should not allow the appearance of the household as a unit of production and consumption which makes use of family labour to deceive us. For despite the fact that the household maintains this appearance it has been enmeshed in different social formations and it has interacted with the concomitant dominant modes of production. Therefore, instead of trying to conceptualise the peasantry as an ideal type, valid everywhere and for all time (universally and eternally), we should evaluate the household which uses family labour according to the concrete historically specific conditions in which it exists. In this way we can avoid the difficulties inherent in attempting to conceptualise the peasantry and in approaching the question of "what is the peasantry?"

Capitalism has today acquired a universal character, but as we have already stated the development of capitalism is of an uneven nature. This unevenness has brought about different conceptualisations of the integral parts of world capitalism in development studies literature.²⁷ Leaving aside the validity and usefulness of concepts such as metropolis-satellite, centre-periphery, we shall try to locate the household as a production and consumption unit in the specific social formation in which it exists. In doing so we must avoid determinism and functionalism. By this we mean that the household should not be considered a passive receiver unit whose way of organisation is determined by the requirement of capitalism in its relationship with the outside world. Instead, the household should be treated as a unit constantly interacting with the outside world, doing its best to reproduce itself and its unity. Once this is accepted we will have avoided one of the major difficulties of contemporary Marxism in trying to conceptualise small producers who own their means of production and use family labour in production as the main labour force. Moving on from the propositions that capitalism destroys all pre-capitalist modes of production wherever it goes and that capital accumulated in the hands of a few while the majority of the small producers lose their means of production, or in other words, become proletarianised, and therefore two distinct classes come into being, some Marxists find it difficult to conceptualise the peasantries of the Third World. This is because they do not fit into the definition of proletariat simply because they own their means of production and use family labour. Marxists such as Amin, Banaji and Bernstein try to fit these peasantries into their scheme through claiming that peasants of the

Third World are disguised proletarians, concealed wage labourers.²⁸

The argument put forward by Bernstein is that through the control of the conditions of household production capital is able to extract the surplus product produced by the household by means of family labour, therefore that part of the product remaining within the family is a concealed wage and the household labourers are disguised proletarians.

This type of explanation is confined to the problematic of capital accumulation and does not explain why capitalism does not proletarianise small producers, but in order to be consistent with the premise that capitalism eliminates small producers this approach simply qualifies them as disguised proletarians. It takes the household as a passive unit of production and consumption open to all the impositions of capitalism. If this is the case, if capitalism can impose its will upon the household, then why does it not proletarianise them? Two possible answers come to mind either capitalism is not able to destroy the household; or the relationship between capitalism and the household is a two-way relationship. To accept the first explanation is tantamount to denying the logic of capitalism, that it destroys other modes of production in its development. So we are left with the second alternative, that there is an interaction between capital and the household. While capital is trying to expropriate more and more surplus the household tries to survive and reproduce itself.

However, capital, being unable to get rid of the household, tries to internalise the mode of calculation of the household into its circuit in order to benefit from this mode of labour usage as much as it can.

It is no longer a wonder that in so many places peasants refuse to accept new innovations introduced by governments in order to improve production. Peasants feel threatened by the introduction of new varieties of crops and seeds, artificial fertilisers and such like, which raise their production costs and make them more and more dependent on the market.

While we suggest that the interaction between the household and capital should be analysed we do not by any means claim that household (peasant) production constitutes a mode of production sui generis.

The fieldwork data of this thesis was collected in Gısgıs and Kalhana villages of Ergani district of Diyarbakır province, in the Southeast Anatolia region of Turkey. The aim of the fieldwork was to collect material to show the importance of the household economy for the developing Turkish capitalism. The Southeast, together with the Eastern region, is the most underdeveloped region in Turkey. Limited industrialisation, low level of development of the productive forces, and dominance of rural production are some of the features of this underdevelopment. The transfer of the surplus produced in the region to the developed Western part of Turkey is the prime reason behind this underdevelopment, and the household economic unit, as the producer of this surplus, is the main bearer of the burden of capital accumulation in Turkey. Before going into the details of the ways in which this surplus is appropriated from the household we shall try to show the structures (regional and national) within which the household economy exists. Therefore, the first chapter will attempt

to explain how the underdevelopment of Eastern Anatolia (including Southeast Anatolia) is the result of the region's integration into the capitalist economy. Capitalism develops unevenly: while bringing about development in one part it causes underdevelopment in another part.

We shall also give an account of the recent economic and political history of the Turkish formation, emphasising that in its efforts to develop a Turkish capitalism, the Turkish state played the part of a buffer mechanism in the underdevelopment of the region and in the transfer of the surplus produced by the household economy in the region. Of course, the Turkish social formation is a part of the capitalist world economy. Being an integral part of the capitalist world economy the Turkish social formation, and therefore the Turkish state, operate within the structure of the world economy. Therefore, in the last section of the first chapter the concept of the capitalist world economy and some aspects of the debate concerning this concept will be touched upon.

NOTES

1. See for example İbrahim Yasa, Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı ve Temel Sorunları (Social Structure and Basic Problems of Turkey) (1970), pp. 71-76, and İsmail Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo/Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller (The Order of Easter Anatolia. Socio/Economic and Ethnic Bases) (1969), pp. 65-67. See also Cavit Orhan Tütengil, 100 Soruda Kırsal Türkiye'nin Yapısı ve Sorunları (Structure and Problems of Rural Turkey in 100 Questions) (1975), pp. 135-139.
2. Teodor Shanin, "Peasantry. Delineation of a Sociological Concept and a Field of Study", European Journal of Sociology, XII (1971a).
3. Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (1956), p. 23.
4. *ibid.*, p. 25.
5. Alfred Louis Kroeber, Anthropology (1948), p. 284.
6. Redfield, *Op. cit.* (1956), p. 68.
7. Eric Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion", American Anthropologist, LVII, No. 3, Part I (1955), p. 453.
8. *ibid.*, p. 454.
9. *ibid.*, p. 454.
10. *ibid.*, p. 456.
11. *ibid.*, p. 461.
12. *ibid.*, p. 462.
13. *ibid.*, p. 467.
14. Eric Wolf, Peasants (1966).
15. *ibid.*, preface, p. vii.
16. Shanin, *Op. cit.* (1971a), pp. 294-296, and Peasants and Peasant Societies (1971b), pp. 14-15. See also, by the same author, "The Nature and Logic of the Peasant Economy", Journal of Peasant Studies, I, No. 1 (October 1973), p. 64.
17. Shanin, *Op. cit.* (1971a), pp. 296-298.
18. Henry Bernstein, "African Peasantries: a Theoretical Framework", Journal of Peasant Studies, VI, No. 4 (July 1979).

19. *ibid.*, pp. 441-442.
20. See Lenin, Development of Capitalism in Russia (1964).
21. Judith Ennew, Paul Hirst and Keith Tribe, "'Peasantry' as an Economic Category", Journal of Peasant Studies, IV, No. 4 (1977).
22. Bernstein, *Op. cit.* (1979), p. 422.
23. A substantivist version of this theory in Anthropology is developed by Marshall Sahlins in the theory of the "domestic mode of production" in Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (1974).
24. Bernstein, *Op. cit.* (1979), p. 422.
25. Owing to our inability to read in French, the following argument is based on a very useful summary of Femmes Greniers et Capitaux by Bernstein in his paper "Capital and Peasantry in the Epoch of Imperialism" presented at the University of Dar es Salam on 23rd November 1976, and on the review article "Production and Reproduction: Meillassoux's Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux" by B. O'Laughlin in Critique of Anthropology, II (Spring 1978). See also Claude Meillassoux, "From Reproduction to Production", Economy and Society, I, No. 1 (1972).
26. Meillassoux, *Op. cit.* (1972), p. 102.
27. For example, according to Frank, the integral parts of the World Capitalist system are metropolis-satellite, whereas according to Amin and Wallerstein they are centre-periphery, but we should remember that Amin and Wallerstein conceptualise centre and periphery differently. For the concept of metropolis-satellite see Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (1969a). For the concepts of centre-periphery see Samir Amin, Unequal Development (1976), and see also Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (1974).
28. See Chapter II, Capitalism and Ground Rent, of Amin's Imperialism and Unequal Development (1977), especially pp. 59-60, and see Jairus Banaji, "Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History", Capital and Class, No. 3 (Autumn 1977), p. 34. See also Bernstein's "Capital and Peasantry in the Epoch of Imperialism" (1976).

CHAPTER I

Regional underdevelopment is a central concern of much of the literature that attempts to grasp the socio-economic and political reality of the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey. Some of the literature confines itself to showing the differences between regions in terms of the level of infrastructure, average per capita income, number of hospitals, doctors, schools, etc. Other contributions approach the phenomenon of regional differentiation in the light of "ethnic" differences, while others situate this disparity in a political economy of the Turkish State. As an introduction to this chapter we shall outline two of these approaches to regional underdevelopment in Turkey in this section. This will then be followed by an evaluation of the Turkish social formation in a manner that indicates the type of general theoretical framework within which this thesis is being written. In other words, we shall be outlining the framework within which we shall later examine the household economy in the Villages of Gısgıs and Kalhana.

REGIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

Ruşen Keleş¹ argues that the advantages provided by the economic and physical geography of a region are "the most important factor in the development of that region".² Borrowing from Myrdal, he refers to this as an "historical coincidence" where, once disparities are

created between regions, they show a certain regularity under free market conditions. The relations and interactions between the developed and underdeveloped regions are summarised by Keleş in terms of two types of effects "backwash" and "spread" effects. Both the capital and labour flow from the backward to the developed region are considered to be "backwash" effects, while the increased demand in the developed region induces, to a certain extent, investment in the backward regions, which represents one of the "spread" effects of the developed regions. Another "spread" effect, highlighted by Keleş, and of particular relevance to this thesis, is the migration of disguised unemployed labour from underdeveloped to developed regions, which he suggests renders possible the marginal productivity of labour in underdeveloped regions. Nevertheless, Keleş emphasises the fact that as a result of the "backwash" effects demand increases in the developed region and this demand induces investment which in turn increases incomes, and the increased incomes in turn increase demand. The capital requirements of new investments, of course, are partly met through the capital flow from the backward regions: the "backwash" effect. Together with Myrdal, Keleş suggests that as a result of this cumulative causal relation "poverty becomes its own cause" and richness leads to further richness and therefore a poor region cannot accumulate capital in order to achieve a cumulative development.³

It is Keleş's failure to analyse the historical process of regional underdevelopment in the light of the "cumulative causation" theory which constitutes the major limitation of this approach. A limitation which, of course, is embedded in Myrdal's own work. The "cumulative

causation" theory⁴ seriously questions the notion of equilibrium and is diametrically opposed to that of neo-classical economics which claims that the free play of the market will reduce regional inequalities. Instead, it argues that the working of the market forces, especially capital and labour movements, increase the existing regional inequalities rather than decreasing them. Nevertheless, although Myrdal is able to show ever-increasing regional inequalities empirically, he fails to situate them in the very process of capital accumulation. It is this failure which is exemplified in his analogy between regional inequalities and the ever-increasing gap between developed and underdeveloped countries, which leads to an ahistorical analysis that cannot account for exploitation, domination, or unequal and combined development.

Unlike Myrdal, the "internal colonialism" approach emphasises the exploitative nature of the relations between the regions. In its Turkish version the "internal colonialism" model takes an ethnic and nationalistic character where the exploitation of the Kurdish East by the Turkish West becomes the major focus of the approach. Such a focus only partially reflects the socio-historical reality of a region in which the Kurds do constitute a very large ethnic group (in the East and Southeast of Turkey).⁵

Notwithstanding our reservations about the reliability of the data, let us have a look at the data concerning the number of Kurdish speaking people in the area. Three major languages are spoken in Southeast Anatolia Kurdish, Arabic and Turkish. Although Kurdish and Zaza have

been considered two different languages in the 1965 population census we have counted them together, since the Zaza speaking people are also Kurds.⁶

TABLE 1.1 Population by Province and Mother Tongue in Southeast Anatolia, 1965

PROVINCE	TURKISH	ARABIC	KURDISH/ZAZA
Adiyaman	143,054	7	124,030
Bitlis	56,161	3,263	94,406
Diyarbakir	178,644	2,536	294,056
Gaziantep	490,046	885	19,955
Hakkari	10,357	165	72,365
Mardin	35,494	79,494	265,388
Siirt	46,722	38,273	179,507
Urfa	207,652	51,090	192,017
Van	118,481	557	147,697
Total	1,286,611	176,270	1,389,421

Source State Institute of Statistics, Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics of Population, 24.10.65, Ankara, 1969

As we can see, the Kurdish speaking population is the largest group in Southeast Turkey. It should be noted, however, that the distribution of the Kurdish people over the area varies from one place to another, as well as between rural and urban areas. While Turkish speaking people predominate in urban areas, Kurdish speaking people predominate in rural areas.⁷ Furthermore, the existence of military rule in the region has been cited as proof that the Turkish State has been intentionally seeking to keep the region underdeveloped ever since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. This seems to be an

oversimplification of the question. How far can ethnicity be held responsible for economic development? How far can we go in identifying ethnic relations with class relations? It is such questions as these which constitute the major limitations of the "internal colonialism" approach.

An example of such an approach is the work of one of the most prominent advocates of Kurdish nationalism, Ismail Beşikçi. Beşikçi argues against the view of the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Worker's Party) exemplified by Behice Boran in her book Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları (Turkey and the Problems of Socialism)⁸ in which she contends that the inequalities between the developed West and the underdeveloped East in Turkey are due to the law of uneven development of capitalism.⁹ According to Beşikçi, the fact that capitalism creates uneven development does not apply to the Turkish case because the Kurds are not Turks.¹⁰ "The law of uneven development of capitalism can explain regional inequalities only under the conditions that all the people living within the state boundaries are of the same nation (sic)".¹¹ For example, Beşikçi argues that it is possible to explain economic, social and cultural inequalities between Istanbul and Çankırı or between Izmir and Çorum, but in a situation where the national structure of the underdeveloped region is different it is necessary to look for reasons other than the law of uneven development of capitalism to find other relationships.¹²

Beşikçi contends that the most important reason for the underdevelopment of Eastern Anatolia is the fact that there is a national

contradiction between the Turkish dominant and administrative classes and the Kurdish nation. Kemalist governments have been implementing colonialist methods since the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 in order to absorb their share of Kurdistan into the structure of the Turkish State. All the measures taken¹³ to ensure the enserfment of the Kurdish people have prevented the development of capitalism and the vitality of the economy in Kurdistan.¹⁴ Beşikçi may be right in pointing out that the "law of uneven development in capitalism" approach is inadequate in the explanation of regional inequalities. However, his ethnically flavoured internal colonialist model seems to be equally inadequate.

An important limitation is his attempt to examine exploitation in purely ethnic terms - Turks exploiting Kurds - rather than in class terms. Ethnic groups, however, are not undifferentiated homogeneous groups, they are differentiated in class terms within themselves. The fact that Turkish capitalists may exploit Kurdish workers and peasants in collaboration with the Kurdish dominant classes (landlords, merchants etc.) does not imply that all the Kurds in Turkey are exploited by the Turks. Kurdish peasants are also exploited by the Kurdish dominant classes. In fact, it can be shown that the Kurdish dominant classes have greatly benefited from their incorporation into the Turkish State.

Landlords (ağas), tribal leaders and sheikhs are very effective in the politics of the Eastern and Southeastern regions. The introduction of the multi-party system in 1945 strengthened the position of the ağas,

tribal leaders and sheikhs, whose social functions had gradually been eroded during the last thirty or so years. Owing to their economic and ideological superiority the ağa, sheikh and tribal leader trio has been able to manipulate the distribution of votes among the political parties. Knowing the ability of ağas, sheikhs and tribal leaders to direct peasants, murits (members of religious sects) and the tribal people respectively in these regions, the political parties have favoured them immensely. The authority of this trio has been weakening due to factors which had brought about the opening up of rural communities, such as mechanisation and capitalisation of agriculture, improvement in transportation and communication, migration from rural to urban areas, education, rapid population increase, etc. Nevertheless, with the advent of the multi-party system they discovered not only the possibility of translating their influence over the masses into material interest, but also the possibility of intensifying their control over the people through their increasing influence on the state apparatus under the multi-party system.¹⁵

This point is substantiated by the fact that the independent candidates (who have no support from the political parties) have been very successful in the Eastern and Southeastern constituencies in all elections held between 1950 and 1977. While in other constituencies independent candidates could not manage to get more than five per cent of the total votes, in the East and Southeast independent candidates polled as much as 46 per cent of the total votes in some provinces. For instance, in Muş province of the Eastern region, the independent candidates obtained 46.19 per cent of the votes and in Siirt province

TABLE 1.2 1977 General Election Results for the Southeast Region

PROVINCE	JUSTICE PARTY		REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S P.		NATIONAL SALVATION P.		NATIONAL ACTION P.		DEMOCRATIC PARTY		REPUBLICAN RELIANCE P.		TURKEY'S LABOUR P.		INDIVIDUALS	
	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs	% of vote	No of MPs
Adıyaman	28.88	1	41.87	2	19.17	1	5.14	-	3.76	-	0.68	-	-	-	0.49	-
Bitlis	34.26	1	17.09	-	27.26	1	0.29	-	0.44	-	0.73	-	-	-	19.93	-
Diyarbakır	26.16	2	34.79	3	17.79	1	1.09	-	1.11	-	0.47	-	1.46	-	17.12	1
Gaziantep	32.42	3	44.93	4	8.53	-	11.11	1	1.18	-	1.19	-	-	-	0.83	-
Hakkari	43.42	1	36.52	-	18.47	-	-	-	0.87	-	0.63	-	-	-	0.09	-
Mardin	16.31	1	21.44	2	23.08	2	0.12	-	0.64	-	7.32	-	-	-	31.10	1
Sırt	17.25	1	16.73	1	21.83	1	0.64	-	0.44	-	0.46	-	-	-	43.15	1
Urfa	33.32	3	33.74	3	19.68	1	6.14	-	1.69	-	1.24	-	-	-	4.20	-
Van	15.40	1	19.39	1	20.43	1	2.82	-	1.20	-	11.84	1	-	-	28.91	-
Averages & totals	27.49	14	29.56	16	19.58	8	3.03	1	1.26	-	2.73	1	0.16	-	16.20	3

Note. Turkey's Unity Party did not stand for election in 1977 in the Southeast region.

Source: Briefing, June 14, 1977

the independents won 43.15 per cent of the votes in the June 1977 elections. Three of the four independent Members of Parliament in the June 1977 elections were from the Southeast region, while the fourth was from Elazığ province in the Eastern region. Independent candidates obtained on average 16.20 per cent of the average votes in the nine provinces of the region, while independent candidates in the other 58 provinces of the country only managed to win an average of 2.76 per cent of the votes.¹⁶

In Table 1.2 we see the distribution of votes and seats among the political parties. We should note that the distribution of votes among the parties in the region does not reflect the class bases of the parties because the poor of the region have voted for their landlords' parties, which represent the dominant classes, due to factors such as clientalism, religion and tribal family relations.

By stating the importance of the economic factors in the underdevelopment of the region we do not deny the fact that some rulers have held negative attitudes towards the Kurdish people. What we are saying is simply that it is wrong to conclude that Eastern Anatolia is underdeveloped because the Kurds live there. There must be something more than ethnicity as the main cause of the regional underdevelopment in Eastern and Southeast Anatolia. Bettelheim's criticism of the notion that the exploitation of one nation by another in colonialism can be applied to Beşikçi's thesis that the Turkish nation exploits the Kurdish nation. Bettelheim writes

Because the concept of exploitation expresses a production relation - production of surplus labour and expropriation of this by a social class - it necessarily relates to class relations (and a relation between "countries" is not and can not be a relation between classes.¹⁷

Beşikçi does not offer any rigorous analysis of the regional inequalities, his explanations mainly remain at the level of rhetoric. He does not try to bring together ethnicity and the features of the working of capitalism in explaining regional inequalities, as H Wolpe¹⁸ does in the case of South Africa. The conceptualisation of class relations does not exist in Beşikçi's explanations of the underdevelopment of Eastern Anatolia. Instead, domination, exploitation and oppression are treated as taking place between national and ethnic groups. Beşikçi's theory is unable to answer two questions raised by Wolpe

First, what is the relationship between the system of class exploitation and domination and the relations of racial, ethnic, cultural or national exploitation and domination characteristic of internal colonialism? Second, in what way does internal colonial exploitation differ from class exploitation?¹⁹

Despite his persistent reference to national oppression and exploitation of Kurdish people by the Turks, Beşikçi makes no attempt to link these to the system of class exploitation, nor does he specify these oppressive and exploitative relations, apart from stating over and over again the fact that Kemalist governments have been denying the existence of the Kurdish nation.²⁰

Such an attempt has been made by Wolpe in the case of South Africa. Wolpe argues that the "internal colonialism" thesis used by the South African Communist Party is extremely vague because it fails "to distinguish between forms of colonial, political, ideological, and cultural domination and modes of imperialist economic exploitation".²¹ Capitalism, once established as a dominant mode of production, tends to either consolidate or dissolve pre-capitalist modes of production with which it coexists in an articulated way in a social formation. South African capitalism benefits from the reservation of non-capitalist relations of production because in this way the capitalist sector reduces its cost of production and therefore raises the rate of surplus value by way of employing labourers, part of whose subsistence needs is met by their kin groups on labour reserves.²² Since what is preserved is the tribal groups themselves the ideologies and political policies focus on the segregation, conservation and control of African "tribal" societies.²³ Therefore it is the logic of capital accumulation which is responsible for the underdevelopment of the labour reserve areas, not the racist policies or ideologies which try to justify the segregation.

The importance of Wolpe's work comes from its attempt to show that the relations of production and class relations lie behind the apartheid ideology and the underdevelopment of black labour reserves in South Africa. No such attempt is made by Beşikçi to show the relationship between the development of capitalism in Turkey and the underdevelopment of Kurdish Eastern Anatolia. Of further interest for this thesis is the work of Mandel, who argues that development and underdevelopment are the basic features of capitalism, and regional uneven development is the

spatial juxtaposition of these two features of capitalism.²⁴

Regional underdevelopment is an inevitable outcome of a capitalist economy, the aim of which is to grow continually through investments in the areas where the highest rate of profit is possible. Investments are unequally distributed because the factors determining the rate of profit are unequally distributed within the country and therefore the growth of the economy will be uneven. The bourgeois state, by creating the national market, ensures the flow of labour and capital from the underdeveloped to the developed regions. Underdeveloped regions are not only a source of labour for the developed regions, but they are also a very important market for the products of the developed regions.²⁵

Although Mandel's theory is a very useful framework in analysing regional underdevelopment it does not take into consideration the specific conditions under which regional underdevelopment occurs, and therefore it remains very general. However, I think that, despite its generality, Mandel's theory, with a few additional points, will serve as a useful framework for understanding regional underdevelopment in Turkey. One of the points to add is that the development of capitalism in Turkey is not of an autocentric nature. Capitalism did not develop in Turkey as a result of the internal dynamics of Turkish society.

Capitalism first used Turkey as a market, then as a place for investment. However, the first investments in Turkey by capitalism were made in order to improve the infrastructure, so that marketing of the commodities produced by the West would be easier.²⁶ These investments

included railway networks, building of ports, water-works, electricity grids, etc. Western Anatolia (Marmara and Aegean regions), being close to the sea routes and Europe, and in addition, being the heart of the Ottoman Empire, as well as being the area, together with the Çukurova region, for the production of raw materials (cotton and tobacco) for western capitalism, enjoyed the lion's share of foreign investments. At the end of the Independence War in the 1920s, the Kemalist regime inherited a country with almost no industry and a very limited infrastructure. The existing infrastructural establishment and manufacturing workshops were mainly concentrated in the West. Kemalists, who aimed at creating a Turkish capitalism,²⁷ implemented a state capitalism policy, giving priority to the areas where the existing infrastructure rendered possible quick and most profitable returns to the investments. The accumulation needs of emerging Turkish capitalism necessitated deliberate negligence of some areas in terms of investments. The deliberateness of the Kemalist policy stemmed from the profit logic of capital, not from the fact that Eastern Anatolia was Kurdish, as Kurdish nationalists would have us believe. In order to take advantage of the labour reserves in Eastern Anatolia in the years of étatist policy, railways were built to connect the remote East with the developing West. For instance, the Haydarpaşa (Istanbul) to Kurtalan (Siirt) railway line was completed in 1935, cutting across Turkey from the northwest to the southeast. In this way Turkish capitalism took advantage of a labour force produced and reproduced within a non-capitalist mode of production without taking on the burden of the reproduction costs of the labourers. Today, not only Turkish capitalism, but also international capitalism takes advantage of this situation. The Turkish workers in Western Europe, mainly in West

Germany, are a good example of this.

The result of such processes and state policies was the underdevelopment of this region vis-à-vis other parts of Turkey. In order to grasp the nature and magnitude of this underdevelopment it is necessary to examine the larger structure in some detail.

THE TURKISH SOCIAL FORMATION

The Ottoman Empire was incorporated into the world capitalist system as a food and raw materials supplier and as an open market for cheaply produced European manufactured goods.²⁸ The abolition of the National Assembly, which was established after the constitutional revolution of 1876, resulted in the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid, which lasted for 30 years and during which time Turkey underwent a tremendously oppressive policy. Although there were no wars of long duration, nor big land losses, Turkish public opinion was under great stress, all publications were censored and civil rights were drastically curtailed.²⁹ The oppressive system implemented by Abdülhamid led to the intelligentsia fleeing the country and to the development of nationalist movements among the Christian minorities of the Empire.³⁰ The Turkish intelligentsia, for one, carried on its struggle against the Sultan's oppression through publications and various organisations which were located in Europe, and especially in France. Such publications were printed abroad and sent to Turkey through foreign post offices.

The 1908 movement³¹ was carried out by patriotic young officers and

the intelligentsia, but the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) was the leading force. The members of the Committee of Union and Progress were merchants (Turks and minorities), low ranking officers and some civil servants. Having gained power the Committee did not hesitate to collaborate with the imperialist powers, especially Germany,¹² and dependence on Germany dragged Turkey into the First World War on Germany's side. With the defeat of her allies Turkey was invaded by imperialist powers. At the close of the First World War, however, Anatolian peasants were exhausted, insecure and without hope. Many had lost their lives as soldiers and their properties had gone through taxation. They were not ready for a new war and were hostile to officers who were identified with the army and war. Who was going to mobilise the masses for a war against foreign invasion? How were the necessary money and numerous soldiers to be provided? The powers which nationalist officers and intellectuals could rely on were the Anatolian nobles, tribal and religious leaders who could mobilise the masses. However, to begin with, the local nobility (esraf) were reluctant to take part in the war and they tried to adapt to the new situation, with some even collaborating with the Greek army which invaded Western Anatolia. It was only when the invaders turned to annihilating all Turks and commandeering their goods, regardless of their being rich or poor, that the esraf were persuaded to participate in the war.

As a result of historical conditions the Independence War (1918-1922) in Turkey had to rely on these local notables, landlords, religious leaders and such like as its basic elements. This aspect of the Independence War determined the direction of Turkey's development in

the following years for, of course, the esraf expected not to be liquidated but to collect the fruits of the victory.³³ Furthermore, despite the fact that the leading cadre of the Independence War (later the administrative cadres of the Republic) declared themselves as anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, they set out with a programme which envisaged the introduction of capitalism in Turkey. This was determined by both internal and external conditions, and especially the balance of social power within Turkey. For policies, following the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress, showed clearly that big landlords, commercial bourgeoisie, industrialists and military-civil intellectuals comprised the social base of the political power. In order to grasp the nature of these policies the recent history of Turkey will be subdivided into periods and examined in some detail.

1 1923-1931 PERIOD

The nature of the state is of great importance in analysing the policies which the state implements, and is responsible for determining who benefits from such state policies. The Izmir Economic Congress of February 17th, 1923 is of central importance with respect to the understanding of the economic history of Turkey because it gathered together to decide which system was to be developed in Turkish society, and to declare the economic policy which would be based on the system adopted. This was stated in the opening speech of the congress by Ataturk³⁴

The congress was held when the Lausanne Conference discussions were interrupted. Although the Lausanne Conference had been expected to finish in a matter of a few weeks, it started in November 1922 and

ended in February 1923, with a two and a half month break. The problem on which the test was focusing at Lausanne was the nature of the system that Turkey was to follow, and accordingly the creation of the conditions that would allow the continuation of old quasi-colonial ties, no matter if they were in new forms. These ties were the Ottoman Debt (Ölün-ı Umumiye Ottoman Public Debt Administration) and the economic and juridical capitulations.

Both Atatürk and the Minister of Economy of the time, commenting about the position that Turkey would take in the face of capitalism, stated that they were not against foreign capital as long as it obeyed Turkey's laws.³⁵ Other important reasons for the congress to meet were to confront the dominant classes of the country with each other, to strengthen the alliance of the powers constituting the base of the political power and to fix the nature of the policy to be adopted. This was not only the aim of the political cadre but also the desire of the dominant classes, in particular the commercial bourgeoisie, who had organised themselves as early as 1922 in the Turkish National Commerce Union, whose aims, according to Ali Başar, one of the founder members of the Union of the time, were to gradually liquidate the non-Muslim merchants from the economic sphere and replace them with Turkish merchants.³⁷ For this, the Union was to get in touch directly with the big industrial institutions of Europe and America and to recommend Turkish agents as the future agents of companies, in place of the non-Muslim agents. This is itself good evidence of the willingness and readiness of the Turkish commercial bourgeoisie in Istanbul to collaborate with Imperialism towards the end of the Independence War.

As a result, the Turkish National Union of Commerce decided to organise a Congress of Foreign Trade in January 1923, with the aim of asserting their policy and justifying the above-mentioned ideas.³⁷ However, the Ankara government was preparing a more comprehensive congress at that time, so the Minister of Economy, Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) sent a telegram requiring the postponement of the Congress and inviting the Turkish National Union of Commerce to attend the Economic Congress to be held in Izmir. Forseeing a better chance to explain their views the Union postponed their meeting and decided to join the Izmir Economic Congress.³⁸ The Union was the group best prepared to participate in the Congress.

The representatives of workers, farmers, merchants and industrialists from each district were invited to the Congress. However, taking into consideration the manner of electing the representatives and the nature of the representatives themselves, one is drawn to the conclusion that the representatives were all those who would advocate the interests of the dominant classes. For example, the representatives of the workers were the members of the Workers' Union, which was established and controlled by the Turkish National Union of Commerce. A. H. Başar, a founder member of the Union of Commerce confesses that "the workers' Union was nothing more than a puppet organisation of merchants",³⁹ and novelist Aka Gündüz was the representative of the workers for the Kütahya district, and became the leader of workers and deputy chairman of the Congress.⁴⁰ Furthermore, political cadres near to the government attended the congress not as formal politicians but as industrialists, workmen, farmers and merchant representatives of various areas.⁴¹

Political power, consisting of an alliance of bureaucrats, landlords, merchants and to a very limited extent industrialists, guaranteed to speed the accumulation of capital in favour of merchants and the landed bourgeoisie in order to render possible the transition to the capitalist mode of production as fast as possible. By means of a special kind of taxation, suited to this aim, the state used its budget policy to transfer money from the pockets of the people to the owners of capital. In this way the state became a means of capital accumulation behind the curtains of populism and nationalism. The speeches of Atatürk are the clearest evidence of this. In an interview with the Russian Ambassador, Aralov, Mustafa Kemal stated

There are no classes in Turkey....The Working Class does not exist in Turkey since there is no developed industry. So as to our bourgeoisie, it needs to be bourgeoisied. Our commerce is very weak because we have not got capital. Foreigners are oppressing us. My aim is to open factories, to discover the riches underground, to help the merchants of Anatolia and to guarantee their becoming rich. These are the tasks confronting the State. We shall legislate all these.⁴²

When the Ottoman Empire became an open market for Western Capitalism, especially after the commercial treaty of 1838, capitalist relations also started to develop. However, apart from the Izmir region, where quite a number of Greeks lived, and the Çukurova region,⁴³ this development did not affect Anatolia. Western Capitalism mostly affected the Balkans and Egypt, while Anatolia remained virtually as it was before. Just prior to World War I there existed in Anatolian agriculture feudal and patriarchal production relations, and even in the 1930s these relations were dominant. I H Tökin points out that in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia feudal relations of production were dominant,⁴⁴ production was for subsistence, and the techniques of

production were primitive.⁴⁵ According to Prof. Tankut, a natural economy was widespread in agriculture. 31,626 villages with less than 500 population were situated as separate units far away from each other and from roads.⁴⁶ The situation in industry was not much different. The commercial bourgeoisie of Istanbul and Izmir, both of which had comprador bourgeois features, did not have the revolutionary potential to transform themselves into industrial bourgeoisies and develop capitalism in Anatolia. According to the industrial census of 1915 the number of workshops employing five or more workers was 284, of which 148 were in Istanbul, 62 were in Izmir, and the remaining 74 were in the provinces, mostly scattered in Western Anatolia. These workshops, where totally 14,179 people were employed, were in the control of Armenians, Greeks, Jews and foreigners, who altogether owned 85 per cent of these 284 workshops. As can be seen, the elements of an industrial bourgeoisie were very small, indeed almost non-existent, and non-national.

As to the network of transport, which is of vital importance in the development of the home market, it was very weak at the time of the national Independence War. The railway network, which the new Turkish State inherited from the Ottomans in 1923, was 4,232 kilometres. Of this, 2,365 kilometres were under the control of foreign companies. The situation with regards to the highways was not brilliant either. Including three-metre wide roads in provincial centres the highways amounted to 9,711 kilometres, of which 3,747 kilometres needed attention, 3,228 kilometres need immediate attention, and the remaining 3,026 kilometres needed reconstruction.⁴⁷ In 1919 only about 100 motor vehicles existed in Anatolia, camels were used as the basic means of

transport⁴⁸ In short, before, during and after the Independence War, Anatolia was on a pre-capitalist production level, the dominant classes who exploited the workers and peasants were landlords, merchants, usurers, tribal leaders and a small number of industrialists. Furthermore, a bourgeoisie which could undertake the industrialisation of the country did not exist in Turkey in the 1920s. Nevertheless, the enlightened civil-military bureaucrats, the leaders of the Independence War, who enjoyed great prestige and power in government, wanted to see the country as industrialised as the Western European countries.

In order to keep power in their hands the civil-military intelligentsia had to co-operate with the merchants and landlords, but their programme aimed to develop capitalism in agriculture and transform merchant capital into industrial capital. A problem arose How to achieve this? The tools in the hands of those in political power were budget policy and state capitalism, and so the main line of the 1923-1931 period was to try to hasten the process of capitalisation with the help of the state. Some have characterised this period as a liberal period, since during this time state interference in the private sector was kept at a minimum and the state-owned companies were maintained at a very low level. However, between 1923 and 1931 the state interfered in the economic life of the country in favour of the private sector, as in the Law for the Encouragement of Industry.⁴⁹ Moreover, some of these interferences were made in such a manner that the conditions of free competition were changed by awarding contracts to certain firms at the expense of others (an example of this is the railway construction) and some monopolies were handed over to some privileged domestic or foreign private companies. All these implementations are contradictory to a

"liberal" system.

Now we can look at the measures taken by the state to develop capitalist relations and first in agriculture. As stated above, a natural economy prevailed in Anatolia in the 1920s. Living side by side with handicrafts and petty commodity production the natural economy to a large extent had a subsistence character. We do not have any data about the rate of marketing of agricultural produce for the 1920s but according to some relatively late research done by the Ministries of Economy and Agriculture, in 1935-1936, of a total agricultural produce worth 500 million Turkish lira, 300 million Turkish liras worth was used in the family needs of farmers, and 200 million Turkish liras worth was marketed.⁵⁰ The technology used by this natural economy was primitive. In 1927, for example, 1,751,239 farming families used 1,187,000 wooden ploughs and 210,794 heavy iron ploughs.⁵¹

After the Independence War, big landlords appropriated the lands of Greeks and Armenians who had been killed, expelled or exchanged with Turkish populations from Greece. The situation was not suitable for land reform because of the small number of the population and the existence of uncultivated areas. In this year out of a total of 231.5 million dönüms of land suitable for cultivation only 43.6 million dönüms were cultivated. The producers of marketable crops such as cotton, tobacco and vegetables were under the exploitation of merchant and usurer capital. The interest on the usurers' loans varied, according to the 1931 agricultural congress reports, between 50 per cent and 600 per cent.⁵² Nevertheless, this merchant and usurer capital was not sufficient to transform itself into industrial capital.

In addition to the merchant, usurer and landlord exploitation, state exploitation in agriculture should also be considered. A part of the surplus produced by the direct producer accrued to the state in the form of taxes. In the last years of the Independence War the aşar tax accounted for the largest part of state income from taxes. In this period about 18 million Turkish lira were collected as aşar taken from the farmers, whereas merchants and tradesmen paid 1.5 million Turkish lira each year as income tax.⁵³ The aşar was a tax in kind which used to be collected as one tenth of the harvest every year. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the farmers proposed the lifting of the aşar the merchants opposed the motion in the Izmir Congress.

The taxes paid by the peasants, however, were not confined to the aşar. Besides indirect taxes the peasants used to pay several other taxes such as road tax, education-share tax, animal tax and so on. The road tax seems to have been very important. In accordance with the law of 21st February 1921, each person aged between 18 and 60 was to pay an amount equal to four days' wages, fixed according to the local wage level. This tax burden was made heavier in February 1925 by raising the number of days to between six and twelve, the exact number was to be decided by the provincial councils. Those who were not able to pay this tax were to work in the area for six to twelve days instead. Taking into consideration the fact that most of the peasants were not involved in a money economy it is easy to see which form the road tax took in practice. The peasants paid their taxes either as corvée or by borrowing from usurers under unfavourable conditions. Of course, in the latter case the amount of tax increased in proportion with the rate of the usurer's interest. I H Tonguç gives a concrete

example of how this tax affected the peasants "If there are three people in a peasant family liable to pay the road tax of 6TL, in order to pay the total amount of 18TL they have to sell two calves or a cow".⁵⁴

Measures Taken to Develop Capitalism in Agriculture

In the 1920s political power took some measures to develop capitalism in agriculture. First, with the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, which recognised the private ownership of land, the unequal distribution of land was consolidated. Although we do not have exact numbers relating to land distribution in the 1920s, the figures from 1913 will give an idea of how land was distributed. Five per cent of the farmers had 65 per cent of the agricultural land, and 87 per cent of the farmers had 35 per cent of agricultural land, leaving 8 per cent of the peasants landless.⁵⁵ The 1923 constitution guaranteed that in the case of any expropriation the money was to be paid in cash immediately, and so both the constitution and the civil code secured the big landlords against any land reform. The recognition of private property prepared the basis for land to become a commodity, and furthermore, cadastral surveys which started in 1925 are worth mentioning as a factor in hastening the development of capitalism in agriculture.

As early as 1923 it was decided, through legislation, that agricultural machinery was to be imported by the Agricultural Bank and distributed to farmers without duty.⁵⁶ Another law in the same year recognised that the importation of animals should be exempted from duty. However, these exemptions were not able to render a fast mechanisation in agriculture, due to the lack of money needed for the importation of the

machinery. Another implementation is that of agricultural credits which increased at a great rate in the first years of the Republic.

TABLE 1.3 Loans from the Agricultural Bank, 1922-1930

YEAR	AMOUNT (TL)	YEAR	AMOUNT (TL)
1922	928,000	1927	17,124,000
1923	4,807,000	1928	29,046,000
1924	16,400,000	1929	25,880,000
1925	15,456,000	1930*	36,000,000
1926	16,214,000		

Source Z Y Hershlag, Turkey. An Economy in Transition, The Hague, Uitgeverij van Keulen, 1958

* O Ozgur, 100 Soruda Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi (Development of Capitalism in Turkey in 100 Questions), Istanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1975

According to Hershlag "The increase was uneven and not yet adjusted to the real needs of the peasantry. Additional sources of credit were needed in order to avoid the farmer's heavy dependence on the usurer".⁵⁷

In 1934, I H Tokin, talking about credit co-operatives, noted

It is hard to say that the credit co-operatives established by the Agricultural Bank are useful for peasants, simply because, being members of the administrative council of the co-operatives usurers and middlemen have been using the co-operatives as a means towards their own interests. Peasants pay their debts to usurers who are members of the administrative committee with the credit they get. A considerable number of co-operatives have become virtually an organisation of usurers. With regard to the situations where town merchants are members of the co-operative, peasants are using their credits to buy their consumption needs in the towns and this money accrues to the merchants in the towns. Town merchants, thanks to the credit co-operatives, have gained a sort of organized market.⁵⁸

The credit policy rendered possible an accumulation of money in the hands of a few and the pauperisation of the masses

The lifting of aşar (tax in kind) under the law of 17th February 1925 also played an important role in the development of capitalism in agriculture. It is possible to imagine that with the abolition of aşar small producers might have increased their surplus product and the home market might have been developed. However, as the aşar was lifted a land tax which had to be paid in cash was introduced, and this forced big producers to produce for a market. The aşar constituted more than half of the state's income in the first years of the Republic and the lifting of it possibly alleviated the exploitation of peasants by landlords, usurers and merchants, but in order to increase the reduced state income the prices of some essential goods, such as salt, sugar, paraffin, etc., were raised.⁵⁹

Despite all efforts, capitalist relations in agriculture did not develop as had been envisaged. This was simply because of the prevalence of primitive and patriarchal relations of production in Anatolia just after the Independence War. Due to the non-existence of a strong bourgeoisie to provide the base of political power the big landlords (though not capitalist) were one of the important groups who had a say in political power. This resulted in a slow development of capitalist relations in agriculture. For instance, a land reform programme was not even mentioned at the Izmir Economic Congress. "Between 1924 and 1936 in the literature of the Republican People's Party land reform is not discussed. Only giving land to the peasants is mentioned - giving land to the peasant in the sense that Crown lands will be given to peasants".⁶⁰ Thus, in short, the endeavour to develop capitalist relations in agriculture was a failure.

Measures Taken to Develop Capitalism and to Create a Bourgeoisie
Outside Agriculture

The banks established after the Independence War as half private, half state-owned companies played an important role in the transfer of the treasury to the private sector. The establishment of the İş Bankası (Work Bank) in 1924, is of great importance. It was triggered off by Atatürk, who himself provided the initial sum of 250,000TL. The administrative committee of the bank consisted of merchants, bourgeois notables and bureaucrats of high rank, and was headed by Celal Bayar, the representative of Turkish Liberalism, who was Minister of Economic Affairs at the time, and Prime Minister and President later on. The committee constituted the bridge between the state treasury and private enterprise,⁶¹ and the aim of the bank was to encourage small savings, enlarge them, and through them to finance domestic industry.⁶² Exceeding its initial aim, the bank took part directly in private enterprises.⁶³ In 1925 the Bank for Mining and Industry (Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası) was established.⁶⁴ In principle this bank aimed at governing the state-owned industrial establishments inherited from the Ottomans. In actual fact, the function of the bank was to encourage the industrial investments of the private sector and to transfer the profits to private companies while taking all the risks.⁶⁵

Another important measure was the law for the Encouragement of Industry in May 1927, whereby the government guaranteed financial support to private enterprise if they were good enough to be recognised by the Ministry of Commerce. The recognised enterprises were to be exempt from many taxes, such as immovable property tax, land tax, profit tax, surtaxes on all previous taxes due to provinces and municipalities,

supplementary personal tax and licence fees due to municipalities for construction, steam engines, motors and so on. They were also provided with free land on which to establish their enterprise, with the installation of telephones free of charge, etc.⁶⁶ "The law for the Encouragement of Industry neglected the government's wish to implement its own declarations and the resolutions of the congress of Izmir concerning the encouragement of private initiative, government intervention being restricted to those cases where private activity had ceased".⁶⁷

The state apparatus was thus used for the enrichment of the private sector. Another tool was the monopolies, most of which, inherited from the Ottomans, were engaged in the importation, production and selling of certain commodities. The implementation of monopolisation in Turkey does not bear any resemblance to Western monopoly capitalism, which resulted from the break of the mechanism of competition in favour of a financial oligarchy which merged financial capital with industrial capital, and the emergence of the state apparatus as a means towards this oligarchy. In Turkey monopolism originates from the non-development of capitalism and has been used as a means to develop capitalism.

The government declared that some sectors of the national economy should monopolise not only in terms of production but also in terms of administration and sales, and then these rights of monopolies were handed over to national or foreign private companies. While possible losses were to be covered by the state private pockets were to be protected in order to secure high profits easily without any competition. In this economic system the state was in the position of distributing

wealth. In practice this meant that the decisions rendering possible the enrichment of a handful of people were to be taken by the highly ranked bureaucrats. Apologist of the time, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, noted forty years later, "In those days the cadre of yesterday's national struggles, today's progressives, had the nature of a profit and interest company....Some of these were after land speculations, some after membership in administrations of big companies, while some were chasing commissions".⁶⁸

The monopoly for matches and flints was given first to a Belgian company and then to an American company. Among the founders of the Turkish Match Monopoly joint corporation with the Belgian company in 1925 were (General) Ismet Pasha, M Celal and Y Nadi. The monopoly of spirits and alcoholic drinks was given to a Turkish-Polish joint company in 1926. The monopoly of gunpowder and explosives was given to a French company in 1927. The export-import monopoly of oil was given to the Americal Standard Oil Company. Also, the working of the Istanbul, Izmir, Trabzon and Mersin harbours was monopolised and handed over to joint companies.⁶⁹

The enrichment of a handful of people (merchants, landlords and bureaucrats) took place parallel with the weakening of the treasury. The burden of this tendency was carried by the social categories who were not given shares from the plundering by means of taxes, most of which were of an indirect nature. The production, importation, and exportation of primary consumption goods (salt, sugar, spirits, oil, matches, etc.) were under state monopoly, and all these goods were subject to indirect taxes which comprised two thirds of state income. In 1925

state income derived from salt was 10,100,000TL, whereas the income tax collected from merchants, traders and wage earners amounted to 4,233,000TL.⁷⁰ In short, most of the state income was derived from the peasants and workers by means of indirect taxes levied on essential consumption goods, and this income was distributed to the merchants and landlords through the state apparatus in which merchants and landlords and bureaucrats held the power.

Foreign Capital

Some have claimed that foreign capital did not play any important role in Turkey after the 1920s. This is a fallacy, because these people were evaluating foreign capital as directly invested capital, but we know that in the period under consideration both Turkish politicians and Turkish capitalists were ready to accept and encourage foreign capital on condition that it worked in collaboration with Turkish capital and organised itself with Turkish companies. U. Ülkü'nü shows that in the 1920-1930 period foreign capital entered Turkey to a considerable extent under the disguise of a Turkish national costume.⁷¹

According to Ülkü'nü, foreign capital took part in 66 out of 201 Turkish incorporated companies established between 1920 and 1930. The total capital invested by these companies was 73,000,000TL, of which 31,500,000TL belonged to companies with foreign capital. From the above it may be concluded that until 1930 the Turkish government and Turkish bourgeoisie were not in favour of breaking the ties between imperialism and Turkey, rather, they were in favour of strengthening them. The Turkish leading cadres were not against imperialism, but against the direct invasion and rule of imperialism, namely direct colonialism.⁷²

2. 1932-1939 THE ÉTATIST PERIOD

State intervention in the economy gradually increased after 1932, and Étatism, implemented between 1932 and 1939, was no longer an economic policy after 1932. The word "étatism" might be misleading. It does not refer to collectivism or socialism. Rather it was state capitalism in the full sense. The state directly entered into the sphere of production and accumulation of capital was secured through direct and indirect taxes through the control of foreign trade and control of the price mechanism. Many factors compelled the leading cadres to resort to a statist policy. First, it was the success of the opposition group Serbest Fırka in local elections in 1931 that led the leaders in political power to think about the economic conditions of the country. They may have realised that they would lose power unless a road to fast economic development was taken.⁷³ Second, despite all efforts and support from the state, the private enterprise endeavour was not successful. According to the statistics, at the end of the period 1923 to 1931, although the number of industrial establishments rose by 30 per cent and the number of employees by 60 per cent, 63,185 out of 65,245 establishments (96.8 per cent) bore attributes of small handicraft industries. Given the fact that 90 per cent of all imports were industrial production goods, it can easily be said that industry had not yet developed in Turkey.⁷⁴ Local private capital preferred to invest in areas where a high short-term profit was easy to obtain, such as foreign trade, mining etc. Foreign capital, although supported and guaranteed, did not seem to be interested in investing in Turkey to any great extent. The foreign capital which came to Turkey came either as a concessionary company or as a partner in a Turkish incorporated

company, it did not bring about the favourable results which had been envisaged. It was the masses who suffered from this situation, and who expressed their discontent in every way possible. Third, world capitalism was shaken by a severe crisis in the 1930s, as a result of which many people were left jobless and prices dropped. For instance, between 1929 and 1933 there existed 13 million unemployed in America, 25 to 30 million in Europe.⁷⁵ The fall in prices, especially in agricultural products which formed the main source of income for the Turkish population and was the greatest part of Turkish exports, was severe. As a part of the world capitalist system Turkey was greatly affected by the world depression. This revealed itself in the decrease in volume of foreign trade as shown below

TABLE 1.4 Foreign Trade Figures for the Years 1929-1935 (in millions of Turkish lira)

YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS
1929	256	155
1930	148	152
1931	126.6	127.2
1932	86	101
1933	75	96
1934	87	92
1935	89	96

Source Z Y Hershlag, Op. cit., 1958

The world crisis of the capitalist system led Turkey to lose her confidence in free trade and a liberal policy. That Russia had kept out of the world depression and had entered into a fast and planned development process, attracted Turkey's sympathies towards Russia, with

whom Turkey had had intimate relations since the establishment of the Republic.⁷⁶ Although Turkey was influenced by Russia she "reserved sovereignty with regard to her socio-political regime....Turkey remained loyal to the principle of private property, did not resort to expropriation without compensation and left most of her economy in private hands, while the Soviet Union nationalised the 'means of production'".⁷⁷ Fourth, another important factor for the state intervention in the economy to reach a high level is the fact that the possibilities of state intervention only came to the fore around 1929, simply because some of the articles of the Lausanne Treaty had not allowed Turkey to implement an effective customs policy⁷⁸ which had deprived the state of an important source of income and restricted the establishment of a national industry. The validity of the Lausanne Treaty restrictions ended in 1929 and the state gained the power of intervening in economic life.

Étatist implementation led some people to think that it was an alternative to the capitalist system an entirely erroneous assumption. Mustafa Kemal had clearly stated that étatism had nothing to do with socialism.⁷⁹ Also, A Aqaoğlu, a member of Serbest Fıkra, criticises those people who assume that etatism is equal to leftism

To concentrate economic activities in the hands of the state might be assumed to be a tendency towards the left....The state which runs trains, works mines and natural resources might be thought to have gone over to the left....To hand over 35 per cent of the Turkish peasants' income to foreign capital and to direct the treasure of the state to a dead end is not etatism, nor right nor left.⁸⁰

Kadrocular, a group of intellectuals writing in the journal called

Kedro, claimed that étatism was as much an alternative to socialism as it was to capitalism, and that it had not existed anywhere but in Turkey. According to them, capitalist states in the West relied on the bourgeois class and the communist state of Russia was based on the working class, whereas the Turkish state did not rely on any class since class formation had not taken place in Turkey, and so the Turkish state was neither capitalist nor socialist, simply because it rested on the sovereignty of the nation rather than on that of a class.⁸¹

Merchants, industrialists, etc., and their representatives in parliament accused the statist programme of being communist,⁸² however, their suspicions were overcome by the appointment of Celal Bayar, previously general director of the Work Bank (İş Bankası), as the Minister of Economic Affairs. Celal Bayar assured the businessmen, in a statement in 1932, that étatism was not going to be implemented against the interests of the private sector.⁸³ The term étatism might cover three different economic political implementations. First, state intervention, as a result of the world depression the prices of agricultural produce had fallen and the prices of imported goods had increased for Turkey. For instance, the price of wheat was around 15 kurus, and it went down to 5 kurus in 1932. Between 1929 and 1932 the prices of the following articles had also fallen drastically: 73 per cent in hazelnuts and opium, 63 per cent in wheat, 52 per cent in figs, 48 per cent in cotton, 44 per cent in olive oil, 43 per cent in grapes and 50 per cent in cotton.⁸⁴ Consequently, not only had Turkey's foreign terms of trade dropped, but the peasants were put in a bad position as far as their standard of living was concerned. Price control and the

readjustment of foreign trade were two different sides of the intervention. The state took over the import and export of some goods and the price control policy revealed itself in the support purchase of agricultural goods by the state, with a view to protecting the peasants but those who benefited from this were the middle and big farmers who were producing for the market. Second, state capitalism, the state directly engaged in the production process. For example, in the fields of chemical industry, earthenware industry, iron industry, paper and cellulose, sponge industry, cotton textile industry, worsted industry and hemp industry.⁸⁵ Third, nationalisation, the seven years' guarantee given to foreign companies in Lusanne ended in 1930, after which nationalisation of foreign companies took place in several spheres.⁸⁶

The burden of capital accumulation of an internally financed industrialisation was shouldered by the masses. The tax policy of the state and the development of the income of the state monopolies reveal the class base of the attempts to industrialise the country. The income of the state budget largely depended on indirect taxes of which the burden was mostly carried by wage earners and the poorer classes. Not only were the agricultural incomes of the big farmers exempt from income tax, but also the income tax paid by merchants and industrialists were of little account in the total income of the state treasury. For instance, income tax collected between 1929 and 1935 was approximately 12 million Turkish lira per year, 60 per cent of which was paid by workers, civil servants etc. In this period aggregate income tax paid by merchants and industrialists per year was 4,800,000 TL, which is one fortyfifth of the total tax income of the state.⁸⁷ This figure indicates which

classes carried the burden of state capitalism

State capitalism was not implemented against the interests of the private sector. On the contrary, it was in accordance with their interests. What was understood from étatism was state activism in the fields where private enterprise failed or was not strong enough. In other words, in those areas where it was impossible for private enterprise to be realised, such as the building of infrastructural establishments, main industrial institutions, electrical power stations, railway networks and an iron and steel industry were all handled by the state

3. 1940-1945 PERIOD

This was a war period, during which time the country was kept in a state of mobilisation. A considerable part of the working population was recruited for the army, and most of the state income was devoted to military expenditure. Imports fell to 50-55 million dollars in 1940-41, from 120 million dollars in 1938. The level of productivity fell as a result of the extraction of the working population from the production sphere, and the reduction in imported production inputs. The production of wheat dropped to 2,200,000 tons in 1945 from 4,200,000 tons in 1939.⁸⁸ The volume of foreign trade dropped sharply. The smallest volume of trade was recorded in 1940, when imports were 19 million Turkish lira, and exports were 111 million Turkish lira.⁸⁹

The feeding of the army and the populations of the big cities constituted a serious problem, and inflation was inevitable. The rate of price increase between 1939 and 1948 was 434 per cent for the whole

period, of 40 per cent per year.⁹⁰ The burden of the war economy was shouldered again by the masses, while a few groups of merchants and big farmers, taking advantage of the situation, made incredible profits. A part of the bureaucracy also had a continuous share of these profits.⁹¹

The laws passed in this period seem to be important. First, the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) Law of 1942. This was a tax to be collected once only from those who made great profits during the war years. The amount of the tax was fixed arbitrarily by commissions who desired to levy heavy taxes on the minorities and the commercial bourgeoisie of Istanbul. Second, the Soil Products Tax, which was collected from big and small farmers. By not differentiating between big and small farmers this tax caused quite a lot of difficulty for the small farmers who produced for home consumption and whose productivity had fallen greatly due to the conditions brought about by the war.

4 1945-1960 PERIOD

This was a period of liberalisation. The 1946 government programme stated that private enterprise was to be made use of and would be supported by the government. During this period foreign capital was invited into Turkey, since the third Five Year Development Plan, prepared in 1947 and hardly implemented, envisaged 3.7 billion Turkish lira's worth of investments and 648 million dollars of this was to be secured from foreign sources.⁹² In the 1948 and 1949 government programmes it was stated that the state needed foreign capital and that private capital was to be encouraged and its investments to be facilitated.⁹³ It is evident that the bureaucracy, in order to be

able to stay in power, tried to please both the local bourgeoisie and imperialism.

With the start of the cold war, Turkey was converted into a vanguard of imperialism. During the Second World War Turkey had borrowed 95 million dollars from America.⁹⁴ The American aid given to Turkey was aimed at the following 1) Turkey would be a vanguard against the Soviet Union, 2) by improving her economy in the fields of agriculture and mining, Turkey would become a food and raw material supplier for the west.⁹⁵

Turkey's several appeals to be included in the Marshall Aid plan were accepted on the conditions that Turkey would develop her agriculture with the aid she was to receive and would buy industrial goods from the West. The United States and international institutions under the control of the United States directed Turkey's economic policy. For instance, Thornburg's report is an example of American intervention in Turkish policy making. In this report, in 1950, entitled "A Criticism of Today's Economic Situation in Turkey" (Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Ekonomik Durumunun Tenkidı), Thornburg noted that Turkey was an agricultural country and should be content with simple agricultural equipments, and that Turkey did not need artificial fertiliser, so the establishment of a fertiliser factory would be unnecessary. The Karabük Iron and Steel Plant should be liquidated, and the government should take measures to encourage foreign capital to invest in Turkey.⁹⁶

The World Bank Committee, invited by the Turkish government to examine the conditions which would help to determine the economic policy of

the government, prepared a report which was considered very valuable, as was the Thornburg report. The World Bank report, known also as the Barker Report, suggested that étatism should be abolished, that comprehensive planning was not necessary at all, that priority in development should be given to agriculture and the production of raw materials. The whole sphere of the economy should be opened to private enterprise and the existing regulations preventing foreign capital from coming into Turkey should be revised because foreign capital must be brought into the country.³⁷

Between 1949 and 1960 American aid to Turkey amounted to 1,110.4 million dollars.

TABLE 1.5 Percentage Distribution of American Aid according to Sector

Agriculture	35.2
Industry and mining	32.0
Transport	3.5

Source: Tunç Tayanç, Sanayileşme Sürecinde 50 Yıl (50 Years in the Process of Industrialisation), İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1973

The years 1950-1954 were a period of liberalisation in Turkey, during which the United States and Canada were stocking their grain because of the Korean War. This made it possible for Turkey to increase her national income through the exportation of grain. However, the economy entered a crisis after 1955, owing to the fact that the reclamation of cultivable lands had reached its limit, and with the end of the Korean War the United States and Canada had begun to market their grain.

TABLE 1.6 The Development of Agricultural Lands (in 1,000 hectares)

YEAR	CULTIVATED AREA	AREA UNDER FALLOW	TOTAL
1934	6,882	3,674	10,556
1938	8,463	4,695	13,158
1942	9,555	4,565	14,120
1946	8,413	4,680	13,093
1950	9,868	4,674	14,542
1954	13,775	6,408	22,453
1958	14,764	8,001	22,765
1960	15,305	7,922	23,227

Source Y Kuçuk, 100 Soruda Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye
(Planning, Development and Turkey in 100 Questions),
Istanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1971

With the priority given to agriculture in development, agricultural credits given to farmers increased considerably. The following table shows the relations between total credits and agricultural credits.

TABLE 1.7 Agricultural Credits

YEAR	NET AGRICULTURAL CREDIT (millions of TL)	TOTAL CREDIT (millions of TL)	AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AS % OF TOTAL
1950	780	2,032	38.4
1951	1,177	2,712	43.4
1952	1,861	3,753	49.6
1953	2,142	4,252	45.1
1954	2,447	5,640	43.4
1955	2,602	7,190	36.2

Source Y Kuçuk, Op. cit., 1971

The number of tractors also rose, from 1,750 in 1948 to 16,585 in 1950, 37,743 in 1954 and 40,000 in 1955.⁹⁹ However, in 1953 only about

one per cent of farming families were benefiting from this mechanisation of agriculture.¹⁰⁰ Under the conditions prepared by the government rich farmers enlarged their lands through the liquidation of their sharecroppers and tenants, through cultivation of previously unused lands, renting and buying of new land, and appropriation of pasture lands.¹⁰¹ Capitalist production in agriculture became more and more evident in large holdings.¹⁰²

Since the 1920s all efforts to create a big national bourgeoisie had failed. The Democratic Party, which came to power in 1950, was in favour of liberalism in the economy. In accordance with the ideas put forward by American advisers, and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, foreign trade was liberalised and 60 per cent of imports were freed. Again in 1954, with the efforts of the American C B Randall, the head of the foreign economic policy council, Law No. 6224 for the encouragement of foreign capital was promulgated. Another important law promulgated in the same year was the Oil Law, positing private enterprise. Despite the fact that foreign capital did not reach any enormous scale, it created a dependent industrialisation structure in Turkey. For example, between 1951 and 1960, 548 million dollars of foreign capital was allowed into Turkey.¹⁰³ However, since foreign capital was inclined to work in collaboration with indigenous capital it induced 514 million Turkish lira of local capital to be invested. In some cases foreign capital would extend a very limited amount of money, sometimes it was even content with only selling the patent licence, know-how, etc. For instance, Coca-Cola was established with 100 per cent Turkish capital, but is 100 per cent dependent on an American company. Similarly, automobile producing

assembly industries are also dependent on metropolitan countries.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Turkey had become a member of imperialist military pacts such as NATO (1952), and CENTO, both of which forced Turkey to spend her national income on military expenditure, which in turn hindered her general development, and consolidated her dependency on the imperialist countries. For instance, Turkey used 45.58 per cent of the money she borrowed between 1955 and 1960 from other countries for military purposes, and 27 per cent of her borrowing was in the form of food aid.¹⁰⁵

5. FROM THE 1960 MILITARY INTERVENTION ONWARDS

The 1960 military intervention lacks any social class base. The factors lying behind it were the student movements arising from inflation, violation of the rule of law by the government itself, and the military-civil bureaucrats' being out of power. The movement was not against imperialism, and so, right after the intervention the officers of the coup declared that they were loyal to both NATO and CENTO and were not against foreign capital.¹⁰⁶ The military administration held an election in 1961 and political life returned to normal. As a result of the election a coalition of the representatives of the merchant bourgeoisie and landlords came into power and the Republican People's Party, which was thought to have been the mastermind of the 1960 coup, lost votes.

The 1960-1961 regime had taken a series of measures which the bourgeoisie itself could not dare to attempt. Although the coalition of merchants and landlords put an end to some of the measures, such as land and agricultural tax, other measures pertaining to the planning of the economy remained in effect. These measures contributed to the speeding

up of industrialisation, capital accumulation took place at a faster pace, dependence on imperialism was consolidated and the bourgeoisie became stronger. After the 1960 coup the State Planning Organisation was established and it prepared the first Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967). This plan aimed to increase internal savings and secure favourable conditions for local and foreign private enterprise.

Despite the fact that the development of industry was given priority in the first Five Year Development Plan, the increase in industrial products was only 8.9 per cent, compared with the target, which was set at 12.6 per cent increase.

The planned period was a golden period for the private sector. With the support of the Agency for International Development and foreign capital, the state systematically tried to create private entrepreneurs in this period more than ever before. For example, in 1963 the state secured 1,760 million dollars for the private sector from external sources.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, 219,980,000 dollars of the credits, borrowed mainly from the Agency for International Development, the International Development Association, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as some other international organisations, were allocated to the private sector as project credits between 1963 and 1966.¹⁰⁸

Although it has not come to a large scale, foreign capital has brought Turkey assembly industry. It works in co-operation with Turkish capital, though in some cases it prefers to use local capital by just selling the rights of patent, royalty, know-how, etc.¹⁰⁹ Small scale industry is dominant in Turkey simply because developed countries

would not like to lose Turkey as a market. In Turkey, industry has developed in the fields of consumption goods and some durable consumption goods. These industries are protected by tariffs, so that companies can make high profits. For instance, the rate of exploitation rose from 178 in 1950 to 216 in 1959, 263 in 1963 and 341 in 1973.¹¹⁰ The parts assembled in Turkey are largely produced in developed capitalist countries' large scale industries with advanced techniques. The industrial establishments which assemble these parts in Turkey are small scale establishments with backward technology. The dependence of Turkey on the western countries is thus consolidated through assembly industry. This dependence is two-fold first, Turkey has to import the inputs of the assembly industry, and second, this makes it easier for the western countries to send capital to Turkey. In short, the assembly industry not only eases the export of capital for western monopolies but also increases the dependence of the country on the external powers.

The table below provides us with some information, from 1973, regarding 89 industrial establishments working in partnership with foreign capital in the field of assembly industry in accordance with Law No. 6224.

It is evident that a large part of the inputs are imported goods. According to Özgür, this figure is misleading simply because the ratio has been calculated according to production inputs and imported goods. In fact production inputs include wages, rent, interest, etc. which have to be taken into consideration. The home-made goods and foreign goods should be compared with each other in calculating the ratio

between local inputs and foreign inputs. Calculated in this way the ratio comes out as 54 per cent.

TABLE 1.8 Main Coefficients in Assembly Industry in 1973

Ratio of profit to total capital	•37
Ratio of profit to foreign capital	•87
Ratio of import to inputs	•38
Ratio of export to production values	•03
Share of foreign capital in total	•42
Payment for each local worker per year	40,356TL
Payment for each foreign worker per year	176,147TL

Source Özlem Özgür, 100 Soruda Sanayileşme ve Türkiye (Industrialisation and Turkey in 100 Questions), İstanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1976

Furthermore, the products of assembly industry are two to three times as expensive as the world prices. According to Özgür, cars produced in Turkey's assembly industry are between 1.9 to 2.6 times as expensive as their counterparts in the world market. These figures for other durable consumer goods are 3.0 for minibuses, 3.5 for lorries, 1.6 for tractors, 2.9 for tape recorders and 2.6 for televisions.¹¹¹

What has the Planned Period Brought?

At the end of the second Five Year Development Plan industry was the most important sector of the Turkish economy, as can be seen in Table 1.9 below. Two things are evident from Tables 1.9 and 1.10. First, the increase in industrial products is the highest, second, the share of agriculture in the Gross Domestic Product decreased from 44.3 per cent in 1948 to 25.3 per cent in 1972, while that of industry increased from 12.2 per cent in 1948 to 23.7 per cent in 1972.

TABLE 1.9 Gross National Product According to Sectors (millions of TL in 1968 prices)

SECTOR	1948	1953	1963	1972	INDEX (1948=100)
Agriculture	16,437	21,235	29,139	36,402	221
Industry	4,753	8,333	14,370	34,155	719
Services	15,875	27,073	40,679	77,797	490
Total	37,065	56,641	84,188	148,354	400

Source State Institute of Statistics, Türkiye Milli Geliri 1948-1973 (National Income of Turkey 1948-1973), Ankara

TABLE 1.10 The Ratio of the Shares of each Sector in Gross Domestic Product (in 1968 producers' prices)

SECTOR	1948	1953	1963	1973
Agriculture	44.3	37.3	34.6	25.3
Industry	12.8	14.6	17.0	23.7
Services	42.9	48.1	48.4	51.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source State Institute of Statistics, Op. cit.

TABLE 1.11 Composition of Production in Turkish Industry

PRODUCTION	1967	1972
Consumption goods	52.9%	46.6%
Intermediate goods	35.4%	39.4%
Capital goods	11.7%	14.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source State Planning Organisation, Third Five Year Development Plan 1973-1977, Ankara, 1973.

As can be seen from Table 1.11 above, consumer goods production is still predominant in Turkish industry. It should also be noted that the share of the public sector in industry has been gradually declining since 1950. The public activities in industry started to a great extent in 1932 and public investment in industry maintained its preponderance until the end of the Second World War. However, these establishments were used as a means of accumulating capital in the hands of a few, both during the étatist period and the war years. Nevertheless, just after the Second World War, with the inclination of the owners of capital to invest in industry, the share of the public sector gradually shrank.

TABLE 1.12 The Shares of Public and Private Industrial Enterprises in the Total Production (as percentages)

SECTOR	1950	1959	1963	1973
State	46.5	44.3	44.2	36.6
Private	53.5	55.7	55.8	63.4

Source State Institute of Statistics, Industrial Census & Annual Industrial Survey for the relevant years

Having left large scale and expensive investments to the state, which would provide private enterprise with cheap inputs, private enterprise has become dominant in the fields producing durable and non-durable consumer goods which would bring the highest possible profits in a short period. If we look at the table below we shall see that the important sectors with regard to the value of production in Turkish manufacturing industry are food, chemicals, metal products, machinery,

transport equipment, textiles and basic metal industries. The private sector is predominant in these sectors, with two exceptions the areas where state production is effective are the basic metal industry and the chemical and paper industries. This is only to be expected, since careful examination will show that these sectors are input-producing sectors for the others, and are considerably large scale, i.e. requiring large sums of money in order to be established.

TABLE 1.13 The Importance of Private and Public Enterprises in the
Sub-sectors of Manufacturing Industry (1973 in percentage)

SUB-SECTOR	STATE	PRIVATE	TOTAL
Food, drink, cotton	43.6	56.4	100
Textile	16.5	83.5	100
Forest products and furniture	28.0	72.0	100
Paper, paper products, printing	47.4	52.6	100
Chemical	54.9	45.1	100
Earthenware	60.6	39.4	100
Metal products, machinery, transport equipment	17.9	82.1	100
Total manufacturing industry	36.6	63.4	100

Source State Institute of Statistics, Annual Industrial Survey of 1973

During the planned period, with the development of industry, the working class doubled in number. The exploitation of the working class, coupled with other causes such as the transfer of surplus values from agriculture through the state's policy, resulted in a rapid process of capital accumulation. The following tables show the increase in the number of the working population in manufacturing industry, and the capital formation in Turkey.

TABLE 1.14 Numbers of Establishments, Workers, and the Growth of Production in the Manufacturing Industry

YEAR	NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS	NUMBER OF WORKERS	PRODUCTION (millions of TL)
1963	3,012	325,441	19,636
1973	5,937	637,617	141,246

Source State Institute of Statistics, Industrial Census of 1963 and Annual Industrial Survey of 1973

TABLE 1.15 Cross Capital Formation in Turkey (millions of TL)

YEAR	NATIONAL PRODUCT	CAPITAL FORMATION	SHARE OF GCF IN GNP (,)
1948	37.1	3.9	10.5
1950	38.5	6.3	16.4
1955	56.6	9.7	17.1
1960	70.9	10.8	15.2
1965	90.4	13.2	14.6
1970	125.2	23.5	18.8

Source State Institute of Statistics, Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50. Yılı, 1973 (1973, 50th Anniversary of Social and Economic Development in Turkey), Ankara, 1977

TABLE 1.16 Growth of National Income and Real Income (in fixed prices)

YEAR	GROWTH OF NATIONAL INCOME (°)	GROWTH OF INCOME IN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR (,)	GROWTH OF REAL INCOME (°)
1963	9.7	12.0	-
1964	4.1	11.2	6.4
1965	3.1	9.5	4.5
1966	12.0	15.2	4.3
1967	4.2	8.2	3.5
1968	6.7	11.1	4.9
1969	5.4	12.0	8.3
1970	5.6	2.1	0.8
1971	10.7	10.4	-5.1
1972	7.1	11.0	-1.4
1973	6.4	9.1	-3.9

Source Tüm İktisatçılar Birliği, Türkiye'de İşçi Ücretleri ve Enflasyon (Wages and Inflation in Turkey) Ankara, TÜB yayını No. 5, 1974

Table 1 16 shows that during this period, while the prices of goods increased, the real wages of the workers dropped

From the above discussion it is possible to conclude that small scale industry with backward technology was created during the planned period. Another attribute of industry is that it was of a dependent nature in terms of its technology, raw materials and finance. Furthermore, while the capitalist class producing for the home market was making huge profits the living standard of the working class declined drastically.

Foreign Trade

Agricultural products are still the main export goods from Turkey. The development of Turkish exports is shown in the following table

TABLE 1.17 Turkish Exports (percentages)

YEAR	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS	MINING	INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS	TOTAL
1923	86.3	5.1	8.6	100
1939	88.2	7.0	4.8	100
1950	93.0	5.6	1.4	100
1960	85.3	5.1	9.6	100
1963	77.2	2.9	19.9	100
1965	75.9	4.5	19.6	100
1967	80.5	4.0	15.5	100
1969	75.4	6.5	18.1	100
1971	72.6	7.2	20.2	100

Source State Institute of Statistics, Op. cit., 1977

As in other underdeveloped countries, Turkey has specialised in one or two primary goods and as such takes her place in the capitalist world

market. Thus cotton and tobacco together accounted for 34.1 per cent of the total exports in 1938, 49.6 per cent in 1950, 34.4 per cent in 1960, 42.8 per cent in 1970 and 47.8 per cent in 1971.¹¹²

Foreign trade is a sophisticated way of exploiting underdeveloped countries.¹¹³ For instance, in Turkey, and as the table below shows, the terms of trade have deteriorated during the period 1968 to 1974. As a result, Turkey lost 26,970 million Turkish lira in 1974, due to these price differentials.

TABLE 1.18 Foreign Terms of Trade in Turkey (Price index = 100 in 1968)

YEAR	IMPORT PRICES	EXPORT PRICES	FOREIGN TERMS OF TRADE
1968	100	100	100
1970	102.5	99.2	96.8
1972	124.0	116.8	94.1
1974	226.4	191.5	84.6

Source State Institute of Statistics, Annual Foreign Trade Statistics (for the relevant years)

Agriculture

Turkey is mainly an agricultural country in terms of the working population. Agriculture accounted for 65 per cent of the working population in 1972, while the figure for industry was 14.5 per cent and for services 20.5 per cent. Nevertheless, statistical data show that the share of agriculture in the Gross National Product was decreasing. In 1972, for example, it was 25.3 per cent, whereas in 1960 it had been 37.2 per cent. Similarly, in 1950 it had been 40.8 per cent and in 1948, 44.3 per cent.¹¹⁴

TABLE 1.19 Sectoral Composition of the Working Population
(percentages)

SECTOR	1927	1935	1950	1962	1972
Agriculture	80.9	76.4	77.7	77.1	65.0
Industry	8.9	11.7	10.3	10.9	14.5
Services	10.2	11.9	12.0	12.0	20.5

Source State Institute of Statistics

Furthermore, the most important means of production in agriculture - land - is unequally distributed among farmers. According to the results of the 1963 agricultural census, 308,899 out of 3,100,947 farming families were landless (8.8 per cent), whereas in 1970 the number of landless farming families becomes 405,182 (11.6 per cent).¹¹⁵ Land is also unevenly distributed among holdings. The table below indicates that 24.8 per cent of the holdings controlled 70.5 per cent of the total land in 1970, while 48.2 per cent of the holdings controlled only 9.6 per cent of the total land in the same year.

TABLE 1.20 Size of Holdings and Area Cultivated by the Holdings,
1950-1970

SIZE OF HOLDING (decares)	1950		1963		1970	
	HOLDING (%)	CULTIVATED AREA (%)	HOLDING (%)	CULTIVATED AREA (%)	HOLDING (%)	CULTIVATED AREA (%)
1-20	30.5	4.3	40.9	6.8	48.2	9.6
21-50	31.5	14.5	27.9	16.9	27.0	19.9
51-500	36.5	56.4	30.7	63.1	24.4	59.3
500+	1.5	24.8	0.5	13.2	0.4	11.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source State Institute of Statistics, Agricultural Census of 1950, 1963 and 1970

Most of the holdings in Turkish agriculture are dwarf holdings. Between 50 and 100 decares of land, according to its fertility and the family size of the holder, is assumed to be necessary for a family's subsistence. This means that at least 75 per cent of families in 1970 did not have enough land to subsist and had to search for an additional income. Nevertheless, the share of the big holdings seems to be decreasing. This may be a result of the fear of land reform, and since the statistics are based on the declarations of farmers and the government's recordings, in which big farmers are inclined to show their holdings as divided, de jure, among family members. Furthermore, land tax concerns also affected the farmers' behaviour, making them show their holdings as being divided among family members.

During the planned period agriculture can be seen as one of the sources of finance for industry. However, the envisaged increase in the production of agricultural goods had not taken place.

TABLE 1.21 First Five Year Development Plan, 1963-1967

CROP	YEARLY AGGREGATE DEVELOPMENT PACE	
	TARGET	REALISATION
Industrial crops (overall)	5.7	7.7
e.g. cotton	6.3	8.1
tobacco	2.0	8.0
Grains (overall)	2.8	1.8
e.g. wheat	2.3	1.8
maize	8.8	5.6
Potatoes	7.5	4.6
Meat	7.6	2.7
Milk	12.1	2.1
Eggs	10.0	4.0

Source State Planning Organisation, Second Five Year Development Plan (1968-1972), Ankara, 1968

The production of commercial crops, especially cotton and tobacco, which are the main export crops, has exceeded the targets set, whereas the production of foodstuffs has lagged far behind the targets. Supposedly an agricultural country, Turkey had to rely on American grain aid during the First Five Year Development Plan, this aid amounted to 283.5 million dollars.¹¹⁶

As in many Third World countries, large investments are lacking in agriculture in Turkey. Capital has penetrated into agriculture through credits, aid and merchant capital, which last played a very decisive role. The state was the biggest merchant in Turkey. Through fixing the prices of agricultural products below their values the state managed to appropriate the surplus products of the peasants. According to the results of a recent study,¹¹⁷ the producers of four commercial crops are being exploited by the price-support policy.

TABLE 1.22 General Index Relating to Four Crops in Terms of Protection Prices and Floor Prices

YEAR	COTTON		TEA		SUGAR BEET		HAZELNUTS	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
1968	100	100	100	100	100	100	-	-
1969	101	99	100	100	112	100	100	100
1970	108	118	117	100	120	142	60	129
1971	131	142	118	114	130	152	122	147
1972	167	157	103	114	148	142	120	147
1973	199	250	118	129	200	213	143	167
1974	363	336	188	179	284	284	173	233

Notes (A) refers to the production prices
(B) refers to the floor prices

Source State Planning Organisation, Destekleme Politikası Uygulamasının Çay, Şeker Pancarı, Pamuk ve Fındık Üreticileri Üzerindeki Etkileri (The Effects of the Price Support Policy on the Producers of Tea, Sugar Beet, Cotton and Hazelnuts), Ankara, 1976

Only in hazelnuts is the floor price higher than the price of production. Those of cotton and tea are lower, while that of sugar beet is the same as the floor price.

Merchant and Usurers' capital are also very effective in the appropriation of the agricultural surplus. Since the organised credits (credits given by the Agricultural Bank or credit co-operatives supported by the Agricultural Bank) are not sufficient, nor distributed equally among the farmers, peasants have to resort to merchants or usurers. For instance, the interest rate of usurers' capital is between 40 per cent and 200 per cent in Söke where cotton production is dominant, between 50 per cent and 60 per cent in the Black Sea region where hazelnuts are the main crop.¹¹⁸ In addition, lack of marketing facilities forces the peasants to sell their products to merchants at a price lower than the declared floor prices. For example, when the floor price for cotton was 760 kurus per kilo in 1974, merchants were buying cotton at 579 kurus per kilo, while the cotton selling price for the same year was about 1,206 kurus per kilo.¹¹⁹ This means that the profit per kilo for the merchant was an incredible 627 kurus.

In short, the surplus product of the peasant is appropriated through the price control mechanism and those who benefit from it are the merchants, usurers and industrialists. The industrialists benefit because with the low prices of agricultural products their expenditure on variable capital (wages) is kept low, second, the surplus accumulated in the hands of the government is transferred to industry with the implementation of the policy of the encouragement of industry. For instance, between the establishment of the Office for Encouragement

of Industry in 1968, and March 1972, 10,500 million Turkish lira's worth of investment projects were given encouragement certificates, whereas this figure amounted to 27,000 million Turkish lira within nine months in 1973.¹²⁰

Given the above discussion of regional underdevelopment and the major features of the Turkish social formation, it is now possible to delineate some of the general aspects of the theoretical structure whose parameters determine the type of analysis to be presented in the following chapters.

GENERAL THEORETICAL REMARKS

In its development and reproduction capitalism comes into contact with non-capitalist modes of production and social formations. Marx pointed out the effects of such a confrontation when writing about India

England has to fulfil a double mission in India one destructive, the other regenerating - the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundation of Western society in Asia.¹²¹

Similarly, in his major contribution, Das Capital, he suggests that "the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future".¹²²

It is clear from the above quotations that Marx believed that capitalism would destroy non-capitalist societies and create a capitalism which

would be similar to Western capitalism. History, however, has shown that Marx's suggestion has failed to materialise. Coming into contact with capitalism, non-capitalist societies did not develop into a western type of capitalist society. On the contrary, they developed into a condition which has been characterised as "the development of underdevelopment" by Frank, or "peripheral capitalism" by Amin, and "dependent capitalism" by Cardoso, to name but a few.¹²³ Nevertheless, regardless of the terms employed to describe the conditions of Third World countries, most contributors to the debate agree that both developed and underdeveloped countries operate within the same framework the capitalist world economy.

Despite the consensus about the existence of the capitalist world economy there are important differences when it comes to conceptualising its nature, the relationship between its component parts and the nature of its constituent parts. Frank, for example, following Baran's classic contribution The Political Economy of Growth, (1957) argues that

Contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries....These relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.¹²⁴

Frank goes on to maintain that even the most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world have been effectively penetrated by the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries. All the economic, political, social and cultural institutions and relations which exist in the underdeveloped world are products of the historical development

of the capitalist system. For Frank, the capitalist world economy consists of

...a whole chain of metropolises and satellites, which runs from the world metropolis down to the hacienda or rural merchant who are satellites of the local commercial metropolitan center but who in turn have peasants as their satellites.¹²⁵

Metropolis-satellite relations create close economic, political and social ties between them. Owing to its monopolistic position the metropolis extracts and appropriates the economic surplus of the satellite in order to use it in its own economic development. While these metropolis-satellite links lead to development in the metropolis they create underdevelopment in the satellite.

This metropolis satellite relationship not only is the relationship on a world level between the developed and underdeveloped nation states, it is also the relationship within the underdeveloped country between provincial, local and sectoral levels. For Frank argues that

There is a close interconnection of the economy and the socio-political structure of the satellite with those of the metropolis. The closer the satellite's links with and dependence on the metropolis, the closer is the satellite bourgeoisie, including the so-called "national bourgeoisie", linked and dependent on the metropolis.¹²⁶

Frank's work is an adequate critique of the dualistic theory of society, and its Marxist version, for claiming that there exist two sectors within a society one being feudal, archaic and underdeveloped, the other being the second sector, which once was at a stage which could be described as traditionally archaic, feudal and underdeveloped

but which has now taken off and become a relatively developed, advanced capitalist sector.

Another important contribution to the debate is Immanuel Wallerstein's The Modern World System, which also tries to analyse the development of capitalism as a world system. Wallerstein attempts to develop an appropriate method for studying the process of social change. Accepting that social change can only be understood within social systems, he rejects the idea "of taking either the sovereign state or...the national society, as the unit of analysis".¹²⁷ Instead, he argues that the only social system is the "world system", in which the changes in the sovereign states can meaningfully be explained as a consequence of the evolution and interaction of the world system.¹²⁸

For Wallerstein, the defining characteristic of a social system is considered to be:

...the existence within it of a division of labour, such that the various sectors or areas within are dependent upon economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the area. Such economic exchange can clearly exist without a common political structure and even more obviously without sharing the same culture....Leaving aside...mini systems the only kind of social system is a world-system, which we define quite simply as a unit with a single division of labour and multiple culture systems.¹²⁹

Like Frank, Wallerstein argues that development and underdevelopment are inseparable from each other and are the two sides of the same coin. Underdevelopment is an outcome of the enlargement of the world division of labour via capitalist extension and also the development of underdevelopment is, in turn, a necessary requirement of the development.

While capitalism develops and expands in some parts of the globe, it also creates underdevelopment in other parts, and the development of underdevelopment becomes a necessary condition for the development, expansion and perpetuation of capitalism. Via trade relations the core appropriates a surplus produced in the periphery and uses it for its own development.

Brenner, in a recent article, criticises both Frank and Wallerstein for internalising Smithian concepts in Marxist analysis. For Brenner, by giving a special weight to market forces, the new-Smithian Marxists fail to take into account the facts that: a) it is the class structures that "determine the course of economic development or underdevelopment over an entire epoch", b) "...these class structures themselves emerge as the outcome of class struggles whose results are incomprehensible in terms of market forces".¹³⁰ Brenner argues that capitalism cannot be reduced to the existence of production for profit in the market.

Capitalism is a system of expanded production. Only under certain conditions "production for profit via exchange" will bring about accumulation and the development of productive forces. These conditions are the existence of a wage labour system where labour power is a commodity, the emancipation of labourers from direct relations of domination and free capital. Only with the existence of these conditions is an expanded production, which is based on the appropriation of relative surplus labour, and not on the appropriation of absolute surplus labour, possible. Without this class structure of capitalism the expanded reproduction of this system is not possible.¹³¹

Brenner also points out that both Wallerstein and Sweezy take the

transformation of classes as a consequence of the development of the productive forces within the individual productive units which comprise the economy. The development of the productive forces themselves is determined by the market forces.

Wallerstein simply denies from the start that free wage labour is a condition for accumulation via innovation, so that he can consistently argue that a trade-based division of labour is not only responsible for the origins of capitalism, but also the source of its dynamic of development. Thus various forms of labour control/reward to labour - free wage labour included - emerge merely to facilitate the market-induced process of economic development (and underdevelopment).... The general consequence of such a position is an ahistorical, non-class conception of the division of labour, which fails to notice that the very development of the trade-based division of labour can only be a product, not the source, of the development of the productive sources (the productivity of labour), which in turn are dependent upon and limited by the class relations in which they evolve.¹³²

Furthermore, Brenner takes issue with another point raised by Wallerstein when he suggests that in different zones of the capitalist world economy different modes of labour organisation are dominant and it is the bourgeoisies of these areas who decide what forms of labour organisation are suitable for a particular type of production. Brenner argues that this is a Smithian way of explanation which does not take into account class and exploitation.

For its logical premise is the extra-historical universe of homo economicus, of individual profit maximizers competing on the market, outside of any system of social relations of exploitation.¹³³

It must be borne in mind that the way in which surplus is extracted from the direct producers is historically determined and is the outcome of a specific historically evolved class structure which in turn is an

outcome of a long process of a class struggle. The historical evolution or emergence of any given class structure cannot be explained as the product of the choice of, or imposition of, a ruling class.

The type of arguments put forward by Frank and Wallerstein does not give much room to the class structure of underdeveloped countries which become a part of the capitalist world economy. While agreeing with the argument that even the most remote parts of the world have been incorporated into the capitalist world economy we must bear in mind that each underdeveloped country has a different historically determined class structure, and this class structure affects, to a great extent, the nature of the relationship between underdeveloped and metropolitan countries. That is why in this chapter we have tried to give a short account of the recent history of class formation in Turkey. Dependent capitalist development has created another dependency relationship within Turkey, namely regional underdevelopment. The regional underdevelopment in Turkey is not a result of racist state policy, but is an outcome of the development of Turkish capitalism.

In the second chapter we shall try to illuminate the features of underdevelopment in the Southeast region of Turkey by giving some indices.

NOTES

1. Ruşen Keleş, "Regional Disparities in Turkey", Yedinci Iskan ve Şehircilik Haftası Konferansları 11-13 Haziran 1963 Ankara (The Conferences of the Seventh Settlement and Urbanisation Week. 11-13 June 1963, Ankara) (1964).
2. *ibid.*, p. 106.
3. *ibid.*, pp. 101-108.
4. Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (1957).
5. We do not have any reliable statistics concerning the number of Kurdish people in these areas. One source we may quote is the official Turkish data sources, the general reliability of which is very doubtful, especially on such a sensitive subject as the Kurdish question. Information about the number of Kurdish speaking people in Turkey is gathered by means of population censuses. The enumerators who fill in the questionnaires according to the respondents' answers are in most cases entirely free of any check as to what they enter on the questionnaires. What the enumerators enter on the forms depends, therefore, on their personal inclinations. The fear of declaring one's mother tongue as Kurdish, and of being identified with backward, lazy and dirty Kurds - as the Turks call them - may lead some respondents to try to impress the enumerators by saying that their mother tongue is Turkish. This increases our reservations about the reliability of the Turkish statistics for the number of Kurdish speaking people in Turkey.
6. See Ziya Gökalp, Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik İncelemeler (Sociological Investigations into the Kurdish Tribes) (1975), p. 48. The book was written around 1900, but was not published until 1975. In the 1975 edition Gokalp classifies the Kurds into five tribal groups. Gurmanç, Zaza, Guran, Lebr (Lur) and Soran.
7. The Turkish state has been extremely sensitive to the Kurdish question in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia since the 1920s. The Barzanî movement in Iraq and the Iranian Revolution have both intensified this sensitivity, which is reflected in the existence of martial law in most of the provinces where Kurds are predominant in numbers. The incidents which occurred in Kahramanmaraş province of Southern Anatolia had nothing to do with the Kurds at all, the chaos there was caused by the members of the fascist National Action Party's Youth Organisation, who attacked the Alevî (Shiite) population, but nevertheless most of the Kurdish provinces were put under martial law as well as Kahramanmaraş, in the summer of 1978.
8. Behice Boran, Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları (Turkey and the Problems of Socialism) (1970).
9. *ibid.*, pp. 183-194.

10. İsmail Beşikçi, Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı (The Enforced Settlement of the kurds) (1977), p. 205.
11. *ibid.*, p. 206 (my translation).
12. *ibid.*, p. 206 (my translation).
13. The measures taken by the Kemalist Turkish State, Beşikçi argues, are that all Kurds have been exiled on the condition that they will not return to Eastern Anatolia; they have been sent to different areas to ensure their assimilation, their wealth has been confiscated, etc. See Beşikçi, *ibid.* pp. 206-207, 236-237.
14. *ibid.*, p. 236.
15. For a similar argument see Özer Özankaya, "Doğu Anadolu Sorunu" (The Question of Eastern Anatolia), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XXIV, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 89-94, and İsmail Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni (The Order of Eastern Anatolia) (1969), pp. 218-219.
16. Strong candidates (landlords, sheikhs, etc.) not only manage to poll a considerable number of votes when they enter the elections as independent candidates, but they can also offer their votes to a political party after they become an elected member of parliament. They even transfer from one party to an opposing party, carrying all their votes with them, if they find their interests are embedded with those of the opposing party. A very good example of this is provided by Hasan Deger, a tribal leader who has had primary school education only, and who was elected as a member of parliament within the Justice Party in 1965. Having lost patience with the Justice Party administration he resigned from the Party and was then elected as an independent MP in the 1969 election. He later joined the Democratic Party and became an MP for the third time. Realising the strength of the Republican People's Party he then joined them and became one of their candidates for Diyarbakır province. However, his tribal support and his luck were not strong enough on this occasion to enable him to become an MP for the fourth time in succession, because in the preliminary elections the provincial delegates of the Republican People's Party voted him to be their fifth candidate for Diyarbakır province, and in the elections the Party only manages to win three of the seven seats in the province.
17. Charles Bettelheim, "Theoretical Comments" in A. Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade (1972), p. 301, (emphasis original).
18. Harold Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism The South African Case", in Iva_r Oxaal et al. (Eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development (1975), pp.229-252.
19. *ibid.*, p. 233.

20. In fact he has devoted a whole book to showing the unscientific nature of the denial of the Kurdish nation by the Turkish state. See İsmail Beşikçi, Bilim Yöntemi (1975).
21. Wolpe, *ibid.*, p. 241.
22. *ibid.*, p. 248.
23. *ibid.*, p. 249.
24. See Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (1974), p. 373, and "Capitalism and Regional Disparities" (n.d.), which is a translation of his article which appeared in Socialisme (April, May, June 1969), No. 17.
25. *ibid.* (n.d.), pp. 2-5.
26. See Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (1951), Chapter XXX, especially pp. 439-445.
27. Gündüz Ökcün (Ed.), Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, 1923 İzmir Haberler, Belgeler, yorumlar (Economic Congress of Turkey, 1923 - Izmir News, Documents and Commentaries) (1968).
28. For this point see Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni. Dün - Bugün - Yarın (The Order of Turkey Yesterday - Today - Tomorrow) (1968), and Stefanos Yerasimos, Az gelişmişlik sürecinde Türkiye (Turkey in the Process of Underdevelopment) (1975), pp. 650-660. Also, İsmail Cem, Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi (The History of Underdevelopment in Turkey) (1970), pp. 261-265.
29. Tefvîk Çavdar, Osmanlıların Yarı Sömürge Oluşu (The Transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a Semi-Colony) (1970), p. 61.
30. *ibid.*, op. 61-62.
31. The 1908 movement was against Sultan Abdulhamid, who had stopped applying the constitutional rules of 1876 for the three decades preceding 1908. The 1876 constitution was very much favoured by the West because it posed liberal policies and eased economic relations. Therefore the young officers' and intelligentsia's efforts to restore the constitution and the national assembly were supported by the West as well as by the merchants and notables in the country. Realising the seriousness of the situation Sultan Abdulhamid declared the Second Meşrutiyet (Constitutional Government) and appointed a pro-British prime minister. For this point see S. Yerasimos, *Op. cit.* (1975), pp. 1050-1058.
32. Avcıoğlu, *op. cit.* (1968), pp. 167-169.
33. *ibid.*, pp. 187-209.
34. Ökcün (Ed.), *op. cit.* (1968), p. 163.

35. Ökçün (Ed.), op. cit. (1968), pp. 252-255.
36. Ahmet Hamdi Başar, "Hatıralar, Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Kadar" (Memoirs, from the Constitutional Monarchy to the Republic), Barış Dünyası, V, No. 54 (1966).
37. Ökçün (Ed.), op. cit. (1968), p. 85.
38. *ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
39. Başar, op. cit. (1966).
40. Ökçün (Ed.), op. cit. (1968), p. 297.
41. *ibid.*, p. 297.
42. Semen Ivanovic Aralov, Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları (Memoirs of Turkey of a Soviet Diplomat) (1967), p. 234.
43. Orhan Kurmuş investigates the penetration of Western Capitalism into Western Anatolia and the gradual development of capitalist relations in the area between 1850 and 1913 in his book Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi (The Penetration of Imperialism into Turkey) (1974). The development of capitalist relations in the Çukurova region is dealt with by A. O. Novichev in his concise article "The Development of Agriculture in Anatolia" in Charles Issawi (Ed.), The Economic History of The Middle East 1800-1914 (1966).
44. İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Türkiye Köy İktisatıyatı (Village Economics of Turkey) (1934), pp. 176-179.
45. *ibid.*, p. 193.
46. Hasan Reşit Tankut, Köylerimiz Bugün Nasıldır, Dün Nasıldı, Yarın Nasıl Olmalıdır (Our Villages: How They Are Today, How They Were Yesterday, How They Should Be Tomorrow) (1939).
47. Tefvîk Çavdar, Millî Mücadeleye Başlarken Sayılarla Vaziyet ve Manzara-ı Umumiye (A Quantitative Analysis of the General Situation at the Beginning of the National Struggle) (1971).
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49. State Institute of Statistics, Agricultural Census of 1927.
50. Ekonomi ve Tarım Bakanlığı, Orta Anadolu Zırai İşletme Hesapları (Agricultural Management Accounts of Central Anatolia) (1938), p. 7.
51. State Institute of Statistics, Agricultural Census of 1927.

52. Tökin, op. cit. (1934), p. 147.
53. Ökçün (Ed.), op. cit. (1968), p. 81.
54. İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, "Köy Eğitim Meselesi" (The Problem of Village Education), Ülkü, No. 65 (1938).
55. Cem, op. cit. (1970), p. 272.
56. For the development about this see the laws Nos. 329, 535 and 572 in Düstur Üçüncü Kitap (Code of Law: Third Book), IV, p. 72, VI, p. 547, VII, p. 423.
57. Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey An Economy in Transition (1958), p. 56.
58. Tökin, op. cit. (1934), p. 150, (my translation).
59. Timur, op. cit. (1971), p. 105.
60. S. R. Hatipoğlu, Türkiye'de Zırai Buhran (Agricultural Crisis in Turkey) (1936), cited by Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), p. 236.
61. For this point see Yerasimos, op. cit. (1976), III, pp. 1263-1264, and see Korkut Boratav, 100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Etatism in Turkey in 100 Questions) (1974), p. 32.
62. Özlem Özgür, 100 Soruda Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi (Development of Capitalism in Turkey in 100 Questions) (1975), p. 93.
63. Yalçın Küçük, 100 Soruda Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye (Planning, Development and Turkey) (1971), p. 213.
64. Hershlag, op. cit. (1958), p. 61.
65. Yerasimos, op. cit. (1976), III, p. 1264.
66. Hershlag, op. cit. (1958), p. 63.
67. *ibid.*, p. 64.
68. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl (45 Years in Politics) (1968), p.
69. See Boratav, op. cit. (1974), pp. 35-38. For a detailed account of how the State Treasury was used for the enrichment of some people see especially pp. 37-38, and Gündüz Ökçün, 1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye Sorunu (The Issue of Foreign Capital in Turkish Incorporated Companies Established in the 1920-1930 Period) (1971), pp. 55-60 and p. 113. See also Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), pp. 194-200.
70. Timur, op. cit. (1971), p. 116.

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74. *ibid.*, p. 167.
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81. See for instance the column by Vedat Nedim Tör in Kadro, No. 17, for this kind of viewpoint.
82. For the discussions in the National Assembly see Boratav, op. cit. (1974), pp. 168-169.
83. See Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1920-1953 (Speeches and Statements of Celal Bayar, 1920-1953) (1954), p. 58.
84. Avcıoğlu, op. cit. (1968), p. 316.
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86. For nationalisation in Turkey see Mehmet Selik, Türkiye'de Yabancı Özel Sermaye, 1923-1960 (Foreign Private Capital in Turkey, 1923-1960) (1961).
87. Timur, op. cit. (1971), p. 179.
88. Boratav, op. cit. (1974), pp. 291-291.
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90. *ibid.*, p. 181.
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93. Kurtkan Fışek, Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi ve İşçi Sınıfı (The Development of Capitalism in Turkey and the Working Class) (1969).

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96. M. W. Thornburg, et al., Turkey, an Economic Appraisal (1949), pp. 94-138.
97. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program (1951).
98. Küçük, op. cit. (1971), pp. 224-225.
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100. Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrası Tarihi (History of Turkish Democracy) (1967), p. 261.
101. Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), p. 403 and Küçük, op. cit. (1971), p. 224.
102. Jan Hinderink and Mübaccel Belik Kiray show an aspect of the development of capitalism in agriculture in the Cukurova region by way of investigating four villages where different levels of technological development are apparent. See Hinderink and Kiray, Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages (1970). For a similar assessment see also Bahattin Akşit, Türkiye'de Azgelişmiş Kapitalizm ve Köylere Girişi (Underdeveloped Capitalism in Turkey and its Penetration into Villages) (1967).
103. Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), p. 457.
104. *ibid.*, p. 457.
105. Yerasimos, op. cit. (1976), III, p. 1400.
106. See Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), pp. 492-498, Cem, op. cit. (1970) pp. 408-412 and Yerasimos, op. cit. (1976), III, pp. 1409-1433.
107. Basım Üstünel, Kalkınmanın Finansmanı Karma Ekonomide Planlama ve Gelişme (The Finance of Development Planning and Progress in a Mixed Economy) (1965), pp. 203-207.
108. Bilsay Kuruç (Ed.), İktisat Politikasının Resmi Belgeleri (Official Documents of Economic Policy) (1963), p. 135.
109. See Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), pp. 508-526.
110. Üzgür, op. cit. (1976), p. 210.
111. *ibid.*, p. 217.

112. Yerasimos, op. cit. (1976), III, p. 1458.
113. By this we do not mean that one country exploits another, as is suggested by Emmanuel, op. cit. (1972). Rather, as Bettelheim, op. cit. (1972), points out, the bourgeoisie of the developed countries exploit the working people of the underdeveloped countries in collaboration with the internal bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped country through foreign trade.
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121. Karl Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India" in Surveys From Exile (1973), p. 320.
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125. Frank, op. cit. (1969a), pp. 146-147.
126. *ibid.*, pp. 149-150.
127. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (1974), p. 7.
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129. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", Comparative Studies in Society and History, XVI, No. 4 (September 1974).
130. Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism", New Left Review, No. 104 (July-August 1977), p. 27.
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132. *ibid.*, p. 56.
133. *ibid.*, p. 58.

CHAPTER II

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, an attempt will be made to exemplify the nature of regional underdevelopment in Southeastern Anatolia by highlighting particular aspects and characteristics of the region. These will then be contrasted with their national equivalents. Second, to acquaint the reader with the larger area within which the fieldwork was carried out in the villages of Gısgıs and Kalhana. It is for this reason that the province of Diyarbakır and the district of Ergani will also be examined briefly.

SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA (REGION)

The Southeast Anatolia region includes nine provinces within its boundaries. These provinces, Adıyaman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa and Van cover 14.3 per cent ($116,720\text{Km}^2$) of the total surface of Turkey ($814,578\text{Km}^2$). (See Map I).

POPULATION

According to the 1975 population census 9.8 per cent (3,943,186) of Turkey's total population (40,347,719) live in the region.




TABLE 2.1 Urban-Rural Population in Southeast Anatolia, 1975

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION	URBAN POPULATION	RURAL POPULATION
Adiyaman	346,892	100,722	246,170
Bitlis	218,305	76,702	141,603
Diyarbakir	651,233	281,960	369,273
Gaziantep	715,939	427,017	288,922
Hakkari	126,036	30,332	95,704
Mardin	519,687	155,876	363,811
Sirt	381,503	148,521	232,982
Urfa	597,277	264,119	333,158
Van	386,314	115,830	270,484
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	3,943,186	1,601,079	2,342,107
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Other regions	36,404,533	15,267,989	21,136,544
Turkey, Total	40,347,719	16,869,068	23,478,651

Source: State Institute of Statistics, 1975 Census of Population

The rural population of the Southeast Region does not seem to be much higher than that of other regions when it is expressed in percentages (59.4 per cent and 58 per cent respectively). This is due to the criteria used in Turkish statistics, whereby areas with less than 2,000 inhabitants are considered rural and the rest urban. In fact there are many places which have more than 2,000 inhabitants but still exemplify rural characteristics in Turkey. It is therefore necessary to treat the above figures with caution when considering the rural or urban nature of the population. A better indicator to show whether or not a certain area is rural or urban is the size of the economically active population and the nature of their activities. For example, in 1970 out of the total economically active population

78.7 per cent were engaged in agricultural activities in Southeast Anatolia, while 66.6 per cent of the economically active population of other regions were working in agriculture in the same year.

TABLE 2.2 Economically Active Population (12 years of age and over) in Southeast Anatolia in 1970

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION	NO. WORKING IN AGRICULTURE	NO. WORKING IN OTHER ACTIVITIES
Adıyaman	128,557	114,018	14,539
Bitlis	77,087	63,628	13,459
Diyarbakır	220,022	165,054	54,968
Gaziantep	214,482	133,778	80,704
Hakkari	47,652	41,155	6,497
Mardin	187,766	159,121	28,645
Siirt	118,601	96,320	22,281
Urfa	203,963	162,482	41,481
Van	132,953	110,036	22,917
Total	1,328,083	1,045,592 (78.7%)	285,541 (21.3%)
Other regions	13,790,804	9,184,904 (66.6%)	4,602,850 (33.4%)
Turkey, Total	15,118,887	10,230,496 (67.7%)	4,888,391 (32.2%)

Source State Institute of Statistics, 25.10.70, Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics of Population, Ankara, 1977

Despite the dominance of agriculture as the main economic activity in the region, there are a few large cities, such as Gaziantep and Diyarbakır. These exist not as a result of industrialisation and the consequent increase in the number of industrial workers and workers in the service sector, but largely due to the rural exodus caused by mechanisation in agriculture. The shanty towns of the big

cities in the region accommodate almost 50 per cent of the population of the cities.¹

INDUSTRY

The level of industrialisation is too low to absorb the labour force that has been freed from agriculture and their dependence on landlords. Furthermore, as in many other aspects, the disparity between the region and the rest of Turkey is also evident in the degree of industrial development. Of the 6,317 public and private industrial establishments in manufacturing industry in Turkey only 150 are to be found in this area. This 2.4 per cent of Turkey's total manufacturing industry employs some 10,108 people, a number which constitutes only 1.5 per cent of the total work force in manufacturing industry in Turkey in 1975.

Nevertheless, although the term "manufacturing industry" is used in the 1975 Annual Survey of the Manufacturing Industry by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics most of the private establishments in the region hardly deserve to be given the name "industrial". They may, at best, be called "workshops", given the fact that the 130 private establishments which constitute 86.7 per cent of the total public and private establishments, only employ 4,224 workers. This figure represents only 41.8 per cent of the total work force employed in the "manufacturing industry" in the region, and the average number of workers per establishment in the private sector in the region is 32.5, a figure which hardly justifies the label "industrial". On the other hand, the 20 state-owned establishments

TABLE 2.3 Manufacturing Industry in 1975

PROVINCE	SECTOR	NO. OF ESTAB- LISHMENTS	AVE. NO. OF EMPLOYEES p.a.	AVE. NO ENGAGED p.a.
Adiyaman	Public	2	865	865
	Private	-	-	-
	Total	2	865	865
Bitlis	Public	2	527	527
	Private	-	-	-
	Total	2	527	527
Diyarbakir	Public	5	1,434	1,434
	Private	5	99	42
	Total	10	1,533	1,476
Gaziantep	Public	5	1,569	1,569
	Private	121	4,073	4,194
	Total	126	5,062	5,763
Hakkari	Public	-	-	-
	Private	-	-	-
Mardin	Public	-	-	-
	Private	-	-	-
Siirt	Public	2	428	428
	Private	-	-	-
	Total	2	428	428
Urfa	Public	2	361	361
	Private	3	52	59
	Total	5	413	420
Van	Public	2	700	700
	Private	1	n/a	n/a
	Total	3	700	700
S E Anatolia Region	Public	20	5,884	5,884
	Private	130	4,224	4,295
	Total	150	10,108	10,179
Turkey, Total	Public	405	247,666	247,666
	Private	5,912	451,949	459,159
	Total	6,317	699,615	706,825

Source State Institute of Statistics, 1975 Annual Survey of the Manufacturing Industry: Preliminary Results, Ankara, 1977a

(13.3 per cent of the total) employ 5,884 workers (58.2 per cent of the total), thus giving an average of 294 workers per establishment.

From Tables 2.1 and 2.3 it is clear that relative to the size of population Southeastern Anatolia lags behind the national averages for number of industrial establishments and average number of employees employed in manufacturing industry. For example in Southeastern Anatolia there is one industrial establishment per 26,288 people, while nationally it is one establishment per 6,387 people. Similarly, the percentage of employees in manufacturing industry with regard to total number of employees is very low.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Communication and transportation are limited in this area compared with the rest of Turkey. In 1962 there were 59,611Km of state and provincial roads in Turkey. Out of this total, Eastern Anatolia has 25 per cent of the state highways and 25 per cent of provincial roads. The figures give the impression that the region is quite well-off in terms of roads, but it is important to note that the roads in Eastern Anatolia are susceptible to weather conditions almost twice as severe as in other regions. In particular, most of the provincial roads, which render possible intra-regional transportation and communication, and link villages and towns with each other, are not all-weather roads. In fact 15 per cent of the state highways and 65.2 per cent of provincial roads in Eastern Anatolia are not all-weather roads.

TABLE 2.4 State Highways and Provincial Roads

STATE HIGHWAYS	ALL-WEATHER ROADS		SUSCEPTIBLE ROADS		TOTAL	
	Km.	%	Km.	%	Km.	%
Eastern Anatolia	5,595	85.0	991	15.0	6,586	25
Other Regions	18,396	92.2	1,548	7.8	19,944	75
Turkey, Total	23,991	90.4	2,539	9.6	26,530	100

PROVINCIAL ROADS	ALL-WEATHER ROADS		SUSCEPTIBLE ROADS		TOTAL	
	Km.	%	Km.	%	Km.	%
Eastern Anatolia	2,886	34.8	5,405	65.2	8,291	25
Other Regions	16,142	65.1	8,648	34.9	24,790	75
Turkey, Total	19,028	57.5	14,053	42.5	33,081	100

Source State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1960-62, Ankara, 1964

Furthermore, rural areas and villages in Eastern Anatolia are less integrated than their counterparts in the other regions, in terms of communication facilities. For instance, only 4.6 per cent of the villages in the region had telephones, while the percentage in the other regions is 22 per cent.²

EDUCATION

The unequal development between the regions is also reflected in the level of education as well as in the number of schools in the region. According to the State Institute of Statistics 69.3 per cent of villages did not even have a primary school in Eastern Anatolia, while in the other regions 37.7 per cent of the villages did not have primary schools.³

Table 2.5 shows that the rate of illiteracy in the Southeast is much higher than in the rest of Turkey, 59.5 per cent for Southeast Anatolia while for the other regions it is 33.8 per cent. This is in addition to the fact that in 1970 68.1 per cent of the 2,627,362 people six years of age and over in the region were illiterate, while 41.3 per cent is the figure for the other areas as a whole.

TABLE 2.5 Literacy in Region, the rest of Turkey, and Turkey as a whole, in 1970 (Among people six years of age and over)

PROVINCE	NO. OF ILLITERATE	NO. OF LITERATE	TOTAL
Adiyaman	160,318	67,056	227,374
Bitlis	100,438	43,346	143,784
Diyarbakır	302,451	142,694	445,145
Gaziantep	266,917	206,623	473,540
Hakkari	59,919	17,752	77,671
Mardin	254,972	92,660	347,632
Siirt	170,250	64,227	234,477
Urfa	306,647	115,667	422,314
Van	168,414	87,011	255,425
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1,790,326	837,036	2,627,362
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Other regions	11,027,510	15,618,489	26,645,999
Turkey, Total	12,817,836	16,455,525	29,273,361
Total population	Southeast Region	3,008,924	
	Other regions	32,596,252	
	Turkey, Total	35,605,176	

Source: State Institute of Statistics, op.cit., 1977

The socio-economic structure of Eastern Anatolia acts as a hindrance to equal opportunities in education: first, there are not enough schools, second, the existing schools are severely under-staffed,

especially at secondary level. It is not unusual to see a statement in the graduation certificate of a secondary school student from this region to the effect that "the graduate has not had physics, chemistry etc. lessons". This is crucial for the student's future career, because the university candidates from this region have to compete with the better prepared candidates of other regions in the university entrance examinations. Given that only 10 to 20 per cent of all candidates applying are accepted by the universities the graduates of Eastern Anatolian schools have a very poor chance. According to the State Institute of Statistics only 8 per cent of university graduates came from Eastern Anatolia (18 provinces) in 1965⁴ compared with 92 per cent from the other 48 provinces of the country, whereas Eastern Anatolia constituted 18.8 per cent of Turkey's total population in the same year. As to the breakdown of graduates in terms of gender, this is shown below, in Table 2.6. Figures, it might be added, which also indicate that the region has a relatively smaller proportion of female graduates than other regions.

TABLE 2.6 University Graduates in Eastern Anatolia, other regions and Turkey as a whole in 1965

	MALE GRADUATES		FEMALE GRADUATES		TOTAL	
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
Eastern Anatolia	12,357	8.7	1,356	4.7	13,713	8
Other regions	129,794	91.3	27,234	95.3	157,028	92
Turkey, Total	142,151	100	28,590	100	170,741	100

Source State Institute of Statistics, 1965 Census of Population Social and Economic Characteristics of Population, Ankara, 1969

TABLE 2.7 Health Services in 1975

PROVINCE	HOSPITALS	BEDS	SPECIAL- ISTS	PRACTI- TIONERS	DENTISTS	REG. ¹ NURSES	HEALTH ² TECH'S	MIDWIVES ³
Adiyaman	4	160	9	18	5	45	45	115
Bitlis	4	145	2	9	3	40	24	71
Diyarbakir	17	1,330	178	160	36	274	130	233
Gaziantep	12	1,256	124	69	44	185	120	148
Hakkari	2	60	1	13	4	18	11	40
Mardin	5	270	10	38	9	96	59	166
Sirt	7	320	16	20	9	53	28	123
Urfa	9	540	16	45	15	132	84	194
Van	7	450	34	19	10	93	51	113
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	67	4,531	390	391	135	936	552	1,203
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other regions	747	81,943	12,308	8,625	4,911	13,870	10,469	11,772
Turkey, Total	814	86,474	12,698	9,016	5,046	14,806	11,021	12,975

1 Covers nurses and assistant nurses also.

2 Covers those who have graduated from health colleges, schools for health technicians and health departments of village schools.

3 Includes village midwives.

Source: State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1977, Ankara, 1977b

HEALTH

The Southeast region, like the Eastern region, lags behind other regions in terms of available health services. Of the total for the whole country 9.3 per cent of hospitals, 6.2 per cent of beds in hospitals, and 4 per cent of doctors, 7.7 per cent of nurses were to be found in Southeast Anatolia in 1975.

From Table 2.7 we were able to calculate that there is one bed for every 730.8 persons in the region, while there is one bed for every 449 persons in the other regions.

Other findings relating to the health services in the region are as follows for the year 1975

TABLE 2.8 Health Personnel per Person in 1975

	SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA	OTHER REGIONS
No. of persons per specialist	8,821.4	2,971
per practitioner	9,170.2	4,240
per dentist	24,491.8	7,452.3
per nurse	3,458.9	2,663.9
per health tech- nician	5,807.3	3,520
per midwife	2,753.6	3,153

Source State Institute of Statistics, op. cit., 1977b

The disadvantaged situation of the population of the Southeast, as well as Eastern Anatolia, with regard to health services has attracted the attention of politicians and successive governments.

In 1963, for example, it was decided that the socialisation of health services would start first in Eastern Anatolia.⁵ Since that time quite a number of health centres have been initiated in the region, but owing to the shortage of qualified staff (doctors, nurses etc.) most of them do not function properly.

AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

It is of interest to examine the usage of modern inputs which are crucial in terms of the level of productivity in agriculture. The Eastern Anatolia region stays well behind the national average in terms of the use of modern inputs in agriculture.⁶ For instance, 66.08 per cent of the total 3,125,884 holdings in Turkey use artificial fertilisers, while only 27.32 per cent of the total 522,248 holdings in Eastern Anatolia use artificial fertilisers. The figures for the use of tractors are 44.69 per cent in Turkey as a whole, and 39.30 per cent in Eastern Anatolia. Similarly, while 57.82 per cent of holdings use insecticide/pesticide and other chemicals on a national scale, the figure in Eastern Anatolia is 30.99 per cent. The same trend can be detected in the use of irrigation. Compared with a 33.47 per cent national average only 16.42 per cent of holdings in Eastern Anatolia make use of irrigation.

In addition to the lower average use of modern inputs within the region, compared with the national average, it is also evident that the use of modern inputs in the region manifests further inequality between holdings of different size. For example, for large holdings

with 500 decares⁷ or more land 71.02 per cent make use of artificial fertilisers, 64.06 per cent use tractors in farming and 57.94 per cent use agricultural chemicals, while these percentages for small holdings with 100 decares of land or less are 19.36 per cent, 34.84 per cent and 30.24 per cent respectively.

The technology and farming methods of the region are predominantly primitive. The extent of use of modern equipment and machinery in the region remains very limited compared with traditional equipment. While tractors numbered only 11,992 there were 155,497 wooden ploughs, and 21,688 walking ploughs, while combine harvesters numbered 901 there were a total of 77,859 threshing sleds. We include the following table in order to illustrate the very low level of technology in the Southeastern region.



TABLE 2.9 Use of Modern Inputs in Eastern Anatolia by Land Size in 1973

LAND SIZE (decares)	ARTIFICIAL FERTILISERS	TRACTORS	INSECTICIDES & PESTICIDES	IRRIGATION	TOTAL MODERN INPUT USERS	TOTAL HOLDINGS
1-20	59,765 (30.22%)	61,573 (31.14%)	65,702 (33.22%)	53,213 (26.91%)	107,266 (54.24%)	197,746
21-50	28,556 (19.36%)	51,397 (34.84%)	44,606 (30.24%)	3,031 (2.05%)	77,781 (52.73%)	147,498
51-100	24,977 (30.25%)	27,279 (33.04%)	21,217 (25.69%)	18,915 (22.90%)	42,434 (51.34%)	82,568
101-200	18,915 (29.07%)	40,132 (61.68%)	21,217 (32.61%)	6,791 (10.43%)	43,163 (66.34%)	65,060
201-500	3,031 (16.02%)	18,186 (96.14%)	3,031 (16.02%)	3,760 (19.88%)	18,915 (100.00%)	18,915
500+	7,430 (71.02%)	6,701 (64.06%)	6,062 (57.94%)		10,461 (100.00%)	10,461
Total	142,674 (27.32%)	205,268 (39.30%)	161,835 (30.99%)	85,710 (16.42%)	300,020 (57.44%)	522,248
Turkey, Total	2,065,800 (66.08%)	1,397,047 (44.69%)	1,807,602 (57.82%)	1,046,380 (33.47%)	2,671,212 (85.45%)	3,125,884

Note Figures in brackets denote the percentages of the users of modern inputs among the total number of the holdings as listed on the extreme right of the table.

Source Oktay Varlıer, Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Değişme ve Toprak Bölüşümü (Structural Change, Technology and Land Distribution in Turkish Agriculture), Ankara, Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayını No. 1636-SPD-307, 1978

TABLE 2.10 Numbers of Agricultural Equipment and Machinery in the
Southeast Region* in 1976

MACHINES & EQUIPMENT	NUMBER	MACHINES & EQUIPMENT	NUMBER
Wooden ploughs	155,497	Sprayers	1,880
Walking ploughs	21,688	Dusters	1,580
Cultivators	5,769	Centrifugal pumps (farm use)	714
Horse-drawn hoes	13	Motor pump (farm use)	5,107
Tractors	11,992	Jeeps (farm use)	358
Ploughs (tractor drawn)	7,971	Trucks (farm use)	396
Disc ploughs (tractor drawn)	3,253	Swivel-type ploughs	835
One-way ploughs	2,001	Spike-toothed harrow	1,961
Rollers	1,108	Rod weeders	87
Trailers	9,829	Rotary hoes	36
Grain drill (horse drawn)	87	Plankers	15,179
Grain drill (tractor drawn)	3,424	Ridging ploughs	188
Cotton planters	98	Rotary cultivators	10
Beet planters	34	Tractor drawn hoes	283
Mowers	605	Combine drills	1,229
Threshing sleds	77,859	Manure spreaders	6
Binders	35	Fertiliser distributors	536
Combines	901	Tractor PTO sprayers	59
Threshers	1,616	Blowers	443
Seed cleaners	152	Deep well turbine pumps	761
Hay mower	645	Sprinklers	139
Hay rakers	5,541	Tractor drawn combines	7
Balers	57	Fanning mills	5,268
Feed grinders	59	Domestic threshers	2,766
Cream separators	9,696	Beet harvesters	3
Butter churns	91,730	Chipper & forage harvesters	9
Butters workers	9	Tractor drawn hay mowers	1,231
Egg incubators	27	Winnowers	2
Stalk cutters	32	Canopied brooders	20

* The data includes the provinces of Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa and Van, which together are considered as an agricultural region by the Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (State Institute of Statistics) since the 1950 Agricultural Census.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Agricultural Structure and Production 1974-1976, Ankara, 1978

STATE POLICIES

The emergence of the multi-party system in 1946 led politicians to pay special attention to Eastern Anatolia, with regard to public investment, in order to secure more votes. Although they emphasised from time to time that the State should invest in the East in their political rhetorics, there was no substantial state policy to overcome regional inequalities until 1960. However, some attempts were made to invest in the East, but they were far from overcoming the underdeveloped state of the region, or from closing the gap between the East and the other regions. For instance, a specific budget for the development of the East was included in the 1949-50 state budget.⁸ Although this procedure was abandoned in subsequent years a few import-substituting industrial establishments were opened in the region.⁹ Nevertheless, on the whole, the free market mechanism was believed in for economic development, and productivity and profitability were the main concern in decisions relating to the locations where state investments were to be established.

Inter-regional inequalities have been recognised as a problem since the first Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967), and various policies have been adopted in the hope of getting rid of these inter-regional inequalities. Nevertheless, according to the Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1979-1983) "despite all envisaged policies and efforts inter-regional imbalance has gradually increased".¹⁰

In the three five year development plans' period one of the

important reasons for the increase of regional imbalance is that the share of the underdeveloped regions in public investment gradually declined. Furthermore, the private sector was not directed to those regions, according to the Fourth Five Year Development Plan.¹¹

TABLE 2.11 Per Capita Programme Investment in East and Southeast Turkey and Other Regions in the Planned Period (1963-1977)*

SECTOR	E & S E REGIONS			OTHER REGIONS			TURKEY, TOTAL		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan
	TL	TL	TL	TL	TL	TL	TL	TL	TL
Agriculture	95	173	291	118	129	305	113	137	303
Industry	298	637	1,515	305	768	3,002	304	743	2,722
Services	324	441	1,511	261	525	1,767	273	509	1,719
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Total	717	1,251	3,317	684	1,422	5,074	690	1,389	4,744
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

* Investments under the name of "various investments", which cover several provinces are excluded.

Source Dorduncu Bes Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1979-1983) (Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1979-1983)), Resmi Gazete, 12 December 1978

In the first five year planned period per capita investment in the East and Southeast regions was higher than that in other regions, but a close look at the table reveals that most of the investments were in the service sector, while in the other regions the share of industry is higher than that in the East and Southeast regions. In the second five year planned period the share of industrial investment exceeds that of services and agriculture in the East and Southeast regions, but when these figures are compared with those

of other regions it becomes evident that per capita investment in industry and services in the East and Southeast regions lags behind that in other regions. These differences increase further in the third five year planned period. In particular per capita investment in industry for the other regions is almost twice that of the East and Southeast regions. Also, the average per capita investment in the East and Southeast regions lags well behind that of the other regions in the third planned period (1973-1977).

Despite all statements and intentions to the effect that priority would be given to the development of the East and Southeast regions, in the application of the plans priority has in fact been given to the developed regions and the gap between the developed parts of Turkey and the underdeveloped East and Southeast has widened rather than narrowed. In most of the investments made, questions of productivity, proximity to big markets and transport facilities have been kept in mind, and so the underdeveloped East and Southeast regions have been neglected in the allocation of investments.

In contrast to the above indicated inequalities, between the Southeast and the rest of Turkey, the East and Southeast regions have been a major cheap labour source for the development of Turkish capitalism. Especially after the 1950s, with the mechanisation of agriculture, quite a large part of the labour force became available. A study of internal migration in Turkey by Tumertekin¹² has shown that the East and Southeast regions have been losing population through out-migration. Although some

centres such as Diyarbakır, Muş and Bitlis have taken in population between 1955 and 1960 this is negligible when we consider the region as a whole. The trend has still continued in recent years. The developed centres still attract a labour force from the East.

According to the results of the 1965 population census the ratio of people born in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia to the rest of the migrant population to the four largest cities in Turkey is considerable. For example, in Adana 44.8 per cent of the migrants are from East and Southeast Anatolia. Similarly, the figures for Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir are 15.4 per cent, 14.1 per cent and 8.8 per cent respectively. The out-migration of population is of considerable importance for the region. This is especially so as mainly young people endeavour to migrate and the resulting age structure of the economically active population in the region changes and therefore the productivity of labour is also affected indirectly. Furthermore, in the case of seasonal labour migration the region supports the labourers in the off-season and thereby reduces the production costs of the labourers' employers. It may, therefore, be concluded from the previous discussion that whereas the Southeast region receives less than its fair proportion of services, capital inputs, etc., it is a major contributor of labour for the rest of the national economy. Given the importance of this factor, it will be discussed at some length in Chapter IX.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA

In order to assess the role and function of the region within the Turkish economy as a whole we shall examine the structure of the economy of the region. Since agricultural production is the major part of the region's economy we shall first deal with land tenure, and the main relations of production in agriculture. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the agricultural production in the region.

Land Tenure

As we can see from Table 2.12, the distribution of land in Eastern Anatolia is highly differentiated.¹³ In 1973, while 4 per cent of the total households owned 30.5 per cent of the total lands owned, small landowners, which constitute 72.7 per cent of the landowning households, owned only 28.2 per cent of the total.

TABLE 2.12 Distribution of Land Owned in Eastern Anatolia in 1973

LAND DIVISION (Decares)	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF LAND
1-20	35.4	6.0
21-50	37.3	22.2
51-100	14.9	19.3
101-200	8.4	22.0
201-500	2.2	10.1
501-1,000	1.6	16.9
1,001+	0.2	3.5
Total No. of households	439,175	
Total area	2,769,998 hectares	

Source Oktay Varliier, Op. cit., 1978

It should be pointed out that the above table does not take into consideration the number of landless families, which account for quite a large part of the rural population in the area. In 1973, for example, 189,403 (30.1 per cent) households, out of the total 628,578 rural households were landless. Of these 125,751 (66.4 per cent) were engaged in farming, mostly through sharecropping arrangements and the remaining 63,652 (33.6 per cent) households earned their main income as labourers.

TABLE 2.13 Landless Households in Eastern Anatolia and Turkey as a Whole in 1973

	E ANATOLIA	TURKEY
(1) Landless farmers	125,751	453,813
(2) Other landless households (in places with less than 2,000 population) - labourers and agricultural labourers	63,652	375,342
(3) Those in need of land (1)+(2)	189,403	829,155
(4) Landowners	439,175	2,965,476
(5) Percentage of landless farmers (1)/(1+4)	22.26%	13.27%
(6) Percentage of landless (3)/(3+4)	30.13%	21.85%

Source Oktay Varlier, Op. cit., 1978

The explanation given in the sources used about the nature of these labourers is far from clear. In the Turkish text the term "straight labourers" is used, without any clarification. Given the fact that the level of industrial development is almost negligible in the area and that these households are located in population centres of less than 2,000 where there are no industrial establishments we can assume that they are not engaged in a wage economy related to

industry. Then who are these "straight labourers"? Are they seasonal labourers? Or artisans? Or what? However, one thing is clear, the ratio of landless households in the area is quite high and much higher than that in Turkey as a whole 22.26 per cent and 13.27 per cent respectively, as Table 2.13 shows.

Owing to factors such as absenteeism, renting and sharecropping arrangements, and the illegal use of public lands etc. the distribution of holdings in the region differs from the distribution of landownership.

TABLE 2 14 The Distribution of Cultivated Lands by Size in Eastern Anatolia in 1973

LAND DIVISION (Decares)	HOUSEHOLD PERCENTAGE	LAND PERCENTAGE
1-20	37.9	4.7
21-50	28.3	11.2
51-100	15.8	13.1
101-200	12.4	21.6
201-500	3.6	11.1
501-1,000	1.3	9.2
1,000+	0.7	29.1
Total No. of households	522,248	
Total area	5,059,384 hectares	

Source Oktay Varlier, Op. cit , 1978

In the above table a similar trend to that observed in Table 2.13 can be detected. While the majority of the households have holdings of one to fifty decares a small minority of the households control a very large part of the lands in the area. Those holdings with

500 decares or more land account for only 2 per cent of farming families, while they cultivate 38.3 per cent of the total cultivable land in the region

The distribution of holdings has shown little change over a 23 year period, as shown in the table below. The numbers of small and big holdings have increased at the expense of medium sized holdings, but in spite of an increase in the number of small holdings the actual amount of land cultivated by these holdings has actually decreased.

TABLE 2.15 Changes in the Distribution of Holdings between 1950 and 1973 in Eastern Anatolia

SIZE OF HOLDING (Decares)	1950		1973	
	% of households	% of land	% of households	% of land
1-50	58.5	18.4	66.2	15.9
51-100	21.7	20.4	15.8	13.1
101-200	11.4	21.2	12.4	21.6
201-500	7.2	18.9	3.6	11.1
501+	1.2	21.2	2.0	38.3
Total	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0

Source Oktay Varliier, Op. cit., 1978

The existence of very large holdings has been one of the most important features of the region since the sixteenth century, simply because large amounts of land were granted to Kurdish notables, tribal leaders, etc., of the area, by the Ottoman administration for political reasons.¹⁴ In fact remnants of the yurtluk/ocaklık system can still be seen in the area. This is revealed by the fact that some

families own one or more villages in the region. According to the Village Inventory surveys carried out by the Ministry of Village Affairs, between 1963 and 1971, out of a total of 4,194 villages in Southeast Anatolia 3,767 belonged to the inhabitants of the villages, 170 belonged to individuals, 161 belonged to families and 96 belonged to dynasties. This gives a total of 427 villages owned by individuals, families or dynasties, which is 11.4 per cent of villages

TABLE 2.16 Type of Landownership in Villages in Southeast Anatolia

PROVINCE	TOTAL NO OF VILLAGES	NO OF VILLAGES OWNED BY VILLAGERS	INDIVIDUAL	FAMILY	DYNASTY
Adiyaman	339	337	-	2	-
Bitlis	253	251	2	-	-
Diyarbakır	663	593	32	29	9
Gaziantep	572	476	38	27	31
Hakkari*	134	(89.7%)	(0.8%)	-	(1.1%)
Mardin	708	617	25	46	20
Siirt	469	437	11	17	4
Urfa	644	521	51	40	32
Van	546	535	11	-	-
Total	4,328	3,767	170	161	96

* Figures for Hakkari are given in percentages in Koy İşleri Bakanlığı, Koy Envanter Etudlerine Hakkari (Hakkari According to the Village Inventory Surveys), Ankara, 1967, and 8.4 per cent of the land is owned by the State.

Source Koy İşleri Bakanlığı, Koy Envanter Etudlerine Gbre (According to the Village Inventory Surveys (relevant provinces)), Ankara

A number of landowners give some of their lands to sharecroppers for various reasons. Some landowners like civil servants, teachers,

merchants, who have no time for farming, give their lands to sharecroppers for a supplementary income. Big landlords and capitalist farmers also give some of their lands to sharecroppers, though for different reasons. For instance, they may give some of their marginally less productive lands to sharecroppers in order to secure a readily available labour force for peak seasons.

Sharecropping plays an important role in reproducing the political and economic power of landlords, some of whom are also tribal leaders. It is through sharecropping arrangements that landlords strengthen their political dominance, which in turn enables them to have access to credits, fertilisers, etc., and therefore to intensify their economic dominance over the sharecroppers. The extent to which sharecropping is used, therefore, is an important feature of the political economy of this region. Table 2.17 shows the widespread practice of sharecropping in Eastern Anatolia.

In Table 2.17 the amounts of rented and sharecropped lands have not been specified, and so it is very difficult to quantify the sharecropping arrangements. However, on the basis of our fieldwork in the area we are able to conclude that most of the lands subsumed under the category "rented or sharecropped" are in fact sharecropped lands. In particular, small lands between one and 100 decares can be considered to have been sharecropped rather than rented. It is also of interest to note that 99,783 (79.3 per cent) of a total of 125,751 landless households engage in sharecropping or renting arrangements. This supports the view that landlords try to tie the landless poor to the land in order to secure a labour force for peak seasons.¹⁵

TABLE 2 17 Distribution of Rented or Sharecropped Lands by Households, according to the Amount of Land Owned* in 1973

LAND OWNED (hectares)	LAND RENTED OR SHARECROPPED (hectares)	1-20	21-50	51-100	101-200	201-500	500+	TOTAL
Landless	-	43,767 (43.9%)	12,853 (12.9%)	18,186 (18.2%)	24,977 (25.0%)	-	-	99,783 (100.0%)
1-20	126,769 (81.6%)	22,425 (14.4%)	6,062 (3.9%)	-	-	-	-	155,256 (100.0%)
21-50	123,975 (75.6%)	6,666 (4.1%)	21,217 (12.9%)	3,031 (1.8%)	9,093 (5.6%)	-	-	163,982 (100.0%)
51-100	57,468 (76.9%)	-	9,093 (13.8%)	3,031 (4.6%)	3,031 (4.6%)	-	-	65,623 (100.0%)
101-200	24,926 (67.2%)	-	-	6,062 (16.3%)	3,031 (8.1%)	3,031 (8.1%)	-	37,050 (100.0%)
201-500	6,791 (69.1%)	-	-	-	3,031 (30.9%)	-	-	9,822 (100.0%)
501+	4,399 (59.2%)	-	-	-	-	-	3,031 (40.8%)	7,430 (100.0%)
Total	337,328 (62.6%)	72,328 (13.5%)	49,225 (9.1%)	30,310 (5.6%)	43,163 (8.0%)	3,031 (0.6%)	3,031 (0.6%)	538,946 (100.0%)

* Numbers in brackets denote the horizontal percentage.

Source Otkay Varlier, *op. cit.*, 1978

absentee landlords who give their lands to sharecroppers or renters play a very important role in the transfer of the surplus product from the rural areas to urban areas. Although absentee families account for only a small number of the landowning families (6.2 per cent of the total) they control 57.3 per cent of the total land in Southeast Anatolia. The figures for Diyarbakır province are well above average. The absentee landowning families, while constituting only 3 per cent of the landowning families in the province control 88 per cent of the total land. As Beşikçi points out, the absentee landlords dwell in towns and cities, running their farms through their kahya (bailiff), or as in the case of big landlords they sometimes run their farms personally and invest in more profitable areas such as commercial activities, running an hotel, cinema or shop, or buying apartments, etc.

According to Beşikçi, ex-feudal landlords and the newly emerging town bourgeoisie are the same people.¹⁶ Without subscribing to the last statement we can conclude that the rural surplus extracted from the direct producers in various forms by the absentee landlords who are also a part of the town bourgeoisie are transferred to other regions through the luxury consumption habits of the big landlords. In some cases the surplus is transferred directly to the developed western part of the country, because the big landlords have moved to the big cities in the West, such as Istanbul, İzmir and Ankara, living luxuriously, educating their children in expensive private foreign schools, engaging in commerce, transportation, real estate speculation and so on.

TABLE 2.18 Absentee Families in Southeast Anatolia

PROVINCE	TOTAL LAND (000 donüms)	TOTAL NO OF FAMILIES LIVING IN VILLAGES (000's)	LAND CONTROLLED BY VILLAGE RESIDENTS (000 donüms)	NO. OF ABSENTEE FAMILIES	LAND CONTROLLED BY ABSENTEES (000 donüms)
Adıyaman	1,050	43	679	1,050	371
Bitlis	568	19	452	1,590	116
Diyarbakır	2,642	58	358	1,740	2,284
Gaziantep	1,751	51	859	6,380	982
Mardin	2,058	59	964	6,220	1,094
Sıirt	968	38	760	670	204
Urfa	4,290	55	1,024	3,920	3,266
Van	1,457	31	1,310	570	147
Total	14,784	354	6,406	22,140	8,464

Source Koy İşleri Bakanlığı, Op cit.

TABLE 2.19 Total Household Income in Eastern Anatolia by Size of Holding, 1973

SIZE OF HOLDING (decares)	TOTAL INCOME (Turkish Lira)					100,001+	TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
	5000 & under	5,001- 10,000	10,001- 15,000	15,001- 25,000	25,001- 50,000	50,001- 100,000	
0-10	102,823 (52%)	55,162 (28%)	17,092 (9%)	16,488 (8%)	5,572 (3%)	604	197,741 (100%)
11-50	24,977 (17%)	49,210 (33%)	32,497 (22%)	30,310 (21%)	7,469 (5%)	3,031 (2%)	147,494 (100%)
51-100	9,093 (11%)	27,279 (33%)	12,124 (15%)	12,124 (15%)	21,946 (26%)	-	82,566 (100%)
101-200	-	6,062 (9%)	15,155 (21%)	15,155 (21%)	12,853 (18%)	12,803 (18%)	71,121 (100%)
201-500	-	-	-	6,062 (47%)	729 (6%)	6,062 (47%)	12,853 (100%)
501-1,000	-	-	-	-	3,760 (55%)	-	6,791 (100%)
1,000+	-	-	-	-	-	3,031 (89%)	3,670 (100%)
Total	136,893 (26%)	137,713 (26%)	76,868 (15%)	80,139 (15%)	52,329 (10%)	25,531 (5%)	522,236 (100%)

Note Figures in brackets refer to horizontal percentages.

Source Oktay Varliier, Op. cit., 1978

Unequal land distribution is further reflected in the unequal income distribution in the rural sector of the region. While income in the majority of households (67 per cent of the total) does not exceed 15,000TL per annum, 3 per cent of the total households enjoy annual incomes of 100,000TL or more. This should be contrasted to 6,898TL per capita income nationally for 1973.

It has been argued that the existing "system of landownership hinders increased production and is contrary to the goals of social justice, it must therefore be reformed."¹⁷ Although the state planning organisation "experts" recommend land reform and many governments have included land reform in their programmes, land reform has been a protracted story of the Turkish Republic from its inception. The existence of a strong landlord class in Turkey and their effective role in Turkish politics has not allowed the implementation of any extensive land reform programme.¹⁸

Apart from the lack of "social justice" caused by the unequal distribution of land, therefore of income distribution too, the existing landownership pattern hinders any rise in productivity in the region. The producers with low income cannot afford to buy highly expensive agricultural machinery, chemicals, improved seeds, etc. Also, some absentee landowners tend to neglect their lands.

Rural Production

Cereals constitute the most important items of agricultural production in terms of both the volume of production and the area under

cultivation in Southeast Anatolia. In 1976 1,610,700 hectares (88.8 per cent) of the total 1,813,242 hectares of cultivated lands were assigned to cereal production. Of the cereals, wheat is the most common out of the total 1,610,700 hectares under cereals 1,279,847 hectares (79.5 per cent) were under wheat, 297,737 hectares under barley, 13,265 hectares under millet, 10,090 hectares under rye, 5,801 hectares under rice, 2,985 hectares under maize, 925 hectares under mixed grain and 50 hectares under oats. Wheat, being the staple, was not only at the top of the table in terms of area cultivated, but was also in first place in terms of the volume of production, accounting for 76.9 per cent (1,725,942 tons) of the total cereal production and 64.4 per cent of the total agricultural production, which was 2,679,530 tons in 1976.

Compared with cereal production the production of other agricultural crops remains limited. However, with the government's anxious efforts to increase the production of commercial crops, crops such as sugar-beet and cotton seem to be gaining importance. Apart from commercial crops lentils are one of the most extensively marketed products in the region. Lentils were the fourth largest crop in terms of area under cultivation in the region in 1976. This is because lentils are an important constituent of the peasant diet in the region, as well as being a marketable crop. However, the importance of lentils as a main item in the peasant family's diet has been eroded by the rise in the price of lentils in the market. Instead of having lentil soup with bread for breakfast, peasant families now tend to have tea, which is much cheaper. This was observed in the villages of Ergani during our fieldwork.

TABLE 2 20 Southeast Region, Area Sown, Harvested with Production and Yield in 1976

CROP	AREA SOWN (hectares)	AREA HARVESTED (hectares)	PRODUCTION (tons)	YIELD (Kg/Ha)
<u>Cereals</u>				
Wheat	1,279,847	1,256,297	1,725,942	1,374
Barley	297,737	297,517	465,812	1,565
Rye	10,090	10,856	15,786	1,565
Oats	50	50	100	2,000
Maize	2,985	2,985	4,311	1,144
Rice	5,801	5,801	12,944	2,231
Millet	13,265	12,977	17,473	1,346
Mixed grain	925	925	1,400	1,514
Total	1,610,700	1,587,408	2,243,768	
<u>Pulses</u>				
Chick peas	10,377	10,302	11,585	1,125
Dry beans	2,936	2,936	3,579	1,219
Lentils	61,426	61,426	63,924	1,041
Cow vetch	1,021	1,021	380	372
Wild vetch	11,584	11,584	12,543	1,083
Others ¹	4,225	4,225	4,647	-
Total	91,569	91,494	96,658	
<u>Industrial Crops</u>				
Tobacco ²	16,232	16,232	19,125	1,178
Sugar beet	5,906	5,890	110,718	18,798
Hemp fibre ³	1,378	1,378	1,790	1,299
Cotton ⁴	69,706	69,706	45,142	648
Flax fibre	4,600	4,600	-	-
Others ⁵	477	477	53	-
Total	98,299	98,283	176,828	
<u>Oil Seed</u>				
Cotton seed	-	-	72,227	1,038
Sunflower	2,825	2,825	3,750	132
Sesame	2,358	2,358	1,429	606
Flax seed	-	-	2,295	499
Total	5,183	5,183	79,701	

TABLE 2 20 (Continued)

CROP	AREA SOWN (hectares)	AREA HARVESTED (hectares)	PRODUCTION (tons)	YIELD (Kg/Ha)
<u>Tuber Crops</u>				
Dry onions	4,095	4,095	39,417	9,626
Dry garlic	830	830	2,935	3,536
Potatoes	2,566	2,557	40,223	15,731
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total	7,491	7,482	82,575	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
GRAND TOTALS	1,813,242	1,789,850	2,679,530	

- Notes 1 Mungo bean, grass pea, fenugreek.
 2 Data is provisional.
 3 Area sown is the same for fibre and seed.
 4 Area sown is the same for cotton and seed.
 5 Sugar cane, saffron, coriander, dry pepper, sorghum, cummin, mustard and tonka beans.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Op. cit., 1978

TABLE 2.21 Number of Livestock Animals in 1976 (in Thousands)

STOCK	SOUTHEAST REGION	WHOLE OF TURKEY
Cattle	1,652	14,465
Water buffalo	137	1,056
Sheep	8,188	41,504
Ordinary goats	3,491	7,515
Angora goats	517	1,302
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	13,985	65,842


Source State Institute of Statistics, Op cit., 1978

Many varieties of vegetables and fruits are also grown in the region, but the production of vegetables and fruits is not to such an extent that it can be considered a major determinant of rural production in the region. The marketed part of the vegetables and fruit brings supplementary cash to the producer households. In 1976 83,216 hectares were used for "market garden" produce which amounted to 1,091,179 tons according to the State Institute of Statistics.¹⁹ Of the "market garden" crops melons, watermelons, tomatoes, aubergines, cucumbers and peppers were the most extensively grown items in order of production output. In 1976 396,739 tons of fruit were produced from 12,748,489 fruit trees. At the top of the table, with 332,153 tons of production, were grapes. Among other "orchard" crops walnuts, pomegranates, almonds, apples, pears, plums and apricots were the most produced items in the Southeast region.²⁰

Livestock production is the second major economic activity in the region. In some areas within the region livestock breeding is even considered the main source of livelihood. For instance, Beşikçi²¹ claims this to be the case in Adıyaman, Bitlis, Siirt and Van provinces in the region. Despite the fact that seven provinces of the region (Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa and Van, which constitute the sixth agricultural region according to the State Institute of Statistics) have 21.1 per cent of the livestock of the whole country, they only account for 12,490 tons of the country's 743,000 tons of meat production.²² This is partly due to low productivity, and partly due to cattle-smuggling into the neighbouring countries, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Low productivity is also a main feature in the production of other animal products, such as dairy products, wool, mohair, honey, etc. The technology of production and methods of production are old-fashioned. For instance, most of the milk produced in the region is processed into yoghurt, cheese and butter by individual households. Prior to 1963 there was no modern creamery in the region. However, in order to meet the increasing demand for milk and dairy products in the industrialised parts of the country governments have planned to open creameries in Eastern Anatolia. Thus the second Five Year Plan envisaged seven creameries being opened in Eastern Anatolia during 1972 and 1973.

So far we have seen the structure of agricultural production in the Southeastern region of Turkey. The agricultural products produced in the region are transferred to the industrialised parts of Turkey or to overseas markets by government agencies such as Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi and Tekel, or by government-supported sales co-operatives such as Çukobirlik and by merchants. Also, rural resources flow out of the region via absentee landlords. In addition to being a source of cheap labour for developing capitalism the region is also a food-stuffs depot for the industrial regions a factor which will also be discussed at some length in Chapter VIII.²³



MAP II SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA: DIYARBAKIR


DIYARBAKIR (PROVINCE)

Diyarbakır Province is situated in the middle of the Southeastern Anatolia region, and is the second biggest province. Diyarbakır city, the major urban conglomerate, is about 958 Km. from the Turkish capital city, Ankara. Being at the north end of Mesopotamia the province is encircled by Siirt and Muş provinces in the East, Mardin and Urfa in the South, Urfa again and Adıyaman in the West, and Elazığ and Bingöl in the North. (See map II)

TOPOGRAPHY

Diyarbakır city is situated on the eastern side of a basalt plateau which lies between Karacadağ Mountain and the River Dicle (Tigris). The territory of the whole province is encircled by both high and low mountains, and in the centre it has the appearance of a slight hollow. The altitude of this lower area varies between 600 and 800 metres above sea level.²⁴

The boundaries of the province are determined by a chain of mountains which is a branch of the Güney-Doğu Toroslar (Southeast Taurus). In the north of the province there lies the Akdağ chain of mountains. This series of mountains runs from the North of the province towards the East, through Ergani, Dicle (Piran), Hanı, Lice, Hazro and Silvan districts. The highest points in the Ergani region are the Mıhrab mountain (2,100m.), Zulkefil mountain (1,660m.) and Dutdibi mountain (1,350m.) at the foot of which lies the district of Ergani. The chain



MAP III DIYARBAKIR: TOPOGRAPHY

of mountains continues eastwards beyond the Tigris valley which divides the province into two halves. Mount Seryeksan (2,561m.) and Mount Anduk (2,830m.) are the highest points in the chain of mountains along the northern boundary of the province. In the South of the province a branch of the East Taurus mountains lies between Malatya province and the Karacadağ mountains. This chain comprises the mountains of Balahor, Salahı and Gune. The first two of these are within the boundaries of Ergani district.²⁵

As we have seen the province has a mountainous physical structure, but between the chains of mountains there exist several plains. The most extensive of these plains are: 1) Diyarbakır Ovası, which covers an area of 40,000 hectares and is divided into two halves by the River Dicle, the western part of the plain is suitable for animal husbandry, while the eastern part has more agriculture. 11) Kıkı Ovası, which is also called Kıkan Ovası, and is about 25,000 hectares, it lies in the eastern and southern parts of Cinar district and stretches towards Bismil district and it is the most fertile plain of the whole province, wheat and barley being cultivated mainly here. 111) Behremkî Ovası, which can be seen as an extension of Kıkı Ovası, it covers a substantial part of the Bismil district and has an area of 18,000 hectares. 1v) Gevran Ovası, which is also called Ergani Ovası, and spreads over an area of 15,000 hectares, it has the appearance of a dried lake encircled by very high hills, and dry farming constitutes the main agricultural activity, although in the area through which Kalhana Suyu (Kalhana Stream) flows six or seven thousand donums of land are irrigated. v) Karahan Ovası, which stretches

between Gervan Ovası and Diyarbakır and the skirts of Karacadağ Mountain, this plain is about 10,000 hectares, a sizeable amount of which is covered by pebbles, and the land is arid, so animal husbandry is more widespread than agricultural activities in this area.

Apart from these above-mentioned large plains there are several other small plains extending along the River Dicle, covering five to six thousand hectares each, which are worth mentioning Pamuklu Ovası, Ambarçay Ovası, Sinan Ovası and Silvan Ovası. Also, in the mountainous areas such as Çermik, Çüngüş, Dicle, Hani, Kulp, Lice and Hazro there are several plains which are no bigger than three to five thousand hectares. Among the rest Mermer, Fis, Kocalan, Dedeköy and Çavlı plains are also worthy of note.

The cultivable lands of Diyarbakır province have more or less similar features. Ignoring some small topographical differences, the general aspects of the lands of the province can be described as follows the soil is generally reddish-brown in colour and consists of limestone, fragmented basalt and marl, the lands suitable for cultivation are generally in the areas of 10 per cent slope or less, these lands constitute chain-like series along the valleys of the streams which flow into the River Dicle.²⁶ These lands become very sticky when they are damp, and fallow lands form a crust three to four centimetres deep after rainfall, however, this crust can easily be broken, which means that the land is suitable for irrigation.²⁷

Irrigation facilities in the province are inadequate and the existing facilities are not sufficiently used. For example, Devegeçidi Dam was built in 1972 with the aim of irrigating 10,600 hectares of land, but even today it is not fully used, since the irrigation project is being carried out very slowly. There are three artificial lakes ensuring irrigation to a very small extent. Of these the Ortavıran Göleti has the capacity of irrigating only 132 hectares, while Gözeöl Göleti provides irrigation for 1,198 hectares and Kurtkaya Göleti provides irrigation for 9,000 hectares. Apart from these, the River Dicle and some small streams are used for irrigation by traditional methods. The River Dicle is considered to be the Nile of Diyarbakır province, on account of its several tributaries being used for irrigation. The River Dicle is fed mainly from two different sources, one of which originates around Gölçük Lake in the southeast of Elazığ province, between the mountains of Mastar and Sarımeşe in the southeast Taurus mountain chain. This tributary flows through Maden district, taking the name Ergani Suyu, then turns eastwards joining in with Behru Deresi at the foot of Zülkefil Mountain, then converging with Sımsırık Suyu around Dicle district it flows through Eğil region and finally converges with the second main tributary which originates in Bırklın (Zülkarneyn). It is after this confluence that the river takes the name Dicle. The second main tributary of the Dicle river has its source in the cave which gives it its name Bırklın Suyu. This stream converges with a few others before joining the other main tributary at Delücan. Flowing through Diyarbakır province the Dicle takes on several other streams (such as the Havar, Yenice, Karasu, Ambarçay, Kuruçay, Pamukçay, Sinançayı,

Göksu and Aşağı Hanık Çayı) before it passes through the Turkish-Iraqi border. The watercourse of the Dicle is 452Km. in Turkey and 1,000Km. as a whole.

There are some other streams which do not converge with the Dicle, but which also contribute to the irrigation of the agricultural lands in the province. Kalhana Suyu is the most important of these, as it is the largest of the streams not converging with the Dicle within the boundaries of the province. Kalhana Suyu carries the name of one of the villages because the river is mainly used for the irrigation of the lands of Kalhana village. The total area irrigated by Kalhana Suyu is about six to seven thousand donüms.

Other streams are mostly within the boundaries of Çermik district, and render possible vegetable cultivation in the district. Their names are Medya Çayı, Sinek Çayı, Göz Suyu, Madrop Suyu and Sinan Suyu. Given the level of technology, the mountainous nature of Çermik district makes it extremely difficult to make use of these streams to their full extent.

CLIMATE CONDITIONS

Agricultural production in Diyarbakır province is largely determined by the weather conditions of the region. The climate of the Diyarbakır basin shows the features of a sub-tropical plateau climate. The high mountains to the North of the basin prevent cool air from reaching the lower inner areas in the summer. In winter they cause the lower

inner areas to be affected by high pressure cold air originating from the mountain peaks. The basin is affected by high pressure originating in Siberia and the Mediterranean in the winter and autumn, and by low pressure generated in the Persian Gulf in the spring and summer. As a result of this the climate is one of cold winters with low rainfall and long hot, dry summers.²⁸

The average temperature of the coldest month (generally January) varies between 1.5°C and 2.3°C . The average temperature of the hottest month (generally July) varies between 30.4°C and 31°C . The eastern part of the region is relatively warmer than the western part. The difference between the hottest and coldest temperatures in a year varies between 28°C and 29.5°C . In the hottest days of July in Diyarbakır the temperature reaches as high as 46.2°C . The number of days in which the temperature falls below zero is 48-68 on average, and the frosty days occur mostly in the months December and March. Towards the middle of April a short spring follows the frosty season, then suddenly summer comes with its suffocating heat. June is the harvest time for wheat, which is sown in November and takes 215 to 255 days to mature. The long summer enables the producers to prepare their land for the winter after the harvest.

The average number of rainy days is about 85 to 90 in the Diyarbakır basin. January and March are the months of heaviest precipitation, (12 to 14 days on average) whereas July and August are the driest months (one day on average). In Ergani average rainfall is 767.4mm . per year, and the number of rainy days per year for the twelve years

from 1960 to 1972 is 80.3 on average.²⁹ Of the 767.4mm. average yearly rainfall 237.3mm. (31 per cent) falls in the spring, 8.8mm. (2 per cent) in the summer, 126.7mm. (16 per cent) in the autumn and 394.7mm. (51 per cent) in the winter. It generally snows in January and February, the average number of snowy days being seven. The snow stays on the ground for about twenty days at the most.³⁰

According to one calculation the humidity index for Diyarbakır is 19.1 on average, which is considered an indication of an arid climate. (According to the formula of De Mantonne a humidity index of over 40 means that a region can be considered humid.) However, humidity between December and March is well over 40, which enables the crops to mature.³¹ Given the limited and inefficient state of irrigation facilities in the province dry farming is dominant, and agricultural production is therefore susceptible to the vagaries of the weather.

CULTIVABLE LAND

Out of a total rural area of 14,238,557 donums³² in the Diyarbakır province 9,887,334 donums (69 per cent) are arable while 4,351,223 donums (30.6 per cent) are wasteland. The figures for Ergani district are 1,358,000 donums of total rural area, of which 1,056,275 donums (77.8 per cent) are arable, and 301,725 donums (22.2 per cent) are wasteland.

TABLE 2.22 Total Arable and Wastelands in Diyarbakır Province in 1963

DISTRICT	TOTAL AREA	TOTAL ARABLE LAND		TOTAL WASTELANDS	
	(donums - 1/10 Ha.)	(donums - 1/10 Ha.)	% of total	(donums - 1/10 Ha.)	% of total
Central	2,522,274	1,882,496	74.6	639,778	25.4
Bismil	1,605,848	1,519,241	94.6	86,607	5.4
Cermik	1,067,000	523,250	49.0	543,750	51.0
Cınar	1,615,900	1,243,525	77.0	372,375	23.0
Cungus	435,000	98,420	22.6	336,580	77.4
Dicle	1,127,000	429,350	38.1	697,650	61.9
Erganı	1,358,000	1,056,275	77.8	301,725	22.2
Hani	242,000	166,600	68.8	75,400	31.2
Hazro	298,270	199,383	66.8	98,887	33.2
Kulp	1,261,500	654,175	51.9	607,325	48.1
Lice	1,416,000	1,064,400	75.2	351,600	24.8
Silvan	1,289,765	1,050,219	81.4	239,546	18.6
Total	14,238,557	9,887,334	69.4	4,351,223	30.6

Source Koy İşleri Bakanlığı, Koy Envanter Etüdülerine Göre Diyarbakır (Diyarbakır According to the Village Inventory Surveys), Ankara, Koy İşleri Bakanlığı Yayınları 42, 1966

TABLE 2.23 Land Utilisation in Diyarbakır Province in 1963

	Donums	Percentage
Vineyards/Orchards	328,180	3.4
Meadows/Pastures	1,040,656	10.5
Forests ¹	1,748,190	17.7
Fields	6,667,632	67.4
Woods - nursery planted	60,405	0.6
Vegetable gardens	42,271	0.4
Total	9,887,334	100.0

Note 1 Figures for forests cover the area described in the Forestry Act.

Source Koy İşleri Bakanlığı, Op. cit., 1966

Cereal production constitutes the main agricultural activity in the province. Wheat is the principal grain produced, and to a varying extent other cereals, such as barley, millet and rice are also produced.³³ Pulses are also produced both for home consumption and for the market. The most important pulses grown are beans, lentils and vetch, which is used as animal fodder. To a very small extent some commercial crops like tobacco, potatoes, cotton, flax, sesame seeds, sunflowers and sweetcorn are also produced.

The tables below demonstrate the types and the extent of the crops produced in Diyarbakır province, as well as the areas devoted to the production of the various crops and productivity of the crops (excluding vegetables). Since the figures speak for themselves we shall be content to point out that the productivity of the crops grown in Diyarbakır is generally low. This is due to the low level of technology and limited use of agricultural chemicals and fertilisers. Although we do not have updated data about the amounts of chemicals and fertilisers used by each farm in Diyarbakır province we may assume that the figures which we used for Eastern Anatolia earlier in this chapter concerning the use of modern inputs hold true for Diyarbakır province as well. Only 27.32 per cent of farmers use artificial fertilisers in Eastern Anatolia, while this figure for Turkey as a whole is 66.08 per cent.³⁴

TABLE 2.24 Area Sown, Harvested with Production and Yield in
Diyarbakır in 1976

CROP	AREA SOWN (hectares)	AREA HARVESTED (hectares)	PRODUCTION (tons)	YIELD (Kg/Ha)
<u>Cereals</u>				
Wheat	212,050	191,300	366,444	1,916
Barley	67,750	67,750	140,895	2,080
Maize	1,190	1,190	1,891	1,589
Millet	9,250	9,060	9,456	1,044
Rice	4,240	4,240	10,435	2,461
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total	294,480	273,540	529,121	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
<u>Pulses</u>				
Chick peas	2,490	2,420	2,342	968
Dry beans	635	635	621	978
Lentils	2,470	2,470	2,682	1,086
Cow vetch	115	115	119	1,035
Wild vetch	870	870	823	946
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total	6,580	6,510	6,587	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
<u>Industrial Crops</u>				
Tobacco ¹	5,104	5,104	4,276	838
Sugar beet	35	35	790	22,571
Cotton lint ²	9,300	9,300	6,023	648
Flax fibre ³	4,600	4,600	-	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total	19,039	19,039	11,089	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
<u>Oil Seed</u>				
Cotton seed	-	-	9,637	1,036
Sunflower	2,100	2,100	3,111	1,481
Sesame	985	985	533	541
Flax seed	-	-	2,295	499
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total	3,085	3,085	15,576	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	

TABLE 2.24 (Continued)

CROP	AREA SOWN (hectares)	AREA HARVESTED (hectares)	PRODUCTION (tons)	YIELD (Kg/Ha)
<u>Tuber Crops</u>				
Dry onions	1,075	1,075	21,625	19,186
Dry garlic	145	145	583	4,021
Potatoes	45	45	268	5,956
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total	1,265	1,265	22,476	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
GRAND TOTALS	324,449	303,439	584,849	

- Notes
- 1 Data is provisional.
 - 2 Area sown is the same for cotton and seed.
 - 3 Area sown is the same for fibre and seed.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Op. cit., 1978

TABLE 2.25 Vegetable Production in Diyarbakır in 1976 (in Tons)

<u>Leafy or Stem Vegetables</u>		<u>Leguminous Vegetables</u>	
Cabbage	2,500	Green beans	2,215
Leaf lettuce	760		
Spinach	405		
Leeks	180		
		<u>Root, Bulb and Tuberous Vegetables</u>	
Total	3,845	Green garlic	290
		Green onion	7,215
		Carrots	240
		Horse radish	3,680
<u>Fruit-bearing Vegetables</u>		Total	11,425
Melons	46,125		
Water melons	178,675		
Squash	3,070		
Cucumber	14,335		
Aubergine	14,500		
Okra	588		
Tomatoes	47,775		
Green peppers	5,100		
Hot peppers	4,120		
Total	314,288		
Total Production		331,773 tons	
Total Area		16,130 hectares	

Source State Institute of Statistics, Op. cit., 1978

We do, however have information about the level of technology used in agriculture in Diyarbakır. Despite the fact that the use of agricultural machinery is gradually increasing in Diyarbakır it has not yet reached a stage where it can determine the nature of agriculture in the province. In 1975 there existed 2,093 tractors compared with 21,740 out-dated wooden ploughs. The numbers of other items of sophisticated agricultural machinery, such as combines, cultivators, etc are very limited, as shown in the table below.

TABLE 2. Numbers of Agricultural Equipment and Machinery in
Diyarbakir in 1975

MACHINES & EQUIPMENT	NUMBER	MACHINES & EQUIPMENT	NUMBER
Wooden ploughs	21,740	Sprayers	1,384
Walking ploughs	1,740	Dusters	665
Cultivators	1,541	Centrifugal pumps (farm use)	88
Tractors	2,093	Motor pumps (farm use)	913
Plough (tractor drawn)	1,613	Jeeps (farm use)	51
Disc ploughs (tractor drawn)	306	Trucks (farm use)	33
One-way ploughs	34	Swivel-type ploughs	39
Disc harrows	75	Spike-toothed harrows	84
Rollers	75	Rod weeders	4
Trailers	1,056	Pottery hoes	10
Grain drill (horse drawn)	57	Plankers	2,916
Grain drills (tractor drawn)	527	Ridging ploughs	47
Cotton planters	30	Rotary cultivators	1
Mowers	10	Combine drills	255
Threshing sleds	17,895	Tractor drawn hoes	120
Binders	10	Fertiliser distributors	193
Combines	111	Engine driven PTO sprayers	594
Threshers	238	Tractor PTO sprayers	11
Seed cleaners	29	Blowers	89
Hay rakers	2,325	Deep well turbine pumps	167
Balers	39	Tractor-drawn combines	5
Feed grinders	59	Fanning mills	21
Milk churns	5,000	Domestic thresher	250
Egg incubators	27	Tractor drawn hay mower	3
Canopied brooders	7	Cream separator	245

Source: State Institute of Statistics, *Op cit*, 1978

LANDOWNERSHIP IN DIYARBAKIR

In Diyarbakir the land is unequally divided among the people, as we shall see in this section. Furthermore, this unequal land distribution in the province is a fair reflection of the general picture in the Eastern and Southeastern regions as a whole. Although we have up-to-date statistics for landownership at regional levels, there are no new data concerning land distribution at the level of the province,

let alone district and village levels. The newest detailed data we can obtain in terms of landownership in Diyarbakir province was published in 1966 by the Ministry of Village Affairs. According to the village inventory surveys carried out in rural Diyarbakir 57,092 families were engaged in farming out of the total 57,494 families, and 25,906 families were landless. That is, 45.4 per cent of all families engaged in agriculture were landless. The percentage of landless farming families varies among the different districts of the province from 18.4 per cent to 73.1 per cent. In the Ergani district for example, 39.7 per cent of farming families are landless (2,298 families out of the 5,776 farming families).

TABLE 2.27 Distribution of Landless Households in Rural Diyarbakir

DISTRICT	TOTAL NO. OF FAMILIES	NO. OF FARMING FAMILIES	NO. OF LANDLESS FAMILIES	% OF LANDLESS FARMING FAMILIES
Central	10,174	9,960	6,250	62.7
Dişmil	6,309	6,294	4,600	73.1
Çermik	4,929	4,920	1,448	29.4
Çınar	4,128	4,083	2,134	52.3
Cünküş	2,461	2,459	453	18.4
Dicle	4,318	4,311	1,397	32.4
Ergani	5,782	5,776	2,298	39.8
Hani	1,759	1,759	458	26.0
Hazro	3,044	2,825	806	39.8
Kulp	4,636	4,512	1,526	31.7
Lice	5,043	5,070	1,738	34.3
Silvan	5,055	5,020	2,800	49.8
Total	57,494	57,092	25,906	45.4

Source: İsvan İslam Ç. Çeligi, Op. cit., 1966

T A B L E 2 2 8 Size and Distribution of Family Holdings in Diyarbakır

Region	0-50 Families		51-100 Families		1-200 Families		200+ Families		Total Holdings	
	No. of Families	Total Holdings	No. of Families	Total Holdings	No. of Families	Total Holdings	No. of Families	Total Holdings	No. of Families	Total Holdings
Center	2,88	47,000	590	43,016	102	7,303	422	65,334	3,710	527,464
	590	800	158	8,0	158	36	110	694	1000	1000
Elazığ	3,351	12,760	321	25,244	110	55,258	712	687,971	4,694	781,133
	714	16	68	3	66	7.1	15.2	880	1000	1000
Erzurum	2,764	40,705	421	28,366	204	27,322	77	26,342	3,472	124,735
	797	20.5	12.2	22.8	59	220	2	227	1000	1000
Malazgirt	557	12,206	223	17,474	160	23,349	167	177,644	1,107	230,763
	114	52	201	7	145	102	150	770	1000	1000
Çüngür	1,977	19,852	27	1,830	2	214	-	-	2,006	20,926
	986	902	13	88	01	10	-	-	1000	1000
Diğir	2,316	38,059	388	27,197	153	20,566	57	18,633	2,914	104,455
	794	364	133	261	53	197	24	78	1000	1000
Erğir	2,517	51,840	521	36,960	276	37,254	164	99,735	3,478	225,779
	725	230	149	163	79	165	47	442	1000	1000
Harir	1,256	14,503	39	2,497	6	778	-	-	1,301	17,838
	965	817	30	140	05	43	-	-	1000	1000
Marz	986	12,954	16	6,402	71	10,740	6	30,695	1,219	60,691
	609	21.1	71	10.6	58	177	62	506	1000	1000
Kulp	3,112	37,601	137	9,045	27	3,476	10	4,184	3,286	54,307
	947	693	42	168	08	64	03	77	1000	1000
Lice	2,657	46,450	436	29,542	179	27,754	63	24,758	3,335	123,504
	796	376	131	240	54	185	17	200	1000	1000
Silvan	1,593	25,366	374	27,608	608	91,142	245	225,676	2,820	369,792
	565	89	132	75	216	246	87	610	1000	1000
Total	25,277	358,593	3,564	255,181	2,498	364,221	2,003	1,663,392	33,342	641,387
	75.8	135	10.7	97	75	138	60	630	1000	1000

Source Koy İşleri Bakanlıđı, Op. cit., 1966

In addition to the large number of landless farmers a large number of landowning families do not own enough land to support themselves. For example, 75.8 per cent of landowning families own only 13.5 per cent of the total land and their lands vary between one and fifty dönüms, while 6 per cent of the total landowning families own 63 per cent of the total land and their lands contain 200 dönüms or more.

Big landlords mostly dwell in towns and cities and run their farms from there or through their agents and/or sharecroppers. Absenteeism is therefore very widespread in Diyarbakır, as is the case in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia as a whole.³⁵ In 1966 1,740 absentee families controlled 86.4 per cent of the total lands in Diyarbakır province. The following table demonstrates the number of absentee landowning families and their distribution among the districts as well as the amount of land controlled by the absentee landowners.

TABLE 2.29 Land Owned by Absentees in Diyarbakır in 1963

DISTRICT	NO OF ABSENTEE FAMILIES	NO OF LAND FRAGMENTS CONTROLLED BY ABSENTEES	TOTAL AREA (donums)
Central	522	6,689	824,123
Bismil	190	2,394	438,173
Çermik	133	670	61,367
Çınar	99	1,665	365,017
Çüngüş	1	4	14
Dicle	43	234	5,049
Fırganı	279	1,813	102,343
Hani	49	101	1,210
Hazro	184	1,000	29,178
Kulp	14	79	535
Lice	75	1,255	118,961
Silvan	151	1,496	337,578
Total	1,740	17,400	2,283,548

Source Kby İşleri Bakanlığı, Op. cit , 1966

Most of the big landlords are descendants of aḡas, tribal leaders and sheikhs, whose relations with the people have been institutionalised over the centuries. However, with the growth of capitalism, the enlargement of the market economy, the mechanisation of agriculture, and the spread of education, these institutions (aḡadom, tribalism and sheikhdom) have been losing their functions, and therefore their strength, since the 1950s. Aḡas, tribal leaders and sheikhs, unable to stop new developments which would endanger their dominance, have adapted themselves to the requirements of these new developments. They are no longer just landlords and tribal leaders who live only on the surplus extracted from their sharecroppers and tribesmen. They are now merchants in the town, prominent political figures in various parties, and mediators between their people and the state.³⁶

Without going into the historical development of the social institutions based on aḡadom, tribalism and sheikhdom, we shall try to outline the main characteristics. Aḡadom denotes a system where agriculture is the dominant form of production on large lands worked by many yaricis (sharecroppers) and marabas (propertyless sharecroppers)³⁷ who are controlled by the owner of the land, called aḡas. Amongst the aḡas there are those who have obtained control of their large estates legally, as well as those who have obtained it by force or by other illegal means, before and after the institution of the Republic in 1923. The crystallised form of aḡadom is seen in places where agriculture is not capitalised and small fragments of land are worked by sharecropping and maraba (propertyless sharecropping) families whose

surplus product is extracted by the landowning ağa, and where the ağas are the political authorities in the villages within the boundaries of their lands, organising and controlling most aspects of the life of their subjects.³⁸

Sheikhs are considered to have religious spiritual authority, and are the leaders of tarikats (religious orders), but they do not perform official religious duties like imams (prayer leaders) do. They have different levels of religious education, and some of them are descendants of sheikhs, known for their spiritual authority. The sheikhs who use their spiritual authority to justify the established system have gained material wealth, like the ağas, and have become ağas themselves. Mehmed Emin Bozarslan states that today in some parts of Eastern Anatolia (this includes the Southeast region) the sheikh and the ağa are one and the same person. Either the ağa might have become a sheikh through his large lands and position of authority, or the sheikh may have become an ağa through gaining wealth through gifts from followers and believers who are mostly illiterate.³⁹

The Altınkar family of Çınar district in Diyarbakır, for example, have become ağas through sheikhdom, and now own large lands, grazing lands and flocks of animals, and they accept numerous gifts from people.⁴⁰

There are also two independent tarikats, Ensari Tarikatı and Fethullah Tarikatı, which have many followers. One of the leaders of the Ensari Tarikatı, Abdüllatif Ensarioğlu, has been an MP for a number of years, his tarikat is well supported by the people of the Mardinkapı quarter of Diyarbakır, Ergani, Çermik, Dicle and Kulp districts.⁴¹ As to the

tribes, the exact number of tribes in the East and Southeast regions is not known, because they are nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes. A tribe consists of kabiles (smaller groups), which in turn are made up of obas (groups of tents), and obas are made up of smaller units called çadırs (tents). Generally tribes have about 1,000 to 2,000 people, however, there are aşirets (tribes) with more than 10,000 members, and Savak Aşireti of Elazığ has 15,000 members.⁴²

Kabiles contain about 30 to 100 çadırs (tents) and generally are called after the name of the current leader. Descent from the same family or dynasty is the basis of aşirets, which also have ağas. Aşiret ağas expropriate a part of the surplus produced by the members of their aşiret. A certain amount of money has to be given to the aşiret ağa for each unit of animals or animal products sold. In addition he is paid for solving the problems and conflicts between his members over matters such as abdication. However, dependency on the aşiret ağa in the aşiret organisation which is based on husbandry of animals is not as severe as that of the sharecroppers on their ağas. The aşiret ağa is responsible for assuring harmony within the aşiret, for finding and renting grazing lands and winter quarters for the animals of the aşiret and for dealing with the outside world in matters concerning the aşiret as a whole. Aşiret ağas and other aşiret leaders have considerable power and influence over their members who obey the economic and the juridical rules of the aşiret, which are implemented by the aşiret ağas and leaders.⁴³

SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

According to the 1975 population census 651,233 people live in Diyarbakir province as a whole, 281,960 (43.3 per cent) of these people live in twelve urban centres and the remaining 369,273 (46.7 per cent) live in rural areas. However, the high percentage of urban population should not be allowed to mislead us for the purposes of statistics in Turkey centres with a population of over 2,000 are considered urban centres. This differentiation may be sufficient for administrative purposes, but the application of the term urban centre to some of these places seems hardly justifiable if one takes into account the division of labour and the nature of the economic activities, whether predominantly agricultural or industrial etc.

Administratively Turkey consists of 67 provinces which are governed by valis (provincial governors). Each province is divided into a number of districts which are governed by kaymakams (district governors). Districts are further divided into smaller sub-districts called bucaks, governed by bucak mudurus (sub-district directors). Bucaks are in turn made up of köys (villages) governed by a muhtar (village headman).

In this way, Diyarbakir province consists of twelve districts, one being the central district. These districts are Dismil, Çermik, Çınar, Çüngüş, Dicle, Ergani, Hani, Hazro, Kulp, Lice and Silvan. Most of the rural settlements other than villages do not have access to the town centre in winter. Although villages are the main rural settlements in Eastern Anatolia there are two other types of units of settlements in the region mezraa and yayla.

The mezraa is a type of rural settlement comprising a cluster of dwellings (2 to 35 households), which is situated in remote parts, within village boundaries but separated from the villages themselves by geographical obstacles such as mountains, hills, deep valleys etc. The mezraa is usually owned by a big landowner, whose inability to cultivate the remote lands compels him to give these lands to tenants and sharecroppers. Most of the houses in the mezraa are owned by the landlord also, and he allows his tenant farmers and sharecroppers to use them for shelter. Large landownership forms the basis for the existence of the mezraa settlement. That is why there exist quite a number of mezraas in the provinces of Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Elazığ and Gaziantep, where big holdings are so prevalent. The total number of mezraas in Diyarbakır province is 813, and in Ergani district there are 58. As we have stated, being in geographically awkward places, most of the mezraas do not have all-season roads.

In contrast to the mezraa, the yayla is mostly the common property of the village

The yayla is a place where animals are taken to graze during a particular period in summer, where agriculture is practised, all sorts of work done in order to gain an improvement in securing one's livelihood, even where one may go to relax. It is outside the normal sphere of village life and is often the common property of the village. Although separate from the village, and frequently far away from it, it is an area linked to the village either wholly or in part by socio-economic ties, or it may be an area which is supplementary to the village's basic sphere of livelihood ⁴⁴

Diyarbakır is experiencing a very rapid process of urbanisation. While the urban population (Diyarbakır city and the district centres of the

province' increased almost fourfold, in the period 1950 to 1975 (from 72,267 to 281,960) the total population of the province increased 2.2 times (from 293,738 to 651,233). Ergani district also shows a very high urbanisation tendency. For instance, whereas the population of the town centre almost quadrupled in the period 1950 to 1975 the population of the whole town only doubled, (see Table 2.30).

Migration from the rural areas is responsible for this urbanisation trend. Research which has been carried out in the province has revealed that the reasons for the migration to the provincial centre are mainly economic. For instance, 60.3 per cent of the migrants came to Diyarbakır because of the fact that their income level was not high enough to secure their livelihood in the rural areas. Of these 11.3 per cent declared that lack of security was the main factor in their migration, and 9.3 per cent gave blood feuds as the reason.⁴⁵ Given the fact that land disputes rest at the root of most of the blood feuds in Southeastern Anatolia we may say that economic reasons are responsible for the unbalanced urbanisation of the province and of the districts within it. We call it unbalanced because the population forced out of the rural areas is not absorbed into the urban centres, due to the fact that industrialisation does not keep pace with the rural-urban migration rate.

TABLE 2.30 Urbanisation of Diyarbakır Province

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	INDEX OF [*] INCREASE	URBAN POPULATION	INDEX OF INCREASE	RURAL POPULATION	INDEX OF INCREASE
1950	293,738	100	72,267	100	221,471	100
1960	401,884	137	124,718	173	277,166	125
1970	581,208	198	238,504	330	342,704	155
1975	651,233	222	281,960	390	369,273	167

* 1950 figures equal to 100; Index figures have been calculated from the results of population censuses for the relative years.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Censuses of Population

INDUSTRY

The largest establishments which may be called industrial are the Tekel İçki Fabrikası, (Rakı Factory) and Sumerbank Yun Yıkama ve Şayak Fabrikası (Sumerbank Wool Washing and Serge Factory). The Tekel İçki Fabrikası was established in Diyarbakır in 1932 with a view to making use of the local resources in Diyarbakır and its vicinity. Only rakı which is 45° alcohol is produced in the factory, for which 3,000,000Kg. of raisins produced in Midyat, Nusaybin, Mardin and Urfa are required. Another necessary ingredient in rakı production is aniseed, which is brought from Tefenni. Annual rakı production is about 1,500,000 litres. A total of 293 people are employed in the factory and the workers come mainly from Diyarbakır province, especially from rganı, Çermik and Lice, and from neighbouring provinces such as Siirt and Bingöl.

Sumerbank Yun Yıkama ve Sayak Fabrikası was established in 1954, again with the intention of making use of local resources. The factory uses about 600 to 700 tons of raw materials per year, and produces 150 to 250 tons of thread, and 350,000 metres of woollen cloth per year. In 1972 a carpet producing unit was added to the factory, the produce of which amounts to 120,000 square metres per year. 475 people are employed in the factory, 45 per cent of whom are from the provincial centre, while 40 per cent are from the districts and villages of the province, the remainder come from Mardin, Bingöl, Siirt and Bitlis.

Both factories are state owned. Apart from these two relatively large production units there are 329 small production units and 128 repair shops, employing from two to ten people.⁴⁶ Some of these small workshops are, for example, 20 brick producing units, 15 carpentry workshops, 4 sweet production units, one soap production unit, electrical powered flour mills, looms, pottery production units, etc

The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that the level of industrial development in Diyarbakır is extremely rudimentary, and is far from being able to absorb the labour force pushed out of the rural areas by factors such as the increasing mechanisation of agriculture, shortage of land and so on. The agrarian nature of the economic activities is best reflected in the table below.

TABLE 2 31 Economically Active Population in Diyarbakır Province

OCCUPATION	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Scientists, Technical, Professional and related workers	5,000	1,888	6,888
Administrative and Managerial	749	40	789
Clerical and related workers	3,199	442	3,641
Sales workers	5,897	113	6,010
Service workers	5,831	532	6,363
Agricultural, Animal Husbandry, Forestry, Fishery and Hunters	85,482	78,156	163,638
Production and related workers	7,399	1,144	8,543
Others	23,278	872	24,150
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	136,835	83,187	220,022

Source State Institute of Statistics, Op. cit., 1977

ERGANI (DISTRICT)

Ergani district is the second biggest district of Diyarbakır province, with a population of 56,995, of which 21,936 (38.5 per cent) live in the town centre, while the remaining 35,059 (61.5 per cent) live in rural areas, according to the results of the 1975 census of population

Ergani town centre itself is situated on the main road between Diyarbakır and Elazığ. This highway goes as far as Istanbul, which is connected with Europe by highways. The town serves as a transit centre between the provincial centre Diyarbakır and the three urban centres Dicle, Çermik and Çüngüş, which only have access to Diyarbakır through Ergani. The road between Ergani and Diyarbakır is about 60Km. and is

asphalted. The road between Ergani and Maden is also asphalted and is about 21Km long. The Ergani-Dicle road (32Km.) and the Ergani-Cermik road (35Km.) are stabilised roads which are closed by snow from time to time in winter.

Ergani district and the province as a whole are linked to both national and international markets through highways and railway networks. The Kurtalan-Istanbul railway was built in 1935 and passes just 4Km. south of Ergani, it goes through Diyarbakir and links it with Batman, the site of one of Turkey's petroleum refineries. Petrol is also produced in Diyarbakir, but we shall return to this subject later

In Ergani district 72.5 per cent (2,517 families) of the total 3,478 landowning families have one to 50 donums of land, which constitutes 23 per cent of the total land. Those families who own 200 or more donums constitute 4.7 per cent of the total landowning families and control 44.2 per cent of the total land in the district.⁴⁷

TABLE 2.3' Land Utilisation of the Arable Lands in Ergani District in 1963

LAND UTILISATION	DONÜMS	PERCENTAGE
Vineyards/Orchards	67,935	6.4
Meadows/Pastures	432,610	41.0
Forests ¹	5,000	0.5
Fields	541,945	51.3
Woods (nursery planted)	5,350	0.5
Vegetable gardens	3,405	0.3
Total	1,056,245	100.0

1 Figures for forests cover the area described in the Forest Act.

In Ergani district 301,725 donums are wasteland, the rest of the total 1,358,000 donums is utilised for different purposes, as shown in Table 2.32.

Ergani district serves as a market place for regionally produced crops. However, Ergani in no sense constitutes a self-sufficient closed economy. Some of the locally produced crops such as wheat, barley, millet etc. are consumed in the district, but the bulk of the crops are sent to the other cities, either by local merchants or by the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Office of Soil Products). Most of the consumer goods (sugar, paraffin, salt, kitchen utensils, durable consumer goods, such as radios, televisions etc.) are brought into the town from other centres, mainly Diyarbakır, Gaziantep and Istanbul. Different crops are produced in different parts of the district, depending on the physical features of the area. For instance, cotton is grown where irrigation of some sort is sufficient, sesame seeds are also grown in irrigated areas. Cotton and sesame seeds are not used by the producers' households, but are sold to merchants in the town, who transport the cotton to Elazığ where there are several cotton-gins and an agent of the Çukobirlik, and they transport the sesame to Gaziantep where there are several small-scale helva producing units. In non-irrigated areas wheat, lentils and barley are the main crops. In certain areas the need for cash directs some producers to grow vegetables and fruits, such as tomatoes, peppers, aubergines, courgettes, water melons and sweet melons.

Production techniques are still primitive in some places. In small-holdings especially the use of improved seeds, artificial fertilisers

and tractors is very limited. The nature of the fields also affects the use of tractors, simply because stony fields make it extremely difficult. In large holdings tractors are used for tilling the soil. Although oxen may be considered the main power for land-tilling, on small-holdings there is a new trend which should be mentioned, namely the renting out of tractors by well-off farmers to those without.

There are two sub-districts belonging to Ergani district, namely Merkez Bucağı and Ahmetli (Guran) Bucağı. There are 61 villages bound to the Merkez Bucağı and ten villages bound to the Ahmetli Bucağı in Ergani district. The total of 71 villages of Ergani district are scattered around the centre at distances varying from 2 to 150Km. Access to the district centre from the villages is mediated either by stabilised roads or by tracks. Only 27 villages have all-season roads linking them with the centre. Even in the spring and autumn some of the villages may be cut off, due to bad weather conditions. According to the Ministry of Village Affairs the number of villages which have access to the town centre in the spring is 42, and in the autumn this number is 69.⁴⁸

Regarding the rate of urbanisation in Ergani district, this can be seen in the table below. Similar to the situation in Diyarbakır province, this district has also witnessed a very rapid process of urbanisation.

TABLE 2.33 Urbanisation of Ergani District

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	INDEX OF* INCREASE	URBAN POPULATION	INDEX OF INCREASE	RURAL POPULATION	INDEX OF INCREASE
1950	27,246	100	5,647	100	21,599	100
1960	36,753	135	8,553	151	28,205	131
1970	50,716	186	18,544	328	32,222	149
1975	56,945	209	21,936	388	35,059	162

* 1950 figures equal to 100, Index figures have been calculated from the results of population censuses for the relative years.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Censuses of Population

We have shown that the Southeast region is the most underdeveloped region of Turkey. The region is mainly of a rural nature. Although Turkey as a whole shows rural characteristics, these are more distinguishable in the Southeast region, where there is almost no industry, the transportation and communication facilities are less developed, the level of education is very low, and health facilities are very inefficient. Although the region is more agricultural than the rest of Turkey the level of technology and agricultural inputs are more backward. The state has not been able to reduce the discrepancies between the Southeast region and the rest of Turkey. Moreover, it is possible to argue that state policies have intensified the discrepancies between this region and the rest of Turkey. The surplus (labour and products) created in the region has been transferred to the developed part of the country. In the following chapters we shall attempt to show how this surplus is created and transferred from the region. The analysis in the following chapters will be based on the fieldwork carried out

in Gisgis and Kalhana villages in 1977. We shall argue that it is the peasant household which creates this surplus labour and product. The organisation of the household economy vis à vis larger structures renders possible the creation and transfer of this surplus which is used in the development of urban capitalism. We shall argue that the peasant household as an economic unit carries the burden of this development. Before going into the details of ownership of means of production, relations of production, division of labour, etc. it seems to be appropriate to acquaint the reader with Gisgis and Kalhana where the fieldwork was carried out.

NOTES

1. Özer Ozankaya, "Doğu Anadolu Sorunu" (The Eastern Anatolia Question), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XXIV, No. 3 (1969).
2. State Institute of Statistics, Köyler İstatistikı 1960 Sayımına Göre (Village Statistics According to the 1960 Census) (1963), cited in the State Planning Organisation Co-ordination Department, Unbalanced Development Between Regions in Turkey (1972), p. 60.
3. *ibid.*, p. 60.
4. According to the 1965 population census the population of eighteen Eastern Anatolian provinces in 1965 amounted to 5,903,000, constituting 18.8 per cent of the total population of Turkey. The area covered by Eastern Anatolia provinces amounted to 220,735 Km², constituting 29.9 per cent of Turkey as a whole.
5. See the State Planning Organisation Coordination Department, *op. cit.* (1972), p. 39, and see Ozankaya, *op. cit.* (1969), p. 98.
6. Oktay Varlıer, Türk Tarımında Yapısal Değişme Teknoloji ve Toprak Bölüşümü (Structural Change, Technology and Land Distribution in Turkish Agriculture) (1978). Varlıer's work is based on data gathered in 1973 by the Institute of Population Studies of Hacettepe University.
7. One decare equals one tenth of a hectare. The Turkish State Institute of Statistics tends to use decares with dönüms interchangeably.
8. State Planning Organisation Coordination Department, *op. cit.* (1972), pp. 39-41, and Ozankaya, *op. cit.* (1969), pp. 99-100.
9. *ibid.*, p. 99.
10. Fourth Year Development Plan published in Resmî Gazete (12 December, 1978), p. 51.
11. *ibid.*, p. 51.
12. Erol Tümertekin, Türkiye'de İç Göçler (Internal Migrations in Turkey) (1968).
13. A brief comment on some of the statistics we are using in this part seems to be necessary. Although we have tried to use statistics concerning only the Southeast region whenever they were available, owing to the tendency of some sources to combine the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian regions of Turkey, we have had to make use of figures pertaining to both regions. Therefore, in this section figures concerning Eastern Anatolia include those of

Southeastern Anatolia, unless otherwise stated. Another point is that the figures given in these statistics are based on the declarations of the owners and should be regarded with caution. In most parts of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, as in other parts of Turkey, cadastral surveys are in their infancy. Nonetheless, the figures we use can give us a basic idea as to what the situation is like in the region.

14. See Chapter IV.
15. See Chapter V, p. 274.
16. İsmail Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo/Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller (The Order of Eastern Anatolia Socio/Economic and Ethnic Bases) (1969), pp. 122-123.
17. State Planning Organisation, First Five Year Development Plan 1963-1967 (1963), pp. 47-48.
18. See Chapter I, p. 37 and see Reşat Aktan, "Analysis and Evaluation of Land Reform Activities in Turkey", Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XXVI (September 1971).
19. State Institute of Statistics, Agricultural Structure and Production 1974-1976 (1978), p. 35.
20. *ibid.*, p. 34.
21. Beşikçi, *op. cit.* (1969), p. 23.
22. State Institute of Statistics, *op. cit.* (1969), p. 23.
23. See Chapter VIII, pp. 378-383
24. Şevket Beysanoğlu, Bütün Cepheleriyle Diyarbakır (Diyarbakır and All its Aspects) (1963), p. 10.
25. *ibid.*, pp. 10-13.
26. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı (Diyarbakır in the 50th Anniversary of the Republic 1973 Provincial Yearbook) (1973), pp. 139-140.
27. Ahmet Necdet Sözer, Diyarbakır Havzası (The Diyarbakır Basin) (1969), p. 33.
28. Beysanoğlu, *op. cit.* (1963), p. 19.
29. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı, *op. cit.* (1973), p. 152.
30. Sözer, *op. cit.* (1969), pp. 16-19.

31. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı, op. cit. (1973), p. 159.
32. One donum equals one tenth of a hectare.
33. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı, op. cit. (1973), p. 541.
34. See Table 2.9, p. 102.
35. See Table 2.18, p. 116.
36. See Chapter I, pp. 22-24, also Beşikçi, op. cit. (1969), pp. 220-221 and pp. 274-276.
37. For a description of maraba see Chapter V . pp. 256-258.
38. See Ziya Gökalp, Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik İncelemeler (Sociological Investigations about the Kurdish Tribes) (1975).
39. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, İslamiyet Açısından Şeyhlik ve Ağalık (Sheikdom and Agadom from an Islamic Point of View) (1964), pp. 108 and 125.
40. Ozankaya, op. cit. (1969), p. 92.
41. See Beşikçi, op. cit. (1969), p. 182.
42. Yön Dergisi (The Yön Journal) (14 December 1962).
43. Ozankaya, op. cit. (1969), p. 91.
44. Necdet Tunçdilek, Türkiye İskan Coğrafyası: Kır İskanı (The Geography of Settlement in Turkey: Rural Settlement) (1967).
45. Sözer, op. cit. (1969), p. 57.
46. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı, op. cit. (1973), p. 537.
47. See Table 2.28.
48. See Köy İşleri Bakanlığı, Köy Envanter Etüdlerine Göre Diyarbakır (Diyarbakır According to the Village Inventory Surveys) (1966), p. 74.

CHAPTER III


Prior to discussing the nature of the social relations of production, social structure, landownership, access to land, role of household, etc. in the following chapters, it is necessary to highlight some general characteristics pertaining to the two villages under consideration. It is for this reason that this chapter has been divided into two sections. The first section will examine the physical environment and population in Gisgis and Kalhana, while the second section will focus on some general features related to agrarian activities.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION IN GISGIS AND KALHANA

Gisgis and Kalhana villages are in the Ergani district of the province of Diyarbakir, which is about 958Km. southeast of the capital city, Ankara. Both villages are on the stabilised road that runs between Ergani and Cermik district centres, the distances between Kalhana and Gisgis and Ergani being six and eighteen kilometres respectively.

GISGIS PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Gisgis village is one of the villages which borders on the Cermik district. It is situated on the main road between Ergani and Cermik and the road cuts through the village from East to West. The area in which the village is situated is a long flat strip lying between two



MAP IV ERGANI: GISGIS AND KALHANA

parallel mountain ridges which form part of the Taurus chain. The mountain to the South of the village is locally named Kemertepe, and at its skirts runs the Mılık Cayı, a stream which runs about three hundred metres away from the village settlement. In the area between the Mılık Cayı and the village there lie vegetable gardens of various sizes. The mountain, which is about one and a half kilometres to the North of the village is much higher than Kemertepe. The fields within the village boundaries are not of an even nature. A number of hills act as reference points for the locational description of fields, vegetable gardens, or vineyards. For example, "the field behind Kemertepe" or "the vineyard on Demirtepe" are typical directions used by peasants.

Gısgıs village has boundaries with Sincık (Çayırdere) village in the Northwest, Zırkıllıyan (Dağarası) village in the Northeast and East, Ziyarek (Teveklı) village in the Southeast and Zımayık (Dibektaş) village in the South, as well as Çermik district in the West. The mountains and hills around all these villages have some form of vegetation, albeit sparse, such as oak trees, hornbeams, and dwarf bushes which are rapidly disappearing since the people from the surrounding villages cut them for fuel and in order to open new fields. Most of the fields cleared in this way are planted with vines. We came across areas of fruit trees and vegetable gardens on the skirts of the locally named Sincık Dağı to the North of the village. About thirty or more fountains around the village serve as water resources for small scale vegetable production.

The village stretches along the Ergani-Cermik road from East to West and the houses line up side by side on both sides of the road. However, there is one line of buildings on the South of the road, while the rest are on the North side. All the windows and doors face towards the South in order both to get as much sun as possible in the cold season, and to be less affected by the westerly and easterly winds, since the village is well protected from northerly and southerly winds by the parallel ridges of mountains lying to the North and the South.

Most of the houses have two storeys with flat roofs. The ground floor, which is generally bigger than the upper floor, is used as an animal barn and storage space for straw and hay. A ladder is used in order to climb up to the roof of the ground floor through a hole in the ceiling. Half of the flat roof of the ground floor serves as a large balcony in front of the upper rooms. The whole family sleeps on this roof/balcony in the summer because it is too hot inside. The upper floor generally consists of two rooms and a kitchen/pantry. The shape of the houses in the village is as shown in the diagram below. Generally there is no toilet in the house. The materials used in the buildings are mostly kerpic (mud mixed with straw and dried in the sun) and stones. Cement has been used in a few buildings, such as the school, the gendarmerie and the health centre. Although there is an abundance of drinking water none of the houses had water inside. Water is obtained from the six fountains in the village.




DIAGRAM 3.1 Plan of Typical Village House

There are two shops and two coffee houses in the village, but one of the shops was closed during our fieldwork and the owner did not intend to reopen it. The coffee houses are the places where most men spend their spare time. Educated youths preferred to patronise one of the coffee houses rather than the one frequented by elderly people.¹ The only shop that was in operation was supposed to be the Post Office also. However, during our stay in the village we never saw anybody taking a letter to the Post Office. Since there are always people going to the town letters are sent with them to be posted from there.

The village school had 119 students and two teachers in 1977. The two classrooms were too few for the five classes of children aged between seven and twelve, so the first, second and third year students were taught in one classroom while the fourth and fifth year students were taught in the other. The gendarmerie station, situated about 200 metres west of the village, had six soldiers and a sergeant who were responsible for maintaining law and order in Gisgis and the surrounding




DIAGRAM 3.2 Sketch of Gisors Village

villages. The health centre and its three storey residential building constitute the last section of the village to the West.









KALHANA: PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The village itself is situated on a small hill in the middle of a large flat area. The area within the boundaries of the village can be described as a flat-bottomed sugar bowl broken on one side, as the mountains form an outer rim on three sides (South, West and North) and large fields stretch towards the East from the centre of the bowl. The village settlement lies on a small hump in the northwestern part of the bowl. One kilometre or so to the West of the village is situated Malan (Pinarkaya) village, in the skirts of the locally named Malan Mountain, which is part of the South Taurus chain, which also continues into the South of Kalhana Ovasi (Kalhana Plain), to the Balahur Mountain. At the skirts of this mountain are two villages: Yukari Balahur (High Balahur) and Asagi Balahur (Lower Balahur). Keydanevleri village is also situated on the mountain, to the North of Kalhana.

The crescent shaped mountain stretching from the West to the Northeast of Kalhana is divided into two parts by the valley of Kalhana Suyu in the North of the village. Kalhana Suyu, emerging from the mountains around Bogaz village, curves around the village from North to Southeast. The mountains and hills are mostly bald, with a few oak trees and hornbeams, and sparse clusters of dwarf trees. The houses are clustered around the landlords' houses and there is a striking difference between the landlords' houses and the rest, both in terms of style and shape, as well as material.

Landlords' houses are made of nicely carved stones, cement and brick, with western style sloping roofs, and with courtyards. The houses comprise several rooms, storehouses, garages etc. The other houses are made of kerpic (mud bricks dried in the sun) with ceilings so low that you have to stoop when you enter through the door. The roofs, covered with timber, rushes and soil, are flat. These houses usually have just one or two rooms, where the family live, and a store-room. Not many houses have a separate barn or stabling for animals. The windows are very small, or even non-existent in some cases. From a distance one forms the impression that the houses are built on top of each other on the hill. Four main groups of houses can be distinguished, with each group seeming to form a shadow of one of the four big houses belonging to the big landlords. However, there are a few houses separate from these clusters. Between three of the four big houses there exists a fountain, from which the villagers get their water supply. This is mostly for drinking since washing is done in the big fountain which is about three hundred metres to the South-west of the village right under the Ergani-Cermik road.

There is no coffee house, no shop, no school, no mosque, not even a clear-cut street in the village. The spaces between the houses are just dusty earth tracks which become extremely muddy in the winter. Most of the village lands lie on the eastern and southeastern sides of the village.



Key

1, 2, 3 & 4 Landlords' houses

5 Groups of peasant houses

6 Separate peasant houses

7 Village fountain

DIAGRAM 3.3 Sketch of Kalhana Village

POPULATION IN GISGIS AND KALHANA

Labour power is very important in villages where the main source of income is agriculture. Although mechanisation in agriculture is growing rapidly in Southeast Anatolia labour power is still widely used, especially in small household production units. However, given the small size and nature of the family holdings, it is evident that the labour force is not used to its full extent within the household economy. The excess labour force of the household seeks employment outside the household. Since job opportunities outside the household are limited, and the nature of employment available is mostly for seasonal labour, there is constant human movement between the villages and the towns and other rural areas where wage labourers are needed. Within the household women play a very important role in the reproduction of the family. In order to understand the nature of seasonal labour migration and the division of labour within the household it seems necessary to study some aspects of the population in the villages under consideration.

Gisgis

At the time of the fieldwork, July 1977, in Gisgis there existed a total of 1,044 people of whom 556 were male and 488 female. The male population constituted 53.2 per cent of the total population, while females were 46.8 per cent of the total. It should be pointed out, however, that it became apparent during the course of fieldwork that these figures derived from our own census were not accurate. Due to

the tendency of the heads of households to include all of the members of their family in their declaration, regardless of whether they were currently living at home or not, the numbers we arrived at came to include those who were actually working outside the village for a period of time. Since the seasonal workers (some male members of the households) did not cut their ties with the village and used their households as a security base when they were unemployed, sick, etc., as well as contributing to the budget of the households with the cash earned outside, they were included in the population of the households by our respondents. It is for this reason that the figure for the male population is higher than that for females.

Although in rural areas of Southeast Anatolia children start to work when they are about 7 to 8 years old, helping their parents in simple jobs, we considered those under 14 relatively unproductive, since they spend most of the year going to school. In the following table we divide the village population according to age. For the convenience of being able to differentiate the physically active population in terms of production from those who are inactive we have arbitrarily divided the population into three groups. The first group includes those up to 14 years of age, the second group includes those between 15 and 65 years of age, and the third group includes those over 65. We are aware of the dangers of arbitrary categorisations like this, however, the first and third groups include those who are basically dependent on the production of the economically active, and as such presents a general picture of the work force in the village.

TABLE 3.1 Population by Age Group and Sex in Gisqis

AGE GROUP	NUMBER	MALE		NUMBER	FEMALE		NUMBER	TOTAL	
		%	% OF TOTAL		%	% OF TOTAL		%	% OF TOTAL
0-14	240	43.2	23.0	229	46.9	21.9	469	44.9	
15-65	307	55.2	29.4	247	50.6	23.7	554	53.1	
66+	9	1.6	0.8	12	2.5	1.2	21	2.0	
Total	556	100.0	53.2	488	100.0	46.8	1,044	100.0	

It is clear from the above table that the population of the village consists mainly of young people. Only 2 per cent of the total village population is over 65 years of age. The active group (aged 15 to 65) comprises 53.1 per cent of the total village population, while the category of children comprises 44.9 per cent of the village population. Similarly, within this group (aged 15 to 65) males constitute 55.4 per cent while females constitute 44.6 per cent.

Now let us have a look at the marital status of those over 14 years of age.

TABLE 3.2 Marital Status of those over 14 in Gisqis

STATUS	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%
Married	196	62.8	215	84.0	411	72.4
Unmarried	116	37.2	33	13.0	149	26.2
Widowed	-	-	8	3.0	8	1.4
Total	312	100.0	256	100.0	568	100.0

In Gısgıs 62.8 per cent of the male population of 15 years old and over are married, while 84 per cent of the female population of the same age group are also married. This is largely a result of females being treated as objects of monetary transactions. Women constitute a very decisive part of the household economy. Not only do they do all the housework, but they also work in the production of the goods produced by the household, and are valuable assets of the household economy, especially since they work without any remuneration. Being a source of free labour they are bought and sold in the context of an ideological structure called başlık² which legitimises the commercial transaction. Marriages in the village are arranged, and neither the boys nor the girls have any say in their marriage. Fathers would marry off their daughters to whomsoever offers more money as a başlık, the age of the future bridegroom being unimportant as long as he can pay the başlık. Such lack of consideration sometimes results in dramatic events such as the girl committing suicide. Fathers with daughters generally want to get rid of their daughters as soon as possible in order to obtain the başlık money. On the other hand, fathers with sons may be reluctant to marry off their sons, because of the başlık money they will have to pay. When they do decide to marry their sons they start to look for young healthy and strong girls as brides for their sons, so that they can use their labour for a long time. Because of these above-mentioned reasons the girls in the village get married at a very early age, sometimes when they are just 12 years old. Another reason for the predominance of married women over married men is the persistence of polygamy³, in spite of it being illegal. In particular, some of the relatively rich farmers have more than one wife, for a variety of reasons, which we do not intend to deal with here.

Regarding the role of başlık in determining marriages it might also be pointed out that in Gısgıs 26.2 per cent of the people above 14 years of age are not married (149 out of 568) and of these 77.8 per cent (116) are male and 22.1 per cent (33) are female. This disparity is partly due to the inability of young men to collect money for the başlık and partly due to the ability of some of the relatively rich villagers to buy more than one wife.

We did not come across any widowers in the village during our field-work, but there were eight widows. This is due to the fact that those men who are divorced or widowed remarry. Some of the widows also remarry, but the prospects of remarriage for widows are very slim if they are over thirty, simply because men want to marry a young healthy woman who will be more industrious in the reproduction of the household. It is not unusual, for example, to see a man in his fifties marrying a teenage girl.

The population of Gısgıs has been increasing at a high rate. A glance at the population increase index, however, will show that this increase is not an even one. For instance, there was a notable difference in the index increase between the periods 1955 to 1960 and 1960 to 1975.

The relatively low level of population increase between 1955 and 1965 can be explained by the out migration from the village. With the promotion of agricultural development from 1950 onwards by the Democrat Party government the production of cash crops, especially in areas like the Çukurova, where capitalist farming had long been established,

gained a momentum. Around Adana and Tarsus not only cotton production increased, but also textile industries using cotton as a raw material developed at a fast rate. Cotton production, which is very labour intensive, and the newly established or enlarged industries in the Çukurova region (particularly Adana and Tarsus) were the main factors attracting the landless or poor peasants from other regions, especially those of Southeastern Anatolia where control of the land is in the hands of a few landlords, and quite a number of peasant families work as sharecroppers, agricultural workers and such like.

TABLE 3.3 Population Increase in Gısgıs

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	INDEX
1955	318	397	715	100.0
1960*	319	398	717	100.2
1965	383	387	770	107.6
1970	433	431	864	120.8
1975	514	484	1,003	140.2
1977**	556	488	1,044	146.0

* Figures for 1960 are taken from Şevket Beysanoglu, Diyarbakır Coğrafyası, İstanbul, 1962

** Population census carried out during our fieldwork.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Population censuses for the relevant years.

Of course the need for workers in the Çukurova region was satisfied within a decade, and migration from other areas for permanent settlement in that region has slowed down. Capitalist cotton production still requires seasonal labour though, thus causing seasonal population

movements between regions. This point will be dealt with at greater length when we consider the migration problem, in Chapter IX.

It may be argued that the increase or decrease in population is also related to factors such as health services, nutrition etc. There is no doubt that improvement in medical treatment and health services would increase life expectancy of the people, we cannot be certain, however, about the extent of the effect on the medical care of the people in the village of the opening of the Sağlık Ocağı (health centre) in 1965. The Sağlık Ocağı was opened in Gısgıs for political reasons and does not function as it should. There is no doctor in the Sağlık Ocağı, only one health officer, one nurse and a caretaker. Apart from basic things such as alcohol, aspirin and tincture of iodine, essential medicines are not stored in the centre. In fact the only services the Sağlık Ocağı can provide are the assistance of a nurse in the case of a birth, and bandaging of wounds or cuts. Given the nature and limitations of the health services in the village it is too difficult to determine the effects of these services on the population increase in Gısgıs.

Social and economic values attached to the number of children are also affective factors in the population increase in the village. To have sons is very desirable in the village. This is due to the fact that there is no social security for old age and it is the sons' duty to look after their old parents. Furthermore, the high rate of infant mortality in the village encourages people to have as many children as they can, in case some of them die before reaching maturity. In the

following table we see the number of children families have had since the establishment of the family, and the number of cases of infant mortality per family at the time of fieldwork.

TABLE 3.4 Live births and Infant Mortality in Gisqis

LIVE BIRTHS PER FAMILY		LIVING CHILDREN		INFANT MORTALITY CASES	
NO OF BIRTHS	NO OF FAMILIES	NO OF CHILDREN	NO. OF FAMILIES	NO OF DEATHS	NO. OF FAMILIES
0-3	20	0-3	33	0	44
4-6	49	4-6	87	1	40
7-9	75	7-9	44	2	32
10-12	13	10+	-	3	13
13+	7			4	19
			164	5	12
	164			6+	4
					164

It is clear from the table above that there is a high birth rate in the village, as well as a high rate of infant mortality. The high death rate is caused in part by malnutrition and lack of medical care, as well as other factors such as the frequency of pregnancy and the young age of the mother at the time of her first pregnancy.³

The desire to produce sons does not only stem from economic necessity, but also from social necessities, such as being strong in kabile (large family group) disputes which generally end up in fights. The strongest kabile always controls political power, reflected in the election of the village headman, in the village. However, despite the general

tendency to desire many children, it emerged that families with a low income and relatively well educated families were not very keen on having many children. Ignorance, economic inability to buy contraceptives, social stigma attached to birth control and the distance from the towns where doctors live are the main factors inhibiting the practice of birth control. However, this does not mean that some of the women do not try to take preventive measures against childbirth. The practice of traditional abortion methods in some cases ends up with tragic results, such as the mother losing her life. Also, in some cases women may try to use each other's medicine to prevent conception or to abort the foetus. For instance, one of my respondents told me that his wife had used her neighbour's injection, which had been obtained from a chemist without any prescription. It should be noted that those people who use medical contraceptives (albeit in some cases belonging to others) are very much in a minority.

Despite the high rate of infant mortality and out migration the data collected show that population growth in Gisgis is considerably fast, and has continuously increased between 1955 and 1977, from 715 to 1,044.

Kalhana

The population of Kalhana village was 258 in 1977. Females outnumbered males in the village, comprising 53.5 per cent of the population. This was partly due to the fact that some of the male population of the village had left in order to find work, and partly due to the natural

population increase. The total number of males in the village is 120, and females number 138. As in the case of Gisgis we have broken down the population into three age groups, so as to be able to see the extent of the working and dependent population in the village.

TABLE 3.5 Population by Age Group and Sex in Kalhana

AGE GROUP	NUMBER	MALE		FEMALE			TOTAL	
		%	% OF TOTAL	NUMBER	%	% OF TOTAL	NUMBER	% OF TOTAL
0-14	66	55.0	25.6	56	40.6	21.7	122	47.3
15-65	49	40.8	19.0	80	58.0	31.0	129	50.0
66+	5	4.2	1.9	2	1.4	0.8	7	2.7
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	120	100.0	46.5	138	100.0	53.5	258	100.0
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

The village population is considerably young, those under 14 comprising almost half of the village population. This is hardly surprising given the economic structure of the village. The majority of households in the village do not have any land at all, and the work possibilities created by commercial farming are not sufficient to keep pace with the population growth in the village as well as immigration into the village. Therefore some of the work force, particularly adult sons, leave the village to work outside. This also partially explains why the female population outnumbers the male population in the middle age group. The same tendency is also evident from the fact that whereas male children outnumber female children, when we move to the second group the reverse is the case, namely females are more numerous than males. The very low number of old people, those over 65,

can be attributed to the fact that people do not have enough food, especially those foods containing high protein, the difficult working conditions causing people to age rapidly, sanitary conditions and medical help being at a very low level.

As in Gisgis, marriage is a contractual transaction between the boy's and the girl's families. The bride is generally chosen for the boy by his family. Neither boys nor girls have any strong say in the choice of marriage partner. The only thing they can do is comply with the wishes and decisions of their seniors, namely their parents, grandparents, uncles, elder brothers etc. Very large sums of money are demanded by the girl's father as başlık, which has to be paid by the bridegroom's family. The başlık mechanism, while leading to the early marriage of girls, affects young males in a different way, creating an obstacle to marriage when young. The following table shows the marriage situation in the village.

TABLE 3.6 Marital Status of those over 14 in Kalhana

STATUS	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
		%		%		%
Married	32	59.2	48	58.5	80	58.8
Single	21	38.9	31	37.8	52	38.2
Widowed	1	1.9	3	3.7	4	3.0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	54	100.0	82	100.0	136	100.0
	—	—	—	—	—	—

In Kalhana 59.5 per cent of males over 14 were married, while 58.5 per cent of females in the same age group were married. In absolute terms married females outnumbered married males owing to the facts that although polygamy is officially illegal in Turkey, some men, particularly those who are relatively rich, have more than one wife, and our population census included only those who were present in the village, and therefore did not take into account those husbands working outside. Single men constituted 28.9 per cent of the male population in the village, whereas 37.8 per cent of the females were single. There was one widower and four widows in the village. Two of the widows had recently lost their husbands in an accident and were living with their brothers-in-law's families.

At this point it might be of interest to point out that until the last decade men felt obliged to marry their brothers' widows, because it was believed in the village that it was immoral for a widow to live alone. The honour of the whole family would be at risk if she lived alone. Of course this was a kind of rationalisation mechanism, which had developed over the years so as to justify marriage with the brother's widow. I assume the real reason behind this was economic, and to a certain extent social. In order to keep the dead brother's property within the family and to have absolute control over it, and also to protect his children as well as make use of their labour when they are able to work, the elder brother would marry his brother's widow. However, this tradition of marrying one's brother's widow is dying out whereby brothers easily avoid marrying their brother's widow if there is no land or property involved. If the property left by the dead brother is

valuable then marriage may be considered. Of course, this was a custom that equally applied to both villages. The fact therefore that there are widows left unmarried in both cases is an indication of the increasing poverty of the peasants.

TABLE 3.7 Population Increase in Kalhana

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	INDEX
1955	65	91	156	100.0
1960*	101	100	201	128.9
1965	103	111	214	137.1
1970	111	112	223	142.9
1975	126	140	266	170.5
1977**	120	138	258	165.3

* Figures for 1960 are taken from Şevket Beysanoğlu, Diyarbakır Coğrafyası, İstanbul, 1962

** Figures for 1977 are derived from the questionnaire applied in the village in the summer of 1977.

Source State Institute of Statistics, Population censuses for the relevant years.

Population increase in the village seems to be very high, but it would have been much higher than it is if it were not for the migration from the village. In order to understand the speed of population increase in the village we noted the number of deaths and births in the village and calculated the rate of population increase in the village for the year 1976 as being 5.7.⁴ It is wrong to assume that the rate of population growth in the village will be 5.7 per cent every year, however, for the sake of convenience let us assume a 5 per cent rate of population increase then the population of the village would have been

much higher than the existing level. Surprisingly enough, the population of the village seems to have decreased in the last few years preceding 1977. This can be explained by two factors first, out migration might have reached such a rate that the natural population increase could not keep pace with it, second, it begs the question of the validity of the statistics we are using. Our suspicion regarding the validity of our figures concerning the whole province was confirmed by the fact that the interviewers in Ergani in the 1975 population census were told by their superiors to inflate the figures for the population of the whole district, simply because it was believed that the district would then be given priority over other districts in the allocation of financial aid and investments within the province if it was shown to have the highest population among the other districts of Diyarbakir province. In short, the figures for Kalhana, for the year 1975, might have been inflated in accordance with this general application. The jump in the indices from 142.9 to 170.5 between 1970 and 1975 seems to be rather unrealistic compared to the increase from 128.9 in 1960 to 137.1 in 1965 and 142.9 in 1970. And yet the index for 1977 calculated from the results of our own population census is much lower than the one based on the 1975 population census.

However, one conclusion we can draw from the above discussion is that the population is growing at a high rate in Kalhana, just as in Gısgıs. Although the level of health services and medical care is very low in the whole of Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia compared to other parts of Turkey, there is nevertheless an improvement in services and medical

care in the past thirty to forty years. Of course this does not mean they are efficient or efficiently organised. For instance, there were only two doctors in Ergani district hospital and they were also working in the Ergani Sağlık Ocağı, which would only deal with people of a certain area. The 71 villages of Ergani were divided into health zones for the purpose of receiving help from the Sağlık Ocağıs. In some cases the allocation of the villages to one health zone or another seems to have been made regardless of the locality of the village.

For instance, Kalhana is about six kilometres from the town of Ergani and has all its economic and social relations with Ergani, and yet the village was included in the Kesentas health-centre zone. Kesentas health-centre is about fifteen kilometres from Kalhana in the opposite direction from Ergani. Ergani health-centre would not look after patients from Kalhana but would refer them to Kesentas health-centre, where there was no doctor. Furthermore, it is economically disadvantageous for the people of Kalhana to go to Kesentas. The only means of transport available to the people of Kalhana to go to Kesentas are minibuses and dolmuş taxis (shared taxis) running between Ergani and Cermik, which pass through several villages, including Kalhana and Gısgıs. It is more or less impossible to get a space in one of these vehicles from Kalhana, because first of all they are not very frequent and therefore become full even before they leave Ergani, and second it is so expensive that poor people cannot afford the fare, because the drivers charge full fare to passengers boarding the minibus or taxi anywhere on route. Instead of facing all these difficulties people tend not to bother about their illnesses unless they are very severe.

However, we may say that the relative improvement in medical care and health services over the years might have contributed to a very limited extent to the population increase.

Social factors, on the other hand, are more important than the medical factors in the increase of population. Children are considered to be the source of social security for the parents in their old age, and male children especially are highly valued for this reason. All the families interviewed wanted to have boys rather than girls, who are commonly considered to be el mali (the property of strangers). Those who do not have male children try various sorts of remedies. A very common strategy based on superstition is to move house in order to change the family's luck, this is locally called kapi deđiřtirmek (literally to change doors). Alternatively, people may go to sheikhs or they may entreat divine intervention by vowing to make a sacrifice in the event of success. Men may eventually remarry, with or without divorcing their current wife.

As to the number of children, poorer families did not seem to be very keen on having many children. Those without any land, animals or permanent job especially did not want to have more than two or three children, but neither did they do anything about not having many children. None of the poor families used any contraceptives, and most of them did not even know anything about such matters. Although a very small minority of the poor had heard about contraceptives they never tried to obtain any because of several factors, such as ignorance of where or how to obtain them, religious belief that it is a sin to

interfere in God's work, fear of other people hearing of their use of such sinful medicines or methods, etc. Nevertheless, poor and uneducated people in the village do use traditional methods to induce miscarriage before the pregnancy reaches its full term, but such methods tend to be extremely primitive and may result in death for the pregnant woman

In addition to the above, the high rate of infant mortality in the village acts as a catalyst for people not to take measures against pregnancy. For instance, 12 families out of 44 had not lost any children before the time of our fieldwork, 7 families had lost one child, 10 families had lost 2 children each, 5 families had lost 3 children and the rest had lost 4 or more children since their marriage. As we stated for Gisgis, the high rate of infant mortality is aggravated by malnutrition and the lack of proper medical care and sanitation.

In distinct contrast the big landlords who are well educated were very conscious of the fact that more children mean more problems to face and more money to have to spend. The highest number of children among the big landlords was four. These families were aware of all sorts of contraceptives and were using them successfully.

AGRICULTURE IN GISGIS AND KALHANA

In this section of the chapter we shall examine in some detail some of the general characteristics pertaining to agrarian activities in the two villages. This should constitute, along with the previous section, the necessary background within which we shall examine social relations of production in Gisgis and Kalhana in later chapters.

GISGIS

To take agriculture as the primary source of income and proceed from it may lead us somehow to false conclusions. The fact that 95 out of 164 families (57.8 per cent) obtain their livelihood primarily from agriculture, as shown in Table 3.8, is not enough to show the whole picture. Although 69 families seem to derive their livelihood from work other than agriculture, most of them are related to agriculture in some way. In some families agriculture is a secondary source of income either direct involvement with agriculture on the part of some members of the family or indirect involvement of some families with agriculture, constitute a secondary source of income. In the first case the head of the household may work outside agriculture as a civil servant, worker, grocer, teacher, etc., and his wife and children would cultivate the land. In the second case the lands of the household may be given to sharecroppers. In short, we may derive the conclusion that in spite of the tendency that more and more people in Gisgis are seeking work outside agriculture the economic structure of the village is still based on agriculture.

TABLE 3.8 Landownership by Primary Job in Gisgis

OCCUPATIONS	LANDLESS	LAND OWNED (donums)			50+	TOTAL	Σ
		1-10	11-20	21-50			
Farmer	8	16	6	39	26	95	57.9
Artisan	-	1	-	-	-	1	0.7
Stoner/Mason	6	2	1	-	-	9	5.5
Permanent labourer							
(including drivers)	3	2	1	4	1	11	6.7
Civil Servant/Teacher	6	-	-	1	-	7	4.3
Casual labourer	12	7	3	2	-	24	14.6
Crocer/Coffee House							
owner	-	1	-	1	2	4	2.4
Merchant	-	-	-	-	2	2	1.2
Unemployed	5	4	1	1	-	11	6.7
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	40	33	12	48	31	164	100.0
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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Agricultural Resources

Land is the main resource in agriculture. The factors such as the amount, distribution, nature, topography and chemical composition of the land are some of the determinant conditions of agricultural production. Water resources are equally important in agriculture. Therefore we shall have a look at the agricultural resources in Gisgis in some detail below.

Land

Leaving aside the landless families, 124 families included in our questionnaire owned 5,306 dönüms of land. The average land per household, including the landless households, is 32.4 dönüms. This figure becomes 42.8 dönüms if the landless households are excluded from the calculation, and if the farming households only are considered the average land owned is 55.9 dönüms per household. It is evident that to rely on average numbers obscures the inequality that exists in the distribution of land. However, our main concern here is not to deal with the inequalities in the distribution of land in Gisgis, but rather to indicate the fact that holdings in Gisgis mainly are too small to maintain the owning household. It is therefore not surprising that many households or some members of the households seek to obtain supplementary income for the sustenance of the household.

Regarding irrigation, 39.4 per cent of the total land (1,499 out of 5,306 dönüms) is irrigated. Although Gisgis is very rich in terms of water resources in comparison with other villages in the Ergani plain these resources are not used to their full extent. Numerous pinars

(natural springs) are used to water mainly vegetable gardens. There is no water pump in the village because, in the first place it is very expensive to buy, and in the second place nobody has a large enough area of land to be able to use a pump to its full capacity. The Mılık Çayı (Mılık Stream) which passes south of the village and is fed by the waters originating from the neighbouring mountains and high hills, as a result of the melting snow which lies for a long time on the high mountains, is not used to its full extent for irrigation simply because the topography of the surrounding fields does not allow for its use in this way. The fields around Mılık Çayı are much higher than the level of the river and the use of Mılık Çayı for irrigation would necessitate irrigation canals or water pumps which do not exist in the village, for the reasons stated above. Secondly, by mid July Mılık Çayı dries up, due to the excessively hot weather conditions.

Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the distribution of both the irrigated and unirrigated lands in the village. Since the landownership pattern will be dealt with later we shall not deal with these tables in detail here.

TABLE 3.9 Irrigated Landownership in Gısqıs

IRRIGATED LAND OWNED (donums)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL LAND OWNED (donums)	PERCENTAGE OF LAND
Landless	56	34.2	-	-
1-10	64	39.0	303	20.2
11-20	24	14.6	450	30.0
21-50	16	9.8	530	35.4
51+	4	2.4	216	14.4
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	164	100.0	1,499	100.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

TABLE 3.10 Unirrigated Landownership in Gisgis

UNIRRIGATED LAND OWNED (donums)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL LAND OWNED (donums)	PERCENTAGE OF LAND
Landless	48	29.3	-	-
1-10	39	23.8	191	5.0
11-20	17	10.3	228	6.0
21-50	31	18.9	834	21.9
51+	29	17.7	2,554	67.1
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	164	100.0	3,807	100.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

According to table 3.11, which denotes the distribution of land among different sections of agriculture, field agriculture⁵ covers the highest amount of land. Production of grain is carried out in unirrigated lands, whereas the majority of the irrigated lands have been assigned to vegetable gardening, which serves, with vineyards, to cover some of the cash needs of the families. Among the cereals wheat is the most produced, followed by lentils and then barley. All three are produced mainly for home consumption. Since bread and cracked wheat (bulgur) are the staple foods of the families in Gisgis some households have to buy supplementary wheat when they cannot produce enough for their own consumption. On the other hand the production of vegetables such as tomatoes, green peppers, aubergines, marrows, cucumbers, onions and of fruits such as grapes, sweet melons and water melons, is the main source of cash income for the farming households.

Fruit production is not carried out with the aim of deriving any income

from it. A few trees of almonds, cherry, black cherry and apricots can be seen scattered around in vineyards, however, the produce of these trees is mainly consumed by all members of the families in the village, especially by children, who sometimes declare ownership to a particular tree in a field and do not let anybody approach their tree without their permission. The fertility of a particular child's tree brings him prestige among his friends and it is not unusual to hear children boasting about their trees, saying "my apricot tree is bigger than yours" or persuading younger siblings to do something by saying "I will let you have that many apricots from my tree" and such like. Before diverting too much let us reiterate that the negligible production of fruit (apart from grapes and melons) is mainly for the consumption of the local households, not for the market. Although the production of vegetables, grapes and melons is mainly for the market this does not mean that these things are not consumed by the village households at all.

Unlike vegetables, sweet melons and water melons are cultivated in unirrigated lands. Therefore the melons and water melons do not grow very large, however they are very sweet. In Diyarbakir and around the River Tigris melons and water melons are cultivated in the alluvial lands which allow the fruit to grow bigger. Incidentally, the Diyarbakir region is very famous for its watermelons, the weight of which sometimes may exceed 40 kilogrammes, (about 100 pounds) and it is not unusual to see watermelon sellers selling their melons in huge slices weighing about three to five kilos each, in the streets.

TABLE 3.11 Land Utilisation in Gisqis

TYPE OF AGRICULTURE	AMOUNT OF LAND (donums)	PERCENTAGE OF LAND
Field agriculture	3,765	70.9
Garden agriculture	869	16.4
Vineyards and Orchards	672	12.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	5,306	100.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Meras (common pasture lands) constitute a part of the rural resources. The place of animal husbandry in the economy of the village renders significant the importance of meras for the village. The meras are communally used lands whose ownership lies with the state and over which the village community has usufructary rights. According to the village headman's estimation there exist about 10,000 donums of pasture land in Gisqis. Although everybody has the right of grazing their animals on the meras the uneven distribution of animals among the households renders it possible for the households with large numbers of animals to make more extensive use of the meras than those with few or no animals. There are households that do not take advantage of the meras at all. Furthermore, the nature of ownership of the meras paves the way for negligence regarding the improvement and upkeep of these lands. And so the meras, exposed to water and wind erosion, fertilised only by natural manure, and subject to over-grazing, are being exhausted year by year.

Animals in Gısgıs

Sheep outnumber other animals in Gısgıs, followed by goats and cows. Karaman koyunu (a fat-tailed sheep, named after the Karaman district of Konya province) is the most numerous breed of sheep, but there are also a few merino sheep. The distribution of sheep and goats in the village is highly unequal.⁶ Although the number of cows is not as high as that of sheep and goats the distribution of them among the households is more or less equal. Oxen are used as draught animals whereas donkeys and to a limited extent horses are used as transport animals. Poultry is also more or less equally distributed among the households. None of the households have poultry as their main source of income, although once in a while some eggs or a few chickens may be sold in the market. During our survey the numbers of animals owned by the 164 households of the village were as listed below

TABLE 3 12 Animals in Gısgıs

Sheep	716
Goats	304
Cows	263
Oxen	133
Donkeys	129
Horses	13
Poultry	281

KALHANA

Agricultural Resources

If we look at Table 3.13 we can see that sixteen households have farming as their main source of livelihood in Kalhana. When the three tractor drivers and one animal breeder are added to this figure the number becomes 20 out of 46 households. Also, if people like casual labourers, who earn part of their income from agriculture, and permanent labourers, like factory workers, who leave their families in the village and go to other places to work, and whose families stay in the village to work as seasonal labourers, we may say that agriculture plays a very important role in the economy of Kalhana.

Land

As we stated in the case of Gisgis, land is one of the most important factors in agriculture, and the quality and quantity of the land, amongst other things, are important determinants of agricultural production. Only ten households in the village own land. Given the formidable discrepancy in the distribution of land among the inhabitant households of the village it would be very misleading to talk about an average holding per household. Only 526 donums out of a total of 11,516 donums of land owned (4.6 per cent) are not irrigated. Each piece of land has a period of time allocated to it for irrigation. Despite all our efforts to find out according to what criteria the distribution of the water to the fields was determined we could not get any information at all. We were simply told that land was inherited or bought with certain hours per week of irrigation rights.

TABLE 3.13 Landownership by Primary Job in Kalhana

OCCUPATION	LAND OWNED (donums)				TOTAL	%
	LANDLESS	1-50	51-100	101+		
Farmer	7	4	1	4	16	34.8
Stoner/Mason	2	-	-	-	2	4.3
Permanent labourers (including drivers)	11	-	1	-	12	26.1
Civil Servants/ Teachers	1	-	-	-	1	2.2
Casual labourers	12	-	-	-	12	26.1
Unemployed	1	-	-	-	1	2.2
Peddler	2	-	-	-	2	4.3
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	36	4	2	4	46	100.0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Percentages	78.3	8.7	4.3	8.7	100.0	

The time of irrigation alternates periodically between nights and days in order to eliminate any sort of injustice. Fields in the northern and some in the eastern part of the village are irrigated with the water of Kalhana Suyu (Kalhana Stream) and in the southern part of the village they are irrigated with the water of Hilar Çayı (Hilar Stream).

Due to the flat nature of the fields, old fashioned irrigation canals without any sophisticated machinery are good enough to irrigate the fields, but the system necessitates a vast labour force. To build a modern irrigation system would necessitate a huge investment, which none of the farmers could afford. The state is the only body which could afford to invest in infrastructural establishments such as irrigation canals and so on, in Eastern Anatolia. When the Karakaya Barajı (Karakaya Dam), which is on the River Euphrates in Cungus

district some 50 kilometres away to the northeast of Ergani and has been under construction for some years, has finally been completed a network of irrigation canals in the region will, we believe, change the structure of agriculture in the regions. Some relatively high fields, or the fields very far from the two streams, are not irrigated at present.

Since we have dealt with the landownership pattern in the village elsewhere,⁷ and the amount of unirrigated land is very little, we shall not deal here with the distribution of irrigated and unirrigated lands separately. But we must recall what we have said about the breakdown of the types of agriculture which demonstrate our classification of agriculture pertaining to the land use, into three categories: field agriculture, garden agriculture and vineyards and orchards. (Of course, this classification is in no way exhaustive. For instance, it excludes animal husbandry as a part of agriculture, however, the purpose of our classification is only to show the ways in which the land is utilised.)

As is evident from Table 3.14 the classification field agriculture is dominant in Kalhana. Field agriculture occupies 98.2 per cent of the total lands, while vegetable gardens, vineyards and orchards occupy only 1.8 per cent of the total. The category of field agriculture includes mainly cotton production and the production of lentils, wheat, sesame seeds, sugar beet, etc. Cotton, sesame seeds and sugar beet are produced exclusively for the market, whereas wheat, lentils and barley may be produced both for the market and for home consumption

depending on the nature of the farm whether it is a peasant farm or a capitalist farm.

TABLE 3.14 Land Utilisation in Kalhana

TYPE OF AGRICULTURE	AMOUNT OF LAND (donums)	PERCENTAGE OF LAND
Field agriculture	11,305	98.2
Garden agriculture	45	0.4
Vineyards and Orchards	166	1.4
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	11,516	100.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>

As we can see from the above table, the amount of land assigned to vegetable gardening is very limited. A few households in the village had a very small plot of vegetable garden to produce for their home consumption. Vegetable gardening necessitates very constant attention as well as a large labour force if it is taken up on a large scale. Given the fact that wage labour is very expensive and that the marketing of vegetables is not organised to any great extent, the big landlords prefer to engage in the production of other cash crops such as cotton and sugar beet, the main buyers of which are the state, or state backed co-operatives like the Çukobirlik.

The big landlords allow one or two of their sharecroppers to plant vegetables on a sharecropping basis, so that they will be supplied with vegetables all through the summer. If there is an excess of

vegetables it is the sharecropper who markets them and then he gives the landlord his share

Unlike the categorisation pertaining to Gısgis, the third category 'vineyards and orchards' includes kavaklık (poplar trees). All the landlords in the village have five to ten donums of kavaklık, which brings a very good income, as poplar wood is very popular in building construction in the area. Fruit production is very limited, and is for home consumption. In the vineyards a very special type of grape is produced şıra üzümü. This is a very sweet grape, the juice of which is used in making pekmez (boiled grape juice), pestil (grape juice boiled with flour and starch and dried in the sun into very thin layers) and sucuk (a sausage-shaped sweet consisting of a thick outer layer of dried grape juice boiled with flour and starch, covering a string of walnuts inside) Pestil and sucuk are very expensive and only rich people can afford them, so they can be considered exotic foods. All the vineyards in the village are owned by the big landlords. Small farmers do not have any vineyards or orchards.

As to the meras, they constitute a relatively small part of the village lands, compared to the proportion of meras in the total lands of Gısgis. This is mainly due to the fact that big landlords have annexed a considerable part of the village communal lands to their own holdings, one way or another. There exist about 4,000 donums of meras in Kalhana. Despite the fact that everybody has a right to graze their animals on communal lands this right only remains in theory, because the existing pattern of animal ownership in the village does

not allow those who have no animals to make use of the meras. What was said about soil exhaustion over a number of years in the case of Gısgis is also valid for Kalhana.

Animals in Kalhana

Sheep are bred both for milk and meat, therefore they are the largest animal group in Kalhana. As in Gısgis there are two breeds in Kalhana karaman and merino, the former outnumbering the latter. Like the distribution of land the distribution of animals is very unequal in Kalhana. Since the distribution of animals in Kalhana is dealt with in Chapter IV it is sufficient here to state the number of the animals that were present in the village during the fieldwork. However, a few words seem to be essential concerning poultry. Despite the existence of a poultry farm there only exist 141 poultry animals in the village. This is due to the fact that Memduh Guldogan, one of the big landlords in the village, built a building that was supposedly a poultry farm in order to secure a large amount of credit from the Agricultural Bank. Since the money was used somewhere else the poultry farm has never worked.

TABLE 3.15 Animals in Kalhana

Sheep	237
Goats	142
Cows	38
Oxen	11
Donkeys	20
Poultry	141

CROP PRODUCTION IN GISGIS AND KALHANA

Owing to differences in the nature of the land and water endowments some different and some common crops are grown, and therefore different crop rotations are followed in Kalhana and Gisgis villages. The land in Kalhana is flat and mostly irrigated, while most of the land in Gisgis is sloping, rocky and unirrigated. Cotton in Kalhana, and wheat in Gisgis are the major crops. While cotton is produced entirely for the market, wheat in Gisgis is produced mainly for home consumption.

Of the 11,305 donums of land devoted to field agriculture almost one fifth (2,250 donums) was laid fallow in 1977 in Kalhana, while the remaining 9,055 donums were divided between various crops in the following way

TABLE 3 16 Land Under Cultivation in Kalhana

Cotton	4,168	<u>donums</u>
Wheat	2,440	"
Lentils	1,417	"
Sugar beet	300	"
Barley	240	"
Vetch	150	"
Millet	100	"
Chick peas	100	"
Sweetcorn	75	"
Sesame seed	65	"
<hr/>		
Total	9,055	<u>donums</u>
<hr/>		

On the other hand, in Gisgis wheat constitutes the largest crop in terms of area cultivated. Of the 3,765 donums of land 800 donums were

laid fallow in 1977 in Gısqis and the rest was devoted to the cultivation of the following crops

TABLE 3.17 Land Under Cultivation in Gısqis

Wheat	1,623	donums
Lentils	577	"
Melon/Watermelon	235	"
Vetch	179	"
Millet	148	"
Barley	143	"
Chick peas	60	"
<hr/>		
Total	2,965	
<hr/>		

In Kalhana irrigation renders possible the production of cotton. Until the 1960s a type of cotton called yerli cotton was grown in Kalhana. The yerli cotton, which originates from Asia and has been known in Turkey for many years, is a short-staple, low yield type. It was replaced in the 1960s by a higher yield, long-staple type, deltapine, of American origin. Despite the introduction of technology and better yielding varieties like koker and deltapine, cotton productivity in the village is well below that of the Cukurova region. For instance, Hinderink and Kiray⁸ state that in Sakızlı and Yunusoğlu villages of the Cukurova region cotton yield in irrigated lands is about 200 kilograms per donum. The average productivity in irrigated cotton in Kalhana rarely exceeds 150 kilograms per donum. In most cases this is partly due to the monoculture of cotton for five or six successive years.

wheat is grown mainly in rotation with cotton in Kalhana, and with other crops like lentils, chick peas, barley, melon etc. Two types of wheat are grown in Kalhana akbaşak and boz, while only akbaşak is grown in Gısgıs. Akbaşak, also called sorgulı, is a pale golden coloured wheat, soft to grind and highly favoured for the locally preferred home-made bread which is the staple food in the area. Boz wheat is hard and brownish in colour and not suitable for local bread making. The boz wheat is grown entirely for the market and is suitable for macaroni production. This type of wheat was introduced to the area in recent years by the official agricultural office and the big farmers of Kalhana immediately switched to boz wheat production, for it brings in more money than the traditional akbaşak type. In 1977 the price of boz wheat was 290 kuruş⁹ per kilo, while that of akbaşak was 250 kuruş in the market.

Small producers who produce wheat mainly for home consumption did not make this switch from akbaşak to boz wheat because firstly boz wheat is not suitable for traditional bread making and therefore had no use value for them. On the other hand producing boz wheat as a commodity was not beneficial for them because it meant that they would have had to sell boz wheat in the market in order to buy akbaşak for their own consumption. By the time they paid for the transport of the wheat, plus the profit of the merchant for the akbaşak wheat either they would have been worse off or the difference they would have received from the selling and buying transactions would have been so meagre that it would not have been worth bothering with. Furthermore, they did not want to take the risk of venturing to grow a new variety which

was totally unknown to them. However, the big landlords who had access to information via their close relations with the agricultural office did not hesitate to try the boz wheat.

The productivity of wheat per donum varies between 35 and 105 kilos, that is between 1 and 6 olceks¹⁰ on poor land, and 105 to 192 kilos on medium quality cropland in the region. However, the lands in Gısgis village can only be subsumed into the first two categories in terms of wheat production, because the highest productivity rate for wheat in the village was 10 to 1, that is to say, given that 17.5 kilos (half an olcek) of seed is planted in one donum the highest productivity was 175 kilos per donum in Gısgis in 1977. On the other hand, the majority of land in Kalhana was medium or good quality as far as wheat production was concerned. The highest productivity rate we came across was 16 to 1 (280 kilos per donum) in Kalhana. This difference between the productivity rates in the two villages is due to irrigation, fertilisation and the nature of the land. Lands in Kalhana are mostly irrigated and well fertilised, while in Gısgis they are dry and often neglected due to the owners' inability to obtain chemicals

Lentils are of secondary importance to the producers, compared to wheat and cotton in Kalhana, and wheat in Gısgis. They are grown almost entirely for home consumption in Gısgis, while they are grown to a great extent for the market in the big farms, and to a very little extent in the small farms of Kalhana.

Tilling the Land

Farming patterns and land tillage not only differ between the two villages, but also vary from farm to farm, even within the same village. Knowing that no particular farm or unit of production can represent the diverse farming operations in the two villages we chose several units of production from both villages to be able to give a general picture of the farming operations as well as crop rotations in these villages.

Farm I

The first example is the largest farm in Kalhana, belonging to Suat Guldogan, who had taken over the running of the farm after his father's death a few years before our fieldwork. Suat is a university graduate, single, and lives with his mother, younger brother and sister. At the time of our fieldwork both his brother and his sister were students and had nothing to do with the farm. The farm consists of 5,000 dönüms divided into many plots. Only about 300 dönüms of the total farm lands are not irrigated, and the rest, which is irrigated, consists of medium and very good lands. The unirrigated lands and an additional 500 dönüms are given to sharecroppers, both from Kalhana and neighbouring villages such as Malan, Keydanevleri, and Asagi Balahur. The rest is planted with different crops in the following way 1,000 dönüms cotton, 1,000 dönüms wheat, 400 dönüms sugar beet and 400 dönüms lentils, and 1,400 dönüms are laid fallow. Wheat and cotton are grown in rotation while sugar beet and lentils are the other crops grown in rotation with each other. Suat's father Bekir, towards the end of his life, decided that he would leave one third of his lands to rest, and

since then a kind of three field system has been used in the farm and Suat continues to follow his father's path. In this way the land that is not given to sharecroppers is divided into six parts: three parts of 1,000 donúms, and three parts of 400 donums each. Crop rotation is followed in the same way.

	FIELDS OF 1,000 DONÚMS			FIELDS OF 400 DONÚMS		
	FIELD 1	FIELD 2	FIELD 3	FIELD 4	FIELD 5	FIELD 6
Year 1	Fallow	Wheat	Cotton	Fallow	Lentils	Sugarbeet
Year 2	Wheat	Cotton	Fallow	Lentils	Sugarbeet	Fallow
Year 3	Cotton	Fallow	Wheat	Sugarbeet	Fallow	Lentils

The agricultural machinery belonging to the farm includes a tractor, a drill, a cultivator, a harrow, a threshing machine, a trailer, a cotton minzer etc. Four permanent labourers are employed on the farm: one overseer, one tractor driver and one personal servant, as well as an animal caretaker.

In the cotton/wheat rotation after the wheat is harvested in July and the beginning of August the land is left until the beginning of November when the ploughing starts. During the winter the land is worked by disc harrow several times to straighten the soil. In April after the rains the land is straightened again by disc harrow and cotton is sown with the cotton minzer. About 4 kilos of deltapine seed is used per donum and 15 kilos per donum of şeker qübre (sugar fertiliser), superphosphate (P_2O_5), is added to the soil. It takes one day to till a field of 50 donums and plant cotton seed, and towards the end of

April, or the beginning of May the cotton planting finishes. Once the plants start to grow the field is irrigated. After the first irrigation the whole field is hoed and weeded by a team of hired workers from both Kalhana and surrounding villages. None of the members of Suat's family works in the fields. About 50 workers are hired for 10 to 20 days for hoeing.¹¹ The workers are recruited mainly from the village and neighbouring villages, and most of the workers are members of the families of Suat's sharecroppers, although some other people, like small farmers, landless poor etc. are also employed.

Cotton fields are irrigated five times from the time of planting to the harvest time in October. Workers were paid 15TL per hour for irrigation work in 1977. Cotton is picked in October and the first half of November. The picking is done by hand where hundreds of workers, women and children, work in the fields on a payment-in-kind basis. The workers are paid one twentieth of the amount of cotton they pick.

The wheat growing season starts as soon as the cotton is picked. Wheat is sown from the second half of October until the end of November. The sowing is done while the field is ploughed by means of a tractor driven by a full time driver. 17.5 kilos of tozgubre (powder fertiliser), ammonia sulphate, is used per donum in wheat production, although sometimes superphosphate is used instead. Harvesting is done at the end of June and the beginning of July by rented combine harvesters which are brought by their owners mainly from Yozgat province in central Anatolia to rent out. In 1977 farmers

were charged 25TL per donum to have their wheat harvested.

The practice of rotating lentils with sugar beet is very new in the village. Mostly big farmers like Suat use this method because sugar beet harvesting especially requires quite a large number of hired workers and small farmers do not have the necessary cash available for the wages. Lentils can be sown between the second half of October and the end of November, and are harvested in July and the beginning of August. Then the land is rested until the beginning of April, when sugar beet planting starts. The fields are ploughed to a depth of 20 to 30 centimetres and before planting they are levelled. A mellow but firm seedbed is prepared by disc harrow. 700 grams of non-pelleted seeds are sown per donum. Once the crop is established irrigation is carried out fortnightly. Harvesting requires a large labour force, where about twenty workers are hired for three weeks.

Farm II

Our second example is also from Kalhana village but is a relatively small farm compared to the first one. It belongs to Huseyin Aslanoglu whose own land comprises just 10 donums of the 60 donums he cultivates. He had been sharecropping 70 donums of land for almost ten years in 1977. Of the sharecropped land 30 donums belong to Memduh and 40 donums belong to Suat. Since he has a large family Huseyin provides labour to the landlords at any time they wish. The extended family consists of fourteen people: Huseyin himself, his wife, three sons, three daughters-in-law, one daughter and five grandchildren. All members of the family, including one child, participate in farming,

working in the fields and looking after the animals. The household has a pair of oxen, two donkeys, one cow, four sheep and six goats. There is no agricultural machinery other than a karasaban (wooden plough), d'oven (threshing sledge) and a number of sickles, scythes and hoes etc. Huseyin's own land is irrigated and the sharecropped land is partially irrigated. The lands are divided into four parcels. 10, 20, 20 and 30 donums each. In the irrigated land wheat, cotton and sesame are grown in rotation, while in the other lands wheat and lentils are grown in rotation with summer crops like chick peas, millet and vetch. Each parcel of land is laid fallow once in four years. The crop rotation followed by the Aslanoglu household is as follows

	IRRIGATED LAND (10 donums)	PARTIALLY IRRIGATED LANDS (20 donums)	(20 donums)	(30 donums)
Year 1	Cotton	Lentils	Summer crop*	Fallow
Year 2	Fallow	Fallow	Lentils	Wheat
Year 3	Sesame	Wheat	Fallow	Summer crop*
Year 4	Wheat	Summer crop*	Wheat	Lentils

* Chick peas, millet and vetches

All fields except the cotton field are ploughed by means of a karasaban (wooden plough) pulled by a pair of oxen. The cotton field is tilled by means of a rented tractor driven by a driver employed by the tractor owner. For lentils and wheat the fields are tilled in the autumn, for the summer crops the land is tilled in December and January, and for cotton and sesame they are tilled in April. The harvesting of wheat, lentils and chick peas, millet and sesame is done mostly by scythes and

sickles. Harvesting time for chick peas and vetch is the end of August and September, while millet and sesame are harvested in October. Only rarely is wheat threshed by machine, which has to be rented. Separation of the crops from the stalk is done by means of a flint-studded threshing sledge pulled by a pair of oxen. Once the crop has been separated this way the winnowing has to be done by means of wooden forks.

All the work of preparing the fields, harvesting, transporting etc. is done by members of the household. On occasion the household may employ one or two people if they cannot cope with the work. Being tied to the landlord the household has to give priority to their labour requirements rather than their own. Therefore it usually happens that while some members of the household work in their own fields the rest may be working in the landlord's fields.

Farm II

Apart from a few exceptions none of the farmers uses agricultural machinery in Gısgıs because most of the lands are stony and furthermore holdings are too small to persuade tractor owners to come to the village in order to rent out their machinery. Cemal Okan is one of the many who do not use agricultural machinery. His household consists of nine people including himself and his two wives and children. He owns 50 donums of unirrigated and five dönüms of irrigated land, as well as 10 donúms of vineyards. His livestock consists of a pair of oxen, two cows, and two female calves. Agricultural equipment owned by the farm includes a karasabon (wooden plough), threshing sledge,

four sickles, two scythes, four hoes and four winnowing forks.

The irrigated land is planted with vegetables, mainly tomatoes, green peppers, cucumbers and to a lesser extent green beans, onions and marrows, in order to meet the needs of the family. On the unirrigated land wheat and lentils are rotated with melons and water melons. Melons and water melons, together with vegetables and grapes are sold in the market.

In the last month of autumn the land is tilled for planting wheat and vegetables. Tilling the land is done by means of a karasaban (wooden plough) drawn by a pair of oxen, and sowing is done by hand. Artificial fertilisers are not used because Cemal does not have access to the agricultural office which provides farmers with agricultural chemicals, nor can he afford to buy enough artificial fertiliser from the market where the price is much higher than that of the agricultural office. However, a small amount of fertiliser obtained from the market is used in vegetable gardening. Since animal dung is used for fuel, called tezek (sun-dried flat round slabs of animal dung) the rest of the fields are not manured and therefore the productivity is very low due to soil exhaustion. Reaping of wheat and lentils takes place in July by means of sickles and scythes, by members of the family, although some close relatives may come to help. Separation of the crop from the stalks is achieved by the use of a threshing sledge pulled by draught animals. All the work involved in threshing, winnowing and transporting the crops is done by family members. After the harvest the fields are ploughed and left resting until the beginning of March,

when they are ploughed again for melon and water melon planting.

Growing melons coincides with vegetable growing as far as the growing season is concerned. Therefore, April to September is the busiest time of the year for Cemal's household.

Cemal does not let his fields lay fallow, instead he grows vetch as a summer crop every four years. The three parcels of his land are cultivated according to the following rotation

	FIELD 1	FIELD 2	FIELD 3
Year 1	Wheat	Melon	Lentils
Year 2	Melon	Lentil	Vetch
Year 3	Lentil	Vetch	Wheat
Year 4	Vetch	Wheat	Melon

His method of crop rotation is based on tradition and is far from being scientific. He rotates those types of crops whose roots stay quite close to the surface of the ground, instead of rotating crops with different root levels under the ground, and thereby making use of the soil to its best extent.

THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS IN GISGIS AND KALHANNA

The level of development of the productive forces should not be taken as only a level of technological information but should rather be taken as "a function of application of technology to the productive process and the development of the social and entrepreneurial division of labour".¹² Nevertheless, this section of this chapter will examine

only the technological aspects, while the social relations will be dealt with in the following chapters.

Gisgis

In Gisgis village the level of technology in agriculture is very primitive, though agricultural machinery is used to a very limited extent. Traditional items of equipment used in agriculture are mainly the wooden hooked plough (karasaban), spade (bel), pickaxe (kazma), shovel (kürek), rake (tirmık), sickle (orak, or kaluç in Kurdish), hoe (çapa), scythe (tırpan), winnowing fork (yaba) and wooden thresher (döven). Among the items of metal equipment, such as the spade, pickaxe, shovel, sickle and scythe, the old fashioned traditional ones produced by the local artisans have been superceded by factory produced ones. Wooden equipment, such as the winnowing fork, wooden hooked plough and wooden thresher, are obtained mainly from the village carpenter or from local artisans in Ergani or Diyarbakır. Repairs of wooden equipment are usually carried out by the village carpenter, however, in some cases they are done by a male member of the household, provided that the household has access to the necessary equipment.

The same things can be said for the replacement of a broken handle of a pickaxe, shovel, etc. The following table will reveal the backward nature of the technological level of agriculture in Gisgis village

TABLE 3.18 Agricultural Equipment in Gisgis

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY
Wooden hooked plough	84
Threshing sledge	85
Sickle	430
Scythe	64
Axe	32
Pickaxe	75
Spade	90
Winnowing fork	75
Hoe	92
Tractor	-
Metal plough	-

There are several factors which do not allow the mechanisation of agriculture in Gisgis. First, the stony nature of some of the fields does not allow the use of agricultural machinery, second, excessive land fragmentation, stemming from the nature of the law concerning inheritance rights, which does not render possible the optimum use of machinery, third, the high prices of machinery necessitate a sum of accumulated capital which is not likely to occur, given the low level of income of the farmers. Nevertheless, there are people in the village with enough money to buy a tractor, who prefer to invest their money in more profitable areas such as transportation and commerce.

Kalhana

Compared to Gisgis village, the level of technology used in Agriculture in Kalhana village is highly advanced. The level of technology of Kalhana's agriculture should be considered from two different perspectives, namely that of small producers, whether they are independent

peasants, sharecroppers or a combination of both, or agricultural wage earners, and that of middle peasants and of big capitalist landowners.

The number of small peasant families with land is considerably low, comprising 8.68 per cent of the village households, (here those households with 50 donums or less are considered as small peasant households). They use family labour in agriculture where the tilling of the land is done mainly by the implementation of a wooden plough pulled by a pair of oxen. However, this is not the only way of tilling the land, for it was observed that sometimes the family rents a tractor to till the land. This is the case either when the male members of the household are away working in other places as casual labourers in building and road constructions, or they are ill, or they are involved in a sharecropping arrangement and the tilling of the land by tractor is a part of this arrangement. In the latter case the condition imposed by the landowner, that the sharecropper should use the tractor in the tilling of the land, may emanate from two reasons first, from the belief that land-tilling by tractor will increase the productivity, and second, from the fact that the landowner himself may be a tractor owner and may wish to increase his income by renting out the tractor. Such is the case with Memduh Bey and Suat Bey.¹³

We shall now dwell on the second perspective, that of big farmers who have continually been increasing their use of technology in agriculture since the early 1950s. Controlling large amounts of land and having close relations with the state officials the big landlords have

considerably greater access to improved seeds and artificial fertiliser provided by the state, and to agricultural machinery through credits granted by the Agricultural Bank. The big landowners who are producing for the market have almost totally abandoned old, traditional farming techniques on their farms. Agricultural machines like the tractor, drill, cultivator, disc harrow, threshing machine, combine harvester etc. are widely used on the farms of big landlords. Not only do they use their machines on their farms but they also rent the machines to other farmers, peasants etc. For instance, Memduh Bey has a tractor, a trailer, a cotton gin, a drill, a cultivator and a disc harrow, and he employs a tractor driver for a wage of 10,000TL per annum. The tractor driver works both on Memduh Bey's land and on the lands of others who rent the tractor. When agricultural work finishes he is sent to transport building materials (bricks, sand etc.). The same things can also be said for Suat Bey, who also has a tractor, trailer, cotton gin, drill, cultivator, disc harrow and, in addition, a threshing machine. The table below shows the numbers of farming implements that existed in the village in August 1977

TABLE 3.19 Agricultural Equipment in Kalhana

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY
Wooden hooked plough	7
Sickle	17
Scythe	31
Axe	4
Pickaxe	6
Spade	15
Winnowing fork	11
Hoe	316
Tractor	5
Drill	3

TABLE 3.19 Agricultural Equipment in Kalhana (Continued)

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY
Cultivator	4
Disc harrow	5
Threshing machine	4
Trailer	5
Cotton minzer	2

^part from the three big landlords' tractors we found two other tractors owned by landless people. Three cousins (Ahmet, İzzet and Fariz Guclu) own one of the tractors and one of the cousins, Ahmet, is working in West Germany. With his initiative the other two cousins, İzzet and Fariz, sold their lands and oxen to buy a tractor by instalments, and are now working as tractor drivers. According to their verbal agreement the income from renting out the tractor and from farming is divided into three equal shares after the extraction of a salary of 12,000TL per annum. The two drivers share the 12,000TL salary between them, as remuneration for their shift work. The two driver cousins find people who are willing to give them land to share-crop. For instance, in 1977 they were cultivating a total of 350 dönüms of land as sharecroppers. The owners of these lands were a merchant (absentee landlord) in Ergani, a teacher who inherited 40 dönüms and was unable to cultivate it himself, and an old couple who were incapable of working.

The other landless tractor owner also engages in the above-mentioned arrangements renting his tractor to needy farmers and sharecropping land on his own account with his own tractor.

In concluding this chapter we may say that agriculture in Kalhana is more market oriented than in Gising, and that the production of commercial crops is more dominant in Kalhana. Furthermore, the nature of the land and of landownership has enabled the big landlords of Kalhana to make use of sophisticated agricultural technology and better agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilisers). In turn, this has allowed the development of new relations of production (wage labour-capital relationship), that will be examined in the next chapters.

NOTES

1. Since smoking and playing cards in front of older relations are considered signs of disrespect, most young people did not want to mix with older members of the village. The elderly people, for their part, in order to avoid being in an awkward position, turn a blind eye when they come across one of their young relatives smoking or playing cards.
2. Başlık means bride-price in Turkish. In the rural areas of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, fathers consider it their inalienable right to ask for money when their daughters get married. The girls are brought up in such a way that they think it normal for a girl to be given in marriage in return for money.
3. For a discussion of some of the factors affecting women's and their babies' health in Turkey, see Sabahat Tezcan, "Türk Kadınının Sağlık Sorunları" (Health Problems of Turkish Women) in Nermin Abadan-Unat (Ed.), Türk Toplumunda Kadın (1979), pp. 73-88, and see also Ayşe Baysal, "Türk Kadınının Besleme Sorunları" (Nutrition Problems of Turkish Women) in Abadan-Unat (Ed.), op. cit. (1979), pp. 133-148.
4. The number of deaths and births in the village was 23. The number of deaths was 9, a difference of 14 people in one year. The difference between 258 and 14 is 244, and from this we can say that 14 is 5.7 per cent of 244.
5. By field agriculture we mean production activities which cover the production of grain, cotton and some animal fodder, as opposed to the production of vegetables and fruit, which we prefer to call garden agriculture, and the production of grapes.
6. This theme, as well as sharecropping arrangements, will be dealt with in Chapter V.
7. See Chapter IV.
8. Jan Hinderink and Mubeccel Belik Kıray, Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development A Study of Four Turkish Villages (1970), p. 61.
9. 100 kuruş equal 1 Turkish Lira.
10. 1 ölçek equals 35 kilos in wheat, 36 kilos in lentils, 33 kilos in barley and 30 kilos in millet, according to local measurement.
11. Hoeing is locally termed dukolan, or simply kolan, and weeding is locally termed asiv yapmak.
12. Theotonio dos Santos, "The Concept of Social Classes", Science and Society, XXXIV, No. 2 (Summer 1970), p. 191.

13. One may ask whether it would not be more profitable for the landlord to cultivate his land by himself, using his own tractor. If the land given to the sharecropper is considered alone the answer would be yes. The long term income of the farm, however, should be taken into consideration. In the peak season the need for a labour force on the farm forces the landlord to give a piece of his land to sharecroppers who are thus tied to the farm by virtue of this arrangement. Landlords thereby avoid a possible labour shortage in the peak seasons. This also strengthens the landlords' position in imposing their will on the labourers in terms of payment. For instance, labourers are paid in kind when they are employed in cotton-picking. The amount of remuneration depends on the amount of cotton picked, in this way a healthy worker can only earn the equivalent of 60 to 70TL in cotton during a ten hour working day, whereas a wage labourer working in building construction for the same hours would earn about 150 to 200TL, and a labourer working in village irrigation works for 15TL per hour would earn 150TL for a ten hour day. The conclusion to be drawn here is that by tying sharecroppers and landless peasants to the farm, landlords decrease their total costs in production, although in a single sharecropping arrangement, taken alone, they may appear to be on the losing side.

CHAPTER IV

Since land is an important means of production in the sphere of agriculture, the control of the land can be seen as a determining factor in the relations of production. It will therefore be helpful when dealing with any particular social formation and/or region in which the main source of income is agriculture, to examine first the landownership system in order to understand later the relations of production and distribution. It is for this reason that this chapter will attempt to examine the landownership structure in the villages of Gısgıs and Kalhana. Nevertheless, the present structure, whose features will be outlined from data gathered during fieldwork in 1977, is itself the product of an historical process. The introductory part of this chapter, therefore, will attempt to outline some of the basic features of the Ottoman land system. This should not only provide the necessary historical background against which to evaluate the present landowning structure, but also permit us to highlight the important differences which characterise the land system in Eastern Anatolia as compared to other parts of Turkey.

In a context where the Islamic State was the absolute owner of all land, these lands being called miri,¹ the basis of the Ottoman land system was the dirlik² and its fundamental element was the timar.³ This mode of organisation provided the centralised authority with control over production, and was also suitable to the military structure of the state. Timars of three different magnitudes were granted

in the Ottoman Empire to those whose loyalty or service to the state and sultan was recognised, or to those who provided the sultan with cavalry and loyal service in war. The income of certain designated timars extracted by different timar holders was of three kinds

<u>Has</u>	not less than 100,000 <u>akçe</u> (Ottoman currency)
<u>Zeamet</u>	between 20,000 and 99,999 <u>akçe</u>
<u>Timar</u>	between 3,000 and 19,999 <u>akçe</u> ⁴

The holders of timars, sipahis, were not the owners of the land but representatives of the state, whose duty it was to collect taxes from the reaya (peasants) who had the usufructory rights in the land. The reaya's right of usufruct was inheritable provided that the land was not left uncultivated for three successive years or more ⁵ The peasant cultivated the land with his own implements, and each year gave a part of his harvest, the amount of which varied between one tenth and one half of the crop according to the fertility of the land and common usage, to the sipahi.⁶ Furthermore, the peasants' freedom of mobility was restricted by the state to certain designated locations.⁷ As to the sipahi, he was only a government official who collected taxes from the producers and provided soldiers for the state when required to do so. The sipahi's right of possession in dirlik could be taken away from him by the state if necessary.

This state-owned land system, miri, began to decline from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, due to the weakening of the centralised authority. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to deal with the reasons behind this decline, which have been examined in

several scholarly contributions.⁸ It is important, however, to note that from the sixteenth century onwards, parallel with the weakening of the centralised authority, the miri land system was replaced by the iltizam⁹ system. In this system in order to increase the income of the state the collection of the âsr¹⁰ was sold to mültezims (tax farmers) who would organise and undertake the tax collection. The reayas (peasants) were left at the mercy of the mültezims as to how much tax was to be levied from them. As a result, in some provinces strong notables (ayans) and tax farmers (mültezims) gained strong positions and by 1808 the state was constrained to confirm their positions. These local notables and tax farmers acted as the owners of the lands and forced the peasants to pay more and more taxes, first in kind, then later in cash. We may call this trend "a feudalisation of the miri system".¹¹

However, miri lands were not the only form of land within the boundaries of the empire. In different parts of the empire other types of landownership can be observed. In Eastern Anatolia, for example, there were some sancaks (administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire) where the dominant form of landownership was serbest mir-i miranlık, yurtluk/ocaklık and mir-aşiretliği

Serbest mir-i miranlıks were those sancaks which were also called hükümet¹² such as Cizre, Genç, Bitlis, İmadiye, Mahmudiye. In these cases ownership of the land rested with the holders, but they nevertheless recognised the higher sovereignty of the Ottoman state. İmar and zeamet did not exist in these serbest mir-i miranlık, and the

sancaks were virtually the property of their holders, beys who paid a certain amount of tax and provided soldiers to the state if necessary.¹³ Furthermore, Kurdish tribal leaders, beys, were given large estates in return for their support of Sultan Selim against Shah Ismail of Iran in 1514 and the following years. The sancaks of these Kurdish beys were called yurtluk/ocaklık and were inherited by their children. The state could not dismiss the Kurdish bey, nor could it appoint a new bey to a sancak. In Diyarbakır province, for example, the number of yurtluk/ocaklık sancaks was eight Sokman, Kulub, Tercil, Mıhranı, İtah, Pertek, Çapakçur and Çermik.¹⁴ There were also about four hundred mır aşiretliği (tribal leaderships) in Diyarbakır, Van and Şehrizar. The leaders of these tribal groups held the ownership of the land, and on their death their children would inherit their lands.¹⁵

As we can see, the lands given as property (mulk) under the names of serbest mır-ı miranlık, yurtluk/ocaklık and mır aşiretliği were the basis of a different structure, whose remnants are still in existence in Eastern Anatolia. This difference was to achieve importance after the sixteenth century when the centralised Ottoman State gradually lost its control over the land. The inability of the central authority to control its provinces led to the consolidation of the power of local notables (ayans) vis-à-vis the reaya who actually worked the land. In the case of the Kurdish notables, who had had a different status to ordinary tımar holders anyway, they were able to enjoy almost total private ownership in land.

Furthermore, with the acceptance of private property in land in 1926, following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kurdish notables, tribal leaders and big land holders who were de facto owners of large lands became de jure owners. Therefore it would not be misleading to suggest the roots of the unequal land distribution in Eastern Anatolia lie in the historical background. Today's large estates and small peasant holdings have been structured by this specific historical development of the landownership in the region. Yurtluk/ocaklık and serbest mir-i miranlık lands constitute the basis of today's large estates whereas the lands tax-farmed out to multezims and worked by reayas (peasant families) constitute the basis of small peasant holdings. For the reayas became the owners of the land over which they had had only usufructory rights before the Republic.

Admittedly, in addition to the above indicated historical aspects, other factors such as the commercialisation of Turkish agriculture have also contributed to the determination of the present landowning structure in Gırgıs and Kalhana. However, as these are factors that will be discussed in later chapters it suffices to point out here that in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia two land systems coexisted: the yurtluk/ocaklık and serbest mir-i miranlık etc which were the basis for large estates, and the state lands worked by reayas (peasant families). These reayas had the right of possession over the land and paid taxes that were collected by sipahıs and later by mültezims. With the acceptance of private property in land in 1926, however, those reayas who produced the official document proving that they were the users of the land became the real owners of the land to which previously they had only had the right of possession.

LANDOWNERSHIP IN GISGIS

Gisgis village is one of those villages characterised by the iltizam land system which existed before the Republican regime. In these villages land was more or less equally divided among the peasants, and this is the basis behind the existing land distribution in Gisgis.

Figures pertaining to land tenure in Gisgis, obtained from the tax office in Ergani, seem to be greatly deflated due to the fact that they are based on the personal declarations of the owners. For instance, according to the records of the tax office there exist 2,696 dönüms of land in Gisgis, whereas according to the data we collected during our fieldwork this figure should be 5,306 dönüms. Given the fact that landowners may have also understated the amount of land they owned during our own survey, it would be highly misleading to rely on the records of the tax office. Therefore, the findings of our own survey for the land tenure in Gisgis will be used below. It is evident from Table 4.1 that 40 of the 164 families (24.7 per cent) in Gisgis are landless. However, 8 of the 40 families, or at least their household heads, work as farmers engaged in sharecropping. Most of the 32 landless household heads work mainly as casual labourers, some have permanent work (as teachers, civil servants, drivers) and some work as stonemasons and masons. (See Table 3.8 in Chapter III.)

TABLE 4.1 Distribution of Land among the Inhabitants of Gısgis

LAND OWNED	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS*	% OF HOUSEHOLDS	CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE	TOTAL LAND (donums)	% OF TOTAL LAND
Landless	40	24.4	24.4	-	-
1-10	33	20.1	44.5	228	4.3
11-20	12	7.3	51.8	164	3.1
21-50	48	29.3	81.1	1,738	32.8
51+	31	18.9	100.0	3,176	59.8
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	164	100.0	100.0	5,306	100.0
	—	—	—	—	—

* In Turkish civil law property rights in real estate rest in individual persons. In contrast, in rural areas, regardless of the individual person who holds the title deeds for a property (especially for land) ownership of the property belongs to a group of people, usually the household. For this reason distribution of land is considered according to households in the two villages.

Given the fact that 10 donums (1 hectare) of land is too small to enable a family to survive, the families with 10 donums or less land can be considered in the same category as the landless. We shall see that more than half of the households with 10 donums or less land make their living from other sorts of activities and use the income from their land as a supplementary income, which is derived either from direct cultivation of the land by family labour, or from share-cropping arrangements.

Landlessness is a fact of the last sixty years of the history of Gısgis. In 1920, for example, there were no landless families in Gısgis, despite the fact that some of them did not have any licence for the land they farmed. Several factors facilitated the alienation

of land from the peasants, such as excessive taxes imposed on farmers during the second world war, indirect taxation later on, and today, usury, unfavourable price mechanisms, indebtedness and the high rate of growth of the population.

The majority of households, 133 out of 164 (81.1 per cent) have 50 dönüms or less. Given the type of agriculture and the low level of the productive forces in the village, these holdings can be considered small holdings which do not enable the family concerned to sustain itself, thus forcing its members to seek supplementary income elsewhere. Holdings between 50 and 200 dönüms may be considered medium sized holdings. Income from such holdings would enable the holders to sustain a decent living and in some cases even to save some money. Of course, this category of 50 to 200 dönüms is not homogeneous within itself, and we are aware of the difficulty in subsuming someone with only 51 dönüms of land and someone with 200 dönüms of land under the same category. In Gısgıs most of the holdings (21 out of 31) in this category are around 60 to 100 dönüms, while holdings above 100 dönüms are not too numerous (7 holdings are between 101 and 200 dönüms).

The relatively rich farmers are able to save money and invest in more profitable spheres, such as transportation, commerce, shops etc. For instance, Abdülkerim Uney owns 200 dönüms of land and co-owns a minibus which transports passengers between Gısgıs, Ergani and Diyarbakır. He also engages in buying and selling grain and livestock. One of those with more than 100 dönüms of land is the only grocer in the village

Celal Pala, who owns 182 donums of land, which is worked by his wife and his son

The data collected during the period of fieldwork also reveal that in Gisgis holdings consist of a few fragments of land, vineyards, vegetable gardens and orchards. The 5,306 dõnums of total village lands owned by the villagers comprises 441 fragments of lands, vineyards, vegetable gardens and orchards. This fragmentation is due partly to the existing inheritance laws and partly to the peasants' desire not to be separated from their means of livelihood. Uncertain job prospects impel peasants to stick to their small piece of land as security

It is clear from the above that the peasantry in Gisgis is not a homogeneous group of people, nor can it be seen to constitute one class. However, it can be analysed in class terms¹⁶ and one of the constituents of an analysis of this sort is the study of the peasantry in terms of differentiation among its members. Having shown differentiation regarding landownership we shall now attempt to demonstrate differentiation among the inhabitants of Gisgis concerning animal ownership. Furthermore, an attempt will also be made to denote the relations of production involved in animal breeding

ANIMAL OWNERSHIP IN GISGIS

It is evident from our fieldwork that peasants tend to keep animals which are more useful for the reproduction of the household, unless

they take animal husbandry as their main occupation. Oxen, cows and donkeys play a very important role in the reproduction cycle of the peasant family. Oxen are used as draught animals, while milk obtained from cows, and products made from the milk, like yoghurt, cheese, butter and cokelék (skimmed-milk cheese) are consumed by the household. Donkeys are one of the most essential animals for the peasant family since they are used for transporting between the fields and the house all sorts of commodities.

The peasant families in Gisgis tend to keep cows and oxen rather than sheep or goats when they can afford to buy cows, although they themselves do not keep many sheep and goats they have access to these animals through sharecropping arrangements. Despite the general tendency toward a preference to have cows rather than sheep and goats some relatively rich families breed sheep and goats for commercial purposes. The high number of sheep and goats is due this fact, which also explains the unequal distribution of sheep and goats among the village households. We shall now have a look at the table below to see the distribution of cows in the village.

TABLE 4 2 Distribution of Cows Owned in Gisgis

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			COWS OWNED		
	NUMBER	%	CUM. %	NUMBER	%	CUM. %
Having no cow	48	29.3	29.3	-	-	-
1 cow	28	17.1	46.4	28	10.7	10.7
2 cows	55	33.5	79.9	110	41.8	52.5
3 cows	13	7.9	87.8	39	14.8	67.3
4 cows or more	20	12.2	100.0	86	32.7	100.0
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Total	164	100.0	100.0	263	100.0	100.0
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Although cows are one of the essential factors in families' livelihood, 29.3 per cent of the families (48 out of 164) lack this essential constituent, while 20.1 per cent of the total families own 47.5 per cent of the cows in the village. Furthermore, if we take the first two categories together we shall see that 46.4 per cent of the total families own only 10.7 per cent of the cows. The inequalities in the ownership of cows approximate to the inequalities in landownership.

Unlike the case that some households have three or even five cows, the highest number of oxen owned by a single household is only two. This may be due to the fact that oxen are used only as draught animals and there are no families with lands so large that they would require more than one pair of oxen for tilling. Also, there is the fact that households in Gisgis with relatively large lands have recourse to renting tractors from other farmers in neighbouring villages to till their lands, on condition that their lands are suitable for the use of a tractor and if they can afford the rent charged. The households with one ox are usually relatively poor peasant households, they cannot afford to buy a second ox, nor do they think it would be wise to buy a second one given the small amount of land they have. The distribution of oxen in the village was as shown in the table below at the time of our survey.

TABLE 4.3 Distribution of Oxen Owned in Gisqis

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			OXEN OWNED		
	NUMBER	%	CUM. %	NUMBER	%	CUM. %
Having no ox	87	53.0	53.0	-	-	-
1 ox	21	12.8	65.8	21	15.8	15.8
2 oxen	56	34.2	100.0	112	84.2	100.0
Total	164	100.0	100.0	133	100.0	100.0

As to ownership of sheep, we can see from the table below that the distribution is highly unequal. This is due to the fact that a few relatively rich households breed sheep for the market and that it is thought that it is more beneficial for the peasant family to keep one cow rather than having one or two sheep. However, a peasant family may come to own a few sheep through sharecropping. At the time of the survey the number of sheep and their distribution among the households in the village was as shown below.

TABLE 4.4 Distribution of Sheep Owned in Gisqis

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			SHEEP OWNED		
	NUMBER	%	CUM. %	NUMBER	%	CUM. %
Having no sheep	134	81.7	81.7	-	-	-
1-3 sheep	16	9.8	91.5	28	3.9	3.9
4-10 sheep	7	4.3	95.8	62	8.7	12.6
11-25 sheep	4	2.4	98.2	63	8.8	21.4
26 sheep	3	1.8	100.0	563	78.6	100.0
Total	164	100.0	100.0	716	100.0	100.0

if the peasant families are to choose between sheep and goats in terms of their usefulness they would prefer to keep goats, whose milk is highly valued by the peasants for making yoghurt and cheese. It is also cheaper to obtain a goat than a sheep. Goat's meat is also one of the most consumed meats in the Ergari district because it is much cheaper than lamb or beef. The ease of marketing makes goat breeding highly popular for some people in the area, however, the number of sheep is higher than that of goats in the area because lamb is more greatly desired than goat's meat in other areas, and so animal traders encourage peasants to breed sheep. However, it is not possible to say they are very successful in their attempts to encourage the breeding of sheep on a sharecropping basis, on the grounds that these arrangements may be very risky for the peasant family. This point will be touched upon when we deal with the forms of sharecropping arrangements in animal breeding in the next chapter. In the following table we see the distribution of goats in the village.

TABLE 4.5 Distribution of Goats Owned in Gisgis

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			GOATS OWNED		
	NUMBER	CUM		NUMBER	CUM	
Having no goats	116	70.7	70.7	-	-	-
1-3 goats	31	13.9	89.6	42	13.8	13.8
4-10 goats	8	4.9	94.5	60	19.8	33.6
11-25 goats	5	3.1	97.6	63	20.7	54.3
26+ goats	4	2.4	100.0	139	45.7	100.0
Total	164	100.0	100.0	304	100.0	100.0

The above table reveals that goats, which are a source of family sustenance, are unequally distributed among the households. For example, 5.5 per cent of the families own 66.4 per cent of all the goats in the village, while 70.7 per cent of the households own no goats at all. This inequality is also evident in the fact that the average number of goats per household is 1.9, while the nine families with the most goats have an average of 22.4 goats per household.

As for the donkeys in the village, they are kept for use as a means of transport, and families with occupations other than farming did not have any donkeys. In the past donkeys were more important for farming families. Crops produced in the village used to be transported on donkeys to Ergani, which is about 16 kilometres from the village, and/or to Çermik, which is about 17 kilometres from the village in the opposite direction from Ergani. Today, with the use of motorised transportation donkeys are no longer used for long distance transportation, although they are still important for farming families. The distribution of donkeys in the village during our survey did not reveal any inequalities of the kind we encountered with respect to sheep. There were 129 donkeys in the village in August 1977, the distribution of which was as follows:

TABLE 4 b Distribution of Donkeys Owned in Gısgis

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			DONKEYS OWNED		
	NUMBER		CUM. %	NUMBER		CUM. %
Having no donkey	56	34.1	34.1	-	-	-
1 donkey	92	56.1	80.2	92	71.3	71.3
2 donkeys	11	6.7	86.9	22	17.1	88.4
3 donkeys	5	3.1	100.0	15	11.6	100.0
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Total	164	100.0	100.0	129	100.0	100.0
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LANDOWNERSHIP IN KALHANI

Land is the main means of production in Kalhania, just as it is in Gısgis. The necessity of dealing with landownership patterns stems from the fact that this kind of analysis enables one to see at least some aspects of the relations of production. As we shall see, the distribution of land within Kalhania village is highly unequal, a situation which stems from the sixteenth century. The origins of landlordism in Eastern Anatolia have been dealt with above, and so it is unnecessary to tackle the problem with respect to Kalhania here except to give a brief outline of the immediate history of the landownership in the village in order to shed some further light on our understanding of the present situation.

In 1977 two families, Göldoğan and Gedikli, or rather offspring of these two families, controlled between them 74.67 per cent of the total village lands (8,600 out of a total of 11,516 dönüms). The


(edik) s are descendants of a Kurdish notable who was granted an ocaklık by the Ottoman sultan in the sixteenth century. Unfortunately there is no data concerning this notable, and the account we relate here was told to us by several old men in the village during the course of our fieldwork. The reliability of the account is disputable but we do know that many Turkish notables, tribal leaders and such like were granted lands by the Ottoman state during the sixteenth century and later on, and the account is in conformity with this historical fact.

We were able to obtain information about landownership from elderly people living in the area which dates back as far as the 1850s. Until 1907 one Lobud Ağa (born in 1834) controlled the lands of the whole village, the residents of which worked the lands as sharecroppers (yarıcı) and marabas. Neither marabas nor yarıcı had any rights to the land. The difference between maraba and yarıcı rests on the fact that the maraba was a worker with no means of production (oxen, plough etc.) who cultivated a piece of demesne land with the demesne's oxen and implements, using his family's labour and remunerated in kind, whereas the yarıcı was a peasant with farming implements and draught animals of his own, who used family labour in production.

Owing to the labour shortage in the area a considerable part of Lobud Ağa's lands remained uncultivated. Lobud Ağa used force to keep the peasants in his village. Writing about the problems of Eastern Anatolia, Pozarslan refers to the period before 1920 as feudal and he describes the arbitrariness of the Ağas' behaviour in Eastern Anatolia.

...ağas punished peasants in various ways they beat them up, jailed them, even killed them. At that time (before the 1920s) ağa or bey meant a small sultan who could wreak his will (on the peasants) and was not answerable to anyone for his actions. Poor peasants! (Being so helpless they did not know what to do or whom to complain to). They (the peasants) could not escape from the village since it involved danger. Because of the competition between ağas escaping from the domain of one ağa to that of another was considered almost equal to crossing the border of a country without a visa. That is why nobody could dare to endeavour this dangerous task.¹⁰

Centralised authority was so weak at the turn of the twentieth century that local ağas, especially the ones in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, and notables were enabled to become economically as well as politically powerful. Being one of the ağas in the region Lobud Ağa exercised his full power to exploit the peasants. He was very infamous for his cruelty. When he died in 1907 the elder of his two sons, İskender Ağa, took over his position. The younger son, Mustafa Ağa (later Mustafa Ceditkılı) did not approve of his elder brother the Ağa bey's behaviour in general. İskender Ağa was very spendthrift and granted the right to possession of some lands to many peasants in the area, he also sold a considerable part of his estate to Bekir Bey, (whose account will be told later) after the abolition of the Ottoman land system in 1925. He did not mind selling his land very cheaply because first of all, owing to the technological backwardness of agriculture in the area the income from it was very low, secondly, there was an abundance of uncultivated land, due to the fact that there was a labour shortage



- ^ This is not a whole family tree, it is included here to make it easier for the reader to see the relationships between the names which appear in the text.

Having been unhappy with his elder brother's extravagance, Mustafa took his share of about 1,000 donums, which he still has today, from the part of the estate remaining. Mustafa had married before he took his share of land from his brother, and he worked on the land controlled by Hakki ¹⁹. He subsequently achieved one of his ambitions, by separating from his brother, but he never achieved his second and most important ambition, namely to have children. He says

I have always wanted to have children and my own farm, unfortunately God did not give me any children. I always could have modernised my farm if I had wanted to. I could have bought a tractor and .. I mean everything.. I consider these landless peasants as my own kids, let them cultivate my lands and earn their livelihood. These boys (he refers to the Gûldoğan family) are infidels, they do not care about poor people, they only think about themselves. It was they who brought this blooming tractor to this village and caused all the unemployment and misery in this village. They are not Muslims, they are infidels .. Thanks be to God, I live quite comfortably without a tractor and twelve families (he refers to his sharecroppers) earn their living under my auspices. I do not want to get richer, richer for what? for whom? Do I have any children to leave my property to? No.

Mustafa Gedikli is today about 79 years of age and does not work himself as he is quite content with the income he derives through his sharecroppers

His brother's sons, Şefik, Hacı and Ekrem Gedikli inherited about 700 donums of land when their father died in 1943. Being the oldest of the brothers (20 years old at the time of Hakkı Ağa's death) Şefik Ağa became the head of the household. He resembled his father in terms of being a spendthrift and in a short period of time he became indebted up to his neck to merchants in Ergani (both to grain merchants and to grocers). In return for his debts he disposed of some lands and mortgaged some more. By the time the three brothers Şefik, Hacı and Ekrem had separated their households they only had 300 donums of land left between them. Today Şefik Ağa has even been reduced to being a sharecropper on his own land.

As to the Gülüdoğan family, they immigrated to Kalhana in 1915 from Çunnuş district where the head of the family, Bekir Bey, was one of the notables engaged in trade and usury. As a rich man Bekir Bey did not have any difficulty in gaining the trust of rich Armenians who were also dealing with trade and usury as well as small scale production. In 1915, when the Armenians were expelled, and some were killed for rioting against the Ottoman state, some of the rich Armenians, personal friends of Bekir Bey and his trade partners, left their belongings with Bekir Bey on condition that they would get them back if they returned from wherever they were to be taken by the authorities. However, they never returned. With the expulsion of the

Armenians the production of pottery and cotton cloth came to an end in the area, and of course in Çunguş as well. Having lost his basis for trade, but with some precious metals and money hoarded away, Bekir Bey came to Erğani with his family and wanted to settle in Aşağı Balahur village. Realising that Bekir Bey had some cash Hakkı Ağa, a relatively powerful landlord, would not let him settle in Aşağı Balahur village and persuaded him instead to settle in Kılhana, with the idea of getting some cash from him.

Aware of Hakkı Ağa's need for cash Bekir Bey continuously bought land from him at very low prices. As we stated above, Hakkı Ağa did not care about land since there was an abundance of uncultivated land. Bekir Bey not only bought land from Hakkı Ağa but also lent money to needy peasants, which resulted in the alienation of some peasants from their land. This process was continued, after Bekir Bey's death, by his sons. Until the 1960s they let the peasants cultivate their lands simply because of their own inability to cultivate the lands with the existing level of technology. Since the early 1960s, however, the Guldoğan family have been cultivating the lands with their tractor and have been expelling their sharecroppers. Of course, this is not a smooth process. In fear of losing their access to the land the peasants rebelled against the Guldoğan family several times in the 1960s. However, it was not difficult for the Guldoğans to suppress these various land seizure attempts with the help of the gendarmerie.¹⁹

We have probably digressed somewhat from our attempt to trace land-ownership in Keth na village, and this much would seem to be sufficient to give an idea as to how the current inequality in landownership came into being. A few remarks about the data on landownership seem also to be necessary. The data was collected from three different sources: first through the application of a questionnaire, in this way household heads were simply asked to state how much land they owned, second, by going through tax office records in Ergani. This information seemed to be highly unreliable because the figures were based on the personal declarations of the landowners, who avoided giving the correct figures in order to evade high land taxes. Since no land survey has been carried out, the landowners were quite safe in declaring false figures. The third method was by referring to a reliable key respondent. Our key respondent was the village headman, whom we have known for fifteen years. The difference between the figures collected from the different sources reveal that landowners had given more or less the same figures in their answers to the questionnaire as they had declared to the tax office. The differences between the official figures and the figures obtained from the village headman is very great in the case of big holdings, and almost negligible in the case of small holdings. This is simply due to the fact that people with less than 50 dönüms of land are exempt from paying any land tax, while people with over 50 dönüms of land pay tax on that part in excess of 50 dönüms.

TABLE 4.7 Distribution of Land among the Inhabitants of Kalhana*

LAND OWNED (donums)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL LAND (donums)	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Landless	36	78.3	-	-
1-50	4	8.7	114	1.14
51-100	2	4.3	200	2.00
101+	4	8.7	9,700	96.86
	—	—	—	—
Total	46	100.0	10,014	100.00
	—	—	—	—

* Calculated from the figures supplied by the village headman.

* Although the village headman was able to provide us with this information for all 46 households in the village we were unable to obtain other data for two of the households whose heads were away from the village.

The preceding table demonstrates the highly inequitable distribution of land among the people living in Kalhana. This inequality can be said to be the result of a combination of two factors: the fact that the yurtluk/ocaklik system, based on big landownership, was legalised with the acceptance of private property in land in 1926, and the fact that continuous alienation of land from the direct producers has taken place. The fact that the estates of big landowners consist of numerous fragments of land reveals the fact that many peasants have lost their lands totally or in part to the big landowners. The following list shows to what extent big estates consist of fragmented lands.

TABLE 4.8 Land Fragmentation in Big Estates

NAME OF THE LANDLORD	TOTAL LAND (donums)	NUMBER OF LAND FRAGMENTS
Suat Guldoğan	5,000	88
Memduh GÜldoğan	2,400	68
Havva Guldoğan	1,300	49
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	8,700	205

When we talk about landownership in Kalhana village it will be misleading to take into account only those people who live in the village. The people who have land within the village boundaries should also be taken into consideration. However, even this treatment will not be fully illuminative for an investigation of the relations of production since this would require the study not only of the relations between landlords and the people living in the village and working for the landlords, but also of the relations between the landlord village and the neighbouring peasant villages. The term peasant village is used here to indicate that land distribution among the inhabitants is more or less equal, farmers work on their own land with their own means of production.

The total land within the boundaries of the village is 11,516 dönüms, of which 10,014 dönüms are owned by inhabitants of the village. 1,502 dönüms are owned either by the peasants from neighbouring villages such as Balahur, Balan and Keydanevleri, which are the labour sources for the landlord village, or by the absentee landowners, merchants, usurers

and teachers, etc. The peasants from the neighbouring villages who have land in kalhana work their own land, while the absentee land-owners either give their land to sharecroppers to work, or rent it to a capitalist farmer, or to a peasant family. Even the inclusion of the lands within village boundaries owned both by peasants from the neighbouring villages and by the absentee landlords does not change the general picture of the distribution of the land in the village. Instead it indicates that 8.2 per cent of the landowning households control 84.2 per cent of the total lands owned in the village, while 92.8 per cent of the landowning families control only 15.8 per cent of the total lands owned in the village. These figures reach incredibly inequitable dimensions as we also take into account the number of landless farming families.

TABLE 4.9 Land Ownership within the Village Boundaries

LAND OWNED (donums)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL LAND (donums)	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LAND
1-20	19	38.7	278	2.4
21-50	16	32.7	587	5.1
51-200	10	20.4	951	8.3
201+	4	8.2	9,700	84.2
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	49	100.0	11,516	100.0

Differentiation, not only in landownership, but also in animal ownership, should be taken into consideration in illustrating the indicators of class affiliations. For products derived from stock constitutes a

part of the peasant family's means of reproduction and the main source of livelihood of some households who mainly engage in stock raising. Even a wage labourer family may be able to have one or two sheep or goats etc. to help the reproduction of the family. The raising of stock means different things to different households, depending on their class position.

For a capitalist household it is a business, aimed at enlarging production which is based on the appropriation of the surplus. The production is not in order to meet the consumption needs of the family, but to sell in the market in order to realise a profit, which is used partly to meet the expenses of the capitalist household (mainly for the acquisition of luxury goods), and partly in reinvestment for an extended production, in other words to produce more, and profit more, then reinvest more

For a petty commodity producer family the raising of stock is both a business and a means to reproduce the household, the size of which varies in its demographic cycle over the years. Although production is for the market the petty commodity producer's main concern is the reproduction of the family, not a profit. As to the peasant households, they produce different things, mainly for home consumption. The amount peasant producers sell in the market is determined by the cash needs of the family, as well as the amount saved

It should be pointed out, however, that the above presentation in terms of petty commodity producers and peasants may lead us to the erroneous

conclusion that these two categories are mutually exclusive, whereas in fact in rural areas such as our two villages it is possible to come across families reflecting the features of both the two types we have described here. For instance, in Kalhana there are some families producing cotton for the market and wheat for home consumption, and in Gisdas too there are families producing vegetables and grapes for the market as well as producing wheat and lentils for home consumption.

The same is true in stock raising. There are families raising stock for the market in order to reproduce themselves with the income derived from this, and there are also families raising stock to meet the family's needs, as well as families having a combination of the features of both these types.

ANIMAL OWNERSHIP IN KALHANA

The following table reveals the distribution of cows in Kalhana.

TABLE 4.10 Distribution of Cows in Kalhana

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			COWS OWNED		
	NUMBER	%	CUM.	NUMBER	%	CUM. %
Having no cow	26	59.1	59.1	-	-	-
1 cow	7	15.9	75.0	7	11.3	11.3
2 cows	4	9.1	84.1	8	12.9	24.2
3 cows	3	6.8	90.4	9	14.5	38.7
4+ cows	4	9.1	100.0	38	61.3	100.0
	---	---	---	---	---	---
Total	44	100.0	100.0	62	100.0	100.0

It should be pointed out that the big landlords, who have 38 cows between them, raise stock for the market. Three of the landlords have employed one family to look after their animals. Their arrangements with animal caretakers are something between a wage-labour and a sharecropping arrangement. The case of Arif Başdemir can be taken as an example to illustrate the sort of arrangements made between the landowners and animal caretakers, who are mainly landless peasants.

Arif Başdemir is 47 years old and the father of four children, who do not officially exist, since they have not been registered.²⁰ He was born in a village called Kermukan, of Haden district in Elazığ province. He was not sent to school since there was no school in his village and his being sent to school elsewhere was out of the question as his family could not afford it. For eight years, from the age of 10 until 18, when he was called up by the army, he worked as a shepherd, grazing the herd of a local landlord. Having finished his military service he wanted to get married, which impelled him to seek work in Adana, where capitalist cotton production is dominant, in order to earn money for the üzümlük parası (bride-price). Being very poor, his family could not help him in accumulating the bride-price. In Adana he worked as a tractor driver on a farm, and saved 5,000TL in two years to pay the bride-price. He married when he was 23 and after a period of four years of temporary work as an amele (unskilled worker in building and road construction) he moved to Hızo village to work as a sharecropper for a landlord who owned the whole village, thinking that his standard of living would get better. He came to Kolhanca village with his wife and three children in 1974 to work for the richest farmer, Bekir Bey, who died in 1976.

Arif is now working for Suat Bey, the elder of Bekir Bey's two sons, and his job is to look after Suat Bey's 80 animals, comprising cows, sheep and goats. The one-roomed house in which Arif and his family live, owned by Suat Bey, is provided free of charge. Arif is paid 6,000TL per year in cash and is given a piece of land and some seed to cultivate on his own. However, this is not the case every year. For instance, Arif was complaining that at the beginning of the year Suat Bey gave him 5.5 ölçeks of wheat and 2.5 ölçeks of lentils to cultivate on his own account, but when the harvest time came Suat Bey claimed half of the crop.

Since Arif is indebted to Suat (he had to borrow 5,000TL from Suat's father Bekir Bey when he first moved into the village) and is unable to repay his debt, he is tied to the village. Unless he pays his debt he cannot leave the village. This is in addition to the hopeless job prospects around the town of Ergani which put him off the idea of leaving the village. In order to secure his place on the farm Arif and his family feel obliged to comply with arbitrary orders from Suat Bey, who, for example, would not let Arif work in irrigation for a few days to earn some supplementary cash. Although Arif's job, according to his verbal agreement, is to look after the animals and produce milk, butter and fetch cheese, and to deliver these to the landlord's house in Ergani, he also is asked to carry sacks and load and unload trucks. His children are also asked to fetch water for the landlord's family when they stay in the village for about two months in the summer.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above example is that although animal caretakers may be paid a wage for the job they do, it is very difficult to call the relations between them and the animal owners a capitalist relation of production. It is also difficult to draw a line between a wage labourer and labourers of other kinds (share-croppers, corvée labourers etc) since the same labourer may also be involved in different types of relations of production at the same time

As we mentioned before, the lands of Kalhana are very suitable for the use of agricultural machinery, since they are not stony. We also mentioned that big landlords having close relations with the government officials, and with the help of the state policy to give credits and assistance to wealthy farmers, have obtained agricultural machines which are rented out to the other farmers as well. The renting out mechanism of agricultural machinery gradually decreased the need for oxen to be used as draught animals. The following table reveals the current low number of oxen in the village

TABLE 4.11 Distribution of Oxen in Kalhana

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			OXEN OWNED		
	NUMBER		CUM	NUMBER		CUM
Having no ox	37	84.1	84.1	-	-	-
1 ox	3	6.8	90.0	3	27.2	27.2
2 oxen	4	9.1	100.0	8	72.8	100.0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	44	100.0	100.0	11	100.0	100.0

Only four households have a pair of oxen, and three households have only one ox each. It was understood that the three households with one ox now had a pair in the previous year and had had to dispose of one ox because of various reasons such as the paying of debts, buying consumption goods, medicine, etc. The four pairs of oxen were all owned by sharecroppers who had also been thinking of getting rid of their oxen previously, but had changed their minds in the light of a 100 per cent increase in petrol prices in the summer of 1977. One of them told me "It is a good job that my wife did not let me sell our oxen. The agras were saying that they were going to raise the price of tilling the land by tractor from 30 to 50TL. My goodness! Nobody will be able to have their lands tilled by tractor".

Differentiation among the inhabitants of Kalhana village in terms of sheep and goat ownership is also the same in the case of Gisgis. As is evident from the tables below, 34 households have no sheep and 31 households have no goats. The number of families that have one to three sheep or goats is very small. For instance, only two families have sheep and five families have goats, in the category 1-3 sheep owned. These families are mainly poor families working as casual labourers. They use the milk of sheep and goats in the household and rarely sell dairy produce in the market, as the produce is not enough even to meet the family's needs. Some permanently employed people working as labourers or civil servants also keep sheep and goats for both home consumption and the market. Their wives and children look after the animals they own or sharecrop. The permanent employees are relatively well off since they have a stable income and their

involvement in farming activities simply decreases the cost of living for them. They are subsumed under the categories of the groups of households with 4 to 10 or 11 to 25 sheep or goats.

TABLE 4.12 Distribution of Sheep Owned in Kalhana

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			SHEEP OWNED		
	NUMBER	%	CUM. %	NUMBER	%	CUM. %
Having no sheep	34	77.2	77.2	-	-	-
1-3 sheep	2	4.5	81.7	5	2.1	2.1
4-10 sheep	2	4.5	86.2	12	5.1	7.2
11-25 sheep	3	6.9	93.1	60	25.3	32.5
26+ sheep	3	6.9	100.0	160	67.5	100.0
Total	44	100.0	100.0	237	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4.13 Distribution of Goats Owned in Kalhana

GROUPING OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS			GOATS OWNED		
	NUMBER	%	CUM. %	NUMBER	%	CUM. %
Having no goats	31	70.5	70.5	-	-	-
1-3 goats	5	11.4	81.9	8	5.6	5.6
4-10 goats	4	9	91.0	25	17.6	23.2
11-25 goats	2	4.5	95.5	42	29.6	52.8
26+ goats	2	4.5	100.0	67	47.2	100.0
Total	44	100.0	100.0	142	100.0	100.0

The last category, households with 26 or more sheep or goats, consists of big landlords' families who own 67.5 per cent of the sheep and 47.2 per cent of the goats owned in the village. The aims of big landlord

families in stock raising are not in order to meet the needs of their families, but in order to make more profit. For this reason they employ labourer(s) on a permanent basis to look after their animals. Although only the head of the household is normally employed, the whole family has to comply with the wishes of the landlord, to work without payment, in other words as *corvée* labour. This is due to the competition between the workers and the landless village poor for a permanent income, and to the fear of being dismissed

As we gathered from the case of Arif Başdemir, it is more profitable for the landlords to take advantage of the redundancy of the working force in the rural areas of Southeast Anatolia, and get involved in relations of production that do not have the features of typical capitalist/wage-earner relations as in industry. Instead these relations carry the feature of both non-capitalist relations of production and wage relations.

Donkeys, as in flocks, though not as extensively, are used for the transportation of crops from the field to the house by producers who do not have tractors. There were twenty donkeys in the village during our fieldwork. Those households who have access to land one way or another seemed to be the ones to have donkeys. Most of the landless casual workers did not have a donkey.

As a conclusion to this chapter we can say that the pattern of distribution of land still carries the basic features of the past. Large estates and small peasant holdings still co-exist side by side.

However, the relations of production have changed to a considerable extent, as we shall see in some detail in the following chapters.

The requirements of the capitalist world market and Turkish capitalism have forced the peasant household to engage in the production of commodities (goods and labour), while the large estates have geared their production entirely for the market.

NOTES

1. In the Islamic Ottoman State all lands belonged to the state, and therefore they were called miri lands, (crown lands). For a detailed explanation of miri land see Ömer Lütü Barkan, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş Devrinin Toprak Meseleleri (Land Problems of the Ottoman Empire in the Establishment Period) (1937), "Türkiye'de Toprak Meselelerinin Tarihi Esasları" (Historical Principles of the Land Problem in Turkey). Ulku Dergisi, XI, No. 61, 63, 64 (1938), and XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zırai Ekonominin Hukukı ve Mali Esasları C. I, Kanunlar (Legal and Financial Basis of the Agricultural Economy of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries Vol. I, Laws) (1943).
2. The term dirlik, in its most general sense, is used in the history of the Ottoman state organisation to denote all kinds of sources of income assigned to those who serve the state. However, the term is used here in its strict sense. What we wish to denote by the term dirlik is virtually equal to the timar system, according to which the agricultural surplus is controlled and used, and dirlik therefore means the agricultural source of income of a certain class in the Ottoman Empire. For more detailed information Mustafa Akdağ, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi (Economic History of Turkey) (1971), pp 251-260.
3. Despite the fact that the term timar is used to denote the Ottoman land system as a whole, larger timars were specifically called has and zeamet, and the smallest timar was itself called timar.
4. Koçi Bey Risalesi (Koçi Bey's Essay) (1939), p. 112, gives these divisions, for the three different categories which are described as follows

Has are those dirliks whose yearly income is over 100,000 akçe and which belong to viziers and sultans. See Muzafer Sencer, Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı (Ottoman Social Structure) (n.d.), p. 251.

Zeamets are given to the people of high rank, state officials and successful warriors. The holders of has and zeamet dirliks have to provide the state with one cebellu (cavalryman) for every 5,000 akçe of their income, Aynı Ali Efendi, Taksimat-ı Der Lıvayı Ali Osman (Division of Ottoman Districts) (1964), p. 54, and Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış (A View of Turkish Agricultural History) (1938), p. 36.

Timars whose value are between 3,000 and 20,000 akçe are those dirliks whose holders have to provide the state with one cavalryman for every 3,000 akçe of their income after the first 3,000 akçe, in the case of a war. See Sakir Berkı, Toprak Hukuku (Land Law) (1960), p. 67.

5. Barkan, op. cit. (1943), p. 7.
6. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) Arazi Kanunnamesi" (The Tanzimat and the 1274 (1858) Land Law in the History of Turkish Land Law), in Tanzimat, I, (1940), p. 322.
7. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Çiftçi Sınıflarının Hukuki Statüsü" (Legal Status of the Farming Classes in the Ottoman Empire), Ulku, IX, No. 50 (1937), p. 106.
8. See, for instance, Halil İnalcık, "Land Problems in Turkish History", The Muslim World, XLV (1955), especially p. 224. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1968), pp. 21-40. Çağlar Keyder, "The Dissolution of the Asiatic Mode of Production", Economy and Society, II (1976), pp. 178-196. Huri İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History", Review, I, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 42-53. Mustafa Akdağ, "Tımar Rejiminin Bozuluşu" (Dissolution of the Tımar System), Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, IV (1945).
9. In order to raise the drastically declined state revenues, from the 17th century onwards the Ottoman state started to rent out miri lands to mültezıms who were contractor intermediaries between the central authority and the peasants. This farming out of miri lands to the highest bidder was called iltizam farming (tax farming). According to this system the mültezım collected the traditional agricultural tax of öşr from the peasants in the name of the state. A certain amount of the öşr collected from the peasants was given to the state as rent. For a detailed description of the nature and the extent of tax farming in the Ottoman Empire see M. Genc, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi", (The Tax Farming System in Ottoman Finance) in Osman Ökyar (Ed.), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri (1975), and for the effects of tax farming see Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of the Traditional Society", in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Eds.), Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey (1964), pp. 47-48.
10. Öşr was a tax in kind, equal to one tenth of the annual product. See Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rûsumu" (Ottoman Taxes) Belleken, XXIII, No. 92 (1959), for an extensive description of Ottoman taxes.
11. For a similar argument see Yahya Sezaî Tezel, "Cumhuriyetin Devraldığı Tarım Yapısının Tarihi Oluşumu Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on the Historical Evolution of the Agricultural Structure Inherited by the Republic), Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XXVI, No. 4 (1971), pp. 270-275. See also Keyder, op. cit. (1976), p. 179. Keyder calls this process the "feudalised transformation of the AMP (Asiatic Mode of Production)".
12. Hükümet means "government" in the Turkish language in general, but the administrative units under the control of Kurdish notables were called hükümet in the Ottoman Empire.

13. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi (Ottoman History), II (1964), p. 580.
14. *ibid.*, p. 581.
15. Aynı Ali Efendi, *op. cit.* (1964), p. 58, and Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.* (1964), p. 581.
16. As Lenin analysed the Russian peasantry in V. I. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1964).
17. The name maraba comes from the term rubu, and means "the one who receives one fourth of the crop". For a detailed description of maraba see Chapter V, pp. 256-258.
18. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, Doğunun Sorunları (The Problems of the East) (1966), p. 10.
19. Similar sorts of land seizures and landlord-peasant disputes in other parts of Southeast Anatolia are dealt with by Nur Yalman's article "On Land Disputes in Eastern Turkey" in G. L. Tikku (Ed.), Islam and its Cultural Divergence (1971).
20. It is not common practice to register new-born children, since peasants have nothing to do with the state. Registering a child with the population office requires one of the parents to go personally to the town centre and deal with the officials, who generally do not speak Kurdish. Furthermore, by not registering their children with the state, peasants avoid having to send their daughters to school and their sons to the army; military service is compulsory for boys aged between 20 and 22, and lasts for two years, but the boys' labour is very vital to the peasant household.

CHAPTER V

The household as an economic unit, a unit of reproduction of the peasant family, has responded to the requirements of the larger economy in different ways at different times in the development process of the larger economy. Although the relations of production in which the peasant households were involved have been different at different periods, one thing is certain that the peasant household has been an integral part of the reproduction of the larger economy. This chapter will focus on the relations of production in which the peasant household in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia have been involved from the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923) onwards.

The conditions of peasant production are determined at larger levels (social formation and world economy) by ownership of means of production, market and credit mechanisms etc., but in most cases the actual process of production is organised by the peasant household. Therefore the peasant household, or at least the members of the peasant household, are involved in two sets of relations of production. First, relations of production outside the household, like landlord-peasant relations, and second, the relations of production within the household, such as control of the product of younger members by older members, etc. While this chapter will concentrate on the relations of production outside the household, the following chapter will focus on the relations of production within the household.

Our knowledge pertaining to the relations of production in Eastern Anatolia before the Republic is extremely limited, owing to the fact that there has been virtually no research done on this subject. However, given the backward nature of agricultural technology and production, even in the 1950s we can assume that the relations of production did not change with the declaration of the right of private property in land in 1926. What happened with the acceptance of private property in land was that de facto private ownership in land was confirmed by law, since those who produced an Ottoman tapu (title deed) were accepted as the real owners of the land.

Writing in 1934, I H Tokin states that in the 1930s in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces the land and the other means of production of the peasants were the property of the tribal leaders, beys and ağas (landlords),¹ and despotism lay behind landlordism.² In the provinces of these regions peasants not only cultivated the land they also lived on the land of the bey and served as corvée labour. Peasants had to do all sorts of things ordered by the landlord, (ağa, bey, etc.) as if it was their duty. If they refused to accept orders the ağa would either expel them or torture them,³ or would hand them over to the police for having committed a crime.⁴

In the 1950s the peasants who worked on the landlords' land were called maraba or azab. The maraba was a direct producer who obtained a share of what he produced. Although in some places the maraba may have had his own land he could not benefit from it. This was because either his land was not fertile or he was indebted to the ağa. In

most cases the maraba did not own any means of production, the ağa owned both the land and the implements, and the maraba only had one rubu (one fourth of the crops). With regard to azabs, they may be said to be agricultural labourers. The nature of relations of production engaged in by the azabs was described by Aras in the 1950s.

Agricultural labourers in Southeast Anatolia are generally devoid of both land and capital. In other words they are poor people without any house or farm. For this reason the whole family prefers to take shelter on a farm than to find a temporary wage job. They would undertake the work given to them as a family (male, female and child members who are able to work will work together).⁵

Aras suggests that rural workers took the form of family labourers rather than individual labourers. This was very convenient for the landlords, who faced difficulties in finding a labour force. According to Aras this form of wage labour should not be confused with sharecropping. However, azabs were more or less temporary wage labourers who were employed by the landlords under arrangements which were similar to sharecropping arrangements. Azabs would not only work in agricultural work, but would also serve personally the landlord who supplied them with board and lodging.⁶ They were generally paid in kind, and sometimes they were allowed to cultivate a small plot of land on their own account, using the implements of the landlord, in lieu of receiving any payment. This way of cultivating the land on the worker's own account was called ıkramıye (bonus) or şekere in the local dialect.

There were two kinds of azab. For instance, in Urfa province of Southeast Anatolia (one of the neighbouring provinces of Diyarbakır)

there were (1) sonbahar azabı (autumn azab), employed from the end of the harvest time (September) until April. He would prepare the land for cultivation and sow the seed. As a wage he would be given a plot of 10 donums and eight timins⁶ of wheat seed. Sometimes two timins of this ikramiye may be barley. The azab sowed his ikramiye by using the farm equipment. The grain part of the harvest was divided into two equal shares, one for the landlord and the other for the azab. Some landlords would even ask for a further eighth of the harvest as the rent for the land. (11) ılkbahar azabı (spring azab), employed for three months, starting in the beginning of April, in fallow works. He would be paid in cash, as well as being given board and lodging during his stay on the farm.⁷

There also existed a similar type of employment of workers in the Diyarbakır area, which was called sıkarte. Here too, in order to tie the seasonal and permanent worker families to the farm landlords would give them a plot of land, and some seed to cultivate on their own account. For instance, one worker would be given 240 kilos of wheat to sow on a plot of land provided by the landlord in return for his services over a period of nine months. The harvest was considered to be equal to 500 kilos of wheat and 500 kilos of barley, which was equal to the nine months' payment. The amount of sowing seed given to a three-month worker was 160 kilos of wheat.⁸

Apart from the above-mentioned arrangements other kinds of sharecropping arrangements existed in the area. Writing in the 1950s Aras tells us about the variety of sharecropping arrangements in Southeast

Anatolia. The following account of these arrangements is based on Aras' work.⁹

(a) Yarıcılık This is the basis of sharecropping the landowner gives land, building and seed, in some cases also working capital if the peasant is unable to operate his land otherwise, and this debt is repaid either in cash or in kind, according to their verbal agreement. Other production expenses are the sharecropper's responsibility. Produce is divided into two equal parts, without first extracting the seed which had been provided initially. If the sharecropper is given any animal fodder during the year this must be paid back after the harvest.

(b) Icare In this mode of operations all expenditure for production belongs to the sharecropper except for land and building. This differs from yarıcılık as to the share of production expenditure since the producer is not given seed by the landowner. Thus the landowner's contact with the land is reduced. The producer is free as regards the seed which will be sown and agricultural method which will be implemented. Because of these features icare comes between tenancy and sharecropping. The share of the landowner varies between one fifth and one tenth in the icare mode. The lands which are given under the conditions of icare are generally poor and infertile. The land-tax is paid by the landowner, who sometimes takes one twentieth of the produce as the "right of title-deed". Since there is no written agreement the landowner can expel a peasant from his land. Icare exists mostly in the North of Eastern Anatolia.

(c) Carıyek (quarter or one fourth) This mode of operation is a kind of combination of yarıcılık and icare. Half the seed and equipment is provided by the landowner and the other half is provided by the sharecropper. Any other expenditure for production is provided by the sharecropper but the land tax is paid by the landowner. One fourth of production is given to the landowner, another fourth is given to the sharecropper, one sixteenth is the rent of the land and the rest is divided into two equal parts for the landowner and sharecropper. This mode of operation is not widespread, and is mostly found around Diyarbakır.

(d) Marabacılık In this mode all means of production belong to the landowner. The maraba lives only by his own strength. Each maraba is given 100 donums of land to cultivate, one third or one fourth of production is given to the maraba but no share is given from straw. The maraba also has to act as a servant to the landowner.

Despite the variety in types of arrangements between the direct producers and the landlords, one thing that emerges is that in both azab arrangements and sharecropping arrangements the peasant's household is the basic unit of production. The household, in order to reproduce itself, takes part in various relations of production. It is the level of development of the productive forces which enforce the above-mentioned relations between the landlords and the peasants. Due to the low population density in the area the landlords, who also held political power, mostly resorted to force to keep the peasants on their lands.¹⁰

Following the establishment of the Republic it is understood that the economy was still to a large extent a closed agricultural economy, based on self-sufficiency, with very few relations with the market. Furthermore, in 1927 only 5 to 6.5 per cent of Turkey's total land area was under cultivation. For this reason Turkish agriculture, especially that of Central Anatolia, is called "oasis" type by P Zhukovsky.¹¹ In a report presented to the Agricultural Congress in 1931 the general backwardness of the country's agriculture was described, and it was stated that the relation of the peasants to the market was only tied to the purchase of necessary consumption goods, such as sugar, paraffin, tea and coffee.¹² However, I H Tokin points out that despite the dominance of a self-sufficient closed economy in Eastern, Southeastern and some parts of Central Anatolia, in Western and coastal parts of Anatolia, which had continuous relations with the world market and which were equipped with railway networks, the producers produced not for their own consumption but for the market.¹³

In the period 1923 to 1950 not only small farms, but also large farms, were technologically backward. Large holdings used only 5 to 10 per cent of their lands as cultivable fields, the rest being used for pasture.¹⁴ It was not until the 1950s that Turkish agriculture underwent a tremendous structural change. This was mainly due to the priority given to agriculture in Turkey's development attempts at the time. The number of tractors and combine harvesters increased drastically. For instance, the number of tractors in Turkey rose from 17,000 in 1950 to 42,000 in 1960, 116,100 in 1971 and 243,000 in 1975.¹⁵

With the state's help, middle and large landowners started to use agricultural machinery on their farms and to expel the sharecroppers from their lands. Y Kanbolat summarises the consequences of the mechanisation of agriculture in Turkey as follows.

(a) The enlargement of the cultivated area Previously uncultivated parts of middle-sized and big holdings (which could be as large as 95 per cent of the total farm) became available for cultivation with the use of machinery. Stony parts, unsuitable for the use of machinery, were allocated for the use of sharecroppers. In this way middle-sized and large farms were converted into modern farms operating with machinery. An abundance of credit enabled some big landlords to accumulate capital and to seek to enlarge their holdings, either by way of renting new lands, or by annexing the state owned pasture lands to their own holdings.¹⁶ The statistical figures available prove Kanbolat's point to be true. Cultivable lands rose from 6,628,000 hectares in 1928 to 13,900,000 hectares in 1948, 22,161,000 hectares in 1957 and 23,836,000 hectares in 1962.¹⁷

(b) The application of modern means of production This increased the productivity of the labour force so that whereas only two or three donums of land could be tilled in one day using a pair of oxen, with a tractor 70 donums of land could be tilled in one day.

(c) The production of commercial crops This gained importance and areas used for this purpose were enlarged.¹⁸

(d) Rise of unemployed peasants As a result of mechanisation in agriculture the number of unemployed people had risen. The sharecroppers were freed from the means of production - the land - and had to sell their labour,¹⁹ in conditions of shrinking demand for labour.

Nevertheless, despite the above indicated changes experienced by the Turkish agrarian sector the household as an economic unit, a unit of reproduction of the peasant family, has stubbornly, as it were, persisted in Southeast Anatolia. Largely due to its adaptability to the new situations it has encountered throughout these changes the peasant household has remained a vital factor in the functioning of the rural economy of the region. This was partially due to the wider integration of the region into the Turkish social formation which helped bring about the play of new factors like marketing and credit mechanisms. The conditions of these market forces and credit mechanisms are, of course, determined at the national and international levels and will be discussed in some detail in later chapters. At this stage it suffices to note that the specific structures generated by such factors affected the already existing duality in landholdings in such a way as to consolidate it. As a result, the peasant household has remained the basic unit of production, as can be seen from the following discussion.

Relations of production vary in Eastern Anatolia according to the nature of the farm in which they occur. Different sets of relations of production occur in small family farms and in big semi-capitalist farms respectively. By semi-capitalist farm we refer to a large estate, the main object of which is to accumulate capital, and in

which various forms of labour are used, such as wage labour, seasonal labour, unpaid labour, etc. In a capitalist production unit the main components are the capitalists, who are the owners of the means of production, and the wage-labourers, freed from all the property ties. The relation between these two are of an economic nature, based on a contract. However, in the big estates of Eastern Anatolia the relations between the workers and the owners of the estate are not purely economic relations. In some cases other types of relations, such as debt peonage, patron-client relations, etc. may also be involved. Of course, in some cases the relations between workers and landlords may also take pure economic forms.

In order to illuminate the relations of production in Gısgıs and Kalhana we shall attempt to describe the relations of production both outside and within household economic units, based on data collected in our fieldwork. We shall then try to show the relations and interactions between the two sets of relations. It must be stated, however, that the analysis we are about to undertake is mainly relevant for those families who have access to land and it is divided into two chapters relations outside the household being discussed in this chapter.

RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION OUTSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD

Given the uncertain employment possibilities outside agriculture peasants always try to have access to a piece of land from which they can earn a living, or at least part of a living. If they do

not have any or sufficient land to secure their livelihood they engage in various relations of production. Wage labouring, sharecropping and tenancy are the main types of relations the peasants may engage in.²⁰ The members of the household may engage in all of these relations of production either at the same time or in different periods of the year. Sharecropping is widespread amongst peasant households around Ergani, and the data pertaining to land use in the two villages under consideration will illustrate this point.

LAND USE IN GISGIS

To answer the question of what forms land use takes in Gisgis let us have a look at the following table

TABLE 5.1 Land Use in Gisgis

LAND USE	NUMBER OF DONUMS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Cultivated by the owner	4,111	77.5
Given to sharecroppers	1,082	20.4
Uncultivated	113	2.1
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	5,306	100.0

It should be pointed out that the uncultivated lands are mostly very small fragments of land, the cultivation of which would not be beneficial at all, and some uncultivated lands are extremely stony or hilly.

It is evident from Table 4.1 (in Chapter IV) that at least 81.1 per cent of the families do not have enough land to reproduce themselves. Sufficiency of land for the reproduction of the family, of course, will depend on the fertility of the land, size of the family, level of development of the productive forces, etc. There are, therefore, major difficulties involved in defining the amount of necessary land for the reproduction of the family. For instance, the answer given to the question "How much land do you think is necessary for a decent life?" revealed that it was very difficult to arrive at a common consensus among the peasants. It became evident that "a decent life" was itself a vague concept, because it meant different levels of standard of living to different people with different expectations.

Nevertheless, families with 50 donums of land or more were considered relatively well off in the village. Therefore, 31 families (18.9 per cent of the total) may be said to have had enough land for their reproduction cycle according to Table 4.1. The remaining households have to look for supplementary income. If they want to derive some supplementary income from farming they have to either engage in sharecropping arrangements or work as agricultural workers, or both. However, the limited possibilities of finding work as an agricultural labourer or as a labourer in the vicinity of the village or in the town forces peasants to enlarge their holdings by resorting to sharecropping arrangements, and so to seek a living by engaging in farming.

From the table below it can be seen that the less the amount of land owned, the more peasants are inclined to seek work outside farming. For instance, only 20 per cent of the landless families engage in farming, whereas 83.9 per cent of families with 51 dönums or more engage in farming.

TABLE 5.2 Farming Families by Land Owned

LAND OWNED (dönüms)	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	NUMBER OF FARM- ING FAMILIES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Landless	40	8	20.0
1-10	33	16	48.5
11-20	12	6	50.0
21-50	48	39	81.3
51+	31	26	83.9

Those landless families who cannot find work outside agriculture work as sharecroppers. Two aspects of sharecropping seem to be important. First, with the land obtained through sharecropping arrangements the size of the holding comes closer to the amount which will render more productive use of labour, draught animals and tools, and therefore increase the household income, second, through sharecropping arrangements a part of the product of the direct producer is appropriated by the owner of the land. Generally, in sharecropping arrangements the landlord provides the seed and the land, and the sharecropper works the land with his draught animals and tools, using family labour. The crop is shared on a fifty-fifty basis, and the straw is also equally shared between the landowners and the sharecroppers.

In most cases the sharecropper is also responsible for the transportation of the landlord's share from the field to the landlord's house. This is done using donkeys as a means of transport. If the landlord is resident in the village or in the neighbouring villages the sharecropper or his son would take the crop to the landlord's house. If the landlord is absentee and lives in the town the crop would be transported on the only lorry, which transports goods and crops as well as passengers, between the town centre and the village. The cost of transportation may be shared by the landlord, depending on their verbal agreement.

If the landowner himself is a farmer he may ask his sharecropper to help him for a few days in his farming. Although this is not a very widespread practice, knowing that to refuse help to the landlord would mean the loss of access to land, sharecroppers comply with the requests of the landlord. This kind of practice occurs more widely in the villages where big landownership is dominant and access to land is more difficult, the case of Kalhana village can be given as an example.

Land fragmentation makes it extremely uneconomical to cultivate the land. That is why some of the families with little land seek work outside agriculture, (see Table 3.8 in Chapter III) which leaves their lands available for sharecroppers. However, those who cannot find work outside agriculture remain as dwarf farmers, seeking a supplementary income which in some cases is obtained through sharecropping. The following cross-tabulation of land ownership with

sharecropping shows the relations between the amount of land owned and the amount of land sharecropped by the families in Gisgis

TABLE 5.3 Landownership by Sharecropping in Gisgis

LAND SHARECROPPED (donums)		LAND OWNED (donums)					TOTAL
		NIL	1-10	11-20	21-50	51+	
None	(1)	32	23	7	33	23	118
1-10	(2)	2	4	2	6	-	14
11-20	(3)	2	3	3	5	-	13
21-50	(4)	4	3	-	4	8	19
51+	(5)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total No. of Families	(6)	40	33	12	48	31	164
Total No. of Sharecropping Families	(7)	8	10	5	15	8	46
Total No. of Farming Families	(8)*	8	16	6	39	26	95
Ratio (7) (8)		100%	62.5%	83.5%	38.5%	30.8%	48.4%
Ratio (8) (6)		20%	48.5%	50.0%	81.3%	83.9%	57.9%

* This column is derived from Table 5.2

It can be seen from the above table that there is a negative correlation between landownership and sharecropping. For example, all of the landless farming families have sharecropping arrangements (100 per cent), while only 30.8 per cent of the farming families with 51 or more donums have sharecropping arrangements. The fact that the percentage of sharecropping families within the range of 11 to 20 donums category is higher than the percentage of families in the category of 1 to 10 donums seems to be contradictory to our claim that there is a negative

correlation between landownership and sharecropping. This may be explained by the fact that the less land people have the less likely it is that they will stay as farmers. (See Table 5.3, line 10).

Furthermore, there is not much difference between having no land and, say, about 5 donums. That is to say, a piece of land as small as 10 donums would not yield an income sufficient to maintain a family, and furthermore, most of the peasants with 10 donums or less do not have a pair of oxen to enable them to cultivate more land. Landowners would not give their lands to someone without any draught animals. Those with 20 donums are more likely to stay as farmers, and to have at least one ox or a pair of oxen, than those with no land or very little. From the landowner's point of view a family with a pair of oxen is more desirable than one without any. Therefore, peasants with 10 to 20 donums and a pair of oxen are much more likely to find land to sharecrop than those with less land and only one ox.

LAND USE IN KALHANA

Compared to the lands within the boundaries of Gısgis, the lands in Kalhana are more fertile and are used to their full extent. There are no stony fields in Kalhana. The following table gives us a picture of land use in the village in terms of whether the land is worked by its owner or is sharecropped or rented out.

TABLE 5.4 Land Use in Kalhana

LAND USE	NUMBER OF DONUMS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Cultivated by the owner	9,031	78.4
Given to sharecroppers	1,865	16.2
Rented out	620	5.4
Uncultivated	-	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	11,516	100.0

The category "cultivated by the owner" consists of the lands of both big farms and small farms, the latter being the more numerous. The sharecropping category includes those lands given to the sharecroppers both by the big farmers and by absentee landowners. The third category comprises land rented out by the owner. The difference between the sharecropping and renting categories lies in the nature of the arrangements made between the owner and the tenants. In the sharecropping category the landowner shares the risk of the investment in case of crop failure, since his share consists of half of the crop in return for seeds and the field provided by him, and he also has the right to interfere in decision-making. The share, therefore, that he receives as payment in kind may be termed "absolute ground rent". As to the renting of land, although it is not a very widespread practice in Southeastern Anatolia, as it is in the Çukurova and Aegean regions, the landowner lets the farmer use his land for a certain period of time, usually one year, in return for a certain fixed payment in cash. He is not concerned with the production

process, nor with the yield of the crop. The farmer who rents land has to find the seed himself, and has to bear the total loss in case of crop failure. The rent the owner receives may be called "capitalist ground rent", in the sense that Marx uses the term in Capital Volume III.²¹

Although the existence of rented land is considered an indication of capitalist farming, the non-existence, or rather non-dominance of land-renting of this kind does not exclude capitalist development in agriculture. The existence of capitalism in agriculture should not be reduced to the existence of certain elements such as wage labour, renting land for rent in cash, etc. What should be done in the study of capitalism in agriculture is to try to establish the extent to which capital dominates labour. Capitalism in agriculture can make use of labour other than wage labour, as is shown by Banaji in the case of India, and by some others in the case of Latin America.²²

We pointed out that giving land to sharecroppers and renting land out differed from each other in Eastern and Southeast Anatolia, and the reasons for giving land to sharecroppers varies according to the nature of the village where the land is. With the danger of over-generalising we may conclude that in the villages where there is no excessively unequal land distribution the reasons may be (i) the land is too small for a family to sustain itself and so they have found an alternative source of income, (ii) in order not to divide a farm into marginally small pieces relatives may decide to let one family cultivate the land on a sharecropping basis, (iii) the

landowner may be engaged in a permanent and more remunerative job,
(iv) the landowner may not be fit enough to work his land himself.

In landlord villages, however, where large farms are dominant in the village, the landowners give their lands to sharecroppers because it is more beneficial for them in the long run. In this way landowners tie the peasants to the land in order to reduce their expenditure on labour during peak seasons. Our two villages can be given as examples of these two trends. We have seen the case of Gisgis previously, now we shall examine the case of Kalhana concerning sharecropping.

In Kalhana the main crops are, in order of importance, cotton, wheat and lentils. They are produced for the market as cash crops by the big farmers. Cotton production especially, and to a lesser degree lentil production, require a high number of workers at harvest time. To find workers in the peak season is very difficult and costly. As we have seen in Table 4.7, 36 households out of the total 46 households in Kalhana village (78.3 per cent) are landless. Although the prospects of finding jobs in the towns are very poor, there is no reason for the landless poor to stay in the village, apart from the nearness of the village to the town centre. The solution the landlords have found to the prospect of a shortage of labour is to tie the landless poor to the land by giving them access to the land. This is done by means of sharecropping arrangements which are considered beneficial by both landlords and the rural poor alike.

From the point of view of the rural poor, the sharecropping arrangement provides a basic source of income and sometimes even a place in the village to live in, if they come from elsewhere. Furthermore, since the amount of land sharecropped does not necessitate the year-round labour of the household in order to cultivate it, some male members of the family, in many cases the household head, also are able to leave the village to seek a supplementary income, working the land and working as cotton pickers at harvest time.

It is also beneficial from the landlord's point of view, in the long run, to give some land, especially the relatively infertile parts, to landless poor or to poor peasants with little land, for this leaves a considerably high number of potential workers in the village, at the same time as it enables them to a certain extent to impose their will on the sharecroppers. For instance, they give their lands to those who guarantee a certain number of people, including women and children, to work in the peak seasons as cotton pickers, who are normally paid in kind. Such a worker could not earn more than the equivalent of 40TL per day, while a day-labourer would get about 150 to 200TL per day. This is because such workers are entitled to one twentieth of the cotton they pick instead of a wage. On average a worker can pick 60 to 70 kilos of cotton per day, which leaves him with between 3 and 3.5 kilos of cotton. The price of cotton on the market was 10TL per kilo in 1977, which means that such a worker could earn as little as 30 to 35TL per day. Furthermore, most of the cotton pickers are unable to market their share of the cotton, thus being obliged to sell at a lower price (8 to 8.5TL per kilo)

either to cotton merchants or to others able to take the cotton to the head office of Çukobirlik in Elazığ. In Kalhana only big landowners are able to transport their cotton to Elazığ, which is 100 kilometres from the village.

From the above it appears that landowners not only benefit from the cheap labour force kept in the village, through sharecropping arrangements, but they also reduce their expenditure on the labour force by paying in kind and also taking advantage of the inabilities of the workers to market the goods they have earned. However, if we take a sharecropping arrangement on its own and try to calculate the landowner's benefit or loss in comparison with the situation where he cultivates the land on his own account, we end up with the conclusion that the landlord may incur a loss in absolute terms. Let us take a look at the following example.

Since the landlords give lands of 10 to 50 dönüms to sharecroppers we thought it would be appropriate to base our example on a 20 dönüm piece of land. The village headman provides us with our example, and the figures were arrived at by careful calculations made together with the headman. Our example in no way constitutes an absolute example, valid for every other sharecropping arrangement, nor is it an absolute representation of various sharecropping transactions taking place in Southeast Anatolia. For the cost of production will vary from field to field, depending on the fertility of the soil, the nature of the inputs, (fertiliser, labour, etc) and on the equipment used. However, we thought that an example of this sort would help to indicate whether sharecropping arrangements are more beneficial to

the landowners or not, when taken in isolation from the other involvements surrounding it

The village headman is a landless peasant who earns his livelihood sharecropping about 200 donums of land consisting of several fragments. Admittedly, 200 donums is unusually high for a sharecropper to have access to, but being the headman of the village places him in an advantageous position. This is due to the fact that in order to obtain fertiliser from the Agricultural Office, or credit from the Agricultural Bank, the confirmation of the village headman is required. For these reasons landlords favour him in giving him lands for sharecropping, and they also use him in recruiting wage labourers. So much for the headman's relations with the landlords, let us now come to the point.

Muhtar Seydo,²³ the village headman, rents a tractor to till the land and a combine harvester for the harvest. In Kalhana 20 donums of land are sown with 10 ölçeks of wheat (1 ölçek of wheat equals 35 kilos of wheat). At the time of our calculations one kilo of wheat was 2.90TL, so for 20 donums of land 350 kilos of wheat, costing 1,015TL were sown. Rented tractors would cost 30TL per donum to till the land, so the total cost of tilling 20 donums would be 600TL. A combine harvester would cost 25TL per donum, giving a total of 500TL for 20 donums, and the total cost of fertiliser would be 600TL, on the basis of a requirement of 300 kilos of artificial fertiliser for 20 donums at a cost of 2TL per kilo in 1977. The productivity of the wheat varies between threefold in poor soils to tenfold in good soils

in Kalhana. Muhtar Seydo informed me that the field in question would never yield more than sevenfold, so we thought it would be appropriate to take a yield of sixfold for our example. Accordingly, the total harvest would be 2,100 kilos bringing a total return, gross, of 6,090TL. Transport costs were 10 kuruş per kilo (100 kuruş make 1TL) so the total cost of transport to the state-owned buying station, Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Office of Soil Products) amounts to 210TL. We should also add 200TL for the cost of loading and unloading, to the total costs.

The total costs are thus	Seed	1,015TL
	Tilling	600TL
	Harvesting	500TL
	Fertiliser	600TL
	Transport	410TL
		<hr/>
	Total	3,125TL
		<hr/>

From the sale of 2,100 kilos of wheat at the price of 2.90TL per kilo a total of 6,090TL would be secured, and the nett income from this is thus 2,975TL for the landlord.

In the case of sharecropping, the landlord only has to supply seed and half of the fertiliser, that means a capital outlay of 1,315TL (1,015TL for seed, 300TL for the fertiliser). He will also have to bear half the cost of transport, i.e. 205TL, so that his total expenditure will be 1,520TL and the remaining costs are borne by the tenant, i.e. a total of 1,605TL. In the end the two parties will receive half of the total selling price, i.e. 3,045TL each. The

landlord's total profit is therefore 1,525TL. Definitely this figure is considerably less than the 2,175TL figure. In absolute terms the landlord seems to be on the losing end of the sharecropping arrangement. However, this is not the case if the benefits brought by the other aspects of sharecropping are taken into consideration, namely the fact that sharecropping arrangements render it possible for a huge labour force to stay in the village and enable landlords to take advantage of this labour force in the several ways described previously.

It was not possible to make a cross-tabulation to show the relationship between landownership and sharecropping, as we have done in the case of Gısgis, owing to the fact that the sharecroppers in Kalhana, with the exception of two households, did not own any land at all. The amount of land owned by the two exceptional families hardly warrants their being called landowners one of the families has four donums, while the other has ten. In the following list we give the names of the household heads and the amount of land sharecropped by them

TABLE 5.5 Sharecroppers and Sharecropped Land in Kalhana

NAME OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD	AMOUNT OF LAND SHARECROPPED	AMOUNT OF LAND OWNED
Seydi KAVAL	200 dönüms	4 donüms
Mustafa CETİN	400 "	nil
Omer CİVELİK	30 "	nil
Ramazan KAVAL	50 "	nil
Hüseyin İSLANOĞLU	70 "	10 donüms
Halil YOLDAŞ	20 "	nil
Izzet GUÇLU	100 "	nil
Fahim GUÇLU	30 "	nil
Halil ERGİN	25 "	nil
Recep ERGİN	20 "	nil

Three families seem to have very large amounts of land to sharecrop. Seydi Kaval is the village headman, and because of his position he is favoured by the landlords. As to the other two, namely Mustafa Çetin and İzzet Güçlü, the lands they sharecrop are mostly in other parts of the district, rather than in the village itself. Since they are both tractor owners, (Mustafa Çetin is sole owner of his tractor, while İzzet Güçlü is co-owner of his tractor, with some of his relatives), they are in a favourable position for access to the lands of absentee landowners who prefer to have their lands cultivated with agricultural machinery and modern technology, rather than by the use of draught animals and more backward methods. Most of the other sharecroppers sharecrop the lands of three big landlords in the village. Ten households work as sharecroppers in the village, that is 21.7 per cent of the total village households.

Sharecropping arrangements are not the only way to keep the labour force in the village. As we stated before, 36 families are landless in the village, 8 of which work as sharecroppers. What about the rest of the landless people? Why should they stay in the village? As we shall see in Chapter IX the rate of migration out of the village is very high. Those remaining in the village are both natives of the village and peasants from other areas, who have settled in the village. Although some of the settlers do not have any access to land they do at least have somewhere to shelter. They are the poor of other villages who could not survive in their home villages. To migrate to the towns would bring them greater misery and suffering. Seasonal job prospects in the village, as agricultural workers, and

the closeness of the village to the town centre, are the main driving forces behind the applications of rural proletarians to the big landlords for shelter on their farms. In the village centre all the big landlords have some sort of accommodation, one or two roomed houses, built of mud bricks (kerpic). A whole family may live in the same room with their animals. The prospect of whether or not a family will remain in the village depends upon their relations with the landlord. The head of a settler family may go to the town centre or Elaziğ to seek a job, mainly in building construction, while the rest of the family work in the cotton fields.

SHARECROPPING IN ANIMAL BREEDING AND CARETAKING

Sharecropping in both animal breeding and animal caretaking has been practised in Eastern Anatolia for a long time. Giving animals to sharecroppers for breeding and raising is practised in two different ways either it is implemented together with land sharecropping or it is practised on its own. (The latter type being mainly practised by nomadic families who tend flocks of sheep and goats as sharecroppers).

Sharecropping agreements are of a verbal nature, based on mutual personal trust. Arrangements are made for a certain period of time, the minimum period being three years, while the maximum varies according to the arrangements made between the owner and the sharecropper. The period usually starts in September, or at the end of the lactation period, and finishes in the same month after the agreed number of years has elapsed. The terms of sharecropping arrangements

vary according to the place, type of animal, age of animals and the conditions of the two parties involved. Below, we shall attempt to point out some widespread forms of sharecropping arrangements prevalent in Diyarbakir province in Southeast Anatolia, from observations made during our fieldwork. This classification, it should be pointed out, is in no sense exhaustive.

(a) Sharecropping in young animals Lambs, calves and kids, under one year old but no longer lactating, are given to sharecroppers to look after them until their first birth-giving year. The sharecropper is entitled to use the first year's milk, and at the end of the lactation season the whole lot, including breeding animals and their young, are divided into two equal shares. The sharecropper is also expected to bear all the costs of raising and maintaining the animals

(b) Sharecropping in sheep and goat breeding Two types of arrangements are apparent 1) a number of animals whose ages are recorded are given to a sharecropper for three years. The sharecropper gives 8 kilos of cheese and 8 kilos of butter for every 10 sheep or goats giving a live birth. If, according to their agreement, the sharecropper is to give only butter, in that case the amount is 1 kilo of butter for each animal giving a live birth. The total sum obtained from the sale of male lambs, old animals, goat's hair and wool is shared by the owner and the sharecropper on a fifty-fifty basis. The total costs of breeding and maintaining the animals are borne by the sharecropper. At the end of the three years the same number of animals with the same ages as the sharecropper was provided with at

the beginning is taken out from the herd by the owner, then the rest is shared equally. In this way the number of animals given to the sharecropper as capital is a fixed number, and any decrease is out of the question. Any loss in the fixed capital has to be compensated by the sharecropper. This form of sharecropping arrangement is highly risky for the sharecropper, who is in danger of losing even his own animals in the event of disease, or other natural disasters.

11) the owner hands over a certain number of animals to the sharecropper on the condition that the sharecropper owes the owner a certain amount of money, fixed according to the existing market prices of the animals in question. As in the first type, the amount of cheese and butter to be provided by the sharecropper is stated in the verbal agreement. The money obtained from the sale of male lambs, ewes, goat's hair and wool is taken by the owner without being shared, in payment of the original debt. When the value of the capital is totally paid up the sharecropper becomes entitled to have half of the herd. Any loss or damages is met by both sides, unless it is due to the negligence of the sharecropper, and any other expenses are met by the sharecropper.

Apart from these two forms of sharecropping arrangements it is possible to find a third type of arrangement, which is not as widespread as the first two. In this type of arrangement two sides attempt a sharecropping arrangement by providing capital animals (sheep and goats) at a certain ratio. The side which undertakes the care of the animals is considered to be the sharecropper. The herd comprises a number of animals provided by the owner and by the sharecropper at a

ratio of two to one. Expenses are met by the sharecropper, the owner is given one nugu' (640 grams) of butter for each animal which gives a live birth. The income derived from any sales is shared equally between the two sides. At the end of the third year of the arrangement the herd is divided into two between the two sides if they wish to end their arrangement.

(c) Sharecropping in cattle raising There are several sharecropping arrangements in cattle raising, similar to the ones in sheep raising. The following prominent types can be distinguished. First, the cattle to be given to the sharecropper are evaluated in money terms and the sharecropper agrees to pay half of the amount evaluated as his debt. All the expenses pertaining to the upkeep and raising of the animals are borne by the sharecropper. Two to 8 kilos of butter, depending on the milk productivity of the animal, is given to the owner for each animal giving a live birth. At the end of the agreed three years capital animals and their young are shared equally between the two sides. Second, the sharecropping arrangements take place by combining the cattle of the two sides to the agreement. As is the case in sheep sharecropping, the owner provides two cows for each one from the sharecropper, and the rest of the conditions pertaining to the agreement are the same as those mentioned for sheep sharecropping. Third, a three year old cow (which has previously produced young) is given to the sharecropper in the autumn. The sharecropper looks after the calves born from the capital animals until they are three years old and gives one three year old cow for each of the capital animals to the owner, the rest being shared

equally. The owner gets four kilos of butter for each cow which gives a live birth. This type of sharecropping is called dolaşma (literally going round) among the peasants.

From the above analyses we can conclude that despite the changes in the relations of production in which the peasants are involved over a period of time, the peasant household as a unit of production has remained the same. This is despite the fact that the relations of production in which members of a peasant household are engaged vary from different types of sharecropping arrangements to wage labour relationships. For, while the large estates try to increase productivity by using machinery, thereby releasing most of their ex-sharecroppers, the peasant household, in order to reproduce itself, is forced to seek supplementary income. This is possible, because the division of labour within the peasant household allows its male members to go out to work for a period of time. a situation that will be examined in the next chapter.

NOTES

- 1 İsmail Hüsrev Tokin, Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı (Village Economics of Turkey) (1934), p. 176
2. *ibid.*, p. 177
3. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, Doğunun Sorunları (Problems of the East) (1966), p. 10
4. Tokin, *op. cit.* (1934), p. 178.
5. Ali Aras, Güneydoğu Anadolu'da Arazi Mülkiyeti ve İşletme Şekilleri (Types of Landownership and Agricultural Management in Southeast Anatolia) (1956), pp. 24-25)
6. One tıman equals 24 kilos of wheat.
7. Aras, *op. cit.* (1956), p. 25.
8. *ibid* , p. 25.
9. *ibid.*, pp. 59-62.
10. Bozarslan, *op cit* (1966), p. 10.
- 11 P Zhukovsky, Türkiye'nin Zırası Būnyesi (Agricultural Structure of Turkey) (1951), pp. 128 and 131.
12. Tokin, *op. cit.* (1934), *op.* 22-23.
- 13 *ibid.*, p 29.
14. Kâzım Koçlu, Türkiye'de Büyük Arazi Mülkleri ve Bunların İşletme Şekilleri (Big Landed Estates and their Management in Turkey) (1947), *op.* 120-121
15. State Institute of Statistics, Summary of Agricultural Statistics, the relevant years.
- 16 Yahya Kanbolat, Türkiye Ziraatında Būnye Değişikliği (Structural Change in Turkish Agriculture) (1963), pp. 23-24.
17. State Institute of Statistics, Summary of Agricultural Statistics (1967).
- 18 Kanbolat, *op. cit.* (1963), p. 24.
19. *ibid* , p 42.

20. Norman Long points out a similar trend in Peru; see Norman Long, "Structural Dependency, Modes of Production and Economic Brokerage in Rural Peru", in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, David Booth (eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development (1975), pp. 270-271.

21. See Karl Marx, Capital, III (1974).

22. For India see Jairus Banaji, "Capitalist Domination and the Small Peasantry Deccan District in the Late Nineteenth Century", in Economic and Political Weekly, XII, Nos. 33-34.

 For Latin America see Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (eds.), Land and Labour in Latin America: The Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1977), especially the articles by Cristobal Kay, "The Development of the Chilean Hacienda System, 1850-1973", Juan Martinez-Alier, "Relations of Production in Andean Haciendas: Peru", Ciro Cardoso, "The Formation of the Coffee Estate in Nineteenth-Century Costa Rica", and Michael Taussig, "The Evolution of Rural Wage Labour in Cauca Valley of Colombia, 1700-1970".

23. The village headman is called Muhtar Seydo (Headman Seydo), or Topal Seydo (Lame Seydo) by the villagers, although his real name is Seydi Kaval.

CHAPTER VI

The very nature of the organisation of production in the peasant household enables the larger structure (urban capitalism) to take advantage of the surplus labour created by the extensive use of female labour. It is this female labour which makes it possible for a part of the household labour force to be released from the production which takes place in the household economy. In turn, the larger structure forces the household to organise its production in such a way that a surplus labour force will be available. At the level of the peasant household production unit this production process materialises through a division of labour by age and sex, and through subordination of women and the young by men and elders respectively. In this chapter we shall see, in the light of our fieldwork data, how this division of labour within the household takes place in Gisgis and Kalhana.

RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD

The household is the basic economic unit in both Gisgis and Kalhana, regardless of whether it consists of a nuclear or extended family, and agriculture constitutes the primary source of income of the majority of the households in both villages. Those families who have a piece of land to cultivate form work groups on a patrilineal basis and all the members of a family, including the women and children,

either work together in the same field or work in different fields at the same time. The head of a household controls the agricultural activities as well as the land and its products. Members of the family occupy different positions in relation to one another depending on their seniority and sex, and a complex set of relations of production takes place amongst the members of the family. All the members are subordinate to the head of the family if the family contains only the head, his wife, his married and unmarried son(s) and unmarried daughter(s). If the family also includes retired parents, the head of the family (the oldest son) cannot have power over his parents, but he will have power over the other members of the family, including his junior married and unmarried brother(s). At the expense of being descriptive, through detailed studies of several different households an attempt will be made to outline different combinations of relations of production within the household economic units. Through the study of various households we shall aim to identify the different ways which govern the unity or fission of the families as economic units.

In the case of a family consisting of a husband and his wife, and their unmarried son(s) and daughter(s), the husband is the head of the household organising the process of production. It is he who decides what is to be produced, and who will do a particular job in the field, though there is a general pattern of division of labour among the members of the family, depending on such factors as age and sex. (Division of labour by sex has varying significance according to the position of the family in the social class differentiation. We shall come to this point later, when we discuss the importance of female

labour in the reproduction of the household and the significance of female labour for capitalism).

The head of the household may send his grown-up son(s) (fourteen years old or more) to nearby towns such as Ergani, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, etc. to work in building construction. This takes two forms either the son leaves the village on his own, taking with him his bed, consisting of a doşek (a kind of mattress made of a sack filled with old clothes and rags and flattened into the shape of a mattress), a yorgan (home-made quilt) and a yastık (pillow), and he would sleep on the building site, or he joins a team of duvarcıs (masons) and ameles (unskilled labourers), organised by a duvarcı ustası (master mason), who has a verbal contract with the man for whom the building is being constructed. The owner of the construction organises the building process through the duvarcı ustası, who mediates between the ameles and the owner. The wages to be paid to the ameles are decided between the usta (master)¹ and the owner. The usta is completely free in recruiting his workers and in deciding the amount of wages each worker will receive. Generally, the usta appropriates the difference between the amount of money received from the owner of the building construction and the amount of money given to his workers. In the event of an amele questioning this practice he would simply be dismissed, and it is not surprising to hear that in some cases the usta disappears with the wages.

Young workers, aged between 14 and 17, are usually paid the lowest wages. If the worker is young and he has come to work on his own,

without joining a group, he is at the mercy of the owner of the building site. He may be made to work longer hours and be paid less, and may even be refused pay if the building site owner is dishonest and realises that the boy is without protection. This is exemplified in the case of Mehmet Çok, who had been sent by his father to work in Elazığ. He notes that

I could not find any work for five days. The money I had was going very fast, although I stayed in the attic of a cheap hotel with some other ameles and ate nothing but a loaf of bread a day. On the fifth day I was picked out by a man, from the amele pazarı. This is where all the ameles gather at about 5 o'clock in the morning in the hope of being picked out by someone who needs a labourer. As there are a lot of ameles seeking work only the strong and big, and those who accept low pay are chosen. At least half of the ameles would wait until 9 o'clock without being chosen, and then they leave the amele pazarı with disappointment, thinking of their hunger. Anyway, I was picked out by a man whom I did not like at first sight. He said he would give me 35 lira for half a day's work. We took a passing lorry to go to his place, which was about 15 kilometres out of the town. I was to carry straw from a nearby field to his house, but the work was at least two days' work for one person. By 2 o'clock I asked him to pay me for my half day's work but he said I had to finish carrying the straw first, otherwise he would not pay. I had no alternative but to continue in order to get my money. Towards evening he came and said there was no hurry to finish the work, I could continue the following day. I could stay the night with him and he would pay me the following day, with some extra money if I stayed there with him. I did not like his way of smiling at me. I was very frightened - he was much bigger than me, he could do whatever he wanted to me. When I saw a passing lorry I ran like hell and waved to the driver to stop. Luckily he stopped and picked me up. I was frightened and ashamed. I did not tell anybody anything. The following day I was picked out by an ustabaşı (chief master-labourer) from the market place, and worked with him for about two weeks without being paid. The ustabaşı kept saying the building site owner had not paid him, so we had to wait. I had borrowed money from other workers, and from a grocer who comes from my village. At the end of the second week we heard that the ustabaşı had been paid by the building site owner but he had already disappeared with the wages of six workers by the time we heard of the payment.

We have stated that the head of the family may send his son(s) to town to work in order to earn supplementary income. Of course, his decision to send a son to work outside the village is dependent on the age of the son and the labour requirements of the family. If the sons are not grown enough to be sent out to work, and if the wife can cope with the farm work with the help of the children, then the head of the family may go out of the village seeking work himself.

Sons, if they are not sent to school to become teachers or imams (Islamic clergy who lead public worship), in most cases remain subservient to their father until his death or retirement. If the family does not have any land, or only very little land, the father may release his son, in order for him to establish a separate household. Otherwise, the father would direct his sons and control the products of their labour, as well as any payment they may receive from non-agricultural work. Marriage, which necessitates a payment in cash or in kind to the father of the girl, and military service both play an important role in the dependence of sons on their fathers. The başlık money (the sum paid to a bride's father by the bridegroom's family) varies between 1,000TL and 100,000TL, and so it is impossible for a young man, the product of whose labour has been controlled by his father, to break his relations with his father if he wants to get married. Furthermore, two years of compulsory military service between the ages of eighteen and twenty consolidates the dependence of the son on the father. First, soldiers are not paid, and have to be supplied with some money by their families, second, when they finish their military service they join the army of unemployed, so the very

limited job prospects force them to return to their villages at the end of their two years of military service. Had they been able to work in an income-bearing job for two years the village youth might have been able to save some money towards their marriage başlık payment

Married sons generally stay within their father's household if they want to have access to land. When they decide to establish a separate household they have to find a way of sustaining their family. However, there are cases where the father lets his sons, or some of his sons, establish separate nuclear families, and gives them a piece of land to cultivate on their own account, but in most cases the members of the sons' families would work for the grandfather in peak seasons.

In the event of the father's death, the eldest son takes over his function, and all the other members of the family work for him, and he also determines the labour process. The extended family may split into nuclear family units if some of the brothers think that they contribute more to the family's subsistence than the others. They may ask to split, but the final decision is taken by the senior male member of the family. The split becomes easier if the senior brother has less children than his brothers and thinks he produces a surplus which is then consumed by the children of his younger brothers. In the case of the father's retirement the eldest son takes over his function, and organises the process of the production with his father's consent. The father's consent, in such cases, is especially vital in

the event of the extended family splitting into nuclear families.

From the above discussion, which was based on fieldwork data, we can conclude that in the peasant households of Southeast Anatolia heads of the households enjoy almost complete dominance over the other members of the family. This applies to matters of production, products, disposal of the products, distribution of the products, organisation of work, etc. It should be pointed out, however, that the male-oriented nature of the above discussion does not in any way imply that women are not an important constituent part of the family labour process. On the contrary, as will be shown below, female labour is central to the whole process, central, in that it permits male labour to engage in seasonal migration and thereby provide the household economy with the additional income necessary for its reproduction. In other words, despite the importance of the male in the decision-making process of the household's reproduction, it is female labour which constitutes the basis.

FEMALE LABOUR IN GISGIS AND KALHANA

In the majority of micro-level studies of Turkey we come across a common feature the underestimation or total neglect of the importance of women's labour for the subsistence of the family. In some of the village studies, like that of Gucbilmez² for example, the division of labour by sex is completely left out, while in others the labour contribution of women is reduced to housework and is considered marginally important in terms of the family's subsistence.³ Moreover, none

of the micro-level studies has yet tried to relate the importance of women's participation in agriculture to the development of capitalism and to the accumulation of capital in rural Turkey. Rural communities in these studies are mainly taken as separate isolated units, and the nature of the relations of production within village communities and their relations with wider economies (national, and world capitalist economies) are simply excluded from the analysis. The analysis would be more meaningful if it were located in a wider context and given a wider perspective.

While capitalist development in agriculture proletarianises the peasantry, the insufficient development of industry in underdeveloped countries does not allow the proletarianised peasantry to be absorbed within the industrial sector. The combination of the lack of access to land, high population growth and limited employment opportunities in industry has a stimulating effect on the semi-proletarianisation of the peasantry.

In his article, Meillassoux argues that in underdeveloped countries rural communities are being taken advantage of by capitalism, which does not assume its social security function. Capitalism uses the rural communities as a source of cheap labour

...once people are compelled to undertake wage earning activities in order to pay taxes, gain some cash, if the capitalist system does not provide adequately for old age pensions, sick leave and unemployment compensations they have to rely on another comprehensive socio-economic organisation to fulfil these vital needs. Consequently, preservation of the relations with the village and the familial continuity is an absolute requirement for the wage earners...⁴

It is the "super-exploitation" of the labourer and his kin group that accounts for the cheap labour in underdeveloped countries.⁵ Since land in Turkish rural communities is controlled by individual families rather than the whole communities, the role of the reproduction of labour power falls upon families. Women have a very important part to play in the reproduction of the labour force, and of the subsistence foodstuffs for the family's consumption. In Turkish rural areas it is generally the male members of the family who leave the farm to earn additional income, and it is the women who stay behind in the village to look after the children and do the bulk of the agricultural work. This division of labour by sex contributes to capital accumulation by lowering the wages the capitalists have to pay, and helps sustain the reproduction of the household unit.

In what follows, an attempt will be made to analyse the relationship between the agricultural division of labour by sex and the differentiation of the peasantry in Kalhana and Gısgıs villages. In doing so we shall try to show that rural seasonal labour migration is very much related to the degree of the women's participation in agricultural production. Nevertheless, prior to proceeding with this discussion it is necessary to outline the method adopted in collecting and classifying the data.

In the questionnaire used during our fieldwork the majority of the answers given by the heads of households to the question "What is your wife's occupation?" was evhanımı (housewife). Only 1.5 per cent of the adult women in the village of Gısgıs and 1.4 per cent in Kalhana were considered rencber (farmer). It became clear that the

uniformity of the answer "housewife" stemmed from the way the question was posed. Although rural women have dual occupations, as rural workers (whether paid or not) and as housewives and mothers, and although their work contributes to the sustenance of the family, in a patriarchal society such as that of Giscis and Kalhana their prime responsibility is considered to be towards their home and children.

A different methodological approach was adopted in our detailed census headed "Operation Sheets". The first of the operations sheets, the "Field Operation Sheet", was used to collect data on labour performed in different fields cultivated by the household. This sheet was organised in such a way as to enable us to record the type of work done by each member of the household and by each non-household labourer, be he wage labourer or exchange labourer, and it also enabled us to see the amount of time spent by each participant in the field. Twenty-two households were studied in detail, for a period of six months. They were visited once a week for the purposes of a detailed survey, as well as being observed daily. Of course, the difficulties arising from the distances between the fields of the families made it impossible to visit each family every day. However, generally once in three to four days each family was observed in the field for two to three hours. In addition, each family was interviewed in depth.

Furthermore, a stratified sample was used for farm analysis and villagers were stratified according to the amount of land they owned and the positions they had in the production process. Although no

strict delimitation is possible, a crude grouping served our purposes. The first group consisted of landless families and those with land up to 10 dönüms. These people are not only unable to make a living from the land they farm, but also earn the main part of their income through wage labour. The second group consisted of those who had 10 to 25 dönüms of land. These may be called small farmers, who derive their living mainly from the family farm, whether market oriented or not. Even in this group, however, and irrespective of whether any other members of the family are working for wages or not, the heads of the households have to find additional sources of income outside the farm, either in agricultural work or in non-farming activities, for instance, as coffee-house owners, peddlars or even as mine-workers. The third group may be called small independent farmers who have 26 to 100 dönüms of land. This delimitation may not hold true for Gısgıs, where the land is rocky in some places. In this category the heads of households are completely engaged in farming operations on their own farms. In many cases and especially in Kalhana, during the summer, temporary employment of paid labour becomes necessary. This does not mean that other members of the family do not seek work as wage labourers on others' lands at times when there is not enough work for everyone on the family holding. The fourth group, who may be called medium farmers, have 100 to 500 dönüms of land and employ hired labour in the months of greatest activity. Wage labour by members of the family is less frequent in this group. The fifth group, which does not exist in Gısgıs, but which dominates agriculture in Kalhana, is the large farmers who have more than 500 dönüms of land. Family labour is not used on these

farms, the land is worked by agricultural wage-earners, sharecroppers and, to a limited extent, by corvée labour.

Since the majority of lands in the last category are utilised by the owners through the employment of wage labourers we may call these holdings capitalist holdings. Furthermore, since the lands belonging to these capitalist landlords and given to sharecroppers are cultivated by peasant families - including landless peasants - they are analysed under the first two groups. It would not, therefore, be too misleading if we were to leave out the last group from our analysis concerning the role of peasant women in the accumulation of capital in general.

Although we have defined four groups (excluding capitalist farming) in terms of landownership and the role played in the production process, in reality it is too difficult to draw a clear-cut line between the groups. Furthermore, it is possible to reduce our four-fold classification into a three-fold classification: poor peasants, middle peasants and rich peasants. In that case we could consider the first two groups together, that is, under the category of poor peasants, with the third group coming under the middle peasant category and the fourth group as rich peasants. As we stated earlier, our simplistic classification cannot overcome the difficulties involved in defining the groups, and determining the families to be subsumed into these groups. However, in accordance with our crude classification twenty-two families were studied in detail. The distribution of households was as follows:

TABLE 6 1 Number of Selected Households by Land Owned

GROUP	NUMBER OF DONÜMS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED	
		GISGIS	KALHANA
1	0-10	4	3
2	11-25	4	0
3	26-50	2	1
4	51-100	2	1
5	101-500	2	1
6	500+	-	2
Total		14	8

An immediate question may arise concerning the number of households selected. Why 22, and not 15 or 50 and so on? We believe that the number of households studied is irrelevant in a study of this nature. We do not believe in the usefulness of an empiricist approach which claims to come closer to the truth by increasing the number of cases studied. Can a number of studies or cases represent the whole truth? Would we arrive at a different result if we studied twice as many cases? We do not suppose we can find a satisfactory answer to these questions.⁶ Our purpose in this section, however, is to try to observe a tendency in the accumulation of capital towards the utilisation of rural female labour. A few detailed studies, therefore, will be indicative of the general process of capital accumulation and of the contribution of women's labour to this process.

Let us take a look at Efrahim Catal's life story. Efrahim was born in 1926 in Gisgis. He was one of three children of a poor peasant,

Apo Çatal, who had 20 dónums of land. As a small boy he worked as a shepherd, grazing the family's two sheep and one goat, and he also helped his parents in the field from the age of 10, watering the vegetables and carrying water from the fountain to the field or to the house. When he was 16 he was married to his uncle's daughter, Kezzo, who was then 19. The young couple lived with Efrahim's parents until he was called to do his national service at the age of 20. His wife and first child, Ibrahim, stayed with his parents while he completed his two years military service. When he returned he worked on his father's land for four more years, and in the meantime his second and third children were born. He realised that it was becoming more and more difficult for them to earn their living from his father's 20 dónums of land. Although in some years they were able to find a small plot of land to sharecrop, it was still very difficult to survive on the amount of land they were able to cultivate. The size of the family had doubled in ten years, with his wife and children, and later his brother's wife joining them too. He and his brother Hasan worked in Ergani in building construction as labourers for one or two months a year, however they could not save much, since they had to support themselves in the town.

With encouragement from his wife, Efrahim dared to ask his father's permission to establish his own household, and permission was granted without any fuss. Efrahim was hoping that he could find a plot of land to sharecrop but he could not. As a last resort he applied to Hasip Ağa, the owner of Zengetil village in Ergani district, who had about 7,000 donums of land. Hasip Ağa housed the family, let them

sharecrop 6 dönüms of irrigated land, where they grew vegetables, and gave them 30 olçeks of wheat (1 olçek equals 35 to 36 kilos of wheat, so about 1,080 kilos in total), in return for the services of the whole family. They were totally at the disposal of Hasip Ağa, who made it seem that by accepting Efrahim and his family into the village he was doing them a great favour. Given the lack of work opportunities existing in the area, the big landlords were able to impose their will upon the peasants. The ağas could even go as far as to use their hizmetkars (service men, like Efrahim) as a security force against their enemies. Owing to land disputes and other social causes there were always clashes between powerful ağas, who would use their peasants (most of them being indebted to them) as security forces. Efrahim said "In order to secure your future you have to comply with the orders of the ağa, if you don't want to see your children in misery, dying of hunger, you have to say 'Evet Ağam' (Yes, my master)".

Efrahim and his family stayed in Zengetil for five years and then left for Gısgıs, following the death of his father. As the oldest son he took over control of the land, but after a few years his feeling that he was mainly working to provide subsistence for his brother's children made him decide to divide the land between himself and his two brothers. Ever since then he has worked his own land (almost 7 dönüms) as well as sharecropping some land. At the age of 30 he lost his wife because of an unknown illness (apparently cancer) and married his present wife, Emine, who was 17 at the time of her marriage. For the last 10 years Efrahim has been going to Adana to work in the cotton fields as a seasonal wage labourer, where he would work for 3 to 3½ months in the cotton fields as a hoer and cotton picker.

The contact between the capitalist farmers of the Çukurova region and the seasonal workers is made through the elçis, the local agents of the farmers. Each year capitalist farmers, who are also named ağa, but whose relations with their workers are entirely different from those in Southeast Anatolia, send telegrams to their elçis in the region. The elçi's function is to contact the workers who are willing to go to the Çukurova region. The workers are transported in big lorries, loaded to their full capacity with the workers and sometimes their wives and children, as well as their so-called beds and necessary cooking equipment. Each lorry is loaded with at least 30 to 40 workers, and the cost of transport is met by each worker. After ten to twelve hours of exhausting travel the lorry arrives at Adana.

The workers stay in tents for the whole period they work there. There is no written contract between the workers and the employers, and in fact the workers and employers never come face to face. Their relations are mediated by the elçis. There is no social security, nor health facilities for the workers, most of whom suffer from malaria, which is endemic in the area. Those workers who are ill or not fit enough to work lose their job. Otherwise they work from 6 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening, with one hour's break at lunch time. Food has to be provided by the workers themselves. The eleven hours of work was remunerated by 63TL in 1977 (33TL were equivalent to £1 sterling at that time, so they were paid the equivalent of £1 90 per day). This was the rate for hoeing, whereas for cotton pickers a piece-work system was in operation. For one kilo of cotton picked workers were paid 1TL. According to İbrahim, a strong

worker could only pick an average of about 60 kilos of cotton per day (in a twelve-hour day)

Efrahim's family in 1977 consisted of six people himself, his wife and four children - his first son from Emine, Recep (17 years old), his elder daughter Auriye (14), his younger daughter Leyla (12) and his younger son Ahmet (9). The other children from his first wife had already married and left home by the time of the interview. For the past couple of years Efrahim had taken his son Recep with him to Adana to work as a cotton picker. He said "I am getting old. If it were not for Recep I could not have earned enough money last year". Although he was only 51 he looked much older, and very weak. Nevertheless, he was still able to work, even if not as productively as he used to.

In 1977 Efrahim owned 7 dönüms of land and sharecropped 15 donüms of land. The owner of the sharecropped land was a school teacher who had inherited the land from his father and did not have the time or the intention to cultivate it himself. The family grew wheat, lentils and vegetables, mainly tomatoes, green peppers, aubergines, cucumbers and onions. On the sharecropped land wheat was planted and 5 dönüms of the family land was used for lentils. The rest was reserved for growing vegetables. The family owned one ox, one sheep, one donkey and several chickens.

Since Efrahim owns only one ox he has to make an arrangement with another villager who also has an ox, in order to be able to make up a

pair to till the land. As soon as he returns from the Çukurova region in mid-September, he tills the land with an ox-drawn wooden plough. It takes him about 12 to 14 days to prepare the 20 dönüms of land for planting, with the help of his son Recep. The actual sowing of the wheat and lentils takes five days. While male members of the household are engaged in tilling and cultivating, the females would do the weeding by hand. Usually the planting of wheat and lentils is completed by the end of November. In addition to the usual, everyday housework tasks, female members are also responsible for collecting wood, bringing meals to the field workers, and fetching water from the village fountain.

During the cold and snowy winter, which lasts from December until the middle of March, male members of the family spend their time in one of the two village coffee houses, drinking tea, smoking cigarettes and playing cards. Efrahim does not participate in the latter activity, for he does not like to play cards, but his son spends whole days playing cards or backgammon. Since playing cards in front of one's father is considered disrespectful, both Recep and Efrahim pay particular attention not to frequent the same coffee house in the village.


In contrast to the adult male members of the family, adult female members of the family are always busy. Their day starts with feeding the animals, preparing breakfast, (generally lentil soup with bread, or tea and bread), fetching tezek (dried animal dung, prepared in the summer for use as fuel for cooking and heating), and lighting the fire. The day is filled with activities such as making bread, knitting 'cous and jumpers), mending clothes, cooking meals for lunch and

dinner, washing up, fetching water from the fountain in the middle of the village and so on. Most of the peasant women are engaged in these daily activities all through the year, except for some special activities necessitated by different seasons, such as heating the house in the winter.

The second half of March and the first half of April is the season for planting vegetables. Vegetable growing is a hard task, requiring constant attention. It takes 6 to 7 days for Efrahim and his son Redep to hoe two donums of land. The weeding is done by the women, by hand. The field is divided in misers (areas of land 3 x 5 metres), and a space of about one metre is left between misers so that it is possible to walk between them. Also, very shallow canals are made between the misers to regulate the irrigation. One corner of each miser has an exit into the canal, which can be opened, or blocked with shovelfuls of mud. Some misers are not planted initially, instead they are reserved for the replanting of the seedlings pulled up from the previously planted misers in the process of thinning. This thinning out and replanting of the seedlings is done by hand by women (wife and daughters). The irrigation of the vegetable plots, daily, or on alternate days, is carried out by women and/or young boys. Once the irrigation canals have been opened by the men, and the misers are organised in such a way, as shown below, it is a simple, although time-consuming, task to water the plants.

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
In the following sketch we show the simple irrigation system designed and implemented by Efrahim

DIACRAM 5.1 Efrahim's Irrigation System

The water is collected in a simple small pond, built in front of a natural water source. The pond is filled overnight, otherwise the amount of water from the tiny stream would not be sufficient for irrigation needs. The water in the pond is allowed through a vertical L-shaped hole, the upright section of which is blocked with a long thick piece of wood which can be held out of the water. The amount of water allowed through is then regulated by pulling the piece of wood

upwards. If the vegetables are to be watered all the other exits to the other fields have to be blocked with mud. The main canal is about 20 centimetres deep and 30 centimetres wide. As we mentioned before, each miser has an entrance for water, and is designed in such a way as to enable the water to reach all the plants by running along all the small subsidiary canals which follow the line of the long sides of the oblong misers. Vegetables are planted in the middle of the distance between these small canals, about 20 to 25 centimetres apart. Generally tomatoes, peppers and aubergine plants are planted between canals, on ridges. The design of each miser in Efrahim's vegetable garden was as shown in the following sketch, (as it was for the general pattern in the village too).

DIAGRAM 6.2 Design of a Miser



Irrigation is carried out by women, sometimes helped by young male children. Since water is very precious the irrigator has to be very careful not to let water overflow the canals and misers. This is done by regulating the amount of water released from the pond.

Irrigating the vegetables took at least 3 to 4 hours a day for Efrahim's wife. Irrigation is usually done between 3 o'clock and 7 o'clock in the afternoon/evening, and towards the completion of the task Efrahim's wife would rush home to prepare the evening meal, leaving the final responsibility of irrigation to Nuriye.

In mid-April, having prepared the vegetable garden and sown the vegetable seeds, Efrahim leaves for Adana, with Recep too during the past two years, to work in the cotton fields as a hoer. The hoeing season in the Çukurova region lasts from April until mid-June, or the end of June in some places. While Efrahim and his son are away, all the productive activities of his household, as well as housework, fall upon the female members of the family, though they may be assisted by their young son (9 years old) in tasks such as fetching water from the fountain, or attending to the transportation of vegetables from the field to the house on a donkey. Once the vegetables start to mature, at the end of May and beginning of June, Emine is faced with two more tasks picking the ready vegetables and marketing them. Vegetable picking is done in the late afternoon and early evening, between 6 and 8 30 p.m. Since it is very hot during the day an early picking would cause the vegetables to rot. Collected tomatoes are put into big wooden boxes, which weigh about 20 to 30 kilos each when full. Peppers and aubergines are put into large sacks. Wild purslane, which grows

around the fields, is put on the bottom and on top of the sacks to protect the vegetables. Boxed and sacked vegetables are then transported to the house on donkeys, late in the evening. The following day Emine and the children would get up at about 4.30 a.m. to transport the previous day's collected vegetables to the köy meydanı (the centre of the village) to load onto the only lorry which transports both vegetables and passengers between the village and Ergani town.

In the summer, each morning at about 5 o'clock, those peasants who want to sell some vegetables, grain, or cheese etc. in the town, would load their goods onto the lorry and board the lorry themselves. The marketing of the vegetables is mainly done by men, who prefer to go to the town, rather than staying in the village. However, during the summer, quite a lot of the male labour force is away from the village, thus necessitating the women to take the goods to the market. Having sold the vegetables to a grocer, Emine buys the things necessary for the household, such as salt, soap, margarine, paraffin etc. and returns home, either on the lorry or by dolmuş (a minibus which runs between certain fixed destinations, and for which the fare is shared between the passengers). So we can add marketing and shopping to the other activities performed by women which we gave previously.

All through the summer at least one of the female members of the family spends one or two hours of her time each day in collecting mayıs (fresh cow dung). The collection of mayıs is done by hand. Bucketfuls of dung are carried home and there moulded into flat round shapes to be left in the sun to dry, ready for future use as fuel. The shaping of

the mayıs is also done exclusively by female members of the family, mostly by daughters or daughters-in-law.

The cutting of grass and weeds on the hills around the village is also done by women, between the end of May and the end of June. Sickles are used to cut the weeds, which are then collected in heaps. Emine and her two daughters Nuriye and Leyla, and the youngest son Ahmet, would leave home at about 5 a.m. to go to the hills to cut animal fodder. The cutting continues until about 1 p.m. when it becomes too hot to continue, and then restarts at 3 p.m. The long grass, when cut, is twisted into long pieces which are then plaited by two people working together. The plaiting of grass for drying is always done in pairs. At about 4.30 p.m. Emine would return home with the first donkey load of fodder, taking Ahmet with her. It is Ahmet's job to transport the fodder from the place where it is being collected to the house. In the meantime, his mother would be preparing the dinner and doing other housework. When it has dried in the sun the fodder is stored in the ground floor of the house, which is used as a barn for the animals.

July and the first half of August is harvest time for wheat and lentils. In some years, at the beginning of July, Efrahim comes back from the Çukurova region to help in the harvest, if they are share-cropping some land in that year. Otherwise he stays in the Çukurova region, seeking temporary employment as an amele (working in building construction) for there is no demand for hoers after June. During our fieldwork, in 1977, he had returned from the Çukurova region.

Efrahim's family reap their wheat and lentils using scythes and sickles. Combine harvesters are not available in the villages where there is not big landownership. The owners of the combine harvesters come from Yozgat and Adana to lease their machines to the big landlords. Using these machines on small plots necessitates moving the machine from one field to another, which takes up a lot of time, something the owners of the machines are not very keen on.

While Efrahim and Recep reap the wheat with scythes Emine and sometimes Nuriye join them with sickles, which are much easier to use, but less efficient in terms of the amount that can be cut at one stroke. The younger children, Leyla and Ahmet, either collect mayıs or çalı-
cırpı (literally sticks and thorns) at this time, or they may be sent to the vegetable garden to look after the garden or to weed or collect some vegetables.

It takes about 8 to 10 days for Efrahim and his family to reap 15 donums of wheat and 5 donums of lentils. The threshing of wheat used to be done simply by renting a threshing machine, which would be brought by its owner to the back of the village at a certain date, for a few days. All those who wanted to have their wheat threshed would bring their wheat to the field where the patoz (thresher) was situated. There were two types of threshing machine in the area at the time the fieldwork was carried out. One type did not separate the wheat from the straw, it would only grind the wheat stalks, and the wheat would come out at the other end mixed with straw. The other type of machine would separate the straw from the wheat. Use of the first type of

machine necessitates winnowing the wheat. Passing the wheat through the threshing machine requires quite a number of people working to ensure that the process continues without stoppages until the whole lot is finished. At least six people are needed to bring the wheat and feed it into the machine regularly and to collect the separated wheat, etc. Relatives, neighbours and friends all give each other their mutual assistance when they have wheat to thresh in a patoz. This mutual aid is called imece.

However, the use of the patoz in most of the rural areas which depended on renting them declined drastically in the summer of 1977 owing to the fact that petrol prices rose 100 per cent after the government stopped subsidising petrol. The increase in the price of petrol was reflected in the prices of everything. Of course, the price of renting agricultural machinery took its share as well. Prior to the increase in the price of petrol the rent for the use of a patoz for an hour was 125TL in Ergani, and this went up to 300TL per hour after the petrol price rise. Since the floor prices fixed for food products by the government were not increased at the same rate as the prices for other items, including petrol, the peasants producing mainly for home consumption were not able to meet the requirements of the price increase. They immediately reverted to using old traditional methods in agriculture, which did not cost them anything.

Efrahim was one of those who could not afford to rent a threshing machine, as he said "Do you think I do not know it is much easier to

have your wheat threshed in a patoz? Of course I do. Unfortunately I am helpless, I cannot afford it. Never mind, I have plenty of time, God does not like idleness" He implied that wheat-threshing is a time-consuming operation. Once reaped, the wheat has to be collected by hand. The threshing floor is prepared by women. A flat part of the field is chosen and a round area of 10 metres diameter is cleared and wetted with water, then flattened with a heavy cylindrical roller and left to dry. The wheat is transported to the threshing floor by donkey. The bundles of wheat are prepared by female labour and loaded onto donkeys by male labour. Bundling and loading are not exclusively female or male tasks respectively, as males and females may help each other in these activities. The wheat is gathered into the middle of the threshing floor and separated by means of a döven (flint-studded threshing sledge), drawn by a pair of oxen. Generally, young boys would keep an eye on this operation, which is play-like for them, as they sit on the threshing sledge as it is pulled by the oxen.

Winnowing is carried out by males, using wooden forks. While Efrahim and Recep take the winnowing in turns Emine and her daughters sieve the coarse bits which gather at the edge of the winnowed heap. When the wheat has been totally separated from the straw the landlord is invited to the field to attend the measurement of the crop. In Efrahim's case one of the relatives of the landlord represents the landlord, who is an absentee. The wheat is measured by a kind of bucket, called a çap, which holds about 9 kilos of wheat (4 çaps equal 1 ölçek). The measured wheat is poured into sacks by women and transported to the house.

Once the crop has been harvested the male members of the family are released from all sorts of duties. Efrahim and Recep spend their time in coffee houses until mid-September, when they set off for the Çukurova again, for the cotton picking, which lasts for three to four weeks. The end of the harvest signals the start of new types of work for the female members of the family, as they are now engaged in preparing foodstuffs for the winter.

Wheat and other foodstuffs made from wheat constitute the main diet of peasant families in Southeast Anatolia. The preparation of foodstuffs made from wheat falls completely upon the women in rural areas. The foodstuffs made from wheat include bulgur (cracked wheat), doğme (boiled and pounded wheat), cucuk or yarma (fine cracked wheat, used for making soup and various kinds of cracked wheat rissoles, bulgur köftesi) We shall describe the preparation of the above-mentioned foodstuffs as observed in Efrahim's family, although the same process was observed as it was carried out by many women in both villages. However, I believe that by confining our description to one case we shall be able to indicate satisfactorily the general trend that women are the ones who are responsible for the bulk of the production and processing of the foodstuffs consumed by the peasant family.

Efrahim's wife, Emine, and their daughter Nuriye, fill sacks with the required amount of wheat and load them onto the donkey to take to the main fountain, situated in the centre of the village. The wheat is washed there in leğens (huge bowls), then boiled and spread on large cloths to dry in the sun for a few days. When the boiled wheat

reaches a certain dryness it is pounded in a soku (large stone mortar) which takes about 5 to 6 kilos of wheat at a time, using a tokmak (big wooden mallet). The boiled and pounded wheat is then winnowed to separate the chaff from the grains, which is called dövme at this stage, and becomes bulgur when it has been cracked in a special hand operated wheat-cracking machine. Coarsely cracked wheat is separated from finely cracked wheat, which is called cücük or yarma, by sieving.

Preparation of the dried vegetables, pickles and tomato paste are other processes carried out by women in readiness for winter use. In almost every house in both villages aubergines (their middles scooped out) and green peppers are dried in the sun, ready for use in preparing dolma (stuffed peppers and aubergines)

So far we have described the activities in which rural women play an important part in the reproduction cycle of peasant and semi-proletarian families, by taking Efrahim's family as an example. This has indicated that women do play a very important and decisive role in the reproduction of the peasant and semi-peasant families who provide a significant part of the seasonal labour force used by rural and urban capitalism

Our first family studied here in detail was included under the grouping "poor peasants". We have shown that it is the women who, by shouldering the bulk of the productive work, (production of the food-stuffs as well as the labour force) made it possible for some of the

male members of the household to go out of the village for a period of time, to seek additional income, in order to assure the reproduction of the household. If it were not for the women's work in the village the whole reproduction process of the household would be distorted, and with the low wages obtainable in return for seasonal work the workforce could not continue to function as it does at present. We shall now have a look at another farm, which may be subsumed under the category "small independent farm", in order to see the extent and significance of women's labour in the reproduction of the household in this category.

Mehmet Şerif Ece's holding consisted of 70 dönüms of unirrigated and 20 dönüms of irrigated land in Gısgıs, and he owned 70 dönüms of the total 90 dönüms he was using in 1977. The other 20 dönüms which he sharecropped belonged to his brother. There were two cows, a pair of oxen, a pair of unweaned calves, one lamb and three donkeys on his holding. As agricultural tools he owned one plough, seven sickles, one scythe, three spades, three hoes and a winnowing fork.

He inherited 10 dönüms and bought the other 60 dönüms with the money he saved when he was working as a stoner, breaking rocks in the village environs and carving huge stones into cubic pieces, then selling them to be used in building construction. Today he does not work as a stoner because it is a very hard job, requiring great physical strength. He now derives most of his income from agriculture, but also from buying and selling livestock.

Out of 90 donums total land, 15 donums of irrigated land were reserved for kavak (poplar wood, used in building construction), which constitutes one of the sources of cash for Mehmet Serif's household, and 5 donums of irrigated land were planted with vegetables. As to the 70 donums of unirrigated land, the division was as follows 15 donums under wheat cultivation, 15 donums under lentils, 5 donums of kuşne (a kind of vetch, used as animal fodder), 5 donums of barley (also used as animal fodder), and the remaining 30 donums were left fallow

Mehmet Şerif's family consisted of eight people himself (52 years of age), his wife Perihan (42), his sons Zekı (23), Omer (17), Ramazan (12), Hasan (10), his daughter Hatice (7) and his daughter-in-law, (Zekı's wife) Hüsna (20) We shall try to indicate briefly what sort of activities the women members of the family perform as their part in the division of labour within the household economy. In order not to be repetitive we shall not give all the details of the tasks performed by members of this family where they are more or less the same as those performed in Efrahim's family. Instead we shall give a list of tasks performed mainly by women, or participated in to a great extent by women. (See Table 6.2)

Mehmet Şerif sends his two older sons to surrounding towns (Ergani, Diyarbakır, Elazığ) to work as ameles in building construction, to earn some cash in order to meet the family's needs, and to save some money. In this way he was able to save enough money to build a small house at the back of his house, which he usually rented to the commander

of the village gendarmerie, and it was here that we stayed during the fieldwork, since the sergeant acting as commander of the village gendarmerie at the time had not brought his family to the village and so stayed in the gendarmerie headquarters. Once the ploughing of the land is completed Zekı and Ömer set off for the towns in search of work. Although they would come home once a month or so for a few days, they stay in town for a total of about 5 to 7 months a year, generally between April and October. However, they may stay in the village for about a month between April and October if they cannot find work in the towns, or if they are desperately needed in the village to help the family in agricultural work. For instance, when a number of poplar trees are to be sold at least one of the boys is asked to return to the village in order to fell the trees. The bark of the poplar tree has to be peeled off in order to prepare it for use in building construction. This task is done mainly by women and children, using sickles. Although the work is not very difficult it is very time-consuming, it may take one person a couple of hours to remove the bark from one tree.

All the housework is done by the daughter-in-law. This includes milking the cows, feeding the animals (sometimes), cooking the meals and the bread, washing the clothes, washing up, collecting firewood and fetching water from the fountain (sometimes this is done by Ramazan or Hasan, the two youngest sons). The mother-in-law mainly directs the daughter-in-law in carrying out the housework. There is a great deal of co-operation between Perihan and Husna, her daughter-in-law, in the preparation of foodstuffs for the winter.

In Mehmet Şerif's household, as in most of the households in the village, ploughing the land is entirely a male task, but in harvesting male and female members of the household take a more or less equal share in the work. In secondary jobs, related to the harvest, such as preparing the threshing floor, sacking the grain, transporting the hay and grain, storing the hay and straw etc., the women do more work than the men

In the following table we show the particular tasks performed by the different members of the family. The table is divided into four parts, to enable us to see if a particular task is carried out exclusively or partly by the male, female or child members of the household. In the first part of the table all the tasks done exclusively by women are listed. In the second part the tasks done by women with the co-operation of other members of the family are listed. Of course it is very difficult to determine to what extent a task is done by one individual or another, so this list should be borne in mind when considering the third and fourth lists relating to tasks performed by men and by children respectively. The aim of the second grouping is to indicate the participation of women in the tasks listed, and also to show who else might contribute his labour. This is indicated by the letter "M" for adult male, "C" for child under 14 years of age after each task listed, to show their participation with women in each task. Where "M" and "C" are indicated together, this denotes the participation of either male, or child, or male and child labour in this particular task, as well as female labour. On any particular single occasion such a task may be carried out by only women,

or only men, or only children, or by a combination of any two, or all three of these The list which follows is in no way exhaustive.

TABLE 6 2 Tasks Performed by the Members of a Household

1 TASKS DONE EXCLUSIVELY BY WOMEN	2 TASKS PERFORMED BY WOMEN AND OTHERS	
Looking after and nursing children	Reaping crops	M
Washing clothes etc.	Transporting crops to the threshing floor	MC
Wahing up	Collecting firewood	C
Washing and spinning wool	Fetching water	C
Knitting socks and jumpers	Collecting animal dung	C
Mending clothes	Shaping and drying animal dung	C
Cleaning the house	Cutting hay	C
Whitewashing the walls (once a year)	Plaiting hay	C
Making bread	Transporting hay to the village to dry	C
Cooking meals	Going to the mill	M
Milking the cows	Shopping	M
Making yoghurt	Marketing vegetables and dairy produce	M
Making white cheese	Weeding	MC
Making butter	Pounding wheat	M
Heating the house	Measuring grain harvest	M
Vegetable planting	Sacking grain harvest	M
Watering vegetables	Threshing grain harvest	MC
Vegetable picking	Winnowing	M
Thinning vegetable seedlings	Loading grain harvest onto donkeys	M
Washing wheat	Unloading grain harvest from donkeys	M
Boiling wheat for <u>bulgur</u>	Removing the bark from poplar trees	MC
Sewing the sacks		
Dispersing wheat on sheets to dry		
Collecting up the dried wheat		
Hollowing out peppers and aubergines		
Stringing up peopers and aubergines to dry		
Pickling vegetables		
Making or repairing earth oven (<u>tandır</u>)		
Making <u>pekmez</u> (boiled grape juice)		

TABLE 6.2 (Continued)

3 TASKS DONE EXCLUSIVELY BY MEN	4 TASKS DONE EXCLUSIVELY BY CHILDREN UNDER 14
Tilling the land	Watching to make sure that birds and animals do not harm the vegetables and crops
Cutting wood (for firewood)	Grazing the animals
Cutting poplar trees	Taking meals to workers in the fields and bringing back the dirty dishes
Doing building repairs	Looking after younger sisters and brothers
Tool repairs	
Carrying heavy loads	
Marketing surplus grain	
Marketing poplar trees	
Work outside the village	
Nightwatch in the harvested fields until the whole crop has been transported to the house	

The foregoing analysis suggests that being unable to reproduce itself with its own production the peasant household seeks supplementary income from outside. The division of labour by age and sex within the household frees some of the male members of the household for outside work. As Meillassoux suggests, capitalism takes advantage of the labourers whose subsistence needs are met partly by the household. In this way, capitalism avoids paying for the workers' social security, old age pensions, sick leave etc. Women's labour within the household plays a vital role in the reproduction of the labour force, and one which is taken advantage of by capitalism.

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We have just said that the peasant household is not able to reproduce itself with its own production. By this we do not mean

that the peasant household production is small in quantitative terms. In most cases the amount produced by the household would be enough for its reproduction if a part of the product was not expropriated by various means. However, the conditions of household production are determined externally. Expensive inputs, unfavourable market conditions and credit mechanisms all play important parts in the impoverishment of the peasant household. In the next two chapters we shall see how the credit mechanisms and market forces operate in a manner that continuously undermines the viability of the household economy.

NOTES

1. The word usta (master) in Turkish becomes ustası when used together with the word duvarcı (mason), for grammatical reasons
2. Erdoğan Guçbilmez, Yenimahalle ve Kayadibi Karşılaştırmalı bir Köy Araştırması (Yenimahalle and Kayadibi: A Comparative Village Study) (1972).

3. See, for example

Bahattin Akşit, Türkiye'de Az Gelişmiş Kapitalizm ve Köylere Girişi (Underdeveloped Capitalism in Turkey and its Penetration into Villages) (1967).

Nıyazi Berkes, Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde bir Araştırma (A Research on the Villages of Ankara) (1942).

Nermin Erdentuğ, Hal Köyünün Etnolojik Tetkiki (Ethnological Investigation of Hal Village) (1956), and Sün Köyünün Etnolojik Tetkiki (Ethnological Investigation of Sun Village) (1959).

İbrahim Yasa, Hasanoğlan Köyü (Hasanoglan Village) (1954), Sindel Köyü (Sindel Village) (1961), and 25 Yıl Sonra Hasanoğlan Köyü Karşılaştırmalı Toplumbilimsel Araştırma (Hasanoglan Village After 25 Years: A Comparative Sociological Research) (1966).

4. Claude Meillassoux, "From Reproduction to Production", Economy and Society, I, No. 1 (1972), p. 103.
5. *ibid.*, p. 102.
6. However, an attempt has been made by Barry Hindess, who criticises positivism and ethnomethodology with regard to their mode of usage of statistical data. See Barry Hindess, The Use of Official Statistics in Sociology: A Critique of Positivism and Ethnomethodology (1973)

CHAPTER VII

Small scale production is the dominant characteristic of Turkish agriculture, as is shown in the table below.

TABLE 7.1 Distribution of Farming Households According to Land Owned

SIZE OF HOLDING (decares)	1970		1973	
	% OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS	% OF LAND	% OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS	% OF LAND
0-50	71.1	29.6	70.1	21.2
51-100	14.7	23.1	16.7	18.9
101-500	13.7	36.1	12.2	38.9
500+	0.5	11.2	1.0	21.0

Source Oktay Verlier, Türk Tarımında Yapısal Değişme
Teknoloji ve Toprak Bölüşümü (Structural Change
Technology and Land Distribution in Turkish
Agriculture), Ankara, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı
Yayını No. 1636-SPD:307, 1978

The exploitation of these small producers does not take place through the capital wage-labour relation but through other mechanisms, some of which we shall encounter in the cases of Kalhana and Gısgıs villages. For small producers are no longer isolated from market relations; they are dependent on the market either in selling their goods or in buying some of the items they use at home. Therefore, although the main aim of the household as an economic unit is to reproduce itself, the requirements of the wider economy, in terms of what to produce and how much to produce, have to be taken into

consideration. This is, of course, due to the fact that these households are not self-sufficient units.

Capitalism needs sources to accumulate and develop, and, of course, agriculture and agricultural producers are sources which contribute to this development. But, in order for capitalist accumulation to take place, in the strict sense, the direct producers must be separated from the means of production, and the owners of the means of production must be separated from the wage labourers. Of course, this definition of capitalism leaves aside small commodity producers such as those who characterise the social structure of Gısgıs and Kalhana. How are we going to understand the small producers' exploitation by capital? Initially it is necessary to differentiate between various kinds of capital, namely industrial capital (production capital), merchant capital, finance capital (banking capital), and usurers' capital, in order to understand the ways in which these small producers are exploited.

In this chapter we shall concentrate on the credit mechanism in Turkey in general, and its manifestations in the Diyarbakır-Ergani region in particular. We shall then try to situate the small producers in the credit mechanism in the Diyarbakır-Ergani region in the light of data collected during the summer of 1977 in Gısgıs and Kalhana villages.

ORGANISED CREDITS IN TURKEY

Agricultural credit in Turkey may be categorised under two headings differentiated by the sources from which the credit is obtained: organised agricultural credit and unorganised agricultural credit. The organised credit agencies are Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank), Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri (Agricultural Credit Co-operatives) and Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri (Agricultural Sales Co-operatives).¹ In fact the state-owned Ziraat Bankası acts as a supervisor for the two groups of co-operatives, and as a result the three organised credit sources are inter-related organisations. Given the limited organisational networks of the Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri and Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri, the Ziraat Bankası can be considered as the only organised source which gives credit to the farmers. The Ziraat Bankası, established in 1888, apart from ordinary banking activities is mainly engaged in providing agricultural credits in order to achieve the targets summarised by Atasagun.² These targets are "to complement the existing capital of farmers in order for them to run their farms, to increase and improve their production, to help them to obtain land or enlarge their holdings and to facilitate and increase the marketing and selling of agricultural goods".³ Furthermore, it is stated in the Charter of the Agricultural Bank that small farmers and their needs will be given priority in the provision of credits.⁴ The types of credit which are available to the farmers can be summarised as follows⁵

(a) Working Credits. The credits given to farmers in order to complete the elements of the working capital are of two types, differentiated by their place of use and duration management credits (çevirme kredileri) and equipment credits (donatma kredileri). The management credits are those credits designed to help farmers meet their expenses in buying animal fodder, seed, seedlings, fertilisers, weed-killers and insecticides, in paying agricultural labourers employed in production, in expenses incurred in the breeding of poultry, bees and silkworms, in the production of animal fodder from their fields and communal pastures (mera and çayır) and in the care and upkeep of livestock. The duration of the management credits is one year. The equipment credits are those credits designed to extend and strengthen agricultural holdings through the provision of agricultural tools of any sort, movable assets for the farm, such as small machines and other equipment, working and draught animals as well as bees etc., or through increasing the supply of such items. The duration of equipment credits is up to five years, according to the value and durability of the equipment in question, or the lifespan of the animals.

(b) Verimlendirme and İyileştirme (Productivity-raising and Improvement Credits) These are designed to raise the productivity of crops and improve the types of crops. The duration of these credits is up to 20 years.

(c) Arazi Edindirme Credits These credits are aimed to endow producers with land. They are credits extended to those wishing to enlarge their holdings or to centralise their scattered small fields. Again, the duration of these credits is up to 20 years.

The agricultural credits extended by the Agricultural Banks can also be categorised into three groups, according to the way in which the repayments of the credits given are guaranteed. Credits may be given to the farmer in return for the mortgage of his lands, or in return for the pledge of his crops, and other movable properties, or they may be given in the case of joint sponsorship of the farmers for each other.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that although the Agricultural Bank aims to help small producers by providing credit and agricultural machinery, big farmers seem to be the main beneficiaries from the implementation of the bank's credit policy. This can be substantiated when we outline some aspects of the general structure within which this policy is operated.

Turkey was expected to give priority to agriculture and become a food and raw material supplier for Europe, according to the Marshall Aid Plan. The Democrat Party government adopted this policy and implemented it.⁶ This was in no way unexpected, since the Democrat Party had been created as a reaction to the Republican People's Party government's scheme of land reform with the collaboration of big landlords, notables, and the commercial bourgeoisie.⁷

The tractors provided by Marshall Aid were given out to farmers on credit. As a result, the number of tractors rose to over 40,000 in 1955, from 961 in 1936, to 1,750 in 1948 and 31,415 in 1952. The number of combine harvesters rose to 6,000 in 1956 from 104 in 1936 and 994 in 1948. The credits given by the Agricultural Bank grew

greatly, from 50 million Turkish lira in 1940 to 235 million Turkish lira in 1948, 1,212 million Turkish lira in 1953 and over two billion Turkish lira in 1957.⁸ The prices of agricultural products also were raised, by 16 per cent in wheat, 23 per cent in sugar beet, 47 per cent in cotton in the 1951-1955 period.⁹ William H. Nicholls, a member of the World Bank Mission who advised that agriculture should be given priority evaluated this development in 1955 and noted: "25,000-27,000 farm families (one per cent of the total farming families) directly benefitted from the implementation of the policy of mechanisation in agriculture". The average annual income of these families is possibly more than 15,000TL and these families received 25 per cent of the total agricultural credits, whereas 2.5 million small farmers could not directly benefit from this policy.¹⁰

By 1965 credits given by the Agricultural Bank had risen to 5,551 million Turkish lira.¹¹ It was the big and medium sized farmers who benefitted from the increased credits. The benefit of the small-holdings from such a credit policy has remained very limited, and insignificant. S Aksoy points out that only one third of agricultural holdings made use of Agricultural Credits in 1965.¹² Table 7.2 shows the differences in the distribution of agricultural credits and its highly unequal nature.

Fifty per cent of the holdings which have access to Agricultural Bank credits receive 300TL or less, whereas this amount of money can in no way assist production,³⁷ big holdings receive 625,000TL each. This unequal credit distribution became even more acute during the late 1960s.¹³

TABLE 7.2 Distribution of Agricultural Credits in 1965

CREDIT CATEGORY (Turkish lira)	TOTAL AMOUNT OF CREDIT GIVEN (TL)	TOTAL NUMBER RECEIVING CREDIT	AVE. CREDIT PER HEAD (TL)
1-500	176 billion	592,700	297
501-1,000	179 billion	261,000	689
1,000+	23,160 billion	37	625,000

Source Türkiye İşçi Partisi Bilim Kurulu Raporu (Report of the Science Commission of the Turkish Worker's Party), Ankara, mimeographed, 1968

The fact that small-holdings are dominant in Turkey and suffer in unfavourable credit conditions plays an important part in the process of social differentiation in the rural areas. And so, small producers and poor peasants are pushed into the arms of usurers for two reasons: first, the total amount of agricultural credits in Turkey is far from meeting the demand for it; between 1963 and 1969, despite the 275 per cent rise in the total agricultural credits extended, only 35 per cent of the demand for agricultural credits was met.¹⁴ Second, as indicated above, the credits extended to agriculturalists are unequally distributed and favour big and medium sized farmers.

Not only big and medium farmers are given large amounts of credit, but also some merchants somehow manage to get sizeable agricultural credits. For instance, in Izmir some merchants who have nothing to do with agricultural production and whose only relation to agriculture is to be a sales representative of some agricultural chemicals, receive hundreds of thousands of Turkish lira from the Agricultural

Bank's special schemes. In an office opposite the agricultural chemical shop the merchant then engages in usury, giving credits at 40 per cent interest for three months.¹⁵

Furthermore, farmers are asked to produce the title deeds to their lands in order to be given agricultural credits by the Agricultural Bank, and they are also requested to find a merchant to sponsor them. In Turkey the inadequacy of cadastral surveys, excess of formalities, arbitrariness in giving credit to small landowners, inconvenient debt repayment time, and difficulties in postponing the date of repayment are all very important factors in leading to the practice of usury. As a result merchants and big landlords who get credits easily from the Agricultural Bank act as usurers, lending money at high interest rates.¹⁶

It should be noted that most of the credit given to producers is used for consumption needs. This is primarily due to the fact that the amount received is too small to be spared for agricultural production and it is therefore spent on the immediate consumption needs of the family.

Until now we have tried to see the activities of the Agricultural Bank in terms of types of credit, credit extension, and the significance of credit for the different strata of agricultural producers. Earlier we mentioned that besides the Agricultural Bank there were other organisations extending agricultural credits, though under the control of the Agricultural Bank. We shall now briefly mention the other organised credit sources.

Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri are under the strict control and trusteeship of the Agricultural Bank in terms of their establishments and functions.¹⁷ The aim of these co-operatives is: to improve and increase the production of their members, to make production profitable for their members, to prevent their members from being exploited by usurers by providing them with cheap production credit, agricultural inputs and machinery, and to thereby enable them to be strong against internal and external competitors.¹⁸

Despite their good intentions, the Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri have great difficulty in achieving their aims, due to a number of reasons. First, they depend on the Agricultural Bank for their money supply. The share of agricultural credits in the total credits in Turkey is very limited and is insufficient, and yet a considerable amount of the agricultural credits is given to Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri for buying up agricultural products from the producers. The amount allocated by the banks as production credits is 13 to 14 per cent of the total agricultural credits, and from this 13 to 14 per cent the Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri obtain a part as their share to distribute among their members.¹⁹ Second, the Agricultural Bank does not give sufficient credit to the Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. Third, organisational problems play a significant part in the failure of the Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. Usurers, merchants and intermediaries, for example, play a very important role in the local organisations of these co-operatives, and receive most of the credits.²⁰

As to the Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri, these are not credit distributing organisations. Their aim is to help their members by marketing

their products and each year they buy up certain products from the producers at prices determined by the government. The money to buy the products is obtained from the Agricultural Bank. Nevertheless, lack of facilities and delayed payments force the producers to sell their products to merchants and in some cases the co-operatives play the role of intermediary between the producers and the merchants. As we are not directly interested in the agricultural sales co-operatives we shall not go into the details of the mechanisms of their operation.²¹

UNORGANISED CREDITS IN TURKEY

Unorganised credits are those credits extended by individuals to those in need of cash. The provision of private credits is regulated either by traditionally accepted norms, or by personal relations. These private credits are of two types: one is given by merchants and usurers with interest, and the other is obtained from relatives, friends and neighbours, without interest. The first type is called tefecı kredisi or murabaha kredisi (both terms refer to credits extended by usurers) and is extended by those who take usury as their occupation. The usurers, in most cases, are merchants and landlords at the same time.

Tefeci credits can be categorised into two groups²² credits extended in cash and credits extended in kind. Producers resort to the money-lenders when they need cash to meet their production expenses, (in

buying seed, animals, agricultural machinery and labour power) or consumption expenses (food and clothing), or to repay their debts (to a bank or an individual). The money-lenders are usually those merchants who engage in the buying and selling of agricultural export products. Before the harvest they give money to the needy producers in return for their harvested products, either at a predetermined constant price or at a price which is a predetermined amount lower than the market prices at the time of the harvest. The prime motive for the usurer is to take advantage of the difference between the prices. In some places if the produce is sold before the harvest at a constant price, which is usually lower than the market price, a certain amount of interest is added to the initial amount of money lent. Then the amount of crops equivalent to the total sum of the initial loan, plus interest, is calculated. The indebted person has to take the agreed amount of crops to wherever the creditor wishes it to go. If the producer for one reason or another fails to hand over the crops he has to pay his debt in cash at the highest market price for the crop in question, plus interest for the days exceeding the original date of payment agreed upon. In these cases small producers usually end up selling or mortgaging their lands or joining the ranks of the rural landless, rural proletariat, sharecroppers or casual labourers. The second type of credit extended in cash by money-lenders involves the mortgaging of movable property (such as jewellery, gold and silver ornaments etc.). If the initial loan, plus the interest is not paid when it falls due, the money-lender appropriates the mortgaged goods. This is a very widespread method of usury in Turkey.

As to the credits given in kind, the base of these credits is that the needy producers are supplied with goods instead of with money, and the debt is repaid either in kind or in cash. These credits are of two types materials necessary for production, and materials necessary for direct consumption. Economically weak holdings need seed, working animals, small agricultural tools and agricultural equipment, and under abnormal conditions (crop failure and such like) these needs become more intense. The production needs of hard-up small producers are usually met by the rich producers and landlords of the same village or neighbouring villages, or by the town merchants who engage in buying and selling these goods, on terms more or less similar to those for selling on credit. The mode of repayment varies according to the type of goods advanced. If the agreed repayment is to be in kind a certain amount is added to the original amount, and if the repayment is to be in cash, again a certain amount of interest is added to the original sum.

The consumption goods obtained on credit by producers comprise food-stuffs that are not produced by the producers themselves, such as oil, salt, sugar, paraffin, margarine, clothes and shoes. These goods are obtained from the village grocer, town grocer, drapers in nearby towns and shoe-makers or shoe sellers.

The contracts between the creditors and the producers are of a verbal nature, and do not involve formalities of any sort. Village grocers, in particular, do not hesitate to provide villagers with the goods they need at prices much higher than the usual market price. The

total debt is usually repaid at harvest time, and the payment may be in cash or in kind. If for some reason the debt is not paid at all, or only partially paid, the debt may be transferred to the following year, with one year's interest added.

So far we have tried to give a general view of the credit mechanisms existing in Turkey. Of course, it is not possible to discover everywhere in Turkey all the forms of credit mechanisms described above. However, it is possible to see some of the above-mentioned mechanisms or combinations of them in different regions of the country. We shall now turn to our area of fieldwork, to see how credit mechanisms work there. By describing individual cases we hope to discern general tendencies in the area.

ORGANISED CREDIT IN ERGANI

In the course of our fieldwork it became clear that both organised and unorganised credit mechanisms were in operation in Ergani. Furthermore, in some cases, credit given by the Agricultural Bank acts as a catalyst for usurers' exploitation because in Southeast Anatolia big landlords and merchants receive the lion's share of agricultural credits, whereas small landowners get very little from the Agricultural Bank. Farmers from Gısgıs, for example, received credits of between 300TL and 10,000TL according to the fieldwork data.

TABLE 7.3 Credits Received from the Agricultural Bank

AMOUNT (TL)	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	AMOUNT (TL)	NUMBER OF PEOPLE
300	15	3,500	10
500	28	4,500	4
800	11	5,000	3
1,000	10	7,500	2
1,500	20	9,000	1
2,500	14	10,000	2

In theory, the amount of credit received is determined by the amount of land owned, number of animals owned, type of crop grown and so on. In practice, however, apart from the factors listed above, factors such as political affiliation, nepotism, and the amount of the bribe offered to the official in charge are also very effective in the allocation of credits. Credits given to small producers are in no way enough for them to be useful in production and most of the credits received by the small farmers were used in meeting the immediate consumption needs of the family. In addition to buying food and clothes the credits were also spent on other things, such as medicine, building construction, opening grocery shops, wedding ceremonies, circumcision ceremonies, setting up in business as a peddler (çerçi) and repayment of debts etc.

Mecit Güzey, of Gısgıs, had a crop failure a few years ago and he could only produce 25 ölçeks of wheat, which was 40 ölçeks less than his family (comprising himself, his wife, son, daughter-in-law and six grandchildren) needed. He borrowed 2,500TL from the Agricultural

Bank at 9 per cent interest. This was a short-term working credit, but instead of using the money for production purposes Mecit bought wheat. When the repayment date came round a year later he did not have the money to repay his debt of 2,775TL and nobody in the village would lend him money. He had to resort to borrowing 2,500TL from the village grocer at 125TL interest per week.

At this point it should be pointed out that the short term (one year) borrowing mechanism works as follows: producers are lent money for one year and at the end of that time they repay it with interest. Within a week of repayment the borrowers are allowed to borrow the same amount again. The short term credits are "frozen" credits in that the borrower borrows money from somewhere in order to repay the bank's money, in order to be able to borrow the same amount again. In fact, what the borrower is doing is simply paying interest to the bank each year on the same frozen amount, and the money-lenders take advantage of the inability of the borrower to produce the necessary amount to repay the bank.

In Mecit's case, what he does is to pay 350TL each year to the Bank as interest, without getting any credit at all, apart from the initial credit which was spent on food. So each year Mecit has to produce 475TL worth of surplus in order to meet the interest requirement from the bank and the money-lender. If he fails to do so he will have to find alternative solutions such as selling his land, animals and equipment. This is an example of the way in which national finance and local usury articulate together to appropriate the surplus produced by the peasant household.

It should also be pointed out that in some parts of Eastern Anatolia some ağas use the people who live in their villages as a means of obtaining more credit. We ourselves did not come across this sort of mechanism around the Diyarbakır-Ergani area, but M E Bozarslan describes this mechanism as follows:

The ağa takes his villagers to the bank and registers them. When the money (credit) is distributed to them they are given two to three hundred lira each. The villagers get the money from the bank, putting their mark on the documents by finger printing, and they hand over the money to the ağa as soon as they come out of the bank. The ağa plays this trick on virtually everybody in his village. It is the villagers who are indebted to the bank, and it is the ağa who pockets the money. It is up to the goodness of heart of the ağa whether he repays the money or not when the repayment is due....(If the ağa does not repay) the bank will get the money from the villagers.²³

In this example the villagers are in fact sharecroppers on the ağa's lands. In the case of the ağa's failure to repay the debts the villagers are doubly exploited: first, as sharecroppers they have to do without a part of their crop, second, they have to pay the interest on the money borrowed by the ağa. However, the mechanism described by Bozarslan seems to be rather exaggerated. Can the ağa use the same mechanism for everybody? And more than once? Would the villagers not rebel against such blatant exploitation?

Now let us consider another example of the Agricultural Bank's mediation, albeit unintentionally, in the exploitation of needy producers. Until very recently the Agricultural Bank used to mediate between the producers and the Ziraat Dairesi (Agricultural Office) in the provision of artificial fertilisers. The Agricultural Bank pays the

Agricultural Office for the amount of fertiliser it gives to the producers and the amount is determined by the area of land owned and the type of crop cultivated. The producers are thus indebted to the Agricultural Bank without any cash transaction having taken place and before they obtain the artificial fertilisers. Since most of the producers are in need of cash to meet their consumption needs, and they are mostly not familiar with the use of artificial fertilisers, they would sell the fertilisers to a merchant at a lower price than they bought it. The merchants in turn would sell the fertilisers to other producers who could not get fertilisers from the Agricultural Office through the mediation of the Agricultural Bank for various reasons. They may not have large enough lands to make them eligible for obtaining fertilisers from the Agricultural Office, they may already be indebted to the Agricultural Bank, which would not give them more credit, owing to the fact that the working credits given to farmers were frozen, they might believe that the corrupt bank officials would not give them any credit,²⁴ they may be tired of the bureaucratic nature of the transactions which may take weeks, or even months.

At the time of our fieldwork the Agricultural Bank had already stopped giving fertiliser credits and the producers had to pay promptly for the fertilisers if they wanted to obtain some. Most of the small producers did not even try to get any fertilisers from the Agricultural Office since they did not have the necessary cash for the purchase. However, the merchants who also engage in buying and selling fertiliser still find other ways of obtaining supplies of fertilisers. Officially it is illegal to buy and sell fertilisers, and some other agricultural chemicals which are distributed by government agencies.

Nevertheless, there were three merchants in Ergani engaged in the buying and selling of fertilisers illegally. One of them was getting fertilisers from the Agricultural Office by bribing the officials, while the other two were buying it from the producers. The three merchants have grocery shops in Ergani town, and have very close relations with some of the producers, who are dependent on these grocers for some of their food supplies and are indebted to them. The merchants ask some of their indebted clients to get fertiliser for them from the Agricultural Office. The merchants were paying 200TL per ton and were able to gain 1,500TL from the sale of that amount.

Of course, not everybody could get fertilisers from the Agricultural Office, since it requires the official confirmation of the village headman as to whether or not the applicant has a certain number of dönüms of land. This is because no cadastral survey has been carried out in the villages and the muhtar's (village headman) approval is considered sufficient for the allocation of artificial fertiliser. Those small producers who cannot obtain fertiliser from the Agricultural Office are left at the mercy of the merchants, who were charging 2.5TL for one kilo of fertiliser, while the official price was around 1TL. This is particularly so in the case of the small vegetable producers, who only need about 20 to 50 kilos of fertiliser. They cannot get such a small amount from the Agricultural Office, and have to buy it from the black market.

In some cases the big landlords themselves sell fertilisers to small producers from neighbouring villages, or to their sharecroppers, at

a price higher than the officially declared prices. For instance, Zülküf Ağa of Gozlu village in the Ergani district is able to get many tons of fertiliser from the Agricultural Office because he owns large areas of land (about 10,000 dönüms) and can bribe the officials. He uses some of the fertiliser on his farm and sells the rest to the neighbouring villagers who cannot get it from the Agricultural Office. They are quite happy about this situation because they are thus saved from the drudgery of transporting the fertiliser from the town to the village. Furthermore, and more important, they can buy it from the ağa by instalment. Zülküf Ağa also gives some of his relatively less fertile lands to sharecroppers who bear the cost of production, the only thing provided by Zülküf Ağa being the seed. At the beginning of the agricultural year Zülküf Ağa agrees to give his lands to sharecroppers on the condition that they will use artificial fertilisers in production. Since the sharecroppers do not own any land or own only very little land they cannot get fertilisers from the Agricultural Office. Even if they had enough land to make them eligible to obtain fertiliser from the Agricultural Office it has to be approved by the village headman, who himself is under the strict control of Zülküf Ağa. So, eventually the sharecroppers have to apply to Zülküf Ağa to buy fertilisers on credit. Zülküf Ağa doubly benefits from all these transactions, to the detriment of his sharecroppers. First, he gets half of the crops without doing any work in its production, second, he gets a part of the sharecroppers' shares as the difference between the price he initially pays for the fertilisers and the price he charges his sharecroppers. Of course, he also benefits from the increase in production resulting from the use of fertilisers in production.

The Agricultural Bank not only appropriates a part of the surplus or of the necessary production of the producers in the form of interest, but it also paves the way for some to exploit others by way of its credit policy. We have already stated that the big landowners receive the lion's share of the credits. This is also evident from the data collected from our fieldwork. We mentioned that the credits given to the producers from Gısgıs village where small landownership is dominant ranged from 300TL to 10,000TL. In Kalhana, where big landownership is dominant, landlords receive a sizeable amount of credit, not only as working credits but also as equipment credits. For instance, the credit allocation for Suat Gldođan was 500,000TL, for Memduh Gldođan it was 750,000TL, for Havva Gldođan it was 100,000TL. These figures are astronomical compared with the 300TL which was received by some of the small producers.

Big landlords do not use all of their credits in agriculture, they sometimes invest it in more profitable areas, such as transport, commerce, etc , and they sometimes engage in usury. This latter aspect allows them to tie the poor peasants to the farm so that they can make use of their labour in the peak season. For instance, in Kalhana most of the landless rural poor were indebted to one of either Suat, Memduh or Havva. Also, Memduh and Suat engage in other sorts of activities besides agriculture. Suat is the owner of the only two petrol stations in Ergani, his father had taken over one of them from a relative before his death, having realised the lucrative nature of being an agent for British Petroleum. Suat opened the second petrol station, with the credit received from the Agricultural Bank, a few miles outside the

town, on the main highway between Diyarbakır and Elazığ, which links them to Ankara and Istanbul. As to Memduh, he became a partner in a small building construction company with the credit he received from the Agricultural Bank for the purposes of opening a chicken farm in Kalhana.²⁵

Of course, these examples are related to the misuse of large scale agricultural credits. Relatively small amounts of credits are also misused. For instance, Celal Pala borrowed 4,500TL from the Agricultural Bank and used it to open a grocery shop in Gısgıs, and Abdülkerim Uney used his 9,000TL credit to pay the advance on a jointly owned minibus, to transport passengers between Gısgıs, Ergani and Diyarbakır.

From the above we can conclude that agricultural credits are not sufficient to be used in production and they are unequally distributed among the farmers. Furthermore, small producers are left at the mercy of merchants, usurers and big landlords in terms of credits, seeds and fertilisers etc.

UNORGANISED CREDIT IN ERGANI

The credits extended by those other than organised institutions take two forms credits in kind and credits in cash. The relations between the producers and the merchants (grocers) play an important role in the credit mechanism in Ergani district. All through the year small

producers and the village poor are in need of both cash and consumption goods, and village or town grocers supply the consumption needs of the producers' or the village poor's families. The prices are fixed by the grocer, and of course are much higher than market prices. At the end of the harvest the producer has to give his produce to the grocer at a price lower than the market price. The village poor pay their debts with the money earned from working as casual labourers, either in building construction, or in agriculture, working as cotton pickers and hoeers in the Çukurova region. The price of the product is fixed by verbal contract, before the grocer will supply the producer with consumption goods. The producer's exploitation by the grocer is two-fold. first, he pays more for the goods than their market price, second, his products are sold at a lower price. Under these conditions small producers can never repay their debts to the grocer, and the unpaid amount is transferred to the following year. In the long run the small producer has to sell his land and other assets (draught animals, household utensils etc.), and becomes impoverished, searching for work for his family's subsistence.

In 1977 the village grocer in Cısgıs, Celal Pala, was supplying some of his clients with consumption goods such as sugar, macaronı, salt, cigarettes, paraffın etc. on credit. The repayment was agreed to be fresh vegetables (tomatoes, peppers and aubergines), melon, grapes, eggs and butter, all at prices lower than current market prices. For instance, he would accept tomatoes, peppers and aubergines at a price 1TL lower than the market price in Ergani. He had arranged with some grocers in Ergani to supply them with fresh vegetables, and he made

about 0.75TL per kilo of vegetables simply by transferring them to the town. Since he is the only grocer (the other had just closed down) in the village, most of the peasants have to shop from him. It is a fact that in some parts of Turkey, like in Ergani, people will do their shopping from the same grocer in the town all the time, and sometimes the people of a whole village will do their shopping from the same grocer.²⁶ For instance, most of the villagers of Kalhana, Malan and Aşağı Balahur villages shop from the same grocer in Ergani.

Sometimes credits in kind end up with a pledge mechanism. When the indebted person cannot repay his debt he pledges his land to the creditor for a certain period of time (generally for four to seven years) during which time the creditor has usage rights to the land. In return the owner does not pay interest on the amount he owes to the creditor. If the loan is not paid back in due time the creditor has the right to sell the land to recover his initial loss. Of course it is impossible for the producer to repay his debt under these conditions, and he ends up by losing his means of production. In most cases, during the pledge years the merchant gives the mortgaged land to its real owner to cultivate on a sharecropping basis. Because of his indebtedness to the merchant the producer is reduced to the position of a tenant on his own land. He has to hand over at least half of his produce to the merchant. The producer not only loses his land at the end of the mortgage period, but also his labour is exploited, and his product extracted from him during this time.

In Gısgis A K Üney and his partner are also dealing in the buying and selling of grain, mainly wheat. Since most of the producers in Gısgis have reserved a part of their farm for vegetable production some of them are unable to produce enough wheat for their home consumption. A.K Üney and his partner bring in lorryloads of wheat to sell on credit in the village. Payment is made either in kind or in cash at the time of the harvest. The rate of profit is between 50 and 100 per cent. If the payment is in kind, at harvest time the debtor has to deliver one and a half times as much wheat as he borrowed initially.

Around Kalhana region, the villages of Kalhana, Malan, and Aşağı Balahur grow cotton as a cash crop. Cotton merchants in Ergani give credit to those who need cash to pay their agricultural labourers, rent tractors or buy seeds, artificial fertilisers etc. Since the credit supplied by the Agricultural Bank is very limited for small producers they apply to the merchants and usurers, who are in most cases one and the same people, for credit and other facilities. Repayment of debts takes different forms. Sometimes it is paid in cash with interest varying from 50 to 200 per cent. Sometimes it is paid in kind at a price fixed by the merchant-usurer, much lower than the normal price for the goods in question. In this case the producer has to hand over his product to the merchant-usurer at the merchant-usurer's place, generally in his store. The type of crop to be grown is sometimes decided by the merchant-usurer, who does not control the means of production. Although household labour, and to a certain extent wage-labour, is used in the actual production process, merchant capital controls the production. For it provides an initial sum of

money and receives products, the value of which is greater than the initial money invested.

In this example the risks in production are borne by the owner of the land. The merchant-usurer does not concern himself with the fate of the production. He is only concerned with the money he has loaned, and its interest. However, there are certain cases in which merchants take on half of the risks involved, by becoming a partner of the landowner. The merchant pays rent for the land, and gives seed to the owner, thus entitling the merchant to receive half of the crop produced. All the other costs of production are borne by the actual owner of the land. If a loan is received by the owner of the land then the interest mechanism becomes operational. At harvest time the merchant gets half of the crop plus a part of his partner's share for the loan made. The price of the partner's share is pre-fixed by mutual agreement, at a level generally lower than the market price.

Apart from the mechanisms described above, which involve either credit in kind or repayment in kind, or both, there also exists usury in the area. Usurers advance credits at high interest. Among the many reasons for which one may apply to usurers in the area the principal reason is in order to buy necessary consumption goods for the family. Dowry payment, wedding and circumcision ceremonies, crop failures, having son(s) in the army, illnesses, natural disasters (such as earthquakes) and house building are among some of the other major reasons for resorting to borrowing from a usurer.

The rural poor, who have no land and choose to set up in business as cerçi (peddlars) also undergo certain exploitation through credit mechanisms. Cerçis are those people travelling between remote villages and the town, selling small kitchen utensils, glasses, buttons and such like. If the cerçi does not have the initial capital to set up the business he either applies to a wholesaler in the town or to a usurer (faiz aña). The cerçi commutes between the town and the villages for nine months of the year, on a donkey or mule, then he loses a part of any profit he makes in interest payments. If he makes a loss he still has to repay his debt with interest, usually he ends up selling his small plot of land or his house or household utensils.²⁷

We can conclude that a part of the peasant household's surplus is drained away through credit mechanisms (organised/unorganised). In order to be able to produce this surplus the peasant household has to either lengthen the working period or reduce the level of consumption. This is called "simple reproduction 'squeeze'" by Henry Bernstein.²⁸

Commoditisation of the peasant household production pushes the peasant household more and more into the exploitative arms of the merchants and usurers. Of course, international and home markets play a decisive role in the determination of the type of commodities to be produced by the peasant household. In order to appropriate a part of the surplus produced by the peasants the larger structures regulate

the prices of these products. In the next chapter we shall attempt to show how the market mechanism is used in the expropriation of the surplus produced by the peasant household.

NOTES

1. See Ümit Hassan, "Tarımsal Kredi Sorunları - Özellikle Tefecilik" (Problems of Agricultural Credits with Special Emphasis on Usury), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XXV, No 4 (December 1970), pp. 88-98
 2. Yusuf Saim Atasagun, "Türkiye'de Teşkilatlı Zırai Kredi Dağıtımının Bugünkü Durumu" (The Current State of the Distribution of Organised Agricultural Credit in Turkey), in Oguz Arı (Ed.), Köy Sosyolojisi Okuma Kitabı (Rural Sociology Handbook) (1977).
 3. *ibid.*, p 83.
 4. See Asım Sureyya İloğlu, Memleketimizde Teşkilatlı Zırai Kredi (Organised Agricultural Credit in Our Country) (1968), pp. 1-11.
 5. The information concerning the types of agricultural credits is derived from Tahir Sayın, Zırai Krediden İstifade Şartları (Conditions for Obtaining Agricultural Credit) (1969), pp. 17-19 and p 43.
 6. İsmail Cem, Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi (The History of Underdevelopment in Turkey) (1970), pp. 437 and 439.
- M. Halil, Atatürk'ün Dışpolitika ve NATO ve Türkiye (Atatürkist Foreign Policy and NATO and Turkey) (1968), p. 191.
- Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni Dün - Bugün - Yarın (The Order of Turkey. Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow) (1968), pp. 401-402.
7. See Avcıoğlu, *op. cit.* (1968), pp. 351-358 and Cem, *op. cit.* (1970), pp. 387-388. See also Stefanos Yerasimos, Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye (Turkey in the Process of Underdevelopment), III (1976), pp. 1344-1346.
 8. Avcıoğlu, *op. cit.* (1968), p. 402.
 9. Osman Ökyar, "Zırai Fiyat Politikası Türk Tecrübesi" (Agricultural Price Policy The Turkish Experience) (n.d.), p. 8.
 10. William H. Nicholls, "Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries", American Economic Review (May 1955). See also Yahya Kanbolat, Türkiye Ziraatında Bunye Değişikliği (Structural Change in Turkish Agriculture) (1963), p. 19, for the effect of mechanisation on agriculture following the decision taken in 1948 to give priority to agricultural development.
 11. Suat Aksoy, 100 Soruda Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi (The Land Problem in Turkey in 100 Questions) (1969), p. 72.
 12. *ibid.*, p 72.

13. *ibid.*, p. 75
14. See Hassan, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 90.
15. Mehmet Şukru Koc, Ulus, XXVII, No. 9 (1969).
16. For a similar assessment see Ziya Gokalp Mulayım, "Tarımda Tefecilik Sorunu" (The Usury Problem in Agriculture), Ulus, VII, no. 1 (1968) and Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, Doğunun Sorunları (The Problems of the East) (1966), pp. 42-46, for the working of the credit mechanism and the significance of agadom in Eastern Anatolia.
17. For the development of co-operatives in Turkey see Ziya Gokalp Mulayım, Tarımsal Kooperatıfçılık (Agricultural Co-operativism) (1967), pp. 18-24 and pp. 91-109.
18. Nabil Dinçer *et al.* "Kooperatıfçılık Sorunları Araştırması" (Research on the Problems of Co-operativism) (1969), p. 54.
19. Hassan, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 93.
20. *ibid.*, p. 94.
21. For this point see Hassan, *op. cit.* (1970), pp. 95-98.
22. This categorisation is mainly derived from Atasagun, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 96-116. For a similar approach see Hassan, *op. cit.* (1970) and, for a discussion of an earlier period see also İsmail Husrev Tokın, Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı (Village Economics in Turkey) (1934), pp. 146-151.
23. Bozarslan, *op. cit.* (1966), pp. 44-45.
24. This last case is true for other parts of Turkey as well, for instance Mübâccel Belik Kıray states that the villagers would not go to banks for credit, believing that "the bank helps those whose ship floats, not those whose ship rolls", meaning that the bank helps those whose business goes well, not those who are in trouble, in Kıray, Ereğli Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası (Ereğli A Coastal Town Before Heavy Industry) (1964), p. 62.
25. See Chapter III, p. 198.
26. Kıray, *op. cit.* (1964), pp. 61-63, indicates the same tendency in the Ereğli region.
27. Bozarslan, *op. cit.* (1966), p. 42.
28. See Henry Bernstein, "Notes on Capital and Peasantry" in Review of African Political Economy, No. 10 (September-December 1977), pp. 64-65.

CHAPTER VIII

Marketing goods produced by the villagers plays an important role in the reproduction cycle of the peasant family and in the reproduction of the relations of production they are involved in. Market relations help us to gain a deeper understanding of relations between direct producers, merchants, landlords, and the state. In this chapter we shall attempt to explain how the marketing of agricultural goods is organized at the level of Turkish social formations and then move to the fieldwork to see manifestations of this general tendency at local levels. Nevertheless, prior to examining the marketing structures it is necessary to outline the transportation network within which marketing operations take place.

TRANSPORTATION NETWORK IN TURKEY

The transportation network and the means of transport are vitally important for the development of the internal market as well as for the international movement of goods. In this introductory section, drawing on statistical data, we shall try to see the extent of the development of transportation in Turkey. It should be noted, however, that since air transport and shipping play a minimal role in the circulation of goods in the Turkish economy we shall mainly concentrate on the highway and railway.

TABLE 8.1 Highways in Turkey (in Kilometres)

YEAR	SURFACED ROADS	GRADED EARTH AND PRIMITIVE ROADS	TOTAL
1933	16,182	21,227	37,409
1935	16,363	22,436	38,799
1940	18,231	23,351	41,582
1945	20,041	23,470	43,511
1949	22,376	22,525	44,903
1955	31,679	23,129	55,008
1960	42,034	19,503	61,537
1965	42,587	16,205	58,792
1970	48,125	11,328	59,453
1975	51,534	7,530	59,064
1976	51,943	7,673	59,616

Source: State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook(s)
of Turkey 1950, 1960-62, 1973 and 1977b

Although the Turkish highways network has increased by about 59 per cent between 1933 and 1976 it is far from being good enough for such a large country. A comparison with other countries will show that the highways network of Turkey is very small. According to Eurostat 1977¹ while highways in Turkey totalled 188,100 kilometres² in 1975 this figure is 400,100 in West Germany, 1,479,200 in France and 343,900 in England, which is almost one third of the size of Turkey.

Of course, the figures given in the table above do not reveal anything about the conditions of the roads. Some of the roads included in the statistics hardly qualify for that name. For instance in 1975 there existed 4,643 kilometres of primitive roads in Turkey. In the following table we see the distribution of the state highways and provincial roads by surface type in 1975.

TABLE E 2 Highways in Turkey in 1976

SURFACED ROADS	KILOMETRES	GRADED EARTH ROADS	KILOMETRES
Bituminous surfacing	26,714	with drainage	1,157
Stone block	189	Without drainage	1,764
Crushed stone	449		
Stabilised	24,599		
		Total	2,921
Total	51,943		
		PRIMITIVE ROADS	4,752
Total highways		59,616 kilometres	

Source State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1977b

Weather conditions make it extremely difficult to use some of the primitive and graded earth roads in the winter. So, when we use statistics we must be careful not to be misled.

The construction of highways in Turkey seems to have speeded up since the 1950s. While 7,494 kilometres were constructed in the 16 years between 1933 and 1949, the figure increased to 14,712 kilometres in the following 26 years. This is hardly surprising, as the more new areas are brought under commercial relations the more roads are built. From the late sixties onwards the government seems to have given priority to highway construction, rather than railways, which are owned by the State. The introduction of the car assembly industry and the interests of foreign companies like Renault and Fiat as well as the interests of their local representatives play an important part in the government's policy favouring highways.

TABLE 8.3 Number of Some Motor Vehicles in Turkey

YEAR	CARS	LORRIES	BUSES	MINIBUSES	PICK-UP TRUCKS
1946	3,649	5,417	1,213	n.a.*	n.a.
1949	8,001	11,470	2,622	n.a.	n.a.
1955	29,970	34,424	6,848	n.a.	n.a.
1960	45,767	57,460	10,981	n.a.	n.a.
1965	87,584	79,121	22,169	n.a.	n.a.
1970	137,771	70,730	15,980	20,916	52,152
1975	383,385	108,614	22,928	39,924	93,046
1976	471,456	124,569	24,581	46,575	111,930

* n a - data not available

Source State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook(s) of Turkey, 1950, 1960-62, 1970, 1973 and 1977b

It is clear that motor vehicles are gaining more and more importance in the transportation network in Turkey. The seating capacity of minibuses and buses has increased from 36,069 in 1969 to 71,156 in 1976.³ It is not possible, however, to get the exact number of passengers carried by minibuses and buses, owing to the difficulty involved in gathering information from many small privately owned businesses. The same thing holds true for the amount of goods transported by the lorries and pick-up trucks. However, we are able to say that the load capacity of the trucks and pick-up trucks has almost doubled between 1969 and 1976, increasing from 118,133 tons to 236,499 tons.⁴

RAILWAYS

Turkish railways are run by the General Directorate of State Railways, which was founded in 1927 before the Republic was founded in 1923.

the railways within the Ottoman Empire were run by foreign companies. The extent of railroads in Turkey shows the following developments since 1923

TABLE 8.4 Railway Network in Turkey (in Kilometres)

YEAR	DISTANCE
1923	3,756
1930	5,632
1935	6,669
1940	7,381
1945	7,515
1950	7,671
1955	7,802
1960	7,882
1965	8,008
1970	7,985
1975	8,138
1976	8,138

Source State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook(s) of Turkey, 1950, 1960-62, 1970, 1973 and 1977b

It is evident that most of the rail network built during the Republic was constructed within the two decades following the establishment of the Republic. The policy of state capitalism was effective in developing the railway network. From 1940 onwards state capitalism slackened and Turkey became more closely linked to the West, especially the USA, who urged Turkey to give priority to private enterprise, rather than public enterprise. As a result, public enterprise declined and railway construction suffered its share of the effects of this decline. Instead of railways the highways were developed so that a new market could be developed for the western motor vehicle industry.

Although the extent of the railways has increased since 1923 from 3,756 kilometres to 8,138 kilometres in 1976, the existing lines are virtually all single track lines, which causes excessive delays in transportation. This makes it impossible for the state railways to compete with private transport companies which use the highways. However, in the transportation of bulky goods, where a few days of delay in transportation would not matter much, the railways seem to be preferred, since they offer extremely cheap freight charges. In this way the state railways play a very important role in the circulation of goods within the internal market, as well as linking the internal with the external market. In the following table we see the freight transport of Turkish Railways in 1976

TABLE 8.5 Freight Transport of Turkish Railways in 1976

GOODS	THOUSANDS OF TONS
Agricultural products	910
Livestock	122
Minerals and ores	7,978
Fuel-oil	438
Wood products	98
Vehicles	82
Chemicals and nitrogenous fertilisers	602
Olivecakes and livestock food	300
Other	2,937
	<hr/>
Total	13,467

Source State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1977b

From the above we can conclude that both the highways and the railways in Turkey, although they helped a lot in the development of the

internal market, are not efficient enough for the movement of both goods and people. However, through the introduction of new lines more and more remote parts of the country have been brought under the influence of market relations and therefore the production in these regions is gradually becoming commercialised.

MARKETING STRUCTURES IN TURKEY

As in most of the underdeveloped countries the agricultural sector accounts for a decisive part of the gross national product in Turkey.

TABLE 8.6 Origin of Gross National Product (Producers' Prices)

SECTOR	CURRENT PRICES				CONSTANT PRICES			
	1974	1975	1976	1977	1974	1975	1976	1977
Agriculture	25.2	25.0	25.9	25.8	21.9	22.5	22.5	21.6
Industry	21.4	21.0	20.7	20.7	24.2	24.4	24.8	25.5
Construction	4.6	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8
Trade	13.2	13.0	13.0	12.6	13.2	13.4	13.5	13.7
Other	35.6	36.3	35.6	35.9	34.9	33.9	33.4	33.3
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
GDP	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, The Turkish Economy: Prospects for Growth Within Stability, Istanbul, TUSIAD, 1978

In its efforts to industrialise or to speed up industrialisation and development the state apparatus pays particular attention to the policy of transferring resources from the agricultural to the

industrial sector. In order to achieve this a price regulation system has been developed in Turkey. There are doubts about the extent to which this policy is successful in transferring resources from agriculture to industry, and we shall see later that it is merchant capital which benefits from the agricultural price policy rather than industrial capital. Furthermore, not only does agriculture comprise a major part of the Gross National Product but it is also the main source of foreign currency earnings, which is crucial for the development of Turkey's industry, the working of which depends to a large extent upon the importation of oil, raw materials, intermediate goods, technology and know-how. For instance, in 1977 59.4 per cent of total export earnings was obtained from the export of agricultural goods. (See Table 8.7)

The four most important export crops are hazelnuts, cotton, tobacco and dried raisins. The government each year declares "floor prices" for the most important crops other than some fruits and vegetables. The state buys most cereal crops through its agency Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Office of Soil Products) and most export crops through state-backed agricultural sales co-operatives such as Çukobirlik, Antbirlik, Tarış, Fışkobirlik etc. It should also be pointed out that the "floor prices" policy has gradually enlarged its spheres of influence since the 1960s. While the number of crops with prices fixed by the government did not exceed six or seven in 1963, the number of crops included in the "floor prices" policy in 1975 was nineteen. The crops with prices fixed by the government in 1975 were wheat, barley, sweet-corn, cotton, raisins, dried figs, sunflower seeds, unhusked rice,

pistachio nuts, sugar beet, hazelnuts, sultanas, tea, tobacco, wool, olive oil, livestock and silk cocoons. A point of interest is that all the crops added to the list in the policy of 1975 were those other than cereals.⁵

When the price of a particular crop is fixed for a year several factors are borne in mind by the government. For instance, the price of wheat in most years is fixed above world prices because the rural masses play an important and determining role in elections. Political parties, in order to gain votes and maintain popularity among the rural people, pay particular attention to give high prices to cereals, which are mainly consumed within the country. This policy seems to be paradoxical. On the one hand the government tries to speed up industrialisation through new investments that are accumulated in the hands of industrialists, on the other hand by giving high prices to wheat they would raise the cost of living of the working class since wheat and wheat products are the staple diet in Turkey. This in turn enforces the working class to seek higher wages, thereby hindering capital accumulation in the industrial sector.

Would the ever-strengthening Turkish capitalist allow such things to take place of course not. What happens is that the state ensures that the price of bread is kept low. The mechanism is as follows Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi buys the wheat from the producer at the fixed price which is higher than the world price. Then the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi, in accordance with the law, hands over the wheat, ten kilograms per person, to local administrations, which act as co-ordinators

between the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi and the wheat mills. This transaction is made at a subsidised price which is much lower than the market price, the loss being carried by the state treasury. For instance the total cost of the agricultural price support schemes rose from some 550 million Turkish lira in 1950 to 5,900 million Turkish lira in 1971.⁶

The champions of the price support policy have been claiming that through this policy they have been protecting low income groups of both rural and urban origin. By keeping the price of bread down the cost of living of the urban poor is lowered, and by giving a high price for wheat the income of small farmers is increased. This is far from being a convincing argument. It is obvious that the high price policy is one of the reasons for the high rate of inflation in Turkey, and it is the people with low incomes who are most affected by the inflation. As to the rural areas, it is still less likely that the small producers benefit from this policy. It cannot be denied that some producers benefit from the implementation of the price support policy for wheat, but the question is whether or not small producers benefit from this policy, and if not, then who is the beneficiary? Only those who produce more wheat than their consumption needs, in other words those who have a marketable surplus of wheat, benefit from the high price of wheat. (We shall see that small farmers in Cizgis and Kalhana do not sell wheat in the market, rather they buy a proportion of their wheat.)

We have seen that the majority of Turkish farmers are small farmers and we have also mentioned that wheat is the staple diet in Turkey.

Small farmers who do not have any, or have very little wheat to sell, definitely do not benefit from this policy, only a very small minority of the farmers, landlords, and ağas in Eastern Anatolia, who produce wheat, benefit from this policy. Peasants producing wheat only for their home consumption, and the rural and urban poor, who have to buy most of their needs are affected by this policy in a negative way. First, they have to pay more for the things they buy because with this policy inflation is intensified, second, if they do not produce enough wheat to meet their needs they have to pay a high price in the market. By way of conclusion we can say that it is very doubtful that an increase in the price of wheat, under the pretext of protecting the rural masses, will result in an increase in the standard of living of the rural population

The question of who is selling wheat seems to be crucial in understanding who benefits from the high price policy. Therefore it is vital to examine the distribution of holdings that are concerned with the production of wheat. According to the results of the Agricultural Census carried out in 1963 there are two million wheat producing holdings. Of these 5.5 per cent produce 32 per cent of the total wheat, and cumulatively 18.5 per cent of the total holdings produce 53.5 per cent of the total wheat. This shows that only a small minority of the wheat producers are positively affected by this policy in Turkey.

However, in 1970 the existing government seemed to be following a different policy, in accordance with the conditions laid down by the

International Monetary Fund. Increasing economic difficulties, especially the shortage of foreign currency, which is necessary for the importation of raw materials and intermediate goods for industry, led the government to seek financial help from international organisations. One of the conditions laid down by the International Monetary Fund was that the Turkish government should not follow an inflationary price policy of subsidisation of agricultural goods. The first thing the government did was to declare that the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi was to cut down the provision of wheat by 50 per cent, and also the subsidisation of the price of wheat was stopped. No longer could the flour factories obtain cheap wheat from the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi and so they had to find wheat in the market. This boosted the market price of wheat.

What followed was that the price of wheat in the world market rose by about 30 per cent to 200 Dollars per ton in 1979, owing to a bad harvest in the USSR which is the biggest wheat producer and importer in the world and which had to buy 25 million tons of wheat from the USA.⁷ Seeing the possibility of exporting some wheat the government declared a very low floor price for wheat, 420 kuruş per kilo, while the world price for wheat was about 700 kuruş per kilo. Another measure taken to secure some foreign currency through the export of wheat, and to prevent the merchants from benefitting from this policy, was to prohibit the export of wheat by anybody other than the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi. However, things did not go as the government planned. The wheat merchants offered 430 kuruş per kilo and collected the wheat from the producers' store. Milliyet, a daily newspaper, reported on the 24th July 1979

...producers in Kırklareli do not give their wheat to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi. They prefer the merchants since this saves them expenses.

and continues

Since the government has declared the floor price for wheat to be 420 kuruş merchants have been buying wheat at 430 kuruş from the producers' store....

When producers take their wheat to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi the price of wheat drops to 400 kuruş from 420 kuruş, owing to factors like weighing charges, the degree of humidity of the crop, cleanness of the crop, etc. In addition to which, the need to queue for a number of days urges the producers to sell their wheat to merchants. In contrast to the situation in the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi merchants go to the producers and without charging them anything they pay them 430 to 440 kuruş according to the condition of the wheat.

The above is but one example. Similar developments have taken place all over Turkey, as verified by statements given by the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi officials. For instance, Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Istanbul Regional Directorate declared that until 26th July 1979 they could only buy 36 thousand tons of wheat, whereas they had purchased 450 thousand tons by the same date in the previous year. Authorities of the Istanbul Directorate had stated that "We were expecting to buy about 700 to 800 thousand tons of wheat this year. Unexpectedly we have only been able to buy 37 thousand tons so far".⁸ The daily paper Cumhuriyet also states that in other regional directorates of Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi such as Ankara, Afyon, Konya, Iskenderun and Diyarbakir the amounts of wheat sold to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi have considerably fallen, in comparison to the previous year. The worst hit region is Trakya, where some people spread the rumour that "this government is about to fall, the coming government will give a

better price for wheat - 470 kuruş is too low. Even the merchants offer 455 to 460 kuruş for a kilo of wheat. Towards the winter the price of wheat may go up to 800 kuruş".⁹ In the same article Cumhuriyet states that despite all the rumours the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi authorities had emphasised that there was to be no price rise for wheat. This was confirmed by the Inter-Ministerial Economic Co-ordination Committee (Bakanlıklararası Ekonomik Koordinasyon Kurulu) which discussed the question of giving a premium of 50 to 100 kuruş per kilo of wheat to those who had sold and those who were going to sell their wheat to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi and decided against this plan on the grounds that merchants had already bought considerable amounts of wheat from the producers. A decision to give 50 to 100 kuruş premium per kilo would enable the merchants to make huge profits by selling to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi the wheat they had already bought from the producers.¹⁰

Despite all their good intentions the government could not resist the merchants' insistence that the price given for wheat should be raised. Having insisted that there was not going to be a rise in the price of wheat the government suddenly changed its mind. This was under pressure from the merchants, whose interests are strongly represented in parliament. On the 13th of September 1979 the government announced that those who had sold their wheat to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi would get 80 kuruş premium per kilo, and those still to sell their wheat to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi in the future would also benefit from this implementation.¹¹

Through this change of policy the government acted as a bridge in the transfer of value from the producers, mainly small producers, to the merchants. It was only small producers who had sold their wheat to the merchants, for they could not afford to store their products. This was because first, they needed cash for their immediate needs, second, they are mostly indebted to merchants and landlords, banks, etc., and third, either they do not have anywhere to store their produce or their stores are not suitable for keeping the produce in good condition. The small producers sold their crops to merchants because merchants were offering more than the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi at that time. On the other hand, big landlords who in some cases are also merchants, were in a position to stock their produce. Moreover, having close contact with the officials, and also being able to follow market movements, they were in a position to know that there was going to be a rise in the price of wheat. We may, therefore, conclude that the state plays an intermediary role in the exploitation of the small producers by merchants and big landlords.

So far we have looked at the state's price policy concerning wheat. We shall now briefly examine the effects of the price policy followed by the government in terms of other important crops, such as cotton, hazelnuts, tobacco etc. While doing this we shall also try to draw attention to some of the relations of production in which the producers of these crops are involved, which would directly or indirectly affect the distribution of these crops and the circulation of money involved in the marketing of these crops.

As we stated earlier, and as is clear from the following two tables, agricultural products account for the majority of the exported commodities, in spite of some relative drop in significance since 1963.

TABLE 8.7 Turkish Exports (in Terms of Earnings)

SECTOR	1963	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Agricultural	79.4	63.2	55.6	56.6	64.0	59.4
Manufacturing Industry	17.6	33.6	39.2	35.8	30.4	33.4
Mining	3.0	3.2	5.2	7.6	5.6	7.2
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association,
Op. cit., 1978

TABLE 8.8 Turkish Exports (in Terms of Commodities) in 1976 & 1977
(in millions of US Dollars)

COMMODITY	1976	1977	INCREASE	DECREASE
Hazelnuts	203.2	251.0	47.8	
Tobacco	251.3	175.8		75.5
Cotton	438.2	213.6		224.6
Dried raisins	52.6	75.0	22.4	
Dried figs	20.6	25.2	4.6	
Figs	2.6	4.2	1.6	
Olive oil	2.8	35.3	32.5	
Oil cake	19.3	13.7		5.6
Molasses	4.4	3.5		0.9
Total of 9 commodities	995.0	797.3	108.9	306.6
Others	965.2	955.8		9.4
Grand total	1,960.2	1,753.1	108.9	316.0

Source Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association,
Op. cit., 1978

In fixing the price of agricultural goods the government seems to have been following a policy which would urge the producers to produce export crops. If we have a look at the rate of increase of the support prices for various crops we shall soon realise that export crops are favoured in comparison with others.

TABLE 8 9 Support Prices for Some Crops (Turkish lira per kilo)

CROP	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	% INCR. 1977-8	% INCR. 1978-9
Cotton	7.83	8.00	10.08	10.75	13.75	25.00	27.9	81.82
Raisins	10.00	10.00	10.50	12.00	17.50	40.00	45.8	128.57
Sugar beet	0.40	0.50	0.58	0.63	0.80	1.30	27.0	62.5
Tea	6.25	7.50	8.50	10.00	12.00	n.a.	20.0	-
Pistachio nuts	25.00	26.50	-	-	26.50	-	-	-
Dried figs	5.00	6.00	7.00	8.00	10.50	22.00	31.2	109.52
Wheat	2.14	2.43	2.61	2.80	3.30	4.20	17.8	27.27
Sunflower seeds	-	5.50	5.75	6.50	8.50	-	30.8	-
Hazelnuts	13.50	14.00	14.50	16.50	21.50	37.50	30.3	74.42

Source: Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 2 August 1978 and 31 July 1979

There seems to be a huge increase in the support prices between 1978 and 1979 if we just look at the figures. However, this is not the case, as Aslan Başer Kafaoğlu writes

Compared with last year the price of cotton in the world (market) has risen by 30 per cent. Given the fact that prices in Turkey have gone up generally by around 40 per cent, the price of cotton should have been raised by 82 per cent. Coincidentally, the support price given by the government has been kept at the same level. Any price below that would have been unjust. Yet it looks as if the

price of cotton in the world conjuncture is going to go up. Therefore the price of cotton could have been declared slightly higher than the current support price.¹²

Kafaoğlu goes on to say that world prices for raisins and figs are more than 55 per cent higher than the previous year's prices. Then, taking into consideration the existing level of price rises in Turkey he calculates that the price increase should be around 117 per cent in these two crops. The difference between the government fixed prices and Kafaoğlu's calculation is negligible, knowing that world prices are likely to continue to rise

Furthermore, despite the fact that in comparison with cereals, export crops are favoured by the government in their price policy the prices given for these crops are not high enough to meet the increasing expenses of the growers of these crops. For instance, support prices given to four commercial crops (cotton, tea, sugar beet and hazelnuts) are lower than the production prices in some years. (See Table 1.22) A question arises Would the producers benefit if the government gave higher prices than the current internal and world market prices? The answer is both yes and no. Yes, for those who have control over their production process and own their land. No, for those who own insufficient or no land, who are indebted to merchants and landlords, who cannot find credits to run their farm and therefore lose their surplus to merchants

Many studies have shown that small producers, who are devoid of credit, fertilisers and other facilities are exploited by merchants. A few

examples will clarify the way in which small producers are exploited at the level of marketing. A research based on the data obtained from the ministries of Monopolies and of Commerce reveals that producers are working for the mediators. In 1964 export merchants bought 90,394 tons of tobacco for 611 million Turkish lira, of which 600 million had been obtained from the Central Bank and the average price paid for the tobacco was 6.76TL. Merchants claimed that they had spent 3.28TL per kilo on storage, processing, etc. though the study emphasised that these expenses would not exceed 2.00TL per kilo. Including 3.28TL per kilo as expenses one kilo of tobacco would cost the merchant 10.04TL, while the average export price of tobacco was 12.60TL per kilo. The total profit of the merchants was 231,408,640 million Turkish lira. This amount was shared by 100 export merchants, each of whom made an average of 2,314,000TL profit.¹³

It should also be pointed out that half of the 450,000 producers sold their tobacco to export merchants. According to the ministries mentioned above, the average production price for tobacco in 1964 was 6.20TL per kilo. The producers, therefore, parted with their tobacco for a 10 per cent profit, namely 0.56TL per kilo. The profit of the 227,000 families who did sell amounts to 50,620,000TL from the sale of 90,394 tons of tobacco. This should be contrasted to the 2,314,000TL average profit made by each merchant and examined in the context where the average annual profit of the tobacco producers is 223TL.¹⁴

A similar case can be observed for the cotton producers. According to a study based on data obtained from the Regional Agricultural Research Institute and Söke Agricultural Technicians Office, the price of production for cotton per decare in the case of land owned by the farmer is 249TL, while the income received per decare is 33.90TL. In return for his labour, therefore, the producer receives 84.90TL per decare. However, a farmer of 50 decares of land can obtain only one fourth of his credit requirements from the Bank and Co-operative and inevitably, he resorts to borrowing from usurers. For this reason the burden of interest amounts to 66.60TL per decare, leaving the farmer with a profit of 16.30TL per decare, or 815TL annual profit. Had it not been for the interest due, his annual income would have been 4,242TL¹⁵

Following a report that the usurers avoid income tax in Söke the tax inspectors have given the following report

The richness of the Aegean crops directly accrues to the usurers. Usury is very widespread in the Aegean region. .. The mechanism is as follows: agricultural credits are insufficient and are given to influential ağas and merchants. The needy producers have no alternative but to apply to usurers. Banks other than the Agricultural Bank issue credits only on condition that the merchant's guarantee is secured. Taking advantage of this the usurers open credits to producers with interest varying from 40 to 200 per cent. The average rate of interest is about 87 per cent. Söke produces 120 million Turkish liras worth of cotton per year. Despite a requirement of 59 million Turkish lira of credit in Söke the banks only provide 10 million Turkish lira at the most. Under these conditions usurers find incredible freedom of the movement in the area.¹⁶

A similar point is made by Z. G. Hülayım

Hundreds of thousands of farmers have to sell their cotton, whose floor price is about 2.20 to 2.30TL, before the harvest, at 1.30 to 1.70TL per kilo. It is these usurers/mediators who ruin the Turkish peasants, and who were declared "the enemies of the Turkish peasants" by the Tarsus farmers. It is perfectly clear that the problem the cotton producers encounter is not that of raising the floor prices by a few kurus, but rather that of being able to obtain the declared prices ¹⁷

The mechanism of exploitation of the cotton producers from production to exploitation is concisely described by I. Selçuk

(1) The expenses in irrigated cotton farming total about 300 to 325TL per decare, excluding land rent, and 250 to 300TL in unirrigated farming. The credits distributed by the Agricultural Bank are 115TL per decare, i.e. one third of the expenses, which is insufficient

(2) . The government intentionally does not open the cotton market until very late in the year. The agricultural sales co-operatives (Çukobirlik, Tarış and Antbirlik) cannot get the money from the government in time to buy cotton from their members, or the government deliberately avoids giving the money to the co-operatives.

(3) Each year, while on the one hand the rumour is spread to the effect that cotton production is going to be plentiful, and therefore quite a number of people will not be able to sell their cotton, on the other hand the cotton exporters spread another rumour that the price of cotton has gone down in the world market

(4) Having thus been panicked, the masses of producers are left at the mercy of cotton-gin owners and intermediaries. Co-operatives and Unions are not on the horizon yet. The cotton is acquired by underhand means at less than its value

(5) To these should be added the part played by the usurers who buy the crop before it is ripe, giving credit on the condition that the producer signs a sales contract before the harvest, thus enabling the usurer to obtain the crop at below its market value ¹⁸

The inability of the state and the state-backed co-operatives to buy up the whole production also forces the producers to sell their crops to merchants and usurers. For instance, Milliyet newspaper reports that the Çukobirlik, which buys cotton in accordance with the government's support price policy, can only buy 30 per cent of the harvest and the rest is sold to intermediaries. In the same article the leader of the Farmers' Union is quoted as saying

Cotton producers are very weak in facing the intermediaries. The producers who queue for days to sell their cotton are selling it at well below its value in order to avoid transport costs and to repay their debts. The fixed floor prices do not mean anything at all for the producers.¹⁹

Hazelnut producers also encounter similar difficulties. We shall not go into the particular details of how the hazelnut producer is affected by the price support policy, since this subject has been well documented elsewhere.²⁰

As a conclusion from the above, we may say that unless the inequalities among the producers in terms of the conditions of production are overcome a price policy would not be beneficial to small farmers. The inequity in land-human relations paves the way for the unequal distribution of the resources which are transferred from non-agricultural sectors to the agricultural sector. The poor become poorer, while the rich become richer. The inequalities between the poor and the rich are intensified through the state policy. The agricultural credits are insufficient and small producers have no, or very little access to these credits. In order to meet their credit needs small producers

have to accept the terms laid down by the merchants and usurers, which leaves them with no alternative but to sell their products at below the floor prices, either before or after the harvest. The price policy does not help the producers at all. It is the merchants and usurers who benefit from it

MARKETING STRUCTURES IN DIYARBAKIR

Diyarbakir province is a commercial centre for a number of surrounding provinces, such as Mardin, Siirt, Bitlis and Van. Commerce in the province is mainly based on agricultural products, livestock and livestock products which are produced within the province. However, the existence of quite a number of wholesalers, who act as bridges between industrial centres such as Istanbul and Adana, and the surrounding relatively small provinces, contributes to the importance of Diyarbakir as a business and commercial centre in the Southeast.

The following two tables show that Diyarbakir is a very vital commercial centre. In the first table we see the items imported into Diyarbakir from other places and in the second we see the items exported from Diyarbakir to other provinces.

A comparison between the two tables reveals that Diyarbakir province plays an intermediate role as a commercial centre. Most of the goods brought into the province from other regions are sold to the neighbouring provinces. Of the exported goods it is mostly agricultural ones which are produced within the boundaries of the province. Apart

from the agricultural products, oil, which has been extracted since 1961 by Shell and Turkish Petroleum, has been an important item in the economy of the province. The importance of oil for the province derives from its work provision for the local people. In 1972 for example Shell employed more than 150 local people.²¹ The oil extracted from 35 wells in Diyarbakır is pumped to Iskenderun through pipe lines. The daily amount of oil pumped to Iskenderun was 45,000 barrels which accounts for 53 per cent of the total oil extraction in Turkey.²² However, in short we may say that the goods sold to other regions mainly comprise oil, grain (wheat, barley, rice and millet), pulses, livestock, livestock products (butter, unprocessed leather, wool, intestines etc.), shelled nuts (almonds and walnuts), melons and water melons

TABLE 8 10 Goods Imported by Diyarbakır Province in 1969

TYPE	VALUE (million TL)	TYPE	VALUE (million TL)
Textiles	160	Lorries	5
Draperies	50	Glass	5
Fuel oil	50	Tea	5
Margarine	40	Luxury goods	5
Cement	20	Shoes	3
Timber	20	Carpets and mats	3
Iron	20	Electrical goods	3
Construction materials	10	Vegetables and fruit	3
Motor vehicle parts	30	Dried fruit	3
Agricultural tools	25	Olives	2
Intoxicants	25	Olive oil	2
Medicine	20	Soup	2
Sugar	10	Furniture	3
Books and stationery	3	Flour	2
Coal	5	Other	16

Total value of goods imported 550,000,000TL

Source Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı
(Diyarbakır in the 50th Anniversary of the Republic
1973 Provincial Yearbook), Ankara, İş Matbaacılık ve
Ticaret, 1973

TABLE 2.11 Goods Exported from Diyarbakir in 1969

TYPE	VALUE (million TL)	TYPE	VALUE (million TL)
Textile and drapery	149	Medicine	10
Minerals and unrefined oil	140	Rice	10
Groceries	50	Sugar and sweets	5
Intoxicants	40	Fuel and cooking equipment	5
Construction materials	40	Luxury goods	5
Grain	40	Silk and silk products	3
Livestock	40	Gall-nut and gum tragacanth	5
Livestock products	30	Other soil products	5
Wet butter	5	Tobacco	5
Margarine	30	Dried fruits	2
Agricultural tools	15	Shoes	2
Motor vehicle parts	15	Vegetables and fruit	2
Fuel oil	10	Books and stationery	2
Confectionery	10	Other	14
Melon and watermelon	20		

Total value of goods exported 700,000,000 TL

Source Cumhuriyetin 50. Yilinda Diyarbakir 1973 il Yilligi
 Ed. cit., 1973

The goods produced within the province are transported to other places either by rail or by road and the transportation by rail only accounts for about 30 per cent of the total,²³ while the rest is transported by road. According to the book Diyarbakir in the 50th Anniversary of the Republic 800 to 1,000 vehicles come and go in and out of Diyarbakir each day. Although the province centre is well connected with the other parts of Turkey we cannot say the same thing for the road network within the province. Compared to the 357 kilometres of state roads (of which 276 kilometres are asphalt, 61 kilometres stabilised and 20 kilometres graded earth without drainage) there exist 488 kilometres of provincial roads, of which 284 kilometres are stabilised and

the rest are earth roads. As to the village roads, Diyarbakir is poorly equipped. Within the boundaries of the province there are 1,856 inhabited places (this includes villages, mezras and koms) of which only 362 are connected with the nearest town by road. Of the total 1,378 kilometres of village roads 544 kilometres are graded roads and 834 kilometres are hard surfaced (kaplama) roads.²⁴

Of course, the lack of suitable roads makes it^l extremely difficult for the inhabitants of these places to transport their goods to the market. Even in the villages with road links it is very expensive and burdensome for small producers who have only very little marketable product to take their crops to the market. This leads this type of producer to sell his crops at a lower price to a middleman in the village, or to a middleman who comes to the village.

MARKETING STRUCTURES IN GISGIS AND KALHANI

In this section we shall deal with the extent of commercial relations in which the people of Gisgis and Kalhania are engaged. One way or another all of the households in the two villages are engaged either in buying or in selling, or in both activities. However, the degree to which the households are engaged in market relations varies considerably from household to household. In the case of grain, and especially wheat, 47 out of the 95 farming families in Gisgis did not have any surplus to sell in the market. Given that wheat and lentils constitute the basic diet of peasant families in the area, and that most of the holdings in the village are smaller than 50 dönüms, it is

hardly surprising that half of the farming families do not have any marketable grain. In some cases small farmers have to buy grain for their own consumption needs. The cash for this is then obtained either by selling vegetables and fruits or by working as seasonal wage labourers. Those who have a marketable grain surplus are faced with three alternatives: (a) to sell the surplus to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Soil Products Office) in Ergani, (b) to sell it to allafs (grain merchants) in Ergani, (c) to sell it within the village.

Although it is possible for the small producers to sell their grain to the state-owned Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi in practice this is almost out of the question. During our fieldwork the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Ergani agency had only three officials to deal with the buying of the grain produced in the whole district. The agency had one weighing station and no store. With the help of a few porters the grain was weighed, priced and stored in the open air by the three officials. Since the weighing and unloading process took quite a while there were queues of lorries waiting to be unloaded. During the peak season the duration of queuing may be as much as three or four days. Furthermore, the transportation fee for lorries was 500TL per day. Given that the floor price for wheat was 280TL per kilo in 1977, waiting three days in the queue would cost the producer 535 kilos of wheat, which means 10 per cent of a lorryload, (considering that a lorry would carry a load of 5 tons of wheat).

Apart from the difficulties arising from the lack of organisation and facilities in the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Ergani agency the attitude

of the officials towards small producers forces them to sell their crops to crop merchants. What was happening was that the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi officials were giving lower prices than the officially declared prices to those who had less than a lorryload of grain, by the ruse of claiming that the quality of the grain was below standard, or saying that there were strange materials mixed with the grain. So, under these and similar pretexts the small producers were given 2 40 to 2 50 TL per kilo, and they also were charged a certain amount toward the cost of unloading.

On the other hand, the allafs were offering 10 kurus more than the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi officials, buying the wheat at between 2 50 and 2 60 TL and then handing it over to the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi at 2 60 TL which was the officially declared price. This collaboration between the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi officials and the allafs caused a considerable degree of discontent amongst some of the small producers who sent hundreds of protest telegrams to the General Directorate of the office in Ankara. Nothing was done about this, however, because the law allows the officials to give low prices to substandard crops. The term standard is too vague to define, thereby allowing the officials to behave arbitrarily in valuing the unprotected small producers.

Some producers either prefer to, or have to, sell their wheat within their village. The village merchant in Gısgıs pays less than the market prices for the grain and sells at a higher price than the market price. When he buys within the village he deducts a certain

amount for the transport cost, as if he has transported the grain to the town market. When he sells the crop he adds a certain amount on top of the market price, as if he has brought the grain from the market. This is the case when the payments are in cash. In the event of a purchase by instalment an interest of 30 to 50 per cent is also added to the bill. Since the production of grain in Gisgis is very susceptible to weather conditions most of the small producers are affected in bad harvest years. In order to survive, borrowing or buying wheat from the village merchant becomes inevitable for those who do not have any stock supply. What the merchant does is to buy cheaply from those who are indebted to him and sell expensively to those who are in need. Of course there is also buying and selling among the peasants without any interest, but this is very limited in its extent.

Although some vegetables and fruits (melons and grapes) are consumed by the peasant families most of them are sold in Ergani town centre. In this sense we can say that the vegetables and fruits are the most important commercial crops grown in Gisgis. Vegetables picked during the night are transported to the town early in the morning at about four o'clock by the only village lorry, which is somewhat antiquated and which carries passengers, fruit, vegetables and animals at the same time, between the village and Ergani a distance of 18 kilometres. In Ergani there is no market system where the direct producers can sell their goods direct to the consumers. The vegetables are bought up by early-rising grocers who then sell them in turn to the consumers. In some cases certain vegetable producers have to give their vegetables

to certain grocers to whom they are already indebted. The grocer supplies the peasant all through the year with necessary consumer goods, in return for which the peasant has to supply the grocer with a certain amount of vegetables all through the summer at a fixed price, which is usually lower than that which the peasant would have been able to obtain in the market, had he not been indebted to the grocer.

Apart from a few households who have a number of livestock animals, the average peasant family does not usually sell dairy products in the market. Milk, cheese and yoghurt are rarely consumed by the peasant family. When there is a pound or so of butter in excess of family needs it might be sold, and this takes place mostly within the village. For those who have a large number of livestock animals cheese, butter, yoghurt, livestock, wool and mohair constitute some of their marketable commodities. Ergani is the main market for these goods. However, livestock is sometimes sold in Diyarbakir, where the demand for livestock animals for meat is much higher than in Ergani. Unless the farmer has quite a number of animals, making it worthwhile to bear the transportation costs, he would not take them to Diyarbakir which is 78 kilometres from the village.

The above discussion for Gircis is more or less applicable to the peasants of Kallina village. The most important difference between the two villages in terms of marketing is that the majority of the villagers of Kallina do not have access to any land. As such their relations with the market involves only the action of buying, rather

then buying and selling. Households with no access to land or live-stock animals take part in market relations as consumers, not as producers. However, when we say that they do not engage in selling activities we only mean the selling of commodities produced by the household. We of course exclude labour power as a commodity which is sold by household members.

Another important difference between the two villages in terms of marketing stems from the nature of the distribution of the means of production and from the nature of the land. Big landownership, easy access to credits and machinery, coupled with the possibilities for irrigation, allow the cultivation of commercial crops such as cotton and sugar beet. Since agriculture is accepted as a business by the big landlords whatever they produce constitutes exchange value, rather than use value. That is why they force their sharecroppers to grow more profitable crops like cotton whenever possible. Cotton has no use value for the sharecropper, who would prefer to grow wheat instead. So he sells his cotton in order to buy wheat. What we should like to emphasise is that the small producers of Kalhana are more market oriented than their counterparts in Gısgis, owing to the fact that the whole village is oriented to commercialised agriculture by virtue of the control exercised by the big landlords.

The cotton produced in the village is mainly marketed in Elaziğ, where the main buyers are the Çukobirlik and the Elaziğ cotton thread factory. The Çukobirlik does not buy cotton from those who are not members but all of the big cotton producers are members of the Çukobirlik. The small producers who only produce cotton irregularly, in

alternation with other crops such as cereals and lentils, and who are unable to meet the membership requirements, do not become members of Çukobirlik. For membership it is necessary to apply to the district officer or regional representative of Çukobirlik and also the candidates have to prove that they have been holding a tenancy to the land for at least ten years. Failing that, they must show a copy of the cadastre, proving the freehold of their land. The small producers cannot meet these membership requirements, due to the fact that either they have not been tenants for the last ten years, or they have no cadastal proof to present. However, the big landlords can easily meet the requirements and benefit from the facilities provided by the Çukobirlik.

At the end of the harvest the small producers, being unable to take their cotton to Elaziğ, which is about 100 kilometres from the village, hand over their cotton either to big landlords or to cotton merchants, who provide the producers with credit in return for their cotton at a lower price than the market price. The difference between the market price and the price small producers get accrues to the big landlords, or to the merchants.

The same things can be said for sugar beet. The main buyer is the Elaziğ sugar factory. The small producer of sugar beet, either by his own choice or by the landlord's imposition, is not usually in a position to be able to transport his crop to Mezir railway station, where the representative of the Elaziğ sugar factory buys the sugar beet.

Again, merchants or relatively well off producers play an intermediary role, appropriating a part of the small producer's production.

It is very rare that households with only one or two livestock animals in Kalhana will sell dairy products. It is those with quite a number of animals who sell both livestock animals and dairy products.

As we stated earlier, both villages are dependent on the market for some of their consumption needs, and for most of the things they use for production. The basic consumption goods bought by the Ergis villagers include sugar, salt, paraffin, margarine, macaroni, matches, cigarettes, etc. and these are mainly obtained from the village grocer who sells these items for cash or by instalments, or by bartering. The only items the grocer would normally purchase from his customers are cheese, butter and eggs, which could be sold daily within the village, mainly to the teachers, health officials, midwife and gendarmerie sergeant, as well as to some of the villagers. This is despite the fact that the basic production of the village is vegetables, they have to be marketed elsewhere. All other consumer goods, like clothing, chairs, woven carpets etc. and agricultural tools, such as sickles, hoe and spades, are bought in Ergina. Some items, like plastic plates, cotton thread, aluminium kitchen utensils may be obtained from the cercis (itinerant peddlars) who travel from village to village on donkeys or mules, selling or bartering all sorts of goods. It is mainly women who make transactions by bartering.

There is no village shop in Kalhana, but there are two peddlars living in the village, travelling between the town and nearby villages, selling all sort of odd things, as well as some consumer goods such as

sugar and cigarettes. Malhana villagers are more dependent on the market than Ergani villagers because 67 per cent of the families during our fieldwork did not have any access to land. Most of the people have to buy all of their consumption needs from somewhere since the landless people generally do not have ready cash to buy their staple food, wheat, they apply to one of the big landlords to obtain wheat on credit. The debt usually is paid in labour. However, not everybody can get wheat on credit from the landlords, they are left to solve their problem by themselves.

Again, most of the consumption goods are bought from Ergani. However, the landlords, being concerned about the quality and the type of the things they consume and use, very often make a trip to Diyarbakir, Ankara or Istanbul to obtain their needs. They usually obtain their luxury goods, such as televisions, cars, carpets, ornaments and furniture from Diyarbakir if it is possible. Otherwise they do not hesitate to use the excuse to make a "small trip for a break, to get away from this boring and suffocating environment", in the words of Suat Guldoğan.

The arguments put forward in this chapter complement those of the previous chapter. The peasants are urged to produce for the market by the state, but they are not given the necessary implements and credits for this. The amount of credits given to small producers has been extremely insufficient, and so the peasants have been left at the mercy of merchants and usurers. The inability of the state to organise necessary marketing conditions has resulted in the

exploitation of the small producers by the merchants and usurers. The floor price policy has been far from beneficial to the small producer. Being continuously exploited and indebted, the peasant household has either lost its means of production or resorted to what we may call "self exploitation". In order to survive the peasant household lengthens its working periods and seeks supplementary income. It is this need to earn some cash outside the household which forces some of the members of the household to migrate from the village permanently or temporarily. In the following chapter we shall deal with this migration question in Gisgis and Kalhana.

NOTES

1. Cited in Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi Odaları ve Borsalar Birliği, İktisadi Rapor (Economic Report) (1978), p. 375.
2. This figure includes 128,800 kilometres of village roads which are not taken into consideration in Turkish statistics. This is why there seems to be a great discrepancy between the figure given by Eurostat 1977 and that given in the Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1977.
3. State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1977.
4. *ibid*.
5. Oktay Varlıer, Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Değişme Teknoloji ve Toprak Bölüşümü (Structural Change, Technology and Land Distribution in Turkish Agriculture) (1978)
6. Nadaraja Ramachandran, Agricultural and Industrial Development Policies in Turkey (1974), p. 21.
7. Haluk Cillov, "Buğday Üretimi Hakkında" (On Wheat Production) Istanbul Ticaret (17 August 1979).
8. Cumhuriyet (29 June 1979).
9. "TMO Yetkilileri Buğdaya Zam Yapılmayacağını Bildirdiler" (The Authorities of the Soil Products Office Declared that there will not be a Price Rise for Wheat), Cumhuriyet (29 July 1979).
10. "Buğdaya ödenecek orım kiloda 50-100 kuruş arasında olacak, pancar taban fiyatı 130 kuruş" (The premium to be paid for wheat will be between 50 and 100 kuruş per kilo, floor price for sugar beet (will be) 130 kuruş), Cumhuriyet (12 August 1979), and also "Buğdaya prim verilmesinden vazgeçildi, dışsatım ise yalnız TMO eliyle yapılacak" (It was decided against giving a premium for wheat and the export (of wheat) is to be carried out only by the Office of Soil Products), Cumhuriyet (13 August 1979).
11. Cumhuriyet (18 September 1979).
12. Aslan Başer Kafaoglu, Cumhuriyet (2 August 1979).
13. Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni. Dün - Bugün - Yarın (The Order of Turkey Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow) (1968), p. 440.
14. *ibid* , p. 440
15. Azmi Erdem, "Müesseseseleşen Tefecilik Bölgemizi Soymaktadır"

(Institutionalised Usury is Robbing our Region), Yön Dergisi No. 113, cited by Avcioğlu, op. cit. (1968), p. 440.

16. Yön Dergisi No. 111.
17. Ziya Gökalo Mulayım, "Pamuk ve Tefeciler" (Cotton and Usurers), Milliyet (16 September 1979).
18. İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet (31 October 1968)
19. Milliyet (7 October 1969).
20. See Ümit Hassan, "Tarımsal Kredi Sorunları" (The Problems of Agricultural Credits), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XXV (December 1970) and Yılmaz Çetiner, "Fındık Tefecileri" (Hazelnut Usurers), Cumhuriyet (8 September 1967).
21. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Diyarbakır 1973 İl Yıllığı (Diyarbakır in the 50th Anniversary of the Republic 1973 Provincial Year-book), p. 556
22. *ibid.*, p. 555
23. *ibid.*, p. 530.
24. *ibid.*, p. 567.

CHAPTER IX

Permanent and seasonal out-migration from Eastern and Southeast Anatolia has a very long history. Rapid industrialisation and expansion of incomes in Europe promoted the demand for Turkish tobacco, cotton, raisins and other cash crops. During the second half of the nineteenth century European capital and technology provided railways, ports, irrigation works, banks and assistance in the development of certain crops.¹ Cotton was one of the most important crops for export

In the twentieth century Germany played a leading part in the development of cotton cultivation in Turkey, seeking to establish there a raw material base for its cotton textile industry.²

Novichev, writing in 1937, states that the Adana region attracted quite a number of seasonal workers

The majority of farm laborers were temporary workers who, especially during harvest time, left their villages in large crowds seeking work in the cotton areas. Often whole groups went from one locality headed by their elders, who served as intermediaries between the laborers and the employers and received the whole wage fund for distribution among the individuals, taking advantage of their position, the elders thoroughly robbed their countrymen. The cotton region of Adana drew from 50,000 to 70,000 workers during harvest time.³

The rural masses were forced to seek additional income to pay their debts and to meet the needs of their families, not because the rapid

development of capitalism proletarianised rural people who had to work as agricultural labourers, but because of the heavy taxation levied on the peasantry, coupled with merchant usury and landlord exploitation.

Today cotton is not only exported as a raw material, but is also used in Turkey's newly developed textile industry. For this reason cotton growing regions have become even more important in drawing larger and larger numbers of labourers. In this chapter we shall attempt to give some particulars of out-migration from Gisgis and Kalhana.

MIGRATION IN GISGIS

Most of the migration is outwards from Gisgis. There are a number of families who have migrated into the village from other places, but migration into the village is very insignificant. It was noted that only eight families had moved into the village in the last ten years. Three of these families were those of the school teacher, the nurse and the caretaker of the health centre, all of whom were appointed to their jobs in the village. Of the others, two families were from the neighbouring village Sincik. They did not have any source of income in Sincik and had come to Gisgis to sharecrop the lands of two teachers who were absentee landowners. Two families were from the villages of Dicle district, who bought land in the village through their relatives, and one family fled from their village because of a protracted blood feud which had claimed ten deaths to date. The head of this household works in Maden copper mine, which is about 40 kilometres away from the village, and he comes home at weekends.

Apart from the families who have come to settle in the village there is a movement of individual women into the village through marriage. We noted that 20 heads of families had brought brides from other places. However, this movement of people through marriage is hardly significant in terms of migration.

The household heads were asked whether or not they had any relatives outside the village, in order to gauge the extent of emigration from the village. The following table is derived from the answers to this question

TABLE 9.1 Number of Relatives Living Outside the Village

NUMBER OF RELATIVES	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS
None	24	14.7
1	64	39.0
2	31	18.9
3	21	12.8
4	13	7.9
9	11	6.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	164	100.0

Only 24 households do not have any relatives outside the village, while 140 households have relatives living outside the village, amounting to 343 people. However, we should pay attention to the fact that most of the households in the village have kinship relations in common with other households, and therefore they might have been

referring to the same family or person as their relative living outside the village. This might have inflated the figure we have given above. Nevertheless, despite these possible ambiguities, it is certain that the level of migration from the village is very high.

Household heads were also asked to state where their relations had migrated to. It was evident from the answers that the Çukurova region, especially Tarsus and Adana, was the most attractive place for rural migrants. As we stated earlier, this is due to the fact that rapid development of agriculture, labour intensive cash crop production and the rapid development of import substitution industries in Adana and Tarsus.

One of the older men of the village told us that fifty-two households had emigrated to Tarsus. The head of the first family to emigrate to Tarsus had been there three summers before the emigration, working in the cotton fields as a hoer and cotton picker. Since he was offered a permanent job as an overseer in a capitalist farm in Tarsus he took the opportunity and took his family there, leaving his 10 donums of dry land for his relatives to sharecrop.

The mechanism of emigration to Tarsus and Adana is as follows. the previously emigrated families inform their relatives about job possibilities, and if the informed heads of households in the village are convinced that the job will increase their living standard they go to Tarsus or Adana to take the job and find accommodation. If he is satisfied with the new environment and the job he will come back and collect his family.

TABLE 9.2 Places of Migration from Gısgıs

PLACE	NUMBER OF PERSONS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Ergani centre	72	21.0
Villages of Ergani	31	9.0
Diyarbakır	45	13.1
Tarsus/Adana	115	33.5
Elazığ/Maden	25	7.3
Ankara/Izmir/Istanbul etc.	42	12.3
West Germany ⁴	13	3.8
Total	343	100.0

Aside from economic factors, social factors also force people to emigrate from the village. Blood feuds, whatever reason they may stem from, are very effective factors in making people emigrate from rural areas. Ali Çelen informed us that in 1972 six families emigrated from the village because of a blood feud. The incident happened on a summer's day. Some straw had been left by the Alp family in a field near a place called Çay, after the harvest. Two oxen belonging to Bahrı, of Mehmet Ağa's family, ate some of the straw while passing through the field without his realising it. The wife of the owner of the field beat the oxen and then insulted and provoked Bahrı, who, having first apologised to the woman, then began to reply in a similar vein on being insulted. The woman went home and incited her husband and her father into action. In the same evening the father and the husband, mad with rage, went up to Bahrı's house swearing and calling him to come out. As soon as Bahrı replied to

them they opened fire in the dark, in the direction where the voice was coming from. One of the bullets hit Bahri's pregnant wife in the heart and she died instantly. In response to this Bahri's nephew, the son of his brother Mehmet, shot down, with eight bullets, Kerim, the leader of the Alp family, in the market place in Ergani. Realising the impossibility of living in fear of reprisal, six households from Mehmet Ağa's family left the village for Adana to join other relatives there

Ergani, as the nearest urban centre, attracts quite a number of people from the village. People migrating into Ergani, which is a commercial centre for the neighbouring villages and is in the process of rapid urbanisation, can find jobs in building construction and transportation. Those who emigrate to Ergani usually keep their ties with the village. They are provided with wheat and processed wheat (bulgur, doğme, cücük etc.), grapes and products made from grapes (pestil, sucuk and pekmez etc.). Apart from the job possibilities the relatively easier life style of the town, as well as educational reasons, are some of the other factors encouraging migrants to go to town centres. In the same way, those who emigrate to Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir and Elazığ also work more or less in the same sort of jobs, working in factories, building construction, transportation etc.

From 1961 onwards Turkey has been exporting workers to Western Europe, mainly to West Germany. The rapid development of capitalism in the West necessitated a labour force which could not be supplied by their

own human resources as profitably as it would be by workers from less developed countries⁵

Quite a number of people of rural origin went to Western Europe before 1971, although the proportion of workers of rural origin declined during the decade 1961 to 1971.⁶

Thirteen men from Gisgis were working in West Germany, most of whom were between the ages of 20 and 30, working as brick-layers, carpenters, dustmen and street cleaners. Four of the workers were married before they went to Germany, leaving their wives and children with their parents. The families of the workers complained that they did not send money regularly from Germany. Some of them sent money to their parents and children a few times, but they sent it irregularly, once in three or four months. As far as the families left behind were concerned, the workers in Germany were carried away with the attractions and bad habits of the West and were spending all their money there.

We asked the relatives of those people who had left the village why their relatives had left. The reasons given have been categorised below

TABLE 9 3 Reasons for Leaving the Village

REASON CITED	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	PERCENTAGE
To seek work	210	61.2
Appointment as civil servant	33	9.6
Marriage	77	22.5
Blood feud	23	6.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	343	100.0

It is clear that the majority of the people who emigrated from the village did so for economic reasons. Those who left the village because of marriage were exclusively women. Bearing in mind the vagueness of the answer "to seek work", we tried to obtain information on what sort of particular occupations people had where they had settled.

TABLE 9.4 Occupations of Relatives Living Outside the Village

OCCUPATION	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	PERCENTAGE
Casual unskilled labourer	57	16.6
Agricultural labourer	23	6.7
Industrial labourer	46	13.4
Civil servant	33	9.6
Trader (including grocer, wholesaler etc)	16	4.7
Artisan	9	2.6
Driver	13	3.8
Farmer	27	7.9
Housewife	70	20.4
Unknown	49	14.3
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	343	100.0

It was also realised from the interviews that not only the rural poor and proletarians had left the village, but relatively rich farmers and usurers had also left the village. Those who had accumulated some money capital from usury and those who had saved some money either from agricultural production or from working somewhere for a period of time, or both, had either opened a grocery shop in the place where they had settled, or had invested their money in transportation. Some of them became grain merchants in Ergani town centre, giving credits to the farmers from their village, or from other villages.

However, most of the people who left the village were those who either did not have any land, or had lost their land because of indebtedness, or did not have enough land to sustain their family. Continuous land fragmentation owing to the population increase and the existing inheritance system forces a part of the rural population to migrate to towns and cities. Moving to urban areas does not automatically solve all the unemployment problems, nor does it always alleviate the misery of the migrants. The very low level of industrialisation in urban areas does not allow the migrant population to be absorbed. After moving into a town centre migrants, if they have been unable to find a job, endeavour to create a business for themselves.

For instance, in Ergani male children of migrant families become shoe polishers and cold water or soft drink sellers in the streets from the age of 9 or 10 onwards. These drink sellers buy ice from housewives who have a refrigerator at home and are pleased to get a small amount

of cash to help cover electricity costs, or to buy small items for themselves. They then wander about in the market place with a decanter full of ice-cold water, ayran or lemonade, shouting "Drink icy water" and such like, during the hot summer days. Female children may become beggars, going from house to house in the relatively rich areas of the town, asking for food, old clothes and money. Adult members of the family may become street vendors, selling all sorts of things, such as needles, cotton, plastic toys, household equipment, vegetables, fruit and nuts.

We have listed just some of the occupations the migrant workers may engage in. Of course, this list is in no way exhaustive, nor representative for all the migrants in the urban areas of Turkey, since it is based on the declarations of the relatives of the migrants from Gısgis village. To what extent the figures given in this list are significant for the village, Ergani, or the whole of Turkey is arguable, but the main aim in giving these figures is not so much to derive any empiricist conclusion but rather to attempt to understand some tendencies in the employment of rural migrants in urban centres.

So far we have dealt with the question of permanent migration from Gısgis, however, this is only one side of the coin. We should also have a look at seasonal migration from the village. We have seen that peasant based household economy predominates in the village and that households do not only produce for home consumption, but also for the market. However, all the economic activities of the household are geared to the reproduction of the household as an economic and

social unit. Being a part of a capitalist social formation the household is inevitably involved in capitalist market relations which pump out a part of the product produced by the household economic unit through the price mechanism. Coupled with this, usurious exploitation and the high rate of interest paid to banking capital, as well as ground rent in some cases, appropriated by landowners through various kinds of sharecropping arrangements, play important parts in the pauperisation of the peasants. In order to be able to reproduce itself the household sends out some of its labour force to bring in supplementary income.

It is at this point that seasonal migration comes into existence. Apart from the low income of the household, the nature of agricultural work, distribution of land, division of labour within the household, and population pressure are also effective in pushing out some of the labour force from the rural areas. For instance, in Gisgis, where vegetables and fruit (melons and grapes) are produced mainly for the market, and grains for home consumption, the agricultural cycle leaves some of the work force unemployed. We asked the heads of households to state the number of months during which they had been unemployed in the past year. The following is an account of this.

Only 39 heads of the households said that they were fully employed all through the year, while the rest stated that they had been unemployed for at least a period of time each year. Considering the fact that some of these heads of households do not derive their main income from agriculture (teachers, caretakers, workers, drivers, etc.) we can

visualise the concealed form of unemployment within the village. Despite long periods of unemployment not everybody would go out of the village for a seasonal job, because of the uncertainties involved in finding a job. For this reason heads of households would sometimes send out their grown up sons to earn a supplementary income, rather than going themselves. However, sixty heads of households had gone to work outside the village for a period of time in the year prior to our fieldwork in 1977.

TABLE 9.5 Unemployment in Gisqis

NUMBER OF MONTHS UNEMPLOYED	NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED HOUSEHOLD HEADS	PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYED
0	39	23.8
1-3	6	3.7
4-6	34	20.7
7-9	42	25.6
10-12	43	26.2
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	164	100.0

The figures given below do not include those members of households who work outside the village for a period of time. However, this is not important for our purpose, which is to try to see the role of the household as an economic unit acting as a source for the labour requirements of developing rural and urban capitalism

TABLE 9.6 Seasonal Labourers of Gısgıs

NUMBER OF MONTHS WORKED OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS WORKING OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE
1	3
2	17
3	12
4	4
5	8
6	10
12	6

Seasonal workers from Gısgıs generally go to one of three areas:

Diyarbakır province, Elazığ province, or the Çukurova region. Capitalist farms producing cotton in Adana in the Çukurova region, and in Elazığ, and to a certain extent in Diyarbakır, are the most important places in terms of seasonal wage labour recruitment. The development of capitalist agriculture and the production of cotton as a cash crop are, to a great degree, fairly new phenomena in both Diyarbakır and Elazığ, but they are well established in the Çukurova region.⁷

The proximity of the cities of Diyarbakır and Elazığ for the peasants of those provinces leads seasonal workers to prefer to seek work in their own provincial centres. However, the limited level of labour requirements in these two neighbouring provinces forces the seasonal migrant workers to go to other regions to seek employment. Building and road construction works are the two non-agricultural fields which offer job opportunities for seasonal migrants. The number of migrants who seek employment in construction work is very high. The

competition among workers reduces the actual earnings of those who are employed in this sector, for there is no unionisation among such workers.

MIGRATION IN KALHANA

Unlike Gisgis, Kalhana attracts quite a number of migrant workers from the neighbouring villages, as well as from some more remote villages. A combination of several factors promoted the development of the production of cotton as a cash crop in the village and its vicinity. Commercial agriculture is a fairly new phenomenon in Southeast Anatolia, and is a result of the area becoming more integrated into the capitalist world economy. The integration of different areas into the capitalist world economy takes place at different times, and the time of integration is determined by various factors such as the importance of the area for the capitalist world economy, the level of development of the productive forces in the area, the social formation of which the area is a part and the class formation within the social formation, etc.

Commercialisation of agriculture in Turkey has been intensified since the 1950s as a result of a new policy adopted by the Democrat Party in accordance with the wishes of the West to direct Turkey towards becoming a source of food and raw materials. Industrialisation was doomed to be of the assembly type, and dependant. Without agriculture being commercialised it was very difficult for the Turkish bourgeoisie

(of a collaborative nature) to transfer resources from this sector. Also, the need for foreign currency for the importation of raw materials and intermediary goods intensified policies for the development of the production of cash crops like cotton, tobacco, hazelnuts and such like, which constitute most of Turkey's exports. New areas have been taken over for the production of these export crops. For instance, the area under cotton production has risen from 297,761 hectares in 1948 to 621,000 hectares in 1960 and 837,896 hectares in 1974. The figures for tobacco are as follows while 106,099 hectares were under cultivation in 1948, 230,147 hectares were under cultivation in 1974.⁸

Farmers have been urged to produce commercial crops and have been provided with credits, seeds, fertilisers, etc. Short term needs for foreign currency forced the government to provide these things to the farmers of suitable areas for the production of the desired crops. This was especially so in Southeast Anatolia, and in places like Kalhana where natural resources allow the production of cotton. However, the construction of dams and canals are still under way in the area, in order to promote agricultural development. The nature of land distribution in the region, coupled with the mechanisation of agriculture, in accordance with the new policy adopted in the 1950s, brought about huge marketable grain surpluses, which were paid for at higher than world market prices for political reasons, thus leading to the enrichment of the big landowners who produce for the market. In short, we can say that as a result of the policy applied since the 1950s some new areas were taken over for the production of cash crops like cotton. Kalhana is one of these places. It should also be emphasised that the nature

of cotton production necessitates a large number of labourers at least for a period of time during the production year.

Not only does a temporary labour force come to the village seasonally or daily to work in the cotton fields, but also some people come to the village for permanent settlement, or at least for a few years. This is largely due to the big landlords' efforts to keep an easily accessible labour source in the village in order to meet their labour requirements at peak seasons. In order to see the extent of migration for permanent settlement or at least for long term settlement in the village we asked the heads of households to state whether they and their wives had been born in the village, and if not, where. Also, we asked when and why they had come to the village.

TABLE 9.7 Origins of Household Heads and their Wives in Kalhana

ORIGINS	HUSBAND	WIFE/WIVES	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
Born in the village	27	20	47	52.8
Born outside the village	16	26	42	47.2
	—	—	—	—
Total	43*	46**	89	100.0
	—	—	—	—

* One unmarried household head was excluded from the calculation.

** Three of our respondents had two wives each, therefore the number of wives exceeds the number of husbands.

It is evident from the above table that quite a number of residents in the village are not natives of the village. Given the patrilocal nature of the families we can assume that some of the females came to the village for reasons other than the village's attraction as a place with work possibilities. This patrilocal nature of the families also excludes the possibility of the heads of households coming to the village because of marriage. More than one third of the heads of resident families came from outside and have stayed in the village. In the following table we find the whereabouts of the origins of the immigrants.

TABLE 9.8 Origins of Household Heads and their Wives Born Outside Kalhana

LOCATION OF ORIGIN	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
Ergani centre	3	7.1
Villages of Ergani	36	85.7
Diyarbakir and its districts other than Ergani	1	2.4
Other	2	4.8
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	42	100.0

Most of the immigrants are from the villages of Ergani. They are mostly the poor of their village who could not survive in their village because they neither had any land nor cattle, nor were there any job opportunities in their village. The majority of immigrant families live in houses or one or two roomed accommodation owned by the landlords in the village. They pay very little or no rent for

the accommodation they occupy. Both landlords and immigrants are happy about these arrangements for accommodation. From the immigrants' point of view finding a free, or at least cheap shelter and the prospect of work, seasonal though it may be, is better than nothing. From the landlords' point of view having tied the immigrants to the village through the supply of free accommodation and assistance in case of difficulties, they will be able to meet at least a part of their labour requirements. Also, the proximity of the village to Ergani town gives the immigrants the possibility of commuting between the village and town if they want to, and are able to find work there. Having stationed themselves in the village one or two members of the family may go to town, working as porters, ameles, drivers and such like, while the rest of the family stays in the village and goes to work in the cotton fields whenever their labour is required.

The flow of immigrants into the village for employment does not mean that there is no out-flow of labourers from the village. A number of people resident in the village leave for a period of time to seek employment either when their labour is not needed or when they find a better paying job outside. The nature of the village economy does not allow year-round employment for the poor, although a few of them may become personal servants of the landlord families.

Some members of households leave the village for a permanent job in urban centres and visit their families intermittently. The frequency of their visits depends on the distance of the place of work from the village, whether or not they are married and the amount of money they

earn. If the amount of money they earn is not sufficient to meet their transport costs they forego visits to the village. For instance, Hacı Gedikli works in Sümerbank Yun Yıkama ve Şayak Fabrikası (Sumerbank Wool-washing and Serge Factory) in Diyarbakır, earning about 3,000TL per month. He is married with five children, the oldest being 15 years of age. His monthly income is not enough to enable him to take his family with him to Diyarbakır, where the cost of living is much higher than in the village. In the village his family does not pay any rent, for they own their house. In order to repay his debts Hacı Gedikli sold 20 donums of his land, and then he sold the remaining 20 donums in order to bribe the officials so that he could get the job in Diyarbakır. He does not have any land now, apart from a very small plot in front of his house, where they grow some vegetables, but these are far from sufficient to meet the family's needs. His wife and three elder children work as cotton pickers in the village for a month or so in the autumn. His oldest son, Kemal, started to work in cotton irrigation for Suat Bey for the first time, but he was paid a lower wage than the other men because he was younger than them. In order to employ him at a cheaper rate Suat Bey told him "Well, I am afraid I cannot employ you because you are very young and you cannot work as hard as the other workers. If you accept 10 liras per hour, as a favour I will employ you. If I did not like you and your father I would not take you on as a worker at this age". So, although Kemal worked as hard as the others he was paid less than the average worker. Hacı comes home fortnightly to see his family.

There are some other heads of households who have left their families in the village for permanent wage work. For example, Hüseyin Erçin

works in Sivas and only comes to the village for a few days every three or four months. Whenever he comes home he brings money for his wife and children. Another example is Efrahim Kahraman, who works for Devlet Demir Yolları (The State Railways). He is able to visit his family in the village every week. He too has no land, and his family also works in the cotton fields

These are only a few examples of the out-migration from the village. We have asked the heads of households who were native to the village to state if they had any relations living outside the village.

TABLE 9.9 Number of Relatives Living Outside Kalhana

NUMBER OF RELATIVES	NUMBER OF NATIVE HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE OF NATIVE HOUSEHOLDS
None	0	0.0
1	1	3.7
2	4	14.8
4	7	25.9
5	7	25.9
7	8	29.6
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	27	100.0

Not even a single native householder was without any relatives living outside the village. The declared number of relatives of native household heads was 126 in 1977, which shows the result of rapid de-peasantisation of agriculture in the village as an aspect of the general developments in Turkish agriculture. It was obvious from our

interviews with the relatives of the emigrants remaining in the village that most of the people who emigrated from the village had done so from the 1960s onwards.

Fehim Kaval's story seems to be relevant here. Fehim was born in 1920 in Kalhana. His father owned about 50 donums of land. Around the 1940s, owing to bad weather conditions, three successive crop failures led his father to borrow a considerable amount of wheat and animal fodder from Sinası Bey, in order to be able to alleviate the starvation conditions of his family and animals. Since he failed to repay his debt he had to mortgage his land to Şınası Bey for five years, on the condition that he would work the land on a sharecropping basis, which stipulated that Şınası Bey would be considered the owner of the land and would provide the seed for cultivation. This meant, in fact, that Fehim's father had become a sharecropper on his own land, giving half of his products to his creditor. Eventually Fehim's father was not able to repay his debt, and so he sold his land to Şınası Bey, but he continued to work for both Şınası Bey and Şenayı Bey as a sharecropper. On the death of Fehim's father in 1955 Fehim's two younger brothers left the village to seek work in the Çukurova, and later one of them found his way to West Germany in 1964.

Before the arrival of the first tractor in the village, land was cultivated by using oxen as draught animals, and the productivity of the soil for wheat did not exceed a return of 5 or 6 to one. When Şenayı Bey brought the first tractor into the village in 1960 most of his sharecroppers, previously landowning peasants, rebelled against him and

his family, under the leadership of Şefik and Hacı Gedikli, the descendants of Lobud Ağa. These men realised that the strength of the Gūldoğan family had undermined their previous authority which had stemmed from their grandparents' control over a vast amount of land, now mostly controlled by the Guldoğan family. The Gediklis provoked the peasants by saying that they would lose the usage of the land as sharecroppers if the tractor was established as a means of production in the village. However, it was not too difficult for the Gūldoğan family to suppress the rebellious peasants by calling in the military police (gendarmerie). Those who had occupied the Guldoğan lands in order to prevent the tractor being used in the village were not given any land by the Guldoğans to sharecrop for the following year. The instigators of the movement themselves did not have enough land to be able to let these people work as sharecroppers on their lands in order to compensate them for the loss incurred as a result of participating in the actions against the Gūldoğans. Not only those people who had rebelled against the Guldoğans, but also some others, lost their access to land as a result of the machinery obtained by the Guldoğans with the credits supplied by the Agricultural Bank.

With the gradual enlargement of cotton production which already existed in the village, from the 1960s onwards the Gūldoğans let some of the poor of other villages settle in the village on condition that they would send one or two workers to work in the cotton fields. Of course, the amount of work and remuneration that cotton fields can provide in the village are not enough to sustain the growing number of village residents. Consequently, a part of the village population seeks work

outside the village seasonally or permanently. As a result the mechanisation of agriculture increased the volume of migration into and out of the village. Seasonal migrants usually go to the nearby towns and cities to work in road and building construction. Some of them would even go to Adana, Istanbul or Izmir to work. The number of people declared by their relatives in the village to have emigrated, and the places they have migrated to, are tabulated below

TABLE 9.10 Places of Migration from Kalhana

PLACE	NUMBER OF PERSONS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Ergani centre	31	24.6
Villages of Ergani	11	8.7
Diyarbakir	22	17.5
Tarsus/Adana	20	15.9
Elazığ/Maden	16	12.7
Ankara/Izmir/Istanbul etc.	21	16.7
West Germany	5	3.9
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	126	100.0

It is obvious that being the nearest urban centre Ergani has attracted most of the migrants. As we have stated previously, Ergani is not an industrial centre to offer jobs to migrants. However, it is a commercial centre for a number of villages, as well as an administrative centre.⁹ Rapid urbanisation of the town created new jobs in the service sector for the immigrants. While some of the migrants worked for others as muavin (assistant driver, helping the driver of a lorry or minibus, or coach), drivers, doorkeepers in government offices,

porters for grain merchants, bakers in one of the several bakeries, and waiters in restaurants and coffee houses (which have mushroomed in the past 15 years). In 1977 there were 52 coffee houses in Ergani centre. Coffee houses in Turkey are the places where men gather together to play cards and drink tea and coffee. Some men would spend their whole day in these places. One of the native villagers told me "If you want to study the level of unemployment have a look at the number of coffee houses per head in a place. Fifteen years ago there were only two or three coffee houses in this town, now their number is about a hundred". He was exaggerating the number of coffee houses in Ergani, but he was right to use the number of coffee houses as an indication of the level of unemployment. Men who are unable to find employment try to establish a business of their own, as street vendors selling things like çekirdek (roasted seeds of pumpkin, melon, water melon or sunflowers), nuts, leblebi (roasted chick peas), fruit, vegetables, plastic toys and so on.

Diyarbakır and Elazığ are two near and rapidly developing provincial centres which can offer work for migrants. A number of state-owned factories like the cement factory, sugar factory, copper and chromium mine in Elazığ, and the rakı (an alcoholic drink) factory, wool-washing and serge factory in Diyarbakır, as well as hundreds of small privately owned workshops producing all sorts of things, are places where migrants can get work. The administrative apparatus and service are other sectors which offer work possibilities for migrants. However, the volume of migration is much higher than the number of jobs the cities can offer to migrants, because the development of industry cannot keep

up with both the population explosion and the rapid proletarianisation of the rural masses. The most industrialised centres like Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Ankara and Adana are also far from being able to absorb the rural masses released from their agricultural ties. The great distance between the area we are concerned with and the more developed region of Western Turkey, coupled with uncertainties in finding work in the West, play a part in discouraging migrants from such a choice of destination. Migrants prefer to go to the nearest urban centre, where they can keep their ties with the village community and relatives, and can seek help in case of difficulties. On the other hand, whenever they can overcome the uncertainties in finding work they do not hesitate to travel "to the other end of the world", in other words, to western Europe.

Finally, it might be added that those who stay in the village also seek to earn supplementary income by way of selling their labour to others. Apart from the peak season, however, the village economy is not capable of absorbing this labour force. Furthermore, the amount of land sharecropped by most of the sharecropping families does not absorb the whole labour force available in the family. This is in addition to the fact that the seasonal nature of agricultural production in the village, as well as the division of labour by sex within the household economy, leaves a part of the household labour force unused. Although all of the heads of sharecropping families said that they were unemployed for a period of time each year, six of them said they had gone out of the village to seek work for two to five months of the year. On the other hand those 11 hours without any access to land (there were twelve such

families in the village) stated that at least one or two male members of their families would be out of the village seeking work of any sort while the women-folk and children would stay in the village, working in the cotton fields during the summer.

The exploitation of the peasant households by landlords, merchants, usurers and the state brings about a continuous impoverishment and even, in some cases, complete proletarianisation of the peasants.

Knowing the very limited job prospects outside agriculture, the peasant household tries as hard as possible to maintain their most important means of production land. Seasonal work outside agriculture helps the peasant household to reproduce itself. On the other hand, capitalism takes advantage of the cheap seasonal labour, for which a part of the subsistence needs is met by the households in the village.

NOTES

- 1 See Charles Issawi (Ed.), The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914 (1966), especially Part II Introduction, and see the article by W. van Pressel, entitled "Railway Projects in Turkey 1872-1900", pp. 91-93, and the extract from Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, entitled "The Expansion of Tobacco Growing in the Nineteenth Century", pp. 60-64, in the same collection.
2. A. D. Novichev, "The Development of Commodity - Money and Capitalistic Relations in Turkish Agriculture" (1937) in Issawi (Ed.), op. cit. (1966), pp. 67-68.
3. ibid., pp. 68-69
4. Although almost all respondents who had relations working in Europe stated that they were in Germany, we realised that some of these workers from the village were in fact in other Western European countries, and not only in Germany. The uniformity of the answers arose from the peasants' inability to differentiate West Germany from the rest of Europe. For example, they would ask whereabouts in Germany was England. The same interpretation was evident among the peasants of Kalhana also.
5. See S. Paine, Exporting Workers (1974), and J. Berge, A Seventh Man (1975).
6. Paine, op. cit. (1974), pp. 75-76.
7. See Novichev, op. cit. (1966).
8. Oktay Varlıer, Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Değişme Teknoloji ve Toprak Bölüşümü (Structural Change Technology and Land Distribution in Turkish Agriculture) (1978).
9. According to the village inventory surveys in 1962/63, carried out by the Ministry of Village Affairs, a total of 74 villages had direct economic relations with Ergani centre, 70 of which were also within the administrative boundaries of the town. See Koy İşleri Bakanlığı, Koy Envanter Etudlerine Göre Diyarbakır (Diyarbakır According to the Village Inventory Surveys) (1966), pp. 20-21

C O N C L U S I O N

Turkish workers constitute an important part of migrant labour in Western European economies, and especially in the case of West Germany where they number approximately one million. This migrant labour force has played a central role in the rapid development of such West European economies as the German one, but has failed to generate any significant benefits for Turkey itself. This is so despite such popular misconceptions about the benefits accruing from Turkish workers' hard currency earnings. For, as was shown in the preceding chapters, migration of Turkish workers is a concrete manifestation of Turkey's underdevelopment an underdevelopment which is itself conditioned by Turkey's position within the capitalist world economy, in which countries such as Germany occupy hegemonic positions.

The mechanisms by which this combined and uneven development/underdevelopment relationship between Turkey and Western capital were brought about are beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the primary concern has been to highlight some aspects of this unequal relationship and in particular to focus on some of its manifestations at the level of the village and the household economy. It is for this reason that an attempt has been made to examine the changing structures of landownership, the nature of production relations, marketing and finance mechanisms, sharecropping arrangements, etc. as they appear at the village level. For it is suggested that such

forces, relations and mechanisms are important in determining the nature and rate both of labour migration and underdevelopment in Turkey.

In the foregoing chapters the following arguments have been made. first, the unequal landownership structures have not only persisted but have actually intensified, with large estates consolidating their position while small owners have been forced to relinquish ownership and control over their plots, second, despite changing ownership structures the historic relationship between large landlords and peasant households seems to have been maintained, albeit under different conditions, third, the division of labour in the household has been an important factor in allowing it to persist despite the emergence of forces which undermine its viability, fourth, the role of merchant and usurer's capital has been significant, both in expropriating peasant surpluses and in articulating the household and village economy with national and international economies, fifth, the state has played an important role in generating the necessary structures within which merchant, finance and usurer's capital can operate in a manner which places peasant producers at a disadvantage, sixth, an important consequence of the above factors has been the process of labour migration from the villages to centres in the national economy, and then to other countries.

Nevertheless, it should also be pointed out that an important theoretical concern of the thesis has been the role and the nature of the household unit of production at the village level. From the

discussions in the preceding chapters it is possible to conclude that, at least in Southeastern Anatolia, the household unit continues to constitute an important factor in the generation of surpluses (product and labour) from the rural economy. Of particular interest is the nature of the relationship between an expanding capitalism and the household unit. For it was observed that although capital conditions the structures within which the household reproduces itself, the household is by no means a passive recipient. This was clearly seen in the manner in which the household division of labour, for example, adjusts itself in order to meet both the ever-increasing demands of capital and to guarantee the reproduction of the household itself. As such, it is hoped that this thesis can be seen as a contribution to the current debates, referred to in the introduction, that concern themselves with the role and the nature of the peasant household economy.

Furthermore, and although it has not been a major concern of the thesis, the importance of the Turkish State in conditioning the structures such as transportation, marketing and finance, for the process of capital accumulation and its effect on the household economy become apparent, as for example in the case of state policies vis a vis agricultural credit, provision of improved agricultural inputs, and the marketing of certain crops. In such cases state policies act as mediators, guaranteeing the expropriation of peasant surpluses by merchants and usurers. It is also hoped that such a brief discussion of the role of the Turkish State might

constitute a contribution to debates regarding State involvement in the development of agricultural capitalism in Third World economies.

In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that the above thesis has attempted to grasp some aspects of the historical and ongoing process of underdevelopment experienced by Third World societies. It has done so by focusing on particular manifestations of this process in the case of Gısgis and Kalhana villages of Southeast Anatolia. As such it does not claim to present an exhaustive study of the development of agricultural capitalism or the process of underdevelopment in Turkey. The limitations of available secondary sources, time and space have determined the scope and extent of the subject matter. It is for these reasons that the above can only be seen as a first step of an ongoing intellectual concern with the complex manifestations of the development of capitalism and the underdevelopment of Third World formations.

APPENDIX I

During our fieldwork one questionnaire was completed for each of the households in Gisgis and Kalhana. The questionnaire consisted of a census sheet and 113 questions. In addition to the questionnaire 22 households were selected from the two villages for a detailed study. (We have already explained in Chapter VI how this selection was made.) The detailed study of the 22 households included a structured interview as well as the completion of operation sheets over a period of time. However, before the operation sheets were used three control forms were prepared for each of the 22 households. Forms 1 and 2 were simply a means of reducing the size of the field operations sheets. (Form 1 codifies the fields worked on by household members and non-household labour, Form 2 codifies the members of the households.) Form 3 is a record of dates of interviews. These three forms were kept throughout the fieldwork for crosschecking.

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

53

State of Village

Date of Interview

Head of Household

Household Code Number

[illegible]

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

Which of the following animals and farm implements do you own, and how many?

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Date and Place</u> <u>of Purchase</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>What you could</u> <u>sell it for now</u>	<u>Current</u> <u>Market Price</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Cow						
Bull						
Water buffalo						
Calf						
Sheep						
Goat						
Unweaned calf						
Lamb						
Kid						
Donkey						
Horse						
Mule						
Poultry						
Tractor						
Combine-harvester						
Cotton-seed crusher						
Cotton gin						
Plough						
wooden plough						
Horse cart						
Ox cart						
Sickle						
Scythe						
Harrow						
Saw						
Adze						
Axe						
Pickaxe						

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

Animals and farm implements owned, (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Date and Place of Purchase</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>What you could sell it for now</u>	<u>Current Market Price</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Spade Hoe Pitchfork Winnowing fork Churn Other (specify)						

Household code No.

Household head.

Village

Date of Interview.

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

QUESTION	HOUSEHOLD HEAD	WIFE (where applicable)
1. If you were not born in this village when did you come here?		
2. Where did you come from? Why?		
3. What is your mother tongue?		
4. How old were you when you first married?		
5. Is this your first/second... marriage?		
6 (If married more than once) Why did you marry more than once?		
7. Is your spouse your relation? (If yes) How close?		
8. How many children have you had since you married?		
9 How many of them are living today?		
10 Do girls and boys have equal rights in inheritance in your family? If not, how is it arranged?		
11. What did you pay as bride price when you married?		
12. (If there are married sons) How much did you pay as bride price for your son's wife?		
13. (If there are married daughters) How much was your daughter's bride price?		
14. Do you have any relatives living outside the village?		
How close are these relatives?		
Where do they live?		
Why did they leave the village?		
What do they do where they live?		
Do they send money to you?		

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

Do they still have connections with the village, and if so, how?

15. How often do you visit your relatives outside the village? (a) once a week, (b) once a month, (c) once a year, (d) never.
16. Do you wish to migrate to a city to settle there? (a) If so, why? (b) If not, why?
17. Is there anyone from your family working outside agriculture? If so, where do they work and what do they do?
18. How often do your relatives from outside the village come to visit you? (a) once a week, (b) once a month, (c) once in three or four months, (d) once a year, (e) never.
19. Do you go to Ergani often? (a) once a week or more, (b) once a month, (c) once in three or four months, (d) once a year, (e) never.
20. Why do you go to Ergani?
 - (a) To sell something in the market.
 - (b) To buy something from the market.
 - (c) To sit with friends in the coffee house.
 - (d) To attend the Friday service at the mosque
 - (e) Other reasons (specify).
21. Which cities have you visited in Turkey?
22. Do you go to Diyarbakir often? If so, why?
23. Where do you sell your produce?
24. Do you sometimes sell your produce in the field, without taking it to the market? If so, to whom do you sell it?
25. How do you derive most of your income?
 - (a) Farming.
 - (b) Animal husbandry.
 - (c) Poultry
 - (d) Handcrafts
 - (e) Seasonal labouring
 - (f) steady wage work
 - (g) Other (specify).

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

26. Is there anyone else in your family who earns money? If so, state

<u>Family member</u>	<u>Job</u>	<u>Total Income</u>	<u>Place of Work</u>
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Wife
Son(s)
Daughter(s)
Other

27. Which crops do you grow most?

- (a) Wheat
- (b) Barley
- (c) Millet
- (d) Lentils
- (e) Maize
- (f) Cals
- (g) Cotton
- (h) Sesame Seed
- (i) Melon and Watermelon
- (j) Sugar Beet
- (k) Other (specify)

28. How many donums of land do you have?

	<u>Unirrigated</u>	<u>Irrigated</u>	<u>Vegetable Garden</u>	<u>Orchard/Vineyard</u>
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Owned
Rented
Leased out
Sharecropped
Mortgaged

29. Is the land you own enough for family subsistence?

30. If the land you own is not enough, how many donums of land do you need for a decent living?

- (a) Irrigated
- (b) Unirrigated
- (c) Vegetable Garden
- (d) Orchard/Vineyard

31. If you rent land, do you think you will buy this land? If so, why? If not, why not?

32. How many donums of the land you own did you inherit, and how many did you buy?

- (a) Amount inherited from father's side.
- (b) Amount inherited from wife's side
- (c) Amount bought.
- (d) Other (specify)

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

33. If you rent land

- (a) Number of donums rented.
- (b) Amount of rent paid.
- (c) From whom the land is rented, his occupation and place of residence.

34. If you sharecrop land

- (a) Number of donums sharecropped.
- (b) To whom the land belongs, and his occupation.
- (c) Percentage of the crop given to the landowner.
- (d) Items provided by the landlord, other than the land.
- (e) Whether or not the sharecropper works for the landlord without wages, as well as giving a part of the crop

35. Do you employ wage labour on your land?

36. If you employ wage labour

- (a) How many do you employ?
- (b) For how many days?

37. How much did you produce last year, including your home consumption?

(a) Unirrigated land	<u>Area Cul-</u> <u>tivated</u>	<u>Amount of</u> <u>Crops</u>	<u>Amount of</u> <u>Crops Sold</u> *
Cotton			
Wheat			
Barley			
Millet			
Sugar beet			
Chickpeas			
Lentils			
Vegetables			
Other			
(b) Irrigated land	<u>Area Cul-</u> <u>tivated</u>	<u>Amount of</u> <u>Crops</u>	<u>Amount of</u> <u>Crops Sold</u> *
Cotton			
Wheat			
Barley			
Millet			
Sugar beet			
Chickpeas			
Lentils			
Vegetables			
Other			

Mostly counted in blocks (approximately 35 kilos).

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

38. Do you use artificial fertiliser?
39. Where do you obtain your artificial fertiliser?
40. Do you get sufficient artificial fertiliser from the Agricultural Office? If not, why not?
41. Do you use improved seed?
42. Where do you get it from?
43. Can you get sufficient improved seed from the Agricultural Office?
44. To whom does the Agricultural Office mostly give fertiliser and seed? Why?
45. Do you use modern agricultural equipment on your farm? (e.g. tractor, combine-harvester, iron plough, etc.)
46. Whose equipment do you use?
47. Have you tried a new crop in the past five years in order to increase your income? If so, which?
- (a) Cotton
 - (b) Sesame seed
 - (c) Vegetables
 - (d) Fruit
 - (e) Other (specify)
48. Are you thinking of cultivating a new crop to increase your income? If so, what?
- (a) Cotton
 - (b) Sesame seed
 - (c) Vegetables
 - (d) Fruit
 - (e) Other (specify)
49. If you need agricultural advice, whom do you refer to?
- (a) Friends and relatives
 - (b) Agricultural officers in Ergani
 - (c) Merchants and agricultural produce shops
 - (d) Farmers from other villages
 - (e) Others (specify)
50. How often do you go to the Agricultural Office in Ergani? (a) once a month or more, (b) once in two or three months, (c) once a year, (d) never.

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

51. Do Agricultural Officers come to your village and help you? (a) once a month or more, (b) once in two or three months, (c) once a year, (d) never.
52. Has the introduction of modern agricultural equipment in your village been harmful or beneficial?
53. How much credit did you get from the Agricultural Bank last year?
54. Was this enough for your needs?
55. How did you spend this credit?
- (a) In buying land.
 - (b) In buying agricultural equipment.
 - (c) In buying seeds and fertiliser.
 - (d) In animal husbandry
 - (e) In trade.
 - (f) In family consumption needs.
 - (g) In the marriage of a relative.
 - (h) In payment of debts.
 - (i) Other.
56. To whom does the Agricultural Bank give most credit?
57. When you need money, to whom do you go for a loan?
58. What are your present debts?
- (a) Amount
 - (b) Lender
 - (c) Occupation of lender
 - (d) Interest rate
 - (e) Duration of loan
59. How will you repay your debts? In cash or in kind?
60. Why do you borrow money?
- (a) For food and clothing
 - (b) For medicine/doctors
 - (c) For wedding ceremonies
 - (d) For building/construction
 - (e) For the purchase of agricultural equipment
 - (f) Other
61. Do you think your family's standard of living has improved/fallen/remained unchanged in the past 15 years?

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

62 Do you own your own house? And does it have

- (a) Toilet
- (b) Window(s)
- (c) Glass window(s)
- (d) More than one storey (how many?)
- (e) More than one room (how many?)
- (f) A separate animal barn

63. Do you have chairs and tables?

64. Which of the following do you have?

- (a) Carpet
- (b) Rush matting
- (c) Woven rugs
- (d) Gas stove
- (e) Sewing machine
- (f) Radio
- (g) Paraffin heater
- (h) Tilly lamp
- (i) Refrigerator
- (j) Television
- (k) Iron

65 Do you sometimes suffer food shortages?

66 Which of the following do you eat?

	<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Lunch</u>	<u>Dinner</u>
Soup			
Tea and bread			
Cracked wheat			
Plain bread			
Other			

67. Which of the following do you make at home?

- (a) Tarhana soup
- (b) Cracked wheat
- (c) Salted meat
- (d) Grape juice syrup
- (e) Cheese
- (f) Oil
- (g) Pickle
- (h) Jam
- (i) Vermicelli
- (j) Dried vegetables
- (k) Grape and fruit confections
- (l) Dried fruit
- (m) Bread
- (n) Other (specify)

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

68. What other provisions do you buy from the market place?
69. What articles of clothing do you buy in the market place?
70. From whom do you purchase your requirements?
- (a) The village grocer and travelling peddler.
 - (b) From the village grocer and from town.
 - (c) From Diyarbakir.
 - (d) Other (specify).
71. In town, with which grocer do you do business, and why?
72. Do you do your shopping with the town or village grocer by paying in advance, or on credit?
73. How do you pay off debts to the grocer or merchant?
- (a) By selling produce in the market and paying with the money thus obtained.
 - (b) By giving produce to the grocer at a price fixed by him, (or the merchant)
 - (c) By giving produce to the grocer at a price agreed by both sides, (same for merchants)
 - (d) With money earned from wage labour.
 - (e) With money gained from mortgaging a field/ fields
 - (f) By money derived from renting out a field/ fields.
 - (g) Other (specify).
74. On an important question (e.g. the marriage of your child) to whom would you turn for advice?
- (a) father
 - (b) mother
 - (c) uncle (father's brother)
 - (d) uncle (mother's brother)
 - (e) other relations (specify)
 - (f) other (specify)
75. Who generally takes decisions on questions concerning your family?
- (a) Household head
 - (b) Wife
 - (c) By consultation between the two
 - (d) Other (specify)
76. What is your greatest problem?

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

77. What is the most important problem of your village?
78. How many months of the year are you unemployed?
79. Do you go outside the village to work?
80. How many days (or months) in a year do you work outside the village?
81. Where do you work outside the village?
82. How much land do you think a man must have in order to be considered rich?
83. Do you think young people show more or less respect to their elders compared with in the past?
more/less/unchanged/don't know.
84. Is it a sin to use a tractor?
85. Is it a sin to lend money with interest?
86. Is it a sin to drink alcohol?
87. Is it important to live comfortably in this world?
88. When you fall ill what steps do you take to get better?
- (a) Go to a religious man
 - (b) Use folk remedies
 - (c) Go to the health officer
 - (d) Go to the doctor
 - (e) Nothing
89. What does one need to do in order to be successful?
90. Is it good or bad to listen to the radio?
91. Is it good or bad to read newspapers?
92. Is it good or bad to have relations with the city?
93. Is it good or bad to go to the cinema?
94. Is it good or bad to watch television?
95. Did your children go to school, or are they going?

NumberSexAge

At school (specify which one)

Not attending

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

96. Why do you educate your sons?
97. What would you like your sons to become?
98. To what level do you want your sons to be educated?
99. What would you like your daughters to become?
100. To what level do you want your daughters to be educated?
101. If you are not sending your sons to school, why not?
102. If you are not sending your daughters to school, why not?
103. Who is dealing with the education of children at home
- (a) Mother
 - (b) Father
 - (c) Other (specify)
104. (If there is no school in the village) Where do your children go to school?
105. Do you perform namaz (ritual worship)
- (a) Five times a day
 - (b) Few times a day
 - (c) Few times a week
 - (d) Friday prayers only
 - (e) Only on holy days
 - (f) Never
106. Who is the most important and influential person in the village, and why?
107. What does "the State" mean to you?
108. Do you go alone to government offices when you have business there? If not, who do you go with?
- (a) Village headman
 - (b) Landlord
 - (c) Grocer
 - (d) Other
109. Do you like discussing politics?
110. Do you believe that government officers will treat you in the same way as any other citizen, when you have business with them?

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

- 111. How is the village headman elected?
- 112. How do you find today's political atmosphere?
- 113. To whom do you turn for advice before placing your vote?

RECORD SHEET
FORM 2

Household Code No.

Village

NAMES AND CODE NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

Code No. of Household Members	Names of Household Members		Sex	Age	Code No. of Household Members	Names of Household Members		Sex	Age
1					11				
2					12				
3					13				
4					14				
5					15				
6					16				
7					17				
8					18				
9					19				
10					20				

RECORD SHEET
FORM 3

Month.

District

Village

DATE OF INTERVIEW RECORD

Household Code No.	Day 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

Household Code No.
Household Head
Village.
Name of Interviewer
Date of questionnaire

[illegible]

OPERATION SHEET III

Household Code No.
Household Head
Village
Name of Interviewer
Date of Questionnaire

AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AND ANIMALS USED IN AGRICULTURE

Date	Day	Field No	Equipment used belonging to household	Animals used belonging to household	Equipment rented and rent paid	Animals rented and rent paid

Household Code No.
Household Head
Village
Name of Interviewer
Date of Questionnaire

FERTILISERS AND SEED

Date of Sowing/ Fertilising	Day	Field No	Animal Fertiliser Type, amount and price (if bought)	Artificial Fertiliser Type, amount and price (if bought)	Seed Type, amount, origin and price (if bought)	Notes

Household Code No.
Household head
Village
Name of Interviewer
Date of Questionnaire

WORK CARRIED OUT ON FARMS OF OTHER HOUSEHOLDS

Date (of interview)	Date of work done	For which household work was done (code no)	Type of labour (paid/unpaid/ reciprocal etc.)	Adult Male workers, payment/hours/work done	Adult Female workers, payment/hours/work done	Children payment/hours/work done

PRODUCE OF EACH FIELD

Date (of interview)	Field No.	Name of field	Date of harvest	Crop harvested	Nature & Quality of crop	Total crop	Notes

CROP ROTATION PATTERNS

Field No.	Irrigated/ unirrigated	People working on the field	Type of tenure	Tenure since how many years	Rent	Name of owner	Last fallow year	Year	Crops produced accord- ing to order of sowing
								1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	
								1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	
								1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	

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Note Information other than crop rotation and land left fallow is obtained from Form 1

* This sheet is to be applied once only, towards the end of the survey.

APPENDIX II

PHOTOGRAPHS FROM GISGIS VILLAGE



PHOTOGRAPH I: GISGIS VILLAGE HEADMAN



PHOTOGRAPH II: GISGIS PEASANT OUTSIDE
COFFEE HOUSE



PHOTOGRAPH III: GISGIS VILLAGE



PHOTOGRAPH IV: GISGIS VILLAGE



PHOTOGRAPH V: GISGIS VILLAGE



PHOTOGRAPH VI: VILLAGE YOUTH POUNDING WHEAT
TO MAKE BULGUR

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